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
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
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PRESENT RELIGION:

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AS

A FAITH OWNING FELLOWSHIP WITH
THOUGHT.

By
SARA S. HENNELL,

AUTHOR OF "THOUGHTS IN AID OF FAITH."

PART I.

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be yet intensified if the ulterior fact could be also brought home to him of the sheer infinity of starry space into which it would seem to him that he must be plunged headlong!

Just of similar kind, I have often thought, is the alarm with which Christian writers of some thirty years back were wont to regard the passage of the human mind, then only dimly presaged, into the new form of faith which, through conversion of one individual thinker after another, has by this time become matter of habitual contemplation to the present generation. Just according to the impression which I have attributed to this hypothetical Pacific islander, so also to the placid orthodox believer, thanking his destiny for the exclusive Providence by which he himself had been stationed as it were paramount upon the very apex of terrestrial experience, did it actually appear a rashness of awful precipitancy, by daring to seek the other side of truth, to tempt the plunge into "the abysses of Atheism,"—to risk the danger of "falling into the hands of the living God!"——Nay, to every one of us, there was something of the same kind of fear, when we first began to think. Let us bless God, those of us who have surmounted the fear, that now we are able to see how simply childish was the instinct of superstition that lay at the bottom of it.

We are as inevitably bound to our mental constitution as to our material soil. We can no more transcend our human conditions of spiritual life to lapse into those that belong to deity and eternity, than we can tumble off the earth, or fall into the firmament. Into whatever new region of investigation our thought may lead us,—into whatever opposite climate, and changed aspect of stars,—we may travel with the most solid assurance of safety: other, indeed, than such as regards the only-too-real danger arising to us from our own stormy passions, and liability to be carried away by misguiding currents of false doctrine, which have truly caused so many fatal instances of making shipwreck of faith; but, as regards the divinely-sanctioned constitution of our nature, safety of

the most absolute sort :—inasmuch as we can never do otherwise than carry along with us both those same affective attachments which have always been a law of moral gravitation to us, and that same instinctive habit of speculative converse with the heaven above us which has so long afforded us a polar guidance of such infinite serviceableness, notwithstanding the impassableness of the aerial barrier that renders closer communication with it impossible. It is to me, I desire to assert, a blessed conviction, that not any of the revolutions which it is in the nature of religious faith to undergo, can ever shake its permanency, or prevent its being to us the most vitally efficient part of our constitution.

Nevertheless, it is quite true that a contrary feeling is most naturally to be entertained upon the matter. For by whatever easy and almost insensible steps the change now in question has been effected, yet when we cast our eyes backward upon the whole distance it has led us, the result is one of such astonishing magnitude, as may well prostrate our spirits before it in terror at the contemplation, if it does not actually succeed in producing the contrary and as I conceive rightful effect, of commanding them by the very force of its grandeur into admiration. And moreover the latter impression is inexplicable to those who have not yet experienced it: just because, in the nature of the case, the perception of it cannot possibly arise till the very last point in the transformation has been gained. As long as but a single link is wanting to complete the demonstration of the perfect revolution as having been accomplished, no hint of the real purport of the revolution is apparent. On whichever side the deficiency may lie,—whether it be on the side of intellectual power, insufficient to the effort of casting off the last lingering particle of old super-naturalism; or whether it rest with the moral nature, lacking inclination to distinguish and preserve every minutest ingredient of real religion, mixed up with, and in danger of being left behind amidst, the refuse of superstition :—in either

case there is that which causes the new conception to miss its integrity, and therefore to convey no intelligible sense to either mind or heart. The glory of Development-principle is that it shows how, through faithfully wrought-out opposite views of truth, an harmonious fullness of idea respecting truth may be obtained when once those opposite views have become reconciled. As long as they are yet severally in the course of their elaboration, there is of necessity an experience of internal conflict, with a fruitless struggle for balance. It is not until they are fairly blended into one that the mind is once more in the state of self-equipoise which it claims as its proper condition, and which it remembers to have held before the disturbing influence of the spirit of investigation began to set it at variance; but *now*, on how much higher a level! It is not until the mind is in a state of equable regulation within itself, that it can also discern a Power of superior control even amidst the heaving world of conflict outside of it: just as it had formerly believed to do, before the tumult of discordant opinions had arisen;—but how has a new era of loftier religious perception actually awakened for us!—and how evident is it to us that the elementary disturbance is the cause of its so doing, when it is thence that we gain what comes to us as this quite new revelation of Divine Intention, springing suddenly as it now does for us out of that which an instant before showed us only a battle of chaos and confusion!

Feeling, as I do, this wondrous *benefit* in the change, so differently regarded by the majority of those around me, I cannot withhold myself from returning to the task I have already entered upon, of delineating my own experience as to the view through which it seems to me that the sense of the benefit has to be attained. When I know that the minds of the whole of the present generation are more or less astir upon a similar track, I cannot help yielding to the impulse for self-expression as an egotism which, although it be such, is

yet not without a sufficient vindication. I cannot help fondly persuading myself that the thoughts whose pondering over has for so many years formed the dearest delight of my own life, must contain that which will be for interest and profit to others. I own that to leave no record of them behind me would have been to me a matter of heavy regret. And although I am conscious how many there must be of far greater ability than myself to say adequately that which I desire to say, but am able to say only with such extreme imperfection, yet the fact is that nowhere amongst writers on theology have I hitherto found the subject treated with that full abandonment to natural principle in which I myself have been able alone to discern satisfaction. There seems to me always to lurk some tinge of reservation which contaminates the whole;—while, on the other hand, I have found nothing but an increasing self-consistency and power to remove difficulties in the utterly-unreserved acceptance and application of that principle, under the mode of it which I have adopted. And hence, as in my former work it was my aim chiefly to show my Faith according to the manner of its gradual biographical construction, it is now my object to set it forth in the contrary light, according to the intrinsic power which since its realization I have found it to possess, and which has caused it to grow upon me, the longer I have re-considered and meditated upon it, into that degree of substantialness of form and practicalness of influence which seem to entitle it to be rightfully counted by me as a Religion.

Relying, therefore, upon the sovereign importance of my subject as my availing apology for whatever is still needful of apology,—as I am only too conscious how much of such kind may become apparent in the following pages,—I will proceed at once to endeavour simply to write down my thoughts in the same manner that I have been accustomed to argue them out with myself. For I am convinced it is only thus, by following out their natural arrangement according to my own experience,

that I have any chance of making them really available to others. If I were to try and force them into a mould likely to be more ordinarily agreeable, I feel sure that I should lose the whole weight of what I believe to be of intrinsic value in them; while, on the other hand, if I can succeed in producing a faithful delineation of my own mental process, I am at all events affording that which has one sure advantage in itself, though it conduce to no other, in the mere offering of a new example as to how that which is of such universal concern has impressed itself upon different conditions of mind: the more wide the difference shown may happen to be from conditions commonly depicted, the greater being in this respect the gain, even though the difference be in the way of inferiority. Under this conviction, I wish to interpose no disguise of any kind to the personality of my Account of Faith. I intend, it is true, to preserve it free from any mixture with autobiographical narrative,—it is the life of my Faith that I wish to paint, and not that of myself;—but still I desire to present it as it seems to me that every representation of Faith must rightfully be presented, on the ground of confessedly personal acceptance. And therefore,—let me also explain from the beginning,—if I speak, as I may occasionally do, of the view I entertain as *my* view, I hope it will be understood that I do so for this reason, and not by any means from an assumption of singularity, or from a conceited estimation of that portion of my matter which really is the fruit of my own cogitation, or of my own effort of combination. For this is the express contrast of my present object from my previous one, that while in my former work I did indeed aim to describe my Faith in the mode in which others had helped me to form it, *here* I am seeking to show it only as that which, having adopted, I myself have found to be a matter of individual guidance and support.

The first thing, then, which I propose to do, as a necessary introduction to the proper treatment of my subject, is to try

to arrive at a definite understanding of some of those general considerations regarding Religion, without the understanding of which there would be nothing to appeal to in what will have to follow. For the consequence of the change in question is, that precisely while, as I maintain, all former essential ideas are found restored, yet it is under a thorough newness of assortment and construction which baffles us at first in our attempts to make use of them. No one idea can be welcomed back except, as it were, by undergoing a new birth and a fresh baptism. And quietly as this renewal may take place, even to the degree of being unobserved, when it occurs to our own solitary meditation, yet the instant we need to speak of it to others, and especially to those who remain within the pale of the belief we have just quitted, it becomes of indispensable importance that the ground of common intelligence between us should be made as clear as the nature of things permits of. All hitherto classified laws of metaphysics and philosophies of the mind fail us, while without metaphysics and mental philosophies we cannot stir a single step! New and better systems, however fast they are advancing, are yet far from the point of fitness for the full application we are in need of, and may not reach it within our life-time. The only thing to be done is to secure for immediate use such items of principle as our instinct of the occasion shows to be firmly available. My own result of such kind I will therefore now set forth,—philosophical, psychological, and social or historical;—distributing it into three separate corresponding sections.

And first, to begin with that most general point of all, which I consider that whoever I were to speak to would have the right to demand explanation upon at the very commencement:—I do assuredly think that under this view of mine it is possible to state in direct terms, what is that character in the new form of religion which I hold to justify its being still estimated as a religion. That is, I think it is possible to show clearly *how* it is that the charge of Atheism, which is justly enough laid against the new belief from the orthodox point of view, dis-

appears the instant we have thoroughly surmounted that point of view: leaving to us the real right of speaking of "divine intention" and "divine Providence," just as much as it belonged to us heretofore. But here at once we strike upon the preliminary consideration that stands in front of this, as in fact it does of every discussion of a large general sort.

However clearly it be our desire to speak, there is a difficulty in the way of so doing which no one who has not made the attempt is in the least able to conceive. There is an absolute want of clear means of expression. How, I would ask, is it possible, when the case is as I claim it here to be, that the subject-matter of thought has actually gone beyond the meaning of words hitherto employed to express it, to render it in language that shall be free from equivocation? It is obvious that the only resource lies in constant explanation of terms, which in itself destroys all simplicity of expression. But the peculiarity of the case is, that this remedy, when taken, only leads us farther on into a deeper degree of the same difficulty: seeing that the explanation, when it has been made forth-coming, can by the nature of the subject be of nothing worth, unless it opens the whole psychological puzzle of the complicated condition required in the mind that can embrace the explanation: the condition, namely, of incessant attention, simultaneous and yet distinct, to two contradictory aspects always belonging to one and the same individual idea.

Into this intrinsic ground of equivocation, inevitable as it is to any sufficing dealing with the subject, I have myself plunged at my very opening. As an answer to the alarm of orthodox religionists I have proffered a source of satisfaction which, however it may be such from my point of view, from their's cannot be any at all. What *they* have feared has been to lose the belief in God;—I have answered by asserting the stability of human nature: to them no answer at all. It is an answer to me only from that reason which they cannot yet acknowledge to be valid: namely, that the principle by which I

believe to solve the contradiction, through including both of the two aspects into one, is a safe and a sound principle.

Thus then I would explain it. The belief in God, such as they depict it to themselves, I frankly admit that I *have* lost. But I have found it again,—one and the same belief,—under what I feel to be a higher form. For whereas before I thought of God, (as they still think of Him,) as a Being apart from man, and only externally acting upon man, so that the manner of God's action appeared to me as a thing altogether opposed to the manner of man's action: I now think of Him as the universal spring of all action whatsoever, human action being only one portion of it eminently distinguished above the rest. And from this it is that follows the conclusion, that having thus reduced, as I have reduced, all the religious efforts of belief into simply the fruit of the human mind, yet so far from this reduction taking it out of the hands of God, as at first it appeared to do, it has actually shown it more than ever as a signal province of Divine creation. .

Continuing to employ theological terms, the matter might indeed be still more simply represented thus: Although it is now discovered that of *direct* agency on the part of God in the workmanship of human religion there is none, yet we may see that *indirectly* it still proceeds from Him in the same way as every other work in nature. If God did not, directly, make the religion, yet still he made the mind that made the religion. And the convenience of this representation (the *permanent* convenience) is, that however we may go on finding out, in constant series of which the last point we can *never* reach, that neither was the making of the mind a direct operation any more than the other, yet the representation will always to the last include the whole essential truth of the matter.

In this re-adjustment, as far as it goes, melts perfectly away the fundamental contradiction between the aspects of religion presenting themselves severally to the two distinct kinds of our intellectual perception: first, to the elder-born instinct of

opening intelligence ; and secondly, to the reversing appreciation of later science. According to the first, it was God that gave us our faith ; according to the latter, it was man that obtained it for himself. According to the reconciling principle of development, including the truth of both the antagonistic propositions in a single formula, it was God that gave to man the power of obtaining.—So far, the abyss of Atheism is, I think, securely warded off from our foundation.

But I have no wish to conceal from myself or others, that the danger re-appears in stronger force than ever when we go on to the farther matter that requires our consideration. It is needful for us fairly to recognize that the image of God, thus employed, is one that will not stand intelligent examination. Dealt with under the scrutiny of rational analysis, it will dissolve away as utterly as the glory of solar beams would disappear if we could reach to investigate the sun's composition. But what if it do so disappear ? The proper use of the sun's beams is to be *felt*, not to be investigated. The light of the sun, as enjoyed by us in the true benefit of it, concerns us only in the way in which most undeniably it *does* affect us, and will always affect us, here, as tenants of earth. And so does the thought of God. According to the impression made upon the *daily* habit of our religious contemplation alone does the image mainly concern us. Whenever we strain our mental powers in the effort to comprehend it, we must be prepared to lose it, so far as the impressional glory of it is concerned. The impression made upon ourselves, in this case as in every other, we must remember, is our only means of knowledge ; and in every other case we are well aware, that general impression is uniformly marred whenever we press upon our object too near. What if it be so, I repeat, with the image of God ? Surely, we need not be startled at this latter day by only realizing more fully than ever to ourselves the truth so long ago proclaimed, that we can never by searching find out God !

But here is the point at which we have stuck, and which at last, and only just at last, has given way,—as the precious fruit of the self-denying scrutiny, hitherto so unjustly condemned as profane from its very self-denial, and only now so richly justified. Although the impression upon ourselves of the image of God is found to be utterly different from what must justly be conjectured to be the real nature of God, it is not on that account in the least unworthy of our confidence. There is, at all events, nothing of delusion in the matter. As it is ascertainably true that there is that in the sun which, coming from the sun to us, causes in us the sensation of light ; so also it is demonstrable to our reason and in a much higher mode than heretofore to our faith, that there is actually in the dominion of nature that which conveys to us this sense of unlimited magnificence, and sovereignty, and awful goodness, which enforces our souls to bow down before it, and own it as God.

This finding out that God, in our own idea of Him, is only a symbol that bears no absolute likeness whatever to the always invisible truth, is nothing but a repetition of the same experience that has occurred to us with regard to every other idea whatsoever. It is the case with the commonest objects around us ; it is the condition of all our knowledge. It has been the fruit of all our strivings into the nature of knowledge, of all the ages-long study of Philosophy, to establish the conviction that every thing we seem to know is *only* seeming. And yet the seeming serves us ! It has been the fruit of the whole study of Science, in like manner, to show us that the impression made upon ourselves by any object is altogether modified into a new thing by the organic constitution under which we receive it. The rays of light falling upon our retina, the vibrations excited upon the drum of our ear,—what are these, in their effect upon our mental sensations, other than the forming of symbols, and standing for things to which they have no actual resemblance ? What, eminently,

are *words*, other than symbols for experience that has intrinsically no connection with them? What is the scent of a familiar flower,—the sound of a church-bell, or of any long-remembered strain of music,—the sight of a friend's likeness,—other than a symbol of hoarded associations, bound up only in the most purely adventitious manner with the sign that recalls them? In every case the image excited within us is of a totally alien nature from the thing that causes the impression. And yet through transforming media of this kind do we effectually gain the power we need of dealing with the else inaccessible world around us! Why should we fear to acknowledge to ourselves that the same experience is exactly befalling us in regard to our religion? Symbol though it be, and nothing more than symbol, this idea of God which our divinely-implanted instincts have taught us to frame, yet is it not shown to us by the result of our universal experience, as, from the very fact of its being so, likely to prove itself the precise thing that our nature requires?

And now, again, in this universal law of symbol, we have the index to an immediate explanation of that practice in the use of language, which is so naturally and yet, as I think, so unjustly made a charge against us from the point of view of the orthodox:—the employment, namely, of theological terms after we have, *as they think*, rejected the proper meaning of them. To me this use of them appears as a permanent necessity established by the natural law of the human mind. Whenever we need to deal with the abstract thought of divineness for practical purposes, we are compelled to enshrine it in a concrete image; there is nothing for us but to call it "God." The only thing required to satisfy the sense of truthfulness in the matter,—and this is truly required of us,—is, that whenever occasion makes it necessary for us to scrutinize into the actual particulars which are held by us as contained under the symbols, we should deal justly in ascertaining that the facts really are such as correspond to the claim made upon them.

They ought to be such as are able to bear the transformation backwards and forwards into the abstract and the symbolic, at will, without losing anything ever of the character required of them. Thus, of the theological phrase just given, "God made the mind that made the religion," every single term contained in it needs, when we are so called upon, to be analysed into an abstract interpretation that, as I maintain, *ought* to do that which for us it *will* do: namely, disperse into solution the entire mass of its symbolic import. *God*; the *mind*; *religion*; *made*:—every one of these several ideas needs from our point of view to lose in the explaining that which to one-sided thinkers constitutes the very essence of it.

God, as I have just stated, means to abstract thought, not the personal counterpart to man, but the universal Power residing in creation, human, as well as other.

The *mind* is, not an individual unit, struck off from Deity as henceforth a solitary and indestructible spark; but the result of a multitude of outward influences, held in concentrated combination only by the present force of the generally-controlling order of things.

Religion is, not the immediate gift of God, but the mode of the mind's striving to become *conscious* to itself of the divine force, which in every other part of creation except the human mind is carried on *without consciousness* on the part of the subject-instrument.

Making is, no longer instantaneous creation, effected by the fiat of the sovereign will outside of nature, but the sustentation of the *growth* that pervades the whole internal constitution of nature, and whose operation is such as neither has had a beginning, nor can have an end, so far as we are capable of conceiving of it, occupying, as it does, in its infinite gradualness, a space of eternity that is to us an immeasurable portion of time. If the *making* of its religion has been seen by us to have employed the efforts of the human mind long as ever history has shown it to us making efforts at all, the *making* of

the human mind has been a work that has engrossed the leading operations of divinely-controlled circumstance for a period of duration, whose ages upon ages we have nothing belonging to us that we have any means of calculating by.

We have no desire to deny it:—dwell minutely upon this explanation, and the soul of faith stands bewildered, as if it had lost itself! Let us, however,—having first recorded it in our intellect,—turn round to occupy ourselves with lower facts of ordinary life, and we shall find that the old images come back to us, with not a bit the less of practical effect than that with which I have just compared it, the light and warmth of the sun cheering us now and ever to our daily tasks, for all our having been possibly taught to know that the real influence consists only in the causing of certain motion taking place within our own bodies!

It is precisely here, I think, that lies the effect that comes as with a sudden flash of revelation respecting the substantial truth and satisfactoriness of this new mode of faith. This power, not only of permanently retaining under a new condition the concrete images, for all their having been utterly dispersed, but of also restoring and re-dissolving them at will, without losing anything of their intrinsic integrity, gives to our consciousness the immediate sense of working upon a natural foundation,—of working as nature works—that is, as God works. Or,—translating the feeling into the mode of philosophy,—it is the same thing as the sudden conviction of *a priori* evidence.

As, however, this kind of instinctive verification is too personal to carry much weight in the assertion of it, let me dwell rather upon the more general side. I may appeal to every one that has at all indulged in speculative generalization, whether there is not indeed the *a priori* satisfaction I claim it to be in finding this conformity of religion to the already known portion of human development. By speaking to us, as it proves to do, only in parables, religion is made manifest as

doing nothing different from following the universal mode of symbolism by which all other abstract perceptions are attained; the attainment in every case being that which in the nature of it forms the proper distinction of man above the sphere of the brute. And beyond this is still the farther coincidence, that the raising of the level of the religion consists here, as it does also in every other case, in our becoming conscious of the symbolism: in knowing the thing as a symbol, and nothing more than a symbol. *This* is the universal means of the raising of simple instinctive impression into the character of science. To compass this crowning stage in religion, as it has been compassed so eminently in the companion career of philosophy, is to those who are already satisfied as to the success in the other case, a presentiment of success in this present instance, such as utters itself even in advance of the historical support to the presentiment which it may so abundantly rest upon when it proceeds hereafter to inquire for it. There is a parallelism in the experience so extensive that the mind dilates with a noble pleasure in the contemplation of it. After all these twenty-four centuries of its historical existence, the matter which Philosophy has with almost universal concurrence made good, is this very same character of symbolicalism which in religion is only just beginning, so far as the average condition of thought is concerned, to confound the religious world into confusion. It began—that is, the elder study began—by supposing that knowledge of a kind “essential” and “absolute” was a thing possible to it; it went next through the adverse stage of discovering that knowledge as pertaining to man can never be any thing else than a mere “seeming”; it has finished by satisfying itself, not only (on the ground of common sense) that the “seeming” is perfectly adequate to all the necessities of human life, but also (on the ground of science) that it is discernibly related, in some certain though distant manner, to that absolute truth which in itself is inaccessible to us:—so that we may return after all to a

modification of the first discarded surmise, seeing that there is really to us an absolute truth acquired, even in the very knowledge of the exclusive relativity of our knowledge. For henceforth it is the relative truth, and the relative truth alone, which is rightfully to be considered, and designated*, as the only "essential" knowledge to be aimed at by the human mind in all its researches.—That a similar result should be obtained by us in regard to our religion, furnishes, I think, an intuitive foreshadowing of conviction that no one can dispute as deserving, if correct, to be ranked as *a priori* evidence of the surest abstract sort.

What is the real nature of the existence of God, (which is the proper subject-matter of religion,) regarded as a thing *per se*, can never be understood by us. Theological religion, —corresponding to the technically-named stage of "metaphysics",—began, nevertheless, by making this understanding its actual aim (as evidenced in its notion of supposed "revelations", notwithstanding all the disclaimers of such aim which have been continually forced from it by the manifest incapability of human faculties to comprehend matter so infinitely beyond them). From this state scientific rationalism burst into violent re-action, and betook itself to fling aside theology altogether; and it did so upon ground that was fairly adequate to its justification, inasmuch as it had seen that the theological notions of God were the fruit of nothing but pure human invention. But let the claim of development principle be admitted, and here also the third era is come which binds the contradictory results in one, by showing that after all this human invention is really the trust-worthy indication of divine fact in the matter, that is not only efficient for the regulation of our practical conduct in life, but also a sufficing vindication of the original

* I have been blamed for having in my former writings used the word "essential" in a wrong sense. I venture to maintain here, that in spite of previous philosophic usage, the meaning as I have here given it is that into which the former meaning must of necessity become modified.

theological aim. We have learnt, indeed, that the knowledge of God which it is possible for us to attain is only a symbolical knowledge, that is, a kind of knowledge restricted by its relativity to our own faculties; but we are re-assured for the discovery by being at the same time certified, that the very relativity is the proof that our symbolizing has been in obedience to that general plan of human nature whose recognition is eminently an absolute success in our endeavours at communication with Deity.

This recognition of Plan, however, comes to us only when the idea of development is *fully* carried out: and in the recognition of Plan alone can we realize the sense of Deity. As long as it is maintained that theology was simply a mistake, as positivists are apt to maintain, no sense of Divine regulation can possibly arise out of the survey of religious history. The spectacle of utter failure out of presumptuous aspiration *will* arouse the feeling of scorn instead: while, upon my view, there is only encouragement to be gathered, awakening sympathy, from seeing how the presumption, being a noble one, has *not* failed except in that respect where failure is success, of reducing its own presumptuousness. I find, in fact, that even in respect of the presumptuousness, it is now revealed that we are all upon one and the same level, except only for the privilege of our degree of improvement. The first religionists set up symbols of Deity, thinking them adequate, that were carved out of wood and stone; and they *were* adequate, relatively to the need that created them, and the worship paid to them *was* genuine worship as long as that need remained in the same condition. But once the need being raised, and the previous symbol become inadequate, and it followed that the worship paid to it was changed, in the eyes of the reformers, into idolatry. It is exactly the same with us still. The highest idea we can form for our representation of Deity will still subject us as much as was ever the case to the charge of idolatry to those who shall have a yet higher idea, unless only we have

learned to admit it as mere symbol. This admission, I urge, is the grand point of change in the nature of religion which once for all frees it from the possibility of idolatry. It is not that we are raised above the frailty which each successive class of reformers has accused its predecessors of, but that we know ourselves, one and all, to be subject to it. Henceforth we never can be idolaters, because we have been chastened to perceive that our purest ideal will to the last stand upon the very same terms with the coarsest of idols. Honoured for its own sake, the ideal would sink the idealist into the very same rank that the idol formerly sank the idolater. But now that it is known for what it is,—now that the Unity of Plan amongst us is recognized,—the symbol can only do that which a symbol ought to do, lead our minds towards that which it is designed to represent.

Herein, I assert, we have gained that which is the essential purpose of religion, according to the meaning of the word “essential” which we have just seen to be henceforth the only true meaning: namely, that which is proper to the being of *man*, instead of as heretofore that which is proper to the being of *God*. It is proper to the being of man to know things through symbols:—very well; and we have now found that religion, in seeking to know God, *does* know him through symbols. It has *not* failed in that which it sought. The reason why it thought itself to have failed, comparatively to the success in what the mind considers matters of positive science, was that its aim touched a deeper part of the human nature than those other matters. Upon lower ground a merely superficial acquaintance satisfies us. We have all that we want to know, and we pass it over as all that has to be known. But religion is more aware of what it requires. It has, happily for our progress, an aspiration that can never be satisfied. It is the pursuit of this aspiration that goes on working out for us the increasing purity and fidelity of our Symbol, and in so far, satisfying to a greater and greater degree the need that is not

superficial, but lying in our inward parts. That our recent religion actually met this need by showing us as it did, its Christ Emanuel in the form of the "God *within* us," is the great fact concerning it that stamps it for ever as a thing of essential value to all of us.

Here, then, is the statement of the ground upon which I am preparing myself to maintain that the religion I uphold is veritably a religion. It affords me the deepening evidence of that Unity of Plan, of beneficent sort, which is the true essence of the idea of Deity. Observe my terms, I entreat, for they contain a modification of sovereign importance. I say that it affords a deepening intensity to my *idea of Deity*: this is all: I am speaking always of matter of human improvement, attained in the ordinary method of human improvement. But human improvement, as only one department, though the highest, of general improvement, is the special evidence which testifies to my innermost conviction the existence of a permanent Divine regulation of things. It is evidence precisely of the sort which I feel contented to rest upon: seeing that, according to my present perceptions, there *could* be no higher evidence than this of Deity given. It satisfies my *intuition* respecting Deity: and beyond this, nothing seems to me possible.

On behalf of the intuition, I have just appealed to the philosophic speculatist to consider the parallelism with the course of philosophic improvement. But I know that this kind of consideration will avail nothing with the orthodox. I know that intuition, as it stands with them, is a totally different thing from intuition as it stands with us. It is the express peculiarity of their ground that religion has nothing to do with philosophy. To them, therefore, I use simply the appeal as I am now putting it forth. Will they not agree with me, I ask, that religious Progress is really a proof of beneficent and super-human control? And, again, will they not agree that history actually does show such a Progress? Put

as I have put it, is there any one, I ask, amongst any class of thinkers amongst us, who is bold enough,—or, as perhaps I should say, unhappy enough,—really to deny that the average existing idea of Deity is superior, say to that of the times of rudest fetish-worship,—or, in a personal point of view, that his own idea, now at this season of his maturest life, is deeper and truer than that which he had when first emerging from infancy?

And if no one can deny it,—as I do not see that they can,—my whole point is gained. That is, my point is gained so far as that which I myself consider necessary. I do not expect that I shall, as yet, have satisfied the orthodox. I have as yet offered only *a priori* proof, which cannot in its nature touch him. What is needed is that the elements of the conviction should be spread out before him in inductive detail. And something towards this I am about to attempt in this volume, after I shall have made clear the proposition that I have to prove. What the Christian demands of me, and has a right to demand of me, I know is this: where lies the *authority* for that which I call religion? “What,” he will say to me, “have you to offer as the sanction that is to compel a belief that you yourself own cannot be spontaneous? My own religion,—the religion that was satisfactory to each one of all of us a little time ago,—gave us Miracles as a testimony of the Something-beyond-us that is necessary to lead us into that which we have as yet no cognizance of, and no desire towards:—what has yours, denying them, to supply in their place?”

It is a just demand; and precisely to meet this demand is that which I am here projecting. Truly, I have no miracles to show, such as we all once esteemed them. But the attestation that I am proposing is one that for my own part I should be apt to call miraculous in a much truer sense than the former: just from its showing what stupendous effects can come from minute influences, instead of showing, as supposed miracles formerly showed, how an enormously incommensurate power had

to be employed to bring about a puny effect. The order of nature reversed to promote cheerfulness at a marriage feast—to cure individual maladies—to promote an inclination to faith in an obdurate disposition:—this is, I cannot help thinking, a device of the same class as the steam-engine would be if it had been invented for the express purpose of pointing one single pin. It would show a delicacy of construction that would indeed awaken the astonishment of beholders—and astonishment is the end in fact attributed by Christian apologists to the *tour de force* implied in miracles: but are they really willing to allow these exhibitions of Divine power as on the same footing with works of mere legerdemain? For real utility, it is in the order of nature that violent shocks of astonishment do not work with moral effect. Experience shows that the gentlest of measures are those which are the surest. But when the accumulation of minute degrees of improvement shows itself as a whole—then, indeed, we may turn round and look upon it with wonder that will only increase into the deeper admiration the longer we dwell upon it.

The entire character of the attestation of our religion is changed just as the state of our own perception is changed, which causes us to see that the former attestation, if it had been real, would have been ineffectual. We no longer hold our belief as resting upon the immediate Word of God, authorized by the visible form and audible voice of the Most High as having taken up its solitary embodiment in one individual human being, solely to be hearkened to as the promulgator of divine truth thenceforth and for evermore:—nothing of this kind of sanction have we at all to offer. But we have something that we think much more really divine. We have the power of a gradually-amassed amount of human experience now at length come to the point where it is capable of making itself distinctly intelligible:—experience that was at first collected in fragments here and there out of earnest brain-labour of independent and widely-different thinkers of the leading

order; that was then diffused, and tested, and sorted, and at last assimilated, through the practical life-action of multitudinous generations of common human beings; that is now at length arrived at the point when, although hitherto the whole operation had been such as was carried on without any sign of what was destined to come out of it, except for the star-like presentiments of the forwarder minds engaged in it, we may feel—that is, those of us who at this latter day of ours have the spirit of an Elias within us, may feel—that we are entitled to proclaim the fulfilment of a newly-ripened principle at hand as the result of it. So fully indeed is the spirit of subtle thought that is abroad wrought up actually towards its perfectness, that nothing, it may be said, is any longer wanting for its manifestation, except that it shall have suddenly found the Voice that shall render it articulate:—the pure and accurate investment in the daily Speech of men, such as shall so faithfully not disfigure the inner truth contained beneath the outer *words*, as shall permit it to do that which finally it *must* do,—compel the world, not at once, but by degrees, to listen to it.

The effect upon human experience:—*this* is the sole test we have to offer in the place of superseded miracle. It is a test that shows its contrary nature to the former test, and as I think its marked superiority, by requiring to be taken in the method of an inductive examination of facts that belong to the past history of men, and therefore that are certainly known as facts, instead of consisting in a theoretic assumption of authority as proceeding from divine acquaintance with facts that at the time of the uttering of the sanction were altogether yet in the future, and still remain so in part at our own day. If the inductive examination of Christianity in this manner of past history, really make good its theoretic claim,—as I think it partially will,—then, but only then, we can admit to the Christian that he has an evidence on behalf of it as satisfactory to us, as his previous evidence was to himself. We think

that hitherto he has been satisfied with evidence far beneath the mark.

"But," he will retort, "your very words have entangled you in a dilemma! You have asserted that evidence, to be valid, must deal with that which is past, and yet you propose to prove the truth of your own religion, which is yet a thing of the future!" — "Not so," I rejoin: "the *acceptation* of my religion, as to the majority of mankind, is indeed still a thing of the future; but my religion itself is a thing that has been in existence, in growing existence, as long as men have been men. Do you not see that *your* religion, in so far as it can show itself to be a true religion, is a genuine portion of mine, that belongs to me just as much as it belongs to you? And when once I shall have accomplished that which I have now in view, and proved how mine is only a fruit that springs out of yours, and forms a legitimate continuation of yours, I shall have established myself precisely upon your strength, and shall apply every tittle of your inductive success to my own benefit."

But this, I know, will seem to the orthodox the greatest absurdity of all. How that which is in manifest contradiction can yet be in harmonious continuation, is a proposition to which it is impossible that he should assent upon the mental ground which he occupies. To remove this deepest difficulty of all, I must have recourse to the final kind of explanation that can be obtained only by entering into the field of Psychology. I must show how the contradictoriness of view which is the inevitable accompaniment of progress in knowledge of the kind here stated, and the source of all the argument attending that progress, is rooted in the essential condition of the mind's universal action.

SECTION II.—THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LAW BY WHICH THE CONTRARY ASPECTS UNDER WHICH RELIGION SUCCESSIVELY PRESENTS ITSELF, ARE HERE CONSIDERED AS FORMING THE ALTERNATE MEANS OF THE PROGRESS OF RELIGION, AND AT THE SAME TIME OF THE GROWTH OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

As an index to this inherent contradictoriness of aspect, let me recur to the statement I have just made, as matter to myself so introvertible, of progress in religious ideas. If I had made such an assertion in general conversation, I know very well that many, if not most, of those who attended to me, at least as to the personal section of it, would on the impulse of the moment be disposed to exclaim, "We do very much doubt whether our religion is purer now than it was in our childhood!" *They* would be thinking of one thing, while I had been thinking of another. *They*, as I should explain the difference to myself, have not dwelt long enough upon the matter to see the distinction which I have found to be so important an one, between religion as apprehended according to the *idea* of it, and religion as apprehended according to the *sense* of it.

What do we mean by "religion"? Is there in fact any definition of it possible to be given that will serve *all* the occasions under which we have need to employ the term? I say, No. There is indeed one meaning of religion that I hope is common to all of us, as relating to that eminently most important side of religion which is the one we have to *live* under, the practical side; but I protest that when, on the contrary, religion is considered as a thing that we have expressly to *think* and to *speak* about, a quite different meaning of the term of necessity arises to us. The first is that which relates to the *sense* of religion, swaying solely the domain of feeling: the latter is that which views religion as a thing largely associated with intellect.

The former aspect, common to us all, is the one that presents itself as long as we simply consult our own individual consciousness. The definition of religion that under it we should all agree to give would be this: that it consists in an intimate recognition of Divine guardianship and sympathy, held characteristically in the manner of an intuition, which thought, so far from aiding, only disturbs, and for the time dissipates. But this, I say, paints only the sense of religion which is allied to action, and not the one which is allied to words, except indeed in the impulsive utterances* of devotion or poetry. The instant we begin to make religion the topic of deliberate analysis, there is an instinctive compulsion, which we may perceive if we seek for it, that causes us to forsake the sphere to which we have hitherto limited ourselves of our own individual consciousness, and to substitute that which regards mind in general. The case is, however, that no one is aware of the change, until an abundance of disputations talk, either with others or himself, has revealed the fact to him. Let the statement be made in ordinary society, as it is very likely to be made, that "Religion has advanced in refinement and value as a consequence of human culture":—it is evident that religion is already treated by the speaker, no longer as a personal sentiment, but as an abstract substance, personified as having an independent existence of its own, although the personification is so natural to the habitual tone of thought that no one will take any notice of it. And, accordingly, to the assertion as thus expressed there will scarcely in any instance be called forth an opposition. But let the speaker continue his topic, and explain his original vagueness by saying, in more accurately-laid-down terms, that "Religion is a thing that owes its growth, and consequently its life, to Science": and how few amongst the hearers will not instantly

* Literary interjections, rudimental to the duly-elaborated forms of logically constructed discussion.

cry out that he is uttering a flat denial of the nature that is implied in the essential idea of religion!—The proper meaning of the term is demanded. *They* go back for it, as habitually, to their individual consciousness; the speaker adheres to his abstract contemplation. And the arguments will be bandied about between them, to no purpose, until at last, perhaps, the truth may break upon one of them, that while both arguers have right upon their own side, the subject is one which, like everything else in the regions of either matter or spirit, has two sides to it.

Some quiet-minded listener, meanwhile, will be sure to have been meditating within himself,—“What is the use of the arguing? why not let each of us be content to think his own thought? They have their opinion: I have mine.”——Very bootlessly! The fact is, that the thinking out of our own thought is nothing else than the transferring of the combat to the sphere within our own minds!—*This* is the experience which it is the use of our internal meditations, just as much as of our social arguments, to teach us: that in the very constitution of our minds there is rooted the necessity which compels us universally to these two opposite modes of judging of things; the alternate play of which opposite modes has finally to procure for us the acquaintance indispensable for us with the two sides pertaining to our subject.

Thought has nothing to do with Faith; it has everything to do with it:—the cultivation of Science is alien to the cultivation of Religion; it is the direct means to it:—these are the contradictory propositions which dawn before our mental vision, and bewilder us with their equal pretensions to truth, until we have taught ourselves to fix them into their several stations. The first section of each assertion is true to us according to the aspect of religion which belongs to the original sense of religion in all of us, namely, the subjective sense of our individual consciousness. The second is true to us only when, in addition to that earliest sense, we have attained to that which

belongs to the abstract or objective aspect of religion. But this later sense is by this means carried so far into the province of the intellect, as to have compelled the change of designation for it, by which we now know it as an *idea* instead of as a *sense*, notwithstanding its still retaining of the outwardly impressionable character which always marks it as of the nature of the senses—that is, it remains as an involuntarily-created image, rather than as a deliberately-elaborated thought. Of this intellectual aspect of religion I have already given at p. 13 what appears to me the sufficing definition. The test of its being the right one, according to my principle, will be that it shall be found in the end, although now seen as contrasting with the ordinary definition, yet at the same time as perfectly consistent with it. Between the *assertion* of this agreement however, and the possibility of its *proof*, lies all the amount of struggling speculation which I am now laying myself out to depict!

I suppose it has been the main purpose of philosophy ever since the German school of it was instituted, to render established this distinction. That school has (teleologically speaking) laid out for itself to make known to the human consciousness, once for all, that in this present stage of its development* the human mind has realized the possession of these two coincident faculties of discernment, the knowing of the matter before it as Subject and as Object. It is however a task beyond me to follow the subtleties through which they have accomplished this point; and therefore it is more than I can say whether my own view is such as can claim an harmony with theirs. But I will state the system upon which I have found it become intelligible to myself, and especially upon which I have found

* I am aware that I am here adding an idea,—that of development,—which I believe the German school did not suffice of itself to bring into contribution to the world's sum of discovery. But without this idea I can myself make no sense out of German speculations. *This*, I feel, is the desideratum which conveys into them at once the solidity requisite for truth, not otherwise seeming to be present in them.

it simple to get rid of that which is the greatest difficulty of all in respect to the especial matter before me:—namely, the difficulty, in treating of the matter of mental operations, of the mind's being itself, in thinking about itself, Subject and Object at one and the same time. Regarding, as I do, the creating of the power of Objective contemplation as a new Sense to the mind, differentiated out of the vague power of general subjective contemplation, just as the finer sense of Sight becomes differentiated out of the body's general sense of Feeling: there is no more difficulty to me in conceiving that mental power concentrated to the accuteness of objective vision may occupy itself upon the other department of mental energy known as ordinary subjective sensation, than in perceiving how the bodily eye looks down upon the working of those characteristic organs of feeling, the hands. (It would not be an outrageous figure of speech to say that *Sight* takes cognizance of *Feeling*; or even of *Hearing*, when it beholds the pricking up of the ears; or of *Smelling*, when it notices the sniffing of the nose.) It is true that there must always be a greater strain upon the mental function, when mind is required to look upon mind, than when it is required to look only upon matter external to self. But this is the meaning of gaining the new function of acting by *Reflection*. This strain is the forcing of inward self into outer projection, which gives the nature to all and every sort of the higher working of the human powers. The mind never does behold mind until it has obtained the image of mental subjectivity thrown out in front of it, by force of inward emotionalism, into that form which we know as symbol. Thus it is, that Feeling (as inward emotion) by its own spontaneous working creates the new mental sense: it keeps compelling the exercise of Reflection. Let us suppose, first, the simple case that thought is directed outwards, say upon the examination of a flower. The observer we will imagine has previously taken in all belonging to the flower that affects his bodily senses, all that can be appreciated by sight and smell and handling; he

has, moreover, we may suppose, imbibed out of it a general image of idealism which gives delectation to his passive fancy;—but still he has not as yet *thought* about it. To do this, is it not the case that he must make application to it of that already-gained knowledge of organic construction which lies within the deeper department of his own mental registry? The turning out of this inner store is the obtaining of a *reflection*. He compares the reflection of former knowledge with the hitherto un-examined specimen before him, and if he finds an analogical resemblance, satisfies himself that he may so far record it together with things that he has acquainted himself with. But this degree of knowledge is only *subjective*. He, the subject, has communicated to his new object only the knowledge that was already his own. He takes hitherto for granted that there is no respect in which the object will show itself different from former objects of observation. To enter upon the search for such difference is to examine the object no longer for its coincidence with the observer's present standing of knowledge, but as it were, for the object's own sake: for its character as standing upon its own individuality. And this effort of abstracting self-ism out of the consideration, is the rendering of the view an objective one. Consequently it seems to me right,—though I am not sure that I am here agreeing with general practice,—to call the person who employs only the first degree of the thinking function, a subjective thinker, while I call the employer of the higher degree an objective thinker. That is, I call the person who *for the time* recurs to the objective mode an objective thinker, by way of distinction: for by the necessity of the case no person can think objectively except by an express strain upon his faculties. The mode of mind which is habitual to every human being must be that in which his own egoism is predominant to him, and in which therefore his thought remains subjective. And in the highest exercise of human thought, there is still the necessity of recurring to the habitual state, for the sake of incessant

comparison, that renders, I imagine, every conception a matter of two-fold construction: a thing that is framed by the constantly alternate insertion of accessions to the web and woof of it.—Now, as to this example of the flower:—I should say, the knowledge attained by the subjective examiner was only a vague, or a superficial knowledge; while that attained by the objective examiner was a knowledge that went much deeper into the matter.* Therefore, for convenience' sake, laying this down in the manner of a general formula, I say that subjective thought is thus shown capable of only compassing what I classify as the *outer* side of knowledge, while only objective thought is capable of penetrating to the *inner* side. And this, exactly contrary to its own pretension! For subjective thought is that which expressly piques itself upon *inner* comprehension!—but in fact is too full of itself ever to get out of itself, so as really to get inside of its matter of thought.

Here, then, is that which causes such infinite complication and liability to confusion in the matter. There are two sides to the subject-matter of thought; two modes to the mind's capability of judging. The highest kind of mind, in which has been realized the differentiation of the two modes, is aware that in considering either of the outer or the inner side, it can severally employ either the one or the other of its own two modes: it can think of the outer side both subjectively and objectively; it can think of the inner side both subjectively and objectively. But the merely subjective thinker, whose own mind is yet unorganized to the requisite perception of difference, has his images either as yet hidden under the primitive

* It occurs to me that here is a reason for the verbal equivocation that constantly arises as to the uses of these words *subject* and *object*. In writing the above, it would have come naturally to me to have said "deeper into the subject". And it is explicable *why* it should be so, when we consider, as above, that in objective thinking we really transfer ourselves so far into the matter of our thought as to feel that *its* subjectivity is really *ours* also.

coarseness of the symbol conceived by the first dawning instinct of psychation, or all roused into a jumble of hopeless confusion. For observe how the occasion for puzzle is increased, by that which is the very law that makes the puzzle a necessity: namely, that the organization of mind required to clear up the puzzle, only comes to the mind as the consequence of the puzzle. It is the trying, and the actually fruitless trying, after heretofore unattempted matter of abstract contemplation, that alone creates within us the faculty, before unpossessed, which is the only proper means of dealing with abstract matter of contemplation.

Let us now go on to apply this to the matter that is immediate with us. Let us consider that the object of the mind's contemplation is *Itself*. I assert that the difficulty with regard to the understanding of the operation is immensely diminished by the view I am propounding, which precisely makes Self-knowledge to be a thing identical with Religion (in its intellectual bearing). For although I admit that Religion has for its final aim the unattainable but still legitimate object of the knowledge of God, yet I assert that what it really does succeed in gaining is the knowledge of Self, and of Self in its most important because most deeply-seated department: that is, the knowledge of Self as possessed of a *Soul*. The acquisition of the consciousness of a Soul as the realization out of Religion, is the point the acknowledgment of which brings my principle into the coincidence I claim with orthodoxy. I agree with it too in acknowledging that herein is the broad line of distinction made clear that separates Religion from all other kinds of knowledge: that is, from Science properly so called. Science regards the knowledge of things external to consciousness; Religion consists always in the gaining of an internal Con-science. There is only one of the strict sciences that lends itself truly as the helpful coadjutor with Religion, in contradistinction to all other sciences, and that is Psychology. The knowledge of Psychology is, in fact, the outer surface of the knowledge

of that which is the object of Religion. Though we cannot know God, we can know the human mind, which is to us the immediate first-fruits of the knowledge whose inner essence is inaccessible.

It is very true that Self-knowledge, in other departments than this of the Soul, is, as it at present stands, of quite different nature from Religion. But surely history has certified to us in a sufficient manner that this was not the case originally. Surely no one, with recent lights, will dispute that each several faculty we now possess, whether intellectual or otherwise, was conceived of as a mythological entity at the beginning. The reason why the mythology is still apparent in regard to the Soul of man, although discarded in the other instances, is that the perception of a Soul within him is the latest of man's discoveries, and is still only in the act of completing itself, so that the mythology still remains hanging visibly about it.—Have I said, “in the act of *completing* itself”? How difficult is it to resist that ever-recurring fancy of *completeness*, as if it were not a metaphysical impossibility in the case of every thing that is human! No: as I am myself expressly aiming to show, there is no *completeness* to our idea of self, or of anything else, any more than to our idea of God. Absolute correctness, as to the absolute truth of things, we have clean done with for ever. The only thing to be thought of, in any kind of knowledge, is that relative degree of truth which will serve us for practical action. Thus the Soul within us, the knowledge of which we consider ourselves to have gained, is in absolute fact a vaguely-diffused Experience,—not a *thing* at all. The idea of the Soul as a Soul, which as I assert is the fruit out of the mythology upon the subject which remains when the primitive coarseness of the symbol has given place to the proper character of an Idea,—when the Entity has fined down into the Essence,—is still as much as ever only a symbol of that which man cannot think of except through a symbol. He cannot by any possibility

think of Experience as it really occurred. That was in its nature only matter of Feeling. The matter of Feeling when projected outwardly for contemplation inevitably takes limitation from circumstance ; and there is essentially the same kind of limitation,—adventitious limitation,—whether the restricting influence be simply the power of Words, or Definition, or whether it be the more sensual configuration of hieroglyphic mythology. —What I should have said is, that the discovery of a Soul has attained the completeness proper to human thought when the mythology of the symbol is thus abstracted, and the verbal symbol alone is retained.

My proposition then is, that the whole purport of religious development resolves itself into this : the action of the human mind, seeking (teleologically speaking) to know itself. The need of the case was to create a Symbol that should adequately afford the reflection of inner condition ; which reflection, being obtained, should be the means, as it was the only possible means, of the bettering of that inner condition. A Symbol *was* created ; but it was defective in that respect wherein it could not be otherwise than defective at the beginning. It was defective in so far that the mind that created it was as yet only in a state of simple subjectivity. Once the higher faculty comes to be developed, in this special sphere of its operation, and the power of Introspection acquires at once the capacity to compass its purpose. The Symbol, through gradually refining influence, has become *abstracted* from all the amount of sensible imagery that was only an encumbrance ; the abstract faculty thenceforth engendered in man has no longer any difficulty in treating the matter of Self as Object : it has obtained the insight it was seeking for. And thus, I think, the operation is shown to be really in the simplest conformity with the general rule of psychical action.

You see, too, how I consider that Psychology establishes the position that I find myself obliged to occupy in arguing with the orthodox. It is a necessity of my principle to regard

them as upon a lower mental level than myself. I perceive how orthodoxy was the right thing for the period in human history that has now passed away. But I perceive also that its adaptation to the age in which it sprang forth is the very token of its inadequacy to the present. As long as the average condition of the human mind was naturally only that of mere subjectivity, it was as beneficial as it was inevitable that symbols of the coarsest kind should be created. We know that this age *was* the rich season of all such symbolization. The human mind in its hitherto crass personal egoism, whatever matter it attacked, could only deal with it by an effusion of concrete, sensual self-repetition. Its symbols were saturated with the mere individual personality of the creator. But on this very account they served their purpose. The soul *has* finally to be known as the purest piece of Individualism pertaining to man. The earnestness of the Self-ism worked out the true character of religiousness. The habit of living under the Symbol produced the habit of religion. The habit of religion produced the intrinsic sentiment and sense of religion, which was henceforth never to be lost as an organic part of the human constitution. Whenever we are in the mood of subjectivity,—and as I have said subjectivity is the ordinary condition of all of us, the sense of religion, in so far as we are in a healthy normal state, must be present with us. But the inability to entertain the more abstract condition when required, is what at this present day we can only account as a deficiency.

I have now, as I think, shown sufficient cause for the different tone of mind prevailing amongst opposite professors respecting the very same matter of religion. Religion, be it always remembered, is to us that which our mind makes it, and never anything else. The orthodox professor sees it under only one aspect, and that of the most confused sort; we, on the contrary, have arranged our perceptions of it under four aspects. Three of the definitions thus required I have already

incidentally supplied, as suited to my own thought; and for clearness' sake, let me repeat them:—

If the mood of our mind be Subjective, the definitions of the outer and inner sides of religion respectively will be these:—

First.—That of the Inner side will be, that it consists in a sense of Divine guardianship and sympathy (I take this first because it is that one of the permanent aspects which most closely corresponds with the original single aspect of the orthodox);—

Second.—That of the Outer side, conveying the *idea* of religion supplying the basis to the just-stated *sense* of religion, will be that it consists in the attaining of a Consciousness of Deity, acting within ourselves as a portion of a general force (see p. 18).

On the other hand, if the mood of our mind be of the higher intellectual strain which (quasi) rids itself of subjective, or purely personal, images, and becomes Objective, the more definite form will be required as follows:—

Third.—The Outer side (this being the one actually first realized,) will consist in the abstract fact of the human acquisition of the faculty known as the human Soul;—

And the fourth definition, or that of the Inner side, requiring to be added, must evidently be that which shall correspond with this third, (just as the first corresponded with the second) by expressing the relation held by the human Soul as towards the entire remainder of Universal Existence:—to set forth which relation will constitute my whole object when I come to the more practical and later part of this work. For it is the necessity of the very facts upon which I am here at issue with the orthodox, that I *cannot* arrive at the proper consideration of the practical sentiment of religion, till I have worked out fully in the first place its intellectual phase. He, with his one definition of religion, all-sufficient as he esteems it, makes it his special boast that he has no need of any other. Religion, he says, has only to be *felt*, and he prefers not to

think about it. "Can taking thought," he virtually asks, "add one cubic to its stature?"—while we rejoin, "Yes, truly it can! seeing that taking thought is the natural exercise of that which belongs to the mind, whatever be the case with the body; and that if religion be debarred from proper mental exercise, it can but fall into degeneracy and decay."

As the consequence of the classification of my ideas, I have no longer the least hesitation as to the question that I supposed under discussion at the beginning of this section: the discussion, namely, as to the fact of religious progress. I see how the turning of human faculties, for a certain limited period, in the alien direction of *thinking about* religion, instead of continuously resting in the inner feeling of it, is the natural means of working out the purification and elevation of that inner feeling, and so of effecting a progress for it. This is the Psychological law that fills up the measure of my confidence: and that does so the more, the farther I see how intelligible are its bearings, in fact, upon the whole field of the phenomena attending the progress.

The necessity for this periodical turning out of personal emotion for the sake of the benefit to be gained by abstract contemplation, (in addition to the modification gained at the same time from outward circumstance,) causes an appearance of *stages* to mark the progress of the mind. To pass from subjective unorganism into subjective organism requires an intervening dwelling in the alien phase of scientific abstractness, whose real purport does not, however, record itself in the consciousness, till the return is made into habitual condition, when the marking of difference now made in that condition shows as a distinct era. This is one fact to be attended to; and another is, that the transaction of passing from one mental attitude to another is always that which we know as the creation of *Forms*. When the mind is passing out of the condition of prevailing Emotion into that of prevailing Ratiocination, it creates Forms of Belief; when it is passing in the reverse

direction, it creates Forms of Thought. The first are religious Symbols; the last are intellectual Formulas: but both, I suppose, are of one nature, and have one function,—to convert that which is impulsive into that which shall have been checked and corroborated by experience.

I am speaking now, as I hope will be understood, as to the general habit of the mind, working out changes upon a large historical stage. But I do indeed conceive that the same thing goes on also upon a smaller scale, in what constitutes in fact the universal manner of psychation: that is, that the whole sense of mind within us is caused by an incessant alternation between two phases, corresponding to those here described. Every mental sensation I consider to have been caused by a temporary projection out of simple sensation. The individual mind in which such projections come to be noted as characteristic, is only that which has them more prominently than other individuals: and so of different modes of mind. And when I say, as above, there is a certain kind of epoch during which the mind creates Forms of Belief, I mean that during that epoch there is a general prevailing condition of only very feeble projection out of self-ism into abstraction; and the reverse in the opposite case.

The creation of the long-enduring Symbol of Faith which we call Christianity, was the work of those centuries of human history during which the abundant subjectivity of the mind *demand*ed the working out of the not yet attained function of self-abstraction. As soon as the demand was satisfied, and the Symbol was completed, the counter-demand arose that the new function must also have its exercise. Thought began to operate upon the Symbol, and just because in so doing it had to create Forms of Thought for its purpose, it destroyed the substance of that which was the Form of Emotion. As long as abstract science remained in the ascendant, Religion was to all appearance being continually crushed out of existence. It was not till the very time of the present day that, according to my

belief, the *third* section of the process arrived, which, by teaching the law of mental development, shows how the improvement in fact gained to religion by the correcting influence registers and establishes itself in the stock of the human constitution.

The nature of the force that compels the mind in these opposite directions, when once the duplicity of function is established, I conceive to be chiefly that of re-action: the mind naturally tending towards the mood that it is in want of. But here is another special matter, of the highest metaphysical importance, to be attended to in connection with the realization of these three-fold stages.

As my easiest illustration of what I mean, perhaps I may be permitted to refer to my own experience in the working out of abstract conception, as I have described it in my former volume of "Thoughts in Aid of Faith." It is true that it is always a perilous thing to set ourselves to generalize upon our own special experience; but let me say, as my excuse in this instance, that if I had not had a latent presentiment that the experience I had encountered was such as would bear the generalizing upon, I should never have thought of laying it out at all for public inspection. It was in that work my object to show the gradual formation, in successive layers, of the conviction respecting Religion that finally had seemed to myself satisfactory. And I will now state in a condensed formula that which appears to me to be the law of the matter, through the fulfilling of which I believe that success is only possibly to be gained:—precisely because, as will be seen, I assume that success in interpreting the natural facts of the growth of Christianity depends upon our mind's acting upon a similar track.

The three-fold process then, as I experienced it, was this:—

First, starting as I did from the basis of supernaturalism, I found that the need present with me was for an implicit search into the truth afforded by History. And what is this, I now ask, but a beginning with that *outer* side of knowledge which I assert to be always required?—only, be it observed, with this

most notable qualification:—The study of History is the examination of the *external* facts of a subject, esteemed not only as they *are*, but as they *have been*.

The second step was that which gave the contradictory aspect. Having gained, as I supposed, some tangible impression as to what History could show, I turned to see what could have been the meaning of the great mistake that my own feelings had made in the matter. There arose a re-actionary craving towards the *inner* side of the subject. I was compelled to seek out the *internal* facts, forming, as I may say, the History of human nature, in continuance of that former History of human transactions. For the same qualification was necessary here also, that the *internal* facts must be considered not only as they *are*, but also as they *have been*.

And lastly, the third step was the one which combined the conflicting results of the two former, by showing to me this very capability of so reconciling contradictions as constituting in itself the actual law of psychical Development:—that is, by showing how the course of human transactions, working upon the course of human nature, is the proper means by which is effected the stable advancement of the latter.

Now by this formula becomes evident the metaphysical fact to which I have just called attention. Throughout the whole of this three-fold process, constituting what may be called a single step or interval of progress, the matter of pervading significance, as really conveying to it the character of progress, is that the step is shown as being consummated through the gaining of the sense of Time.* It is the introduction of this

* As an instance of the beginning need for external History on every universal occasion of a fresh awakening of the mind's attention, we may take the recent illustration out of pure matter of science in regard to the observation of the sun's spots. During the discussion upon the nature of them carried on by the members of the British Association at Newcastle, was it not evident that the stringent requisition was felt to be first to ascertain what might have been the *behaviour* of those spots, as the necessary preliminary to lead to the knowledge of what the spots really *are*?

new consideration that first, as I believe, conveys to the mind a distinct knowledge of what it has been doing. The law of the matter, as I would propound it, is the following: that the means of ripening the human faculty out of its original subjectivity into the compound habit of mind which maintains itself by the alternate play of the actively-objective function (dealing with *outer* facts) and the passively-subjective repose of the thinking principle (falling back upon the more habitually congenial dealing with *inner* facts) consists precisely in the acquiring of this novel mode of estimation,—this learning, on the part of the mind, to see its own subjection to that which it has already seen as the controller of all things besides itself, the sovereign power of Time.

The sense arrives, as I suppose, just by the fact of the change of mental position that has been going on. From having exalted itself to an external station whence to look down upon its subjective self;—from having subsequently plunged back into the recesses of self, with all the greater depth of (so-to-speak) self-sympathy, on account of the temporary alienation:—the mind comes to entertain the recognition of change of condition as belonging to itself,—change, that is, both as regards its recent abstract position, and its previous inferior subjective position. It entertains the idea of its own condition under different circumstances as *successive* phases of condition. And this is the gaining of the idea of development in relation to itself as the work of Time.

When I said, therefore, that my conception of the purport of Christianity, as making us aware of the possession of a Soul, was in agreement with the orthodox, I had still to point out this respect in which I consider my view to go far beyond theirs. The orthodox idea of the Soul was that which was incapable of change or extension: it was a thing literally of that inorganic sort which they instinctively associate with it when they describe it by the figure,—beautiful *as* a figure,—of its being “a spark” emitted from the bosom of “heavenly

flame" which is Deity. Taken with the literalness that they do take it, the figure is surely the farthest from being beautiful! Do they not imply by it that the character of Deity is to them as the flint or other mineral substance that really is always the furnisher of the spark! And such a suggestion is, I assure them, as barbarous to my feeling, as I know that the interpretation which *I* put upon the figure, and which makes it more pertinent to *me*, is a nullifying of it to *their* feeling. But let us stop to attend to one little fact, and see if the matter does not come out straight between us. The sparks which according to the old-world notion were portions out of the peculiar Entity of the substance of Fire, are brought to light by modern chemistry as no other properly than incandescent particles of mineral, flinty or gaseous. Does not this afford, I ask, the true reflection of the very dilemma of our controversy? *They* accuse me of denying the existence of the spark because I say there is proved to be no such substance as that supposed element of Fire, *except as an ideal image*; I accuse them of degrading the ideal character of the spark by the literalism which, in taking the "emission" as an actual one, really makes the nature of the spark upon the same low level with the carbon or flint.

Do I then really desire to prove, I shall be asked, that the Soul is in very deed nothing at all except only thus an apparition of incandescent feeling?—It is, at all events, only thus that I *know* any thing about it. What it is in absolute fact, as I have told you, I am aware that I have no capacity for knowing. God only knows. But when I do know it thus as incandescent feeling, relatively to myself, I turn round to ask again of you, what is there of greater importance respecting it that I require to know? Surely I know it as that which concerns me far more immediately than any thing else about it can concern me. What do you care to know about the spark more urgently than that in touching you it will burn you?

Let me ask you farther this: do you not know the spark, after all, upon the very same terms that you know the flint,—

the ideal entity upon exactly the same basis of evidence as the so-called mineral reality:—excepting indeed the modification that its nature rightfully demands? The spark as Flint you say you know as such because it possesses the substantial attribute of extended Solidity? Very well: your measuring standard is a sufficing one because it is adapted to the thing you measure. An inorganic substance like Flint whose nature is such that it shows upon itself no evidence of the influence of Time, requires no thought of Time to enter into its definition. *Solidity* is a term that respects Space alone of the two great metaphysical divisions. It is an idea also that is proper to the early mental stage of mere subjectivity, and corresponds with it the more precisely because in fact, although the regard to Time is not yet differentiated out of it, it is nevertheless present in a nascent state jumbled up together with the idea of Space. When thought has dwelt upon the idea,—occasion for it having arisen in the organic character of the matter in hand,—it becomes perceptible that *Solidity* really means the capability of preserving the form to which the object is accustomed (*solitus*) in resistance not to a single attack, but to a *succession* of attacks upon *Solidity*. And under the influence of this new consideration, Solidity naturally changes itself into *Durability*.* Extension as *Durability* means Extension in regard to Time, while Extension in regard to Space remains still lurking under the original term with an understood variation that it now means the *act* of extension instead of as formerly the simple *fact* of extension.

* The word that really corresponds to *Solidity* by its inclusion of the two aspects of Space and Time in one is *Expansion*. The two terms, I would say, adequately depict the difference I am drawing out between Orthodoxy and Development-principle. The one is fixed and therein *earthy*; the other is *expansive*. Observe, for the whole of the above scheme, the degree of sanction that I may claim from the following passage of Locke:—“And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men’s ideas . . . one may have occasion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of existence, with

I say then, that just as the spark when taken as Flint is known by its extension in solidity, so is the spark when taken as Fire known by its durability in extension. It endures, so long as it endures, inasmuch as it extends; it extends as long as ever it endures. It is this which forms the especial attribute which makes Fire what it is in our apprehension, an idea that is altogether exalted above that of the fragmentary mineral, by the organism introduced into it, which makes it at once instinct with *life*. Fire is a vital image: our mental image of flint is as destitute of life as the thing it images. Keep the distinctions clear between that which is imaginary, and that which is imagined, and our thinking ability is at once solid and vitally true. But, mix up the two, and our thought is, as I have said, all in a jumble:—a jumble that may be very little trouble to us with regard to this transitory illustration of the spark, but that is of the most eminent significance in relation to that which the spark so happily typifies.

When you image to yourself that the human soul is literally an instantaneous production after the identical fashion of the creation of an ignited atom of flint, I say that your conception is still of that low sort which is only appropriate to the most inferior of the departments of actual existence. It remains in the very same region of crass mythology which produced the metallic notion of Wisdom in her armour, springing, spear in hand, out of the cleft skull of Jove. It is a conception of that unadvised, little carefully-worked-up sort, which characterizes every way of accounting for things in the mode of *miracle*:—

a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity....were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words so near of kin, as *durare* and *durum esse*.... But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body, and all other things: which may (to those who please) be a subject of farther meditation." *On the Human Understanding*, Book II., ch. 15, § 4.

a supposing of effect brought about without regard to the Time that really was needed to bring it about.

All this, however, *must* be unintelligible to the orthodox upon his own ground; he *can* only consider it as that which I am very sure he *will* consider it:—a petty quibble upon words. When I come to draw out the explanation in detail, I hope the case may be otherwise; but in this introductory outline I can only expect the misunderstanding that according to my own principle lies in the very nature of the case. And it is moreover inevitable with regard to the thinker that is in direct opposition to the orthodox, not at all less than with regard to the orthodox himself. For if the orthodox, as I suppose, rests upon a range of thought that, having never yet attempted to make introspection upon itself, is by that very fact upon a lower level than mine,* yet in respect of his regard to religion, which he and I equally maintain to be the chief thing with us, the plane of our thoughts at all events is parallel. But the Positivist who has by his own profession turned his back upon religion, and for the present rests in an intellectual alienation from it, if nearer to me in one respect, lies as to his direction at an angle of the greatest difference. I say that he is stopping short at the stage of scientific abstraction that really ought to re-act by bringing him on to me. But where he actually is, he cannot even see the meaning that I intend by the very words I use. My continuing to talk, as I do, about "God" and "the Soul" is to him as sheer nonsense, as perhaps to the orthodox it is profane blasphemy.

* Of course I mean a *relatively* lower level. I may be arguing with a man whose actual power of mind is far above mine, and who may therefore have the right to look down upon me: but still it is possible that his mind may not have reached the stage of its own development corresponding to mine which alone can enable him to understand me,—mine, on the other hand, being always possibly defective in the contrary way of being over-hasty,—premature and feeble. The meanest herb that bears a flower, if it *do* indeed bear a flower, *must* be thought of in classification as in a condition that in so far is beyond that of the oak itself.

While, however, I propound these mental stages, as affording to me the sufficient reason for all this occasional unintelligibility, I must not omit to render more prominent than I have done, one important point of my explanation. I said only that these stages existed as an *appearance*. I have no idea of them as that kind of reality which proves itself as such by making its indelible mark upon the *habitual* consciousness of mankind. I consider them as pertaining solely to the thought that created them, and that created them because it could not get on without them. Like all other work of classification, I consider the distinction implied by them, while essentially necessary from the intellectual point of view, purely arbitrary on the contrary and more familiar mode of judging. To itself, the subjective consciousness is, as we have seen, always one and indivisible: a tablet in which we may indeed perceive, by taking in large masses of experience together, so much of progress as that our spiritual nature is at the actual moment to some indefinite extent wider and deeper than it was in time past, and less wide and less deep than we aspire for it to become in time future, but in which every kind of more special demarcation is utterly wanting. The subjective consciousness is by its nature as incognizant of any thing like linear boundaries or particular eras of transition in itself, as it is of the rational material that brings to it the incessant maintenance required to its substance from without. And in this respect it is in fact only showing its fidelity as that which the subjective consciousness *ought* to be, the genuine transcript of circumstantial nature. Neither in the actual course of experience, any more than here in the human registry of experience, is there any thing which at all corresponds with this assortment into mental epochs, and seasons of passing over into one or the other of the different modes of function. In reality they are going on at one and the same time, except for a degree of separateness too minute for ordinary thought to distinguish, although veritably such as still, in spite of its minuteness, serves

the purpose to which abstract penetration is able to make it minister:—I mean, to exhibit that true order of precedence as to the *outer* side of knowledge needing to establish itself in priority to the *inner* side which I hold to be of fundamental necessity. The triply-marked operation, by which I signify the gaining of one and the other side and then their combination; and which, as one entire operation after another is accomplished, shows the general acquisition of knowledge in the tangible mode of the formation of successive layers of accretion to the mental substance: is a matter solely of the peculiar necessity that belongs to all obtaining of general conceptions. Have we not seen,—is it not universally acknowledged,—that the intellect can do nothing without its Forms, any more than the semi-intellectual religious imagination? And, indeed, to those that persist in holding by the demand for correspondence with external fact, it may be replied, that there is here, after all, just the same kind of sanction for the distinction made, as there is in an abundance of other instances in which custom has long caused us to feel no want for any thing more. There is the same ground of distinction, for example, as that in the cases of which we so familiarly avail ourselves, without any demur as to the arbitrariness which some of us have perhaps never been aware of, but which all of us have no present thought about,—the separation between youth and age, summer and winter, day and night.

Do you not perceive, then, the analogical force that I am going to claim out of this, both for my psychological scheme, and the argument on behalf of which my psychology is adduced?—Grant that the forms of intellect, for all their arbitrariness, have nevertheless this acknowledged utility;—grant also, as this first datum analogically tends to prove, that the forms of intellectual emotion, although perhaps somewhat frailer in their nature, are still essentially of similar kind:—and the proved utility of the one class is the strongest antecedent evidence in favour of the utility of the other. The creating of distinctive

forms, all arbitrary though they are, has long been owned as the glory of the intellect: why shall we hesitate to admit that the creating of distinctive forms may also be the glory of our religious nature, notwithstanding the arbitrariness which is being shown to exist here also? In the former case, we have not the least uneasiness to say that these forms are the fruit of mere human invention,—that where the human mind is not, there they are not;—why shall we be afraid to recognize that our religious symbols have also not a bit of reality within them, save always this, which after all is the truest reality that can possibly exist for us: that they have had a genuine foundation within our own human nature, and by their practical exercise have shown themselves a genuine benefit to human nature? Upon the reality of this benefit,—I come round to my former conclusion,—I am willing, for my own part, to rest the whole evidence of Religion, and of Religion as a work of intrinsically Divine Origin.

SECTION III.—THE DEVELOPMENT-VIEW OF RELIGION, BY WHICH IT APPEARS AS A COMMON STOCK, MAINTAINED TO MANKIND BY SUCCESSIVE INSTANCES OF FORMAL DESTRUCTION AND RENEWAL: LYING OPEN TO, AND DEMANDING, THE ADVANTAGE OF A GENERAL COMPARATIVE SURVEY. —ASSUMPTION OF CHRISTIANITY AS THE FORM WHICH IS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GROWTH OF RELIGION IN GENERAL.

Having now shown, as I hope, that my belief with regard to these two important points of God and the human Soul is by no means the negation that at first sight it appears to be, but that it is really a most solid and expanding belief, I must say a few words upon the position that my view causes me to hold towards the general matter of human belief.

And what I claim it to be is indeed no less than that enlarged and deepened kind of sympathy with the subject, such

as no one can deny, when so stated, to be indispensable for the arriving at a true judgment respecting it. Orthodoxy has sympathy only within its own sphere; Positivism, which treats religion as only matter of abstract science, cannot be said to have any sympathy with it at all: but the Development-view which takes the whole of human belief as disposed in the manner of one common stock, is that which of necessity carries a vital interest into every part of it.

Think of it, and you will see that this sympathy comes, and can come, only with that special view which has just been stated as the law of Forms:—Forms, which in this matter of religion are so inevitably apt to be treated by reformers with what I cannot help esteeming a most unphilosophic contempt. From the point of view taken by Positivism, Forms of belief are certain products created out of the mind, indicating a certain condition, which when the mind has passed beyond that condition, are of no farther import, but simply deserve to be cast away. To Development-view, on the contrary, Forms are precisely that portion of the integral substance of the mind wherein consists the real energy that has the continued creating of the mind. Instead of being considered as merely products out of the mind, though such products they undoubtedly are, they ought to be much more influentially regarded as the real *sources* of mind. Without Forms of Faith, I say we could never have had Faith itself. Faith is the present result out of previous Forms: and this manner of regarding it is, I assert, the only means of doing justice to those Forms, and to the whole subject connected with those Forms.

It is quite true that Forms of Faith must severally pass away, being, as they are, in their nature, successive: but this is quite a different thing from their requiring to be cast away. By reducing them, as is here proposed to be done, to conformity with the general law of organic increase, we see how the falling off of some certain portion of exterior element is the phenomenon that always naturally accompanies, and indicates

the existence of, the counter-phenomenon of the assimilation of the true substance of the Form. The falling off is the sign at once of the Form's having had a true work to perform, and of its having performed it truly. And thus we come to the right balance as to the estimation in which the Form ought always to be held, as compared with the substance: neither the original over-estimation which at first exulted that the presently-sufficing Form must of necessity be permanent; nor the under-estimation which on finding out its merely temporary character is apt to look back upon it with contempt. The finding of this balance is, I say, the removal of a practical torment unspeakable.

What is Growth, let us consider, throughout the whole economy of Nature, other than always this same process of continuously accepting of, and profiting by, the successive acts of formal destruction? Constant attachment as to substance, under periodical instances of abandonment as to form:—this is the universal paradox that in one kind of living experience after another, always afresh startles and terrifies us at first, and strengthens and consoles us at last. Is it not truly a reason for rejoicing that it is only this old thing over again that has just been agitating us in the soul-shaking catastrophe come over our religion? Shall we not indeed be glad,—I appeal to every struggler after truth, now in the agonies of self-contradiction, and half of self-condemnation resulting therefrom:—shall we not have the *right* to congratulate ourselves, if it really be made clear that this harassing tearing of ourselves away from all our early associations of belief is only the expression for that outer loosening and fertilizing of the soil, and those inner growing pains, which will have to end in their spreading themselves out in only a larger sphere of always similar kind of construction? And surely the world-wide analogy is strong enough to support the trust!—Nay, as a still closer analogy:—if the whole substance of our body is continually passing away without any interruption to our identity, how much

simpler than this is it to believe that the same kind of thing may happen to our religion? How is it possible to avoid the conviction, that it is at least the natural state of the case, that our faith also has been really only establishing itself by the very means that at first appeared to be uprooting it?

The recognition of this identity as preserved in the essential matter of religion, whatever be the outward changes that it may undergo, is the third leading point which I now offer as proving the genuine religiousness of my views. Together with the recognition comes the sense of personal consistency of faith, so much deepened by this fact of its resting upon the larger sense of the general continuity of faith, as I may say from my own individual experience to have an irresistible power in winning over to such an impression of those views. I own that, as an habitual influence, I should even now feel very little satisfaction in them, if it were not for the re-assurance,—always needed in cases of change,—that this perception brings home to me. It would have been but a sorry thing to have had the soul broken up in the latter part of life, when most the strength of soul is needed, if this confidence as to the real obedience to the law of preservation even in the very fact of the dispersion, had *not*, as I say it *does*, brought with it the renewal, and more than the renewal, of early vigour. But very slight ground of self-gratulation should I have found,—for remember I am now speaking only for myself,—in even the most palpable superiority of present faith that might have been gained, if the acquisition had really been made, as at first it appeared to me to be made, and as it must still appear to orthodox believers to be made, at the expense of the absolute subversal and denial of the faith that had gone before it. If I could not now perceive that what was once true to me, and true to the world, was true for ever, in relation to what had to come after it, I do not deny to myself that I should inevitably fall away to cease believing at all henceforth both in myself and in the world. Yes: if I could not see in relation to Christianity

just as truly as was seen by the master-spirits of that religion in relation to Judaism, that neither of this later form of realization "can one jot or one tittle pass away, until all be fulfilled" in the newly-arriving doctrines of General Religion,—never, I am convinced, could the latter take any real hold upon me: never, in fact, could it *be* a religion to me. For what is religion, if not that which is Universal? I see truly that the old assertion of Catholicity, and reprehension of schism, made by the recent form of faith at its period of culminating vigour, and in fact the sign of that vigour, was an instinct as to the requisition of the case that would have the right to rise up against any form that came after it that did not carry it out.

But Development-principle *does* carry out the Catholicity; and carries it out to an extent of which the former prescience of the principle gave only the faintest conception. By showing religion under this great continuity, which applies now not only to all present spheres of human acceptance, but also to those of all past ages of time, it is exhibiting a Catholicity as much larger than the merely "Roman", as that which is naturally based must always be larger than that which is humanly partial. The Catholicity of General Religion is such as shows that union really lies in the minds of men by the intrinsic constitution of men: the Roman Catholicity had a dawning idea that the union must be a good thing for men, but not seeing yet that it was in them, and not knowing yet how it was rightly to be brought about, made the mistake of fancying that it could be extrinsically forced upon men, and so made itself a hindrance to the very thing it was ignorantly attempting to accomplish:—the times of which ignorance "God winked at", and is now doing the work at His own time, and in His own way.

When we see the various modes of error in belief, no longer in the light of heresies that we have the right to punish, or even to despise, but only as the incomplete condition that must of necessity belong to that which has to ripen out of the lower state into the higher;—and when we bethink ourselves, that it

is the matter of our own most cherished aspiration that our own condition, as presently occupied, has to appear in the very same light to the station to be attained hereafter:—charity towards the imperfection is so inevitable that indeed it no longer requires to be insisted on as if it required inculcation. Our sphere of religious sympathy has been so much enlarged beyond its former bounds, that the original matter of duty has become matter of simple unquestioning feeling. And have we not here, I appeal to all Christians, the very element which they, at all events, will not deny as by the strongest article of their profession the veritable essence of religion, on the human side of it? Maintaining Charity, as it is thus shown that our new doctrine does maintain it, have we not, I say, the right to claim Paul himself as bearing prophetic testimony in its favour, and as encouraging us to rely that not only Faith, but Hope also, will not be found wanting in the end to complete the natural conjunction!

An expanded sense of human brotherhood, in addition to the deepened sense of Deity which I have already claimed for the new form of faith, fills up surely the whole character that we have rightly to seek for in our religion. And who will dispute that this is the immediate attendant upon the recognition of continuity just spoken of? But there is in the specialty of my view exactly the provision that meets the demand for *Charity* in that respect wherein Charity, in the modern and more nicely-defined sense of it, differs from the ordinary sentiment of Love, over and above its general maintenance of the latter. For while the consciousness of identity in our faith with that of the whole mass of our fellow-beings ministers to the growth of habitual fellow-feeling, the peculiar means of the preservation of identity, consisting in the perpetually renewed existence of contrary states of feeling, affords the ground for the peculiar kind of Love which precisely consists in the power to maintain sympathy while in the presence of difference. Say, —as we may say, out of our experience,—that Charity is a

form of Love most eminently beautiful and desirable: in the view now offered I argue that there is exactly the adaptation to human needs that comes with quite a peculiar force of its own. For not only does this especial provision for disagreement amongst men furnish the actual basis for charity, in its affording of that without which charity would have nothing to exercise itself upon; but it vindicates the necessity for all that constant warfare in the mode of logic and argument without which intellect would cease to be intellect, and men would cease to be men. Even down to the very low ground of opinionative, self-esteemative, assertion,—which, low as it is, is a quality that cannot be entirely abandoned as long as we are human beings,—even here, there is the permanent source of maintenance. For while the characteristically-subjective thinker will be commanded by his increased charity to own that the characteristically-objective thinker holds an integral portion of the truth which they are aiming at in common; and the reverse: yet, inasmuch as the necessity of the case is that the opposite phases should be worked out in an incessant course of alternation, it will always be open to question to the parties concerned, whether the one or the other really possess that higher level of the two which he seems to himself to possess. And here again is made good the constant ground for charity in the sphere where so familiarly we know the value of it,—in that, namely, of the matter that is purely and simply personal.

But now this very showing how upon this principle argument can be carried on to the truest advantage, is also the showing how in its intrinsic nature the principle rises altogether above the ground of argument. Examined for its own sake,—and that is certainly the only way I am going to examine it here,—there is no longer any thing to argue about. The different stations of belief which have led on to the coming to the point where I now stand, are no longer known to me as those occupied by individual antagonists, but are those which I remember myself to have formerly occupied, or which I see by sympathy

must have been logically occupied as the natural preparation for my own position. The only kind of conflict remaining is, on the one hand, with myself: have I made my present station good by assimilating out of the common stock of religion in time past that which makes my individual condition a lawful consequent upon, and integral portion of, the Catholic whole?—and, on the other, with the mass of human experience: is the entire course of religious development, shown in history, really such as shows that continuous and consistent advance which alone can make good the figure of the common stock as thus applied to it? In both aspects,—that is, upon considerations both individual and general,—does it really fulfil the character of *eminent benefit* which alone is sufficient to constitute it a Religion? I have come back to the appeal to Experience which I offered as the test at the end of my first section, and to answer which will be my purpose after finishing this preliminary outline of my general position.

To possess a personal satisfaction in religion, otherwise than in that manner of supposed miraculous confirmation which is here discarded, there is no sufficing means except in the being able to trace every portion of it down to a natural root in the constitution of human nature. And it is evident that this *can* only be done by taking the matter of religion as forming one common stock. Not in any other way than this, but in this way most surely, *must* there be discoverable those inner fibres of rational connexion whose existence all along to the foundation is the only true means of convincing us that our present belief really *has* a foundation. And till we have seen that it has such, it is of little avail to consider the personal question of how that belief is calculated to meet the state of our own needs. The outer side of the matter inevitably precedes the inner. Personal feeling must stretch itself out into the abstractness that makes it quasi *im*-personal, before it can effectually look down upon itself. And therefore it will be in this order that I shall deal with the subject. I shall first

examine what I can make out of the development of religion as shown in the general history of the past, and then return to consider how the result thus obtained practically affects myself.

The reader will remember that in entering upon so large a range as that which is here implied, I am not pretending any thing more than offering a delineation of those general reflections which to *myself* have seemed to afford guiding suggestions through the study. My object is as narrow in one way as it is extensive in another. And so much has already been done in the laying down of the broader landmarks of the subject, that it is perhaps only too easy, and too invitingly tempting, to go on for oneself mapping out the field under those hasty generalizations, which are so liable to appear to the mind that originates them sufficient in the place of prolonged investigation of particulars! In what follows I have, however, at least the assurance on behalf of my own, that in framing them I have possessed the consciousness of not going far away from opinions which have a real weight of authority. And yet it is in the nature of generalizations that they must always be largely affected by the individual mind that employs them.—And this is so remarkably the case with the one generalization that is now of leading importance with me, that I must carefully explain myself respecting it before I begin to make use of it.

The generalization I speak of is in fact the one by which I feel that Providence itself has aided me, by laying out an arrangement of such beginning simplicity as makes me not afraid of entering upon the task. I see that, in wishing to inquire into religion universally, there is one special form of religion, and that the one most near in position to myself, which includes within it all that is necessary for me to examine in order to have a representative idea of all the rest. But then, after it has been thus accepted, what is Christianity? I am still thrown entirely upon my own resources to paint

accurately to myself what it is that the adopted generalization expresses to me. And this is a matter that exactly is baffling accordingly as we do not remember the vagueness proper to itself which *can* be fixed only by a fixed purpose in the mind that deals with it. Let any one question himself, and he will perceive how the limitation that he may have determined to put upon the idea, as seeming to him for the moment he made it a true one, will melt away of its own accord the instant he suffers his thought in the least degree to diverge. A new definition is in fact required, not only for every separate person that uses it, but for every special mood of mind under which one person may desire to appropriate it. As a general average idea, Christianity means the embodiment of human belief that has been comprised in our own ancestral connexion within the space since the time of Christ. But let us, on the one hand, be urged into greater definiteness, and it will shrink into the Thirty-nine Articles, the decision of the Council of Trent, the Apostles' Creed;—let us, on the other hand, suffer our idea to dilate by attention to detail, and the space will advance and recede till we shall see the literal truth of the saying that the religion of Christ was before Abraham.

It is obvious that for my purpose of a representative notion of religion, the largest possible of these definitions, and in so far the vaguest, is the one that I am in need of. Christianity is, then, I will say, to me, that which includes, not only every subordinate division of sects that can by any consideration be taken as belonging to its immediate form, but also the whole of religion that went before, preparing the way for that form, and every one of the subsidiary forms that have subsequently to its origination been derived out of it. It is the one great stock, Hebrew-Grecian-Mahometan-Teutonic, that has contained the religion of all the civilized nations of the earth, with the sole exclusion of that which has been comprehended within the rival or companion stock of Buddhism. And most instructively, I must observe, does it stand thus contrasted by the latter

exception, even for the very purpose of our definition: since if we did not know by the spectacle of this extant specimen of old-world religion, proper to ages so long gone by prior to the period that gave birth to our own, exactly *wherein* lay the weakness that now shows so conspicuously by the side of the doctrine that we have inherited out of the mother-soil of Judea, scarcely could we have had the positive sense that we now have as to the source of vigour that has made Christianity what history has exhibited it. I mean, of course, the principle of Monotheism: the consolidation into one mass of the vague sense of Deity otherwise floating only diffusively through the minds of human beings; but *here* bound up with that concentrated and living energy, which alone could ever have given to it, not only the power so to endure and to spread as we have seen it, but also to elaborate out of itself all that ramification of idea which now lies before us to spend our powers of speculative analysis upon. Because of the want of this concentration, Buddhism has at the present day only its few scattered embers remaining, while the enduring essence of Christianity is, as we maintain, upon the point of developing itself into a form that may even take up finally the essence of Buddhism too. So to regard its capabilities is at all events a necessary part of the present view. The consideration even of this alien stock, but much more so, the consideration of every part of our own stock, and of every part at every past era of its formation, is that which must enter into any idea of religion of the intrinsic sort that now we are in search of.

“How can it be necessary to wander away so far to find that whose proper home is within our own hearts!”——It is thus I seem to hear some orthodox religionist protesting. But is it not a sufficing rejoinder when we can say, that we find truly it is the very voice of our hearts that does thus compel us to wander? What, I ask, but the very narrowest sort of interest must that be which would compel us to rest satisfied *without* knowing both what our fellow-beings do believe,

and what they have believed, as well as what we believe ourselves?

Only thus has all knowledge come to us that we have ever hitherto attained:—through comparison. We have long been aware of it as the general rule of knowledge. It is, once more, only the following out of an *a priori* conclusion, to admit that it is the comparative view of religion that must first give to us our only true acquaintance with it. A natural growth, spreading and deepening through all the successive ages of human existence:—it is thus that I believe it has now revealed itself, in eminently advantageous contrast with the idea of it which has been superseded, however more modest be the claim which it now puts forth. The old idea of religion was that it was an “absolute good,” fitted at once for the condition of all minds and all ages. So to estimate it was the natural instinct of the personal sense of religion, intrinsically egotistic as it is, and self-exalting as to all that proceeds out of self. But now, without at all gainsaying that instinct,—rather, on the contrary, confirming it, as within its due bounds a most true and beneficial insight,—we have seen that the measure of its absolute benefit is solely determined by the power which is in it of modifying itself in adaptation to the shifting condition of our own minds. We know that what we have to seek for in our own minds and hearts is always simply improvement, and never a finished perfection. And that our religion be of the same kind is just that which we require of it to make it adapted to us. If we can assure ourselves that our present form of religion is *better* than that which came before it, and that it is capable of preparing the way for a better still to come after it, we have, I say, a ground of content in it that for its steadfastness is incomparably safer than any we have possessed heretofore. Our safety has been gained in spiritual things exactly in the same to us indisputable way as in regard to the law of terrestrial movement it was incapable of being comprehended by our hypothetical Pacific islander:—through the abolition of all idea

of possible fixity in any mental position whatever that we may occupy. It is this abjuration of fixity that is the firm because freely-balanced standard of Development-principle. Incessant movement, and incessant progress because of the movement, is the secure proposition by which precisely it vanquishes in us the sense of Insecurity. And the attaining of this recognition is arrived at only through the instituted habit of making *comparison*. If I were obliged to find a *name* that should of all others point out the character of the Religion that I am describing as based upon Development-principle,—lowering its affirmative aspect of General Religion, as the convenience of controversy will occasionally require us to lower it, into the merely sectarian aspect of the *ism*,—it is *here* that I would assuredly select the distinction. I would signify its repudiation of at once the dogmatism of so-called orthodoxy, and the positivism of so-called exact science, by calling the new form—*Comparativism*.

But now there is a final objection against this system which I admit in its full force, and would make no effort at all to silence. "All this," it is exclaimed, "is so difficult, and so complicated; so painfully contrasted with that which has been hitherto cherished as the glory of our religion,—its simplicity! Talking of harmony with human instincts, it is a pure repugnance to them that what has been so evident to the most child-like apprehension in the believing, should become so abstruse and so entangled in the explaining!"——I acknowledge it. The improvement I am seeking for religion is difficult, is complicated: I think there is no one who ever set about the task of obtaining it who ever found it otherwise. And as to repugnance, this is the one case in which it is a fighting against nature to adduce it as an objection. Nature *will* have improvement, and complication is the universal means of improvement. The simplicity which we at any time rejoice in is only the result of previous complication, of inferior kind; and if we were to

endeavour to content ourselves permanently with any actual stage of simplicity because of the present rest it seemed to afford us, we should find that our faculties, bid to stand still, and denied their proper exercise, would speedily convert the fancied rest into only an un-rest by their imprisoned restlessness. It would demand a miracle at least as great as that of Joshua to bid the power of Intellect "stand still,"—however earnestly the prayer for it might be made by the Ptolemaic religionists who are desiring the unimpeded slaughter of these trouble-creating innovations!—"How much *easier* would it be," cries out crude orthodoxy,—“How much *easier* would it be, if we must inquire into the nature and cause of our religion, to say unpretendingly, as we have been wont to say, that religion is here in our hearts and minds just because God has placed it there!”—"How much *easier* would it be," echoes crude materialism, "to say discreetly, so far and only so far as modern physiology has shown us, that religion exists in our nature simply because we have a natural organization adapted to it!"—And yet, cry up their several dicta as they may, the busy thought of man persists in finding itself satisfied with neither. Both of them may be true,—*are* undoubtedly true,—as far as they go. But there lies beneath the one and the other a farther basis of explanation respecting which we have become conscious that our own labour is alone wanting to make it accessible to us. And explore it onwards deeper and deeper we must, without any natural end to our investigation being possible, just till the real connexion with the soil, which at first appeared to lie upon the plain surface of the matter in which the subject is rooted, shall have been gained—by the tracing into distinctness of every single fibre belonging to it, out of all this confused heap of ramifications which truly is enough to discourage us when first we begin to unearth it.

PART I.

**PRESENT RELIGION, CONSIDERED IN REGARD
TO THE RELATION WHICH IT BEARS TO
PRECEDING RELIGION.**

CHAPTER I.

RELATIONAL VIEW OF CHRISTIANITY, CONCEIVED AS A WHOLE.

I HAVE now stated the conditions under which I have laid out for myself to enter upon the great task which is to be the occupation of this first part of my work: namely, the examination of Christianity upon the unreserved understanding of its being simply the natural growth of the human mind. I have, by my Introduction, set it forth as my purpose to show, not only how such natural growth may upon examination be made satisfactorily demonstrable as belonging to religion; but moreover and specially, how the fact of our so regarding it forms a real accession to the religious character of our own minds. I aim to prove how Present Religion really is a true religion, better and higher in its character than former Religion, precisely on account of this manner in which it does enable us to view the Religion of the Past.

It is true that this is a representation of my purpose which bears the aspect of a fore-gone conclusion. I speak of that mode of Religion as now existing, which yet it is the result that I look for out of the present examination just to lay the foundation for. But surely I may say that this apparent inconsistency is that which is inevitable to the nature of my subject. It must be remembered that some sort of conclusion upon the result that I am about to draw out, with a special view of

exhibiting the steps in the process, *must*, with regard to myself, have fore-gone the exhibition. I *have* already, in a certain disjointed manner, gone through to myself the task that I propose as one requiring to be accomplished. And inferior as that original effort was to what I am now striving to make it,—being, as it was, the collection of fragmentary, unsupported ideas, which in fact spontaneous thinking always consists of: full of blunders, whose incessant need of correction causes the mind employed in it to remain during the process strewn all over with heaps of instances, upon a small scale, of that very same kind of “formal dispersion” of which I have lately been asserting that Christianity itself is but an instance upon a superlatively large and noble scale:—still it is the fact that the beginning solitary effort was that which constituted the very means by which I am now endeavouring to remedy the effect of those first blunders. And in now adding, or endeavouring to add, the degree of mental arrangement and of moral confidence which I feel enabled to add, it is obvious that in the very act of so doing there is of necessity present with me, by the very character of my subject, the peculiar kind of religious consciousness which I state myself aiming to produce:—that is, of course, according to my own estimation of it. Mental arrangement and moral confidence, as exercised upon this subject, are, according to my view, the very stuff that this sort of religion is made of! And therefore in the act of my now adding, or supposing that I add them, I am doing that which, so far as myself is concerned, is actually the unfolding of the New Form of Religious Thought which I am asserting as the due condition of the entire mass of present mankind.—Nor let it be thought that I say this merely to vindicate my own mode of statement. It must never cease to be borne in mind that Religion is itself a matter of mental process; so that it is, and can be, only by watching our own mental processes, of the religious sort, that we can come to learn what Religion really is.

A train of thought carried on upon any external and purely intellectual subject might perhaps be repeated without undergoing any shade of difference from the original train that was perceptible. But the repetition of religious thought can never take place without an increase to that which constitutes the moral intensity of it. And this, indeed, we may perhaps conceive of as being the veritable source of the super-abundant luxuriance that has universally manifested itself in the creation of religious forms. But surely this instinctive formation of a scheme (—and a scheme *must* be called, whatever be the inferiority of its pretensions as such, that which brings in the present manner the originally desultory speculation into the mode of a pre-determined task,—) is that which no kind of rational illegitimacy is chargeable against, when the scheme is held, not as sufficient in itself, (as I shall have presently to argue has been the manner of past Orthodoxy,) but only as the guide to help us in gathering the actual sort and degree of knowledge that has the real claim to be sufficient. And the fact is, as it is now of fundamental importance to insist, there is a prematurity, and an inevitable prematurity of assertion, of the very same kind, in a part of my representation of my purpose where probably, notwithstanding its being the essential part of the matter that it is, it is so much less obviously such, that few persons, not already conversant with the subject, would think of its existing. I allude to the mode of the very conception which expresses to us the entire result, as hitherto gained, out of the assumed dispersion of the late (or Christian) Form of Religious Thought, and which accordingly now stands to us, upon our present position, as the sole available foundation to us for the working out of the new one. That which I have stated as the at-present-accepted understanding of the nature of Christianity, perfectly definite as it appears at first sight to be, is in fact,—as, if we have any success, we shall hereafter prove to ourselves,—nothing more

than the merest fore-shadowing of an understanding of the matter. It is, if we take it rightly, only that which has to be our guide in seeking out the mental facts that we have to seek out. It is that which, if it *were* the real understanding of the matter that it bears upon its surface the assertion that it is, we should in truth have nothing before us that it was needful we should examine. Let me appeal to the experience of my reader (—whoever it may happen to be that is willing to be my actual companion into this task of investigation now to be entered upon.—May it, at all events, be one who has no idea of its being possible for any human being whatever to make the slightest gain out of such task, unless by giving to it the utmost depth of studious earnestness of which that being's nature is capable!—). Has it ever occurred to you, I would ask of that reader, yet to bethink yourself of this which it is necessary to the affording of any really formal arrangement to this work of examination that I should call upon you to perceive: not only how utterly vague and inexpressive is to us for the present, but how circumstances are even against us in the rendering otherwise, that very phrase, and the only one in truth that is possible for us to use, that actually defines our whole object for us? What we have to satisfy ourselves upon demonstrably, as hitherto we have perceived it only theoretically, is that Christianity is *the natural growth of the human mind*; and yet,—for this is the point which I wish to urge upon you,—the very terms of the proposition lie buried in obscurity to us, and must so remain buried, until we shall actually have completed our demonstration respecting it. As long as the proposition remains mere theory,—which is so evidently the case that it does here, notwithstanding all that strong basis of confidence in it, supported upon the ground of universal analogy, which gives us, as it were, an intuitive right to expect that we shall succeed in obtaining the demonstration we are in search of,—there is and must be wanting that true intelligibleness, which in

this instance cannot arrive even into its verbal import, until there shall have been an adequate entertainment of the whole proof of the proposition. Because, as we know, simple as these few words appear,—so that every one of us, upon hearing them, would be apt to exclaim, “At all events, we know the meaning of the assertion, whether or not it be true that we are prepared to yield our assent to it,”—the peculiarity of this case of religious comprehension is, that every one of the words is permeated by a conception which, although we have now fully acknowledged to ourselves that it is a false one, nevertheless itself, again, so entirely permeates the whole field of our thought, that it is simply impossible for us all at once to supplant it by a new one. So thoroughly has the habit of orthodox thinking been engrained into the minds of all of us, that not the most practised powers of intelligence have or can have it in them to see the full bearing of the change of meaning come into the words, until the whole investigation of the subject has been completed;—just because neither by any possibility can any of us all at once comprehend the enormous degree of change that has come into our whole manner of needing to depict Christianity to ourselves.

Orthodoxy, as we remember, has indeed not so much as begun to recognize that the mind, as to the essential part of it, has any thing at all to do with growth:—the *mode* of its growth, natural or otherwise, is a question far from having come near to it. It remains at present altogether at issue with us as to what sort of ideas are to be included within the term “natural.” Here therefore it is clear there is no common ground of understanding. But I feel, (as already observed,) that I have very nearly an equal incompatibility with regard to Positivism. I believe that any Positivist in making the assertion in question, would have not the least intention in his mind of any farther idea than that of Christianity springing as a natural production *out* of the human mind; for the reason that he has not yet admitted the fact of

its lying under what I have called the law of all Forms (see p. 48.) Whereas the meaning that is all in all in the proposition to me, is, that Christianity by the fact of its being a "natural growth" is also the source of substantial religious increase to the mind. *How* it is so, we have not yet discovered; but that it actually is so, is the vague, and yet not on that account baseless, hint of suspicion which I am now desirous of setting about to comprehend. And thus the acknowledgment of the lack of duly determined perception that yet rests with us,—owing to the fact of this beginning impression's being the mere impression, the altogether insufficiently supported, and therefore almost certain to be contested assertion, that it is,—is just the necessary mental preparation that can only save us from working, as we should otherwise do, at cross purposes with ourselves and with one another from the very beginning.

But then, to make up for this feebleness of position on the intellectual side, I have more than a counter-balancing strength,—I have that which gives me the requisite degree of command over that position,—on the religious side. The peculiarity which I consider to belong to my presumptive assertion is this, that instead of taking Christianity to be a merely *casual* circumstance of mental growth, such as I suppose Positivists esteem it, I believe it to be in itself the *proper* growth of the mind. That is, I take it to be, not *a* growth of the mind, but mental growth itself (—for which reason it obviously is, that until I shall have learned what Christianity is, I see that I cannot adequately know what mental growth is—). But this brings me into immediate association with what I must call the special foregone conclusion belonging of right to religion:—no longer of the sort that is private and personal, but the universally characteristic one, which constitutes the heritage, already laid claim to by me in my Introduction, which all former religion that the world has ever yet known has been treasuring up for me. I find that, notwithstanding all the difference come

into my present mode of religion, the proposition I am now making respecting it is one that in fact rests upon the religious support of an alternative of consequences, in no way, to me, essentially varying from the hitherto maintained form of it. If I can make clear to myself and to you that the original production and constant course of Christianity *have* all along been following a "law" of acting as the necessary means of bringing about a certain moral effect to the human mind, I shall have made good the recognition of Plan respecting it, which according to my principle is the true and only authorization of the sense of Deity in connexion with it. And herein I shall have done what no one can deny me to be effecting the very sum and substance of religion for it! If, however, on the other hand, Christianity *be* really only the same sort of human production which might be classed, as I suppose Positivists class it, with weeds springing out of the earth,—erratic comets,—aimless thoughts:—then, truly, I own that neither do I, any more than the orthodox world, see any resource against admitting the very same sort of consequence which that world has all along been threatening us with discovering:—namely, that the very existence of Christianity, dominating as it has done over so long a period of the best part of human life yet known, is the strongest of all aggravations to the misgiving of Scepticism, that in fact there is no Plan and no certain Governance in the world. Christianity, I fully perceive, *will* have been demonstrated to be that out of which can spring truly *no* succeeding Form of Thought to be the inheritor of the life and substance of it.

My own concurrence with this established mode of dealing with the subject, while still I in no way cease to adhere to my own ground, is thus to me, I repeat, the very taking up of the heritage of long-stored-up religious feeling, which accordingly forms to me the express sign of the filiation which I assert for my present doctrine upon the entire previous stock of general belief. If I were to set about examining into the nature of

Christianity *without* such taking up of the tone of fore-gone religiousness, I should miss the analogical force on behalf of that doctrine which, if it was much to me on the intellectual side of the matter, is almost everything to me on the religious side. If the ground of universal analogy gives, as I believe it does, a real basis to my suspicion as to what is likely to be discovered, the special analogy of the world's religious experience gives to me a degree of confidence amounting to myself almost to a moral certainty, that, even if I do not actually gain the definiteness of view I aim at, yet that at all events whatever degree of it I do gain will be that which will show me the carrying on of what I have seen to be the whole course of the Providential unfolding of religious experience hitherto. And therefore *with* this feeling of continuity for our support, I say, the absence of the properly intellectual strength which goes with a purely inductive mode of working out conclusions, is actually more than compensated to us.

This, therefore, is what I would call the scheme for our examination, which if it restricts us in the manner of arranging our thought, does so nevertheless in a way that is eminently desirable. We need to bear in mind that our object, in order to be satisfactorily attained, must be attained thus,—that we *so* fill up our at-present vague and unsupported notion of what the Growth is that henceforth furnishes the fundamental character to our Religion, as that we may thereby at the same time possess the demonstration of the now-anticipated Plan and Purpose to be found within it. For indeed it is *only* under this restriction that, so far as I can see, we *can* be enabled to proceed upon our task.

But still, it must be with caution, and without hurry of mind. For, once again, we have to remember that, in order to our perceiving this character of Plan and Purpose within it, a total change has first to be undergone by us in our apprehension of what a Divine Plan and Purpose really require. We have, let us not forget, to re-model our notion of Chris-

tianity upon an altogether new footing; and not only this, but also to remodel altogether our own mode of conceiving of it: since it is here, more than upon any other subject whatever, a main part,—if not indeed *the* main part,—of our learning to look at our object aright, that we should rightly direct our own manner of looking at it. And thus is it that we have need of a care and deliberation in especially the working out of our method of working, even more than in the work itself, the utmost that we can bring to bear upon it.—But this indeed is also a matter of primary importance in the work itself, that we should at all events take good heed that we begin upon it at that which is the right beginning. If we set ourselves first to the wrong end of the matter, we shall assuredly find ourselves speedily entangled in an inextricable confusion of half-right and half-wrong ideas.

So far as this, however, my principle *has* been already laid down. I have already maintained it to be the determined rule of all investigation that the right beginning is to address ourselves first to the general or outer aspect of the matter.—Thus, therefore, let us now address ourselves.—We require first to sit down, as it were, in front of our subject, and look at it well from a distance, in order to see the effect of the change in our mode of conception in mass, before we attempt to follow it out into detail. And yet we must look at this general effect minutely too: because there is need of close mental analysis even in this consideration in mass. What we need first of all to ascertain is that Christianity really is a Whole to us; without which it would be mere trifling to endeavour to think of it as a Form. To prove its right to such a designation we must make sure of its having both the consistency of composition, and the definite limitation of outline, which are needful to give the self-independence of substantial existence that can alone make it a distinct being, or thing. And this we have to do at the same time that we must never belie the vague, elastic, arbitrary character that we have seen to belong to it, by the very necessity of its being that natural

mental production which we assert it to be!—Truly, we must not imagine that the task we have set ourselves to is an obvious and *easy* task!

How are we, with our actual means, to conceive of the nature of this Wholeness?—this is the first question to ask of ourselves.

The manner in which the orthodox view made good the character of independent self-consistency in Christianity, necessary to its wholeness, was that it asserted of Christianity a peculiar reference of all that was characteristic in it to the direct agency of God. This was *its* selection of peculiarity whereby to set Christianity apart from all modes of human knowledge beside;—while, by my principle, the view we are about to gain must be that which will form a real confirmation to the orthodox view, at the same time that it contradicts it. —*How*, then, is it that we are to gain it?

I would answer the question thus:—It is indeed true that I have determined respecting Christianity that it has no claim to direct procedure from Deity, inasmuch as I believe there is no such thing in the entire plan of existence; I believe that Christianity is only a part and parcel of that which all along proceeds, never directly, but still, though indirectly, always in the manner of a true proceeding, from Deity. But then I see that, comparatively speaking, it is always possible that one effect may be nearer to direct proceeding than another effect. And accordingly, if I can show, as I hope to show, that Christianity really does afford a sort of manifestation of Divine Plan regarding it, that is *more* noble, *more* Divine, than any other kind of such manifestation that had ever been known in the world before:—*then*, I maintain, this difference in degree, though it is no longer one in kind, is still a difference of the real nature

that *does* constitute a true peculiarity belonging to it which, by all the rules of classification, will authorize me in counting it as set apart from other things of the same kind. This, let it be at once understood, is the sole nature of the proposition which I am seeking to uphold. But as I think it is that which cannot be questioned as really meeting the demand of the case, I will assume it to be such, and proceed upon it to the next requisition. And that is, to show how this fact of the being distinctively *more* noble and *more* Divine in its manifestation of Divine Orderliness is capable of being carried out by the present view of Christianity.

I have said that Christianity is to be regarded by us henceforth in the light of an intellectually-created generalization, prevailing over the thoughts of a certain portion of human beings deserving to stand as representatives of all the rest:—by which definition it is manifest that I place it on a level in respect to its kind with all other generalizations similarly formed. But this, I repeat, by no means implies that I also place it on a level in respect to its degree. Nay, it is important to assert at once that I am going to show how it is different even in *kind*, in a subordinate sort of way (—for this difficulty in terms in the nature of things besets us, and will beset us, even after all that has been said as to the limitation of species, until the sufficing definition of what species really is has been finally settled—). For that there is such a sub-specific difference, class it how we may, is proved to me by this, that if I try to image to myself what this Christian generalization means,—that is, what sort of natural fact, or rather combination of facts, it stands for,—in the same manner that I try to understand other generalizations, I find myself at fault. Let us try the experiment.

If we think upon the above definition more closely, it spreads itself out thus: we see that a definite form of thought has been engendered which gives an immediate expression to the otherwise diffused mass of religious feeling, existing, as to

its actual individual abode, in the several bosoms of the incalculable number of the component parts of the whole of the human race:—which complicated idea practically settles down into the familiarly equivalent one, that the religious formulary is a tangible medium for communicating in one single phrase, or set of phrases, that which represents the religious wants of the entire community of men. And that Christianity has been such a medium, as adapted to its own sphere of duration, has surely been amply testified by the experience of all the multitudes of those who have been its professors; while I myself, over and above the proof to its being such which I accept from them, am about to add on my own behalf the additional proof to the fact, of the enlightenment which I believe the mere intellectual handling of it to convey to myself respecting that internal experience, even now that the latter has become to me a by-gone thing. Yet we all feel at once that if the Christian form were only this medium of human inter-communication, form though it might be, it would be no religious form. All the peculiarity required for it would be wanting. It is true there is something inexpressibly wonderful, even in its being merely this:—wonderful in that sense which we who have passed beyond Christianity have learned to feel so infinitely deeper than the supposed character of miracle! Are we able to grasp the idea of the mere *amount* of mental operation that must have gone to the creation of a standard expression of human feeling like this?—or that of the *number* of the myriads of beings that must be thought of as having been engaged in the creation: one generation after another of the widely-scattered sections into which human beings are divided, bringing together their minute atoms of contributions towards it?—or, still less likely, are we able to conceive the amount and kind of labour which it must have been that thus, while really tending to such general effect, was in no way directed towards it by the conscious will of the workers, but towards so contrary a purpose, as to be, for by far the greater portion of the work

performed, unavailing for the purpose that nevertheless had to be fulfilled? For,—let us dwell a moment on the conception:—each contribution to the general effect was rather, in fact, left behind, than brought in, or offered up. Each several worker employed upon the raising of that which was finally to be this enduring centre of benefit to mankind, came to his task in utter disregard of such disinterested result, and solely absorbed by a need immediate to himself. He came to it weighed down by his own burden, sore from his own anxieties, blinded by his own tears. He had neither eyes to see, nor compassion that he could spare to feel for, any sorrows that befell, or should have to befall, any beings besides himself. If it had been only the procuring of such disinterested relief that *had* resulted,—if he had not actually obtained the relief for his *own* sorrow that he sought, or at least some degree of it, through the expression that he made of his need for it,—he would have ceased to go on with his work. He *did* however go on; and that he did so is the standing proof that the expression of his religious pain *was* the source of relief of the kind that he was in want of. But all the fruit out of the expression that from its being thus merely personal turned back upon himself,—and such would be very nearly the whole of it,—was nothing towards the general utility. It was only the modicum of purport that was *non-individual* that remained behind for permanence, and that, meeting with similar residues, could coalesce with them in the manner that a common and non-personal nature would alone enable them to coalesce. For this is the very process of first gathering together particulars in a miscellaneous heap, of then sifting away those that are not to the purpose, and lastly of combining only those which upon trial prove themselves of the congeniality that allows them to combine, which we know belongs in ordinary to the forming of every kind of abstract conception; although here, I repeat, upon a scale of what incomparable magnitude and importance!—But still, there is nothing here that yet accounts for what is the main fact of

actual experience in the matter. Supposing all this to have taken place, as I *do* suppose it to have taken place;—and allowing, as I do claim it to be allowed, that this correspondence with ordinary process is, as far as the explanation has yet gone, exactly that which *ought* to be seen in the creation of the religious standard:—still there is wanting any thing to explain the reason for that peculiarity of religiousness in it which causes the notorious result to our practical feeling, that it is *not* the same kind of generalization that others are, that, this generalization respecting our religious wants is to us. And therefore I say that the sub-specific difference which I have proposed as such, is in a manner shown to be such, by this failure yet to explain it; though at the same time, I conceive, the very failure put us in the way to supply what *shall* appear as the source of the peculiar distinction needed.

I am not now thinking, I must however observe, merely of this being the subject of deep personal feeling that it is to us, which others are not. I am speaking purely of the intellectual character. The extreme magnitude and importance of it is indeed one element which separates it from others; but still it is not here that lies the essential point of difference. The latter, it appears to me, can only be expressed,—but *can* fully be expressed,—by the one word that attaches itself of right to the entire intellectual domain of religion. And accordingly I would say that the real essence of the difference sought for is sufficiently described, so far, when we say that the religious generalization is, by a degree of pre-eminence above all other generalizations, special enough to constitute its characteristic, a *symbolic* generalization. Nor, I think, is it inexplicable how both the general agreement and the special difference thus signified have arisen. The idea of a symbol simply implies that the actual knowledge sought for is out of reach; and hence the symbolic idea of God is a pure symbol. But a general knowledge of human religious feeling, condensed into a standard form, is not entirely out of reach. It is only extremely

difficult of attainment. The process of attaining it (—that is, of attaining it to a degree satisfactory for human purposes; an absolutely perfect attainment being in no case possible:—) is one that requires an immeasurable continuation of operation to bring it about. Hence, intellectually regarded, to say that Christianity is a symbolic generalization is merely to say that it is one in a state of incompleteness. But then it is at the same time obvious that it is incomplete precisely on account of the height of purpose it aims at. And therefore I hold that I am by this recognition so far from missing the point which is the desideratum with me, as first appearance suggests that I do, that I am really laying a firm grasp upon it; seeing that the present imperfection, when so accounted for, is expressly the sign, not of inferiority, but the contrary.

The explanation, however, may be carried much closer than this: close, I think, even to the degree of a realistic solution. The religious form is manifestly religious exactly on account of the combination of wondrousness, of practical benefit, and of un-perfectibility contained in it:—this is an assertion which I do not suppose any one would take exception to. But this allowed, it seems to me that we have evident cause for its being such, as soon as ever we compare the intrinsic composition of it with that of lower generalizations. In purely intellectual generalizations,—in the assertions of mathematics, or in such as relate to any of the sensible qualities attached to inorganic matter, colour, size, shape, &c.,—there is what we may call that perfect homogeneity of thought which nowhere arrests attention to the fact of difference between the thought of one man respecting it, and that of another man, or number of men. Whoever assents to the assertion that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that a revolving body will become circular, or even to a general assertion of such nature as that “greenness pertains to grass,” is not in the least caused to perceive that his own conception of the several facts varies in any way from the accepted standard concep-

tion; though doubtless it really does to a minute extent so vary. But eminently contrary is the case here in religion. We are upon a ground in which such a thing as homogeneity is out of the question. The individual being that refers his own religious wants to the standard representation of them feels indeed a true kinship with that standard expression, but still more strongly he feels the mass of expression that does *not* precisely accord with his own. And this must have been the case, even if the whole number of minds that had concurred in the creating of the standard had been contemporaneous in their existence. How incomparably more must it be so when they were actually divided into the manifold succession of different generations of minds! It is the idea of the effect of Time, the idea of Growth,—of such sovereign importance to us,—which asserts itself beyond every inferior effect immediately that it comes into play, as of necessity *here* it does, upon the highest of all organic ground, that of human feeling. The concentration of religious experience that has been *growing* through so many ages, *must* contain an amount of difference from present individual experience that will not allow of its being received without demur as similar to the latter. And hence, surely, the prime characteristic of religious symbolic expression that it stands as if *apart* from the individual. But now comes the peculiar crisis of growth in regard to it. While the mere effect of accumulation remains, it is like that which simply corresponds with the effect of physical accumulation. Now, however, it is as if the increasing amount of alien character in the standard gave it, as it were, a gravity of its own, which caused attention no longer to flow into it in the simply instinctive manner, but to be drawn to it in the manner of compulsion. For we know how it happens in ordinary, that when the state of general feeling arises that a new notion is said to “lie in the air”, every one considers it as appropriate to himself; but the instant the notion has been converted into definite expression, it is felt to take positive command over the thoughts of man. And so

also I suppose it happens, and to the extent of even constituting the very specialty of the case, in the matter before us: namely, that this moment of crisis, if we consider it, actually brings about the sort of change in the standard that is no longer merely mechanical, but, as we may call it, chemical. For while the sort of mental operation that flows instinctively is Feeling, that which flows as in opposition to instinct, is Intellect. As soon as the mind possesses this religious concentration as an object of mental contemplation, it is Thought which is occupied upon it. And this it is which henceforth works it out into definite Form. Symbol, therefore, I conclude,—for here I arrive at what I consider the sufficing determination of the separation of the religious sort of generalization from all other sorts:—Symbol, I say, is to be defined as nothing else than the organic kind of generalization which builds itself, of intrinsic necessity, round about the expressed Feeling of men, just because there has taken place the act of spiritual chemistry by which human Thought has elaborated itself out of human Life.

The intensest of passionate emotion, the most stringently personal of all kinds of egotistic feeling, has become transformed into the calmly-intellectual substance that can be distinctly outlined, and disinterestedly meditated upon!—And does not this very fact, if we *do* disinterestedly meditate upon it, bring with it this farther reflection, as to what makes the religious Symbol the thing it is to us? All the intensity of passion, if concealed by the transformation, is still conserved latent within it! The full measure of the vital force originally poured into the growing Form, remains embodied within that Form,—until indeed the time comes when it is natural and right that the Form should die.—And what is it against the Form that it *does* have to die?—To those who think now-a-days that they are making an accusation against Christianity by crying out respecting the Christian creed, in parrot-repetition of a proverb that had a quite different meaning when it was

originated,—“Forms are but dead things; let us hold to the spirit which alone is life:”—I rejoin, “It may very well indeed be that Christianity *has* now become a thing that is dead; but the very fact of its being dead shows that it is that which we ought to honour as having once been alive.”

I cannot help feeling, when I compare this view of the general mass of Christianity with that of the orthodox, that there is here what I must again call the *organism* of thought which is wanting in the latter. I am aware that the present scheme is, as I have said, altogether vague, elastic, arbitrary: it stands as the mere assumption that all general statement must stand until the working out of its proof. But vagueness, elasticity, arbitrariness are the proper characteristics of beginning organism. And when I place the character of Divineness, which it is my desideratum to find in the constitution of Christianity, as consisting thus peculiarly in the very fact of the deep humanness of its derivation, I do feel myself altogether upon the track that must lead me away from the mechanicalness that I complain of in the orthodox scheme.

Let me, to make out the comparison I need, recur to the orthodox basis laid out once for all for succeeding thinkers in Butler's argument of Analogy. I *can* only, upon my own principle, describe my own position of thought by showing its continuity with the previous natural stage of thought; and I *can* moreover establish the tenableness of my own position only by showing also that my present thought has that quality of higher development induced upon the former, without which, after all this century of mental operation spent upon the question, the pretence of continuity would be a nullity. But I do feel, I say, that my own position is that which places me in the parallelism with Butler's position which exactly enables me to make the comparison of my own representation with the theological. The gist of his irrefragable argument of Analogy—never possible to be disputed again, but only to be carried out farther

and farther into universal completeness,—was that the whole of the constitution of things, natural and supernatural, was upon one and the same Plan. And here it is that I also take up my stand. Objection has been made,—or rather I should say, was formerly wont to be made,—against the idea of Plan, and of Design, on the ground of their being of anthropomorphic implication. This is no objection at all to me. I have seen that man can by no possibility have other than anthropomorphic conceptions. The idea of Plan is that which stands to me for the greatest reality which is contained in nature for me:—that, namely, of Progress upon an ascertainably (—a more or less ascertainably—) regulated method of Progress. And by my now finding how Christianity was this expressly human thing that I have described it,—by my now finding that the divineness which still I recognize in it lies in that which is to me so evident, the control which *must* be imaged as exercised in a sovereign manner over the mass of human weakness and blindness employed in the work here supposed, and the sovereignty of whose benefit is moreover manifested just by making that very impotence of the workers the means of its own remedy and elevation out of its impotence:—by this mode of estimating Christianity, I say, the divine recognition, coincident with the recognition of Plan, that still lies within it, is only varied from that which was obtained by the orthodox view, just by the diminishing of the *directness* of the divine agency conceived by us, which diminishing in every case pertains to the character of an increasing perception into divine things on our part. To see that God has planted in human nature the power of making the religion that was to ameliorate itself, which is the theological phrase that still befits the matter, is only, I say again, (see p. 9,) the raising of our idea of God by a certain marked stage.

According to Butler's idea of the divinity that lay in the general scheme of things, it consisted in the fact that God, who

originally devised the scheme, also carried it out immediately, as it were, with His own hands; or at least did so in regard to that portion of events which were considered subject to miracle,—this division being in itself the sign of that incompleteness in Butler's extension of his own principle which shows now in his theory as a defect. It is, indeed, no real charge against Butler as a man that he could not at once subvert a notion which, as that of miracle did, pervaded the whole thought of his day; still, it is of the highest importance, if the present view is a true one, to charge it as a defect against Butler's theology. The supposed operation of miracle is, as I have already said, entirely an inorganic conception. It is a taking of that which *may* be said figuratively, as if it were true literally: for this is, I think, a much truer description of the incongruousness of the idea of miracle, than if we were to say broadly that it is a *false* idea. When we read in the sublime first chapter of Genesis how the sole word of God called light and all things else into being, it would be the mere fatuity of prosaicalness which would find fault either with the expression or the idea contained under the expression;—but if symbol is here in its right place, the intellect of the present day asserts as strongly, that to say God with His own word caused the sickness of a particular man to fly, or the fig on a particular tree to wither, is an exhibition of symbol in a most irrelevant and wrong place.—Such distinction was however not yet made out in Butler's day. He accepted miracle as if it had been the tested and proved thing which it really was not. He took the possibility of its literal existence upon assumption. And this accordingly gave what we feel now to be the inherent weakness of his whole work. The plan of that work to which the necessity of his mental position bound him was that he should limit himself to showing how Christianity, when taken as a system, was in an analogous consistency with the general ordination,—at least as to any objections that might be made against it (see his Introduction).—I say "he limited himself", because

virtually this was the case: that is, he limited himself to this object in so far as that which is sufficing in his work is concerned;—and he himself appears to recognize this when he acknowledges that in some parts his demonstration is “more, in others less, exact.”—The existence of miracles being then to him an indispensable postulate of Christianity, it *was* the theoretic necessity of the case that he should pre-assume the fact of their existence: but none the less, the presumption caused that his whole view of the system of things was, as he owns it to be, a system considered “prior to the proof of it.” It stood upon the ground of mere theory. He expected that the proof of miracle, both as to the possibility of its existence in general, and as to its actual occurrence in the cases in question, when it should be fully made out, would confirm that which he theorized respecting it: whereas we now know that the contrary is the case. The century of research and criticism which has intervened for us has shown us that what he presumed as to the miraculous and moral purpose of Christianity was a matter of utter failure in the matter of his intellectual pre-vision. (Nay, in regard to the moral purport we cannot help feeling even that the *man* was to blame. He *ought* to have had a better insight than not to feel the essential difference that there is between supposing God to have sanctioned immorality by direct command, and our inferring such sanction only generally from the miscellaneous facts of circumstantial occurrence. Suppose Christianity had proclaimed, in the same mode that the first chapter of Genesis proclaimed that the guiding Providence of the world in its primitive barbarous condition had uttered its voice to the then barbarians that they must go forth to war and to plunder, to murder and to steal,—it would have been a poetic representation of fact that no moral feeling could have taken exception to. But to say that God commanded a particular man or nation to commit such abhorrent actions, is what every one ought to shrink from as a blasphemous falsehood, on behalf of which no proof *can* be

expected.) What we have therefore to do towards Butler's scheme is that which I conceive the present view does do. We have to retain his principle of Analogy, extended as it is now into that great law of perfect Unity in Nature's composition, so far beyond what Butler himself perceived respecting it; while we mould his whole theory over again in regard to that *manner* in Nature's composition as to which his presumptive expectation has so signally failed. And this is, I say, preserving the strength of his argument without being cumbered by its weakness. For his principle as to Nature's being a System was perfect as far as it went;—the *a priori* proof which he has stated on behalf of its being such, has gone on confirming itself through all the experience subsequently gained;—the theory holds fast as a theory, even after the basis of the homogeneity between Revelation and Non-revelation is found to consist in a quite different thing from the assumption with regard to the mode of the Authorship and Government of Nature which to him seemed satisfactory. We have found that the homogeneity is much more truly preserved,—can indeed only be preserved,—by throwing away the notion of supernaturalism altogether. And hence by this rejection of the miraculous from the whole body of our present scheme, in availing ourselves of the scientific light that is available in our day, though it was not in Butler's, we are, I argue, framing that which is on the higher ground than his that precisely results from ours being a theory no longer "prior to", but *subsequent* to, "the proof of it". We take Christianity as it comes to us out of the judicial hands of criticism, and even thus, stripped of its factitious disguise, we still find,—that is, I assert that we still find,—the same kind of orderly benefit in it which was heretofore supposed to reside only in that which we have been obliged to cast away. Butler's theory itself, indeed, if it had not been the mechanical one that I say it was,—if it had been the *elastic* one that I say all beginning theory ought to be,—would have yielded to the modification that time has brought

so as to accept and embody all the present innovations. But instead of being elastic, it was dogmatic.

The true test of the religiousness of any scheme of thought, we know is, as Butler has so clearly stated the case, the manner in which it enables us to deal with the "difficulties" in life and the world. If we are empowered by it to contemplate those "difficulties" without disturbance to our general trust in the entire ordering of things, our religion does that which it is required to do. And here, I consider, is shown at once the superiority I claim. What was the enigmatical stumbling-block to orthodoxy, entirely melts away as such to development-principle. However hard they may be to deal with in the practical mode of enduring them in actual life, they are no longer that which forms in the least an obstacle to religious faith. Setting aside the thought of them as trials, they fall, as mere intellectual difficulties, into simply that ordinary and surmountable sort of difficulties which it is the special work, and even delight, of the intellect to have in its way in order that it may overcome.

If we could master the understanding of the complete actual scheme of things laid out by Providence, it is obvious that we should *have* no difficulties respecting it. But this being not the case, and being impossible ever to be the case, it is, I say, an alleviation of them to such extent as entirely to ameliorate their character, to find that they lie, as "difficulties", merely in the always-improvable imperfection of our own intelligence, and not in the express design of their Contriver to puzzle as, attributed to them by Butler. Now that the whole matter of Christianity is taken as solely and purely the work of human intelligence, the clearing up of all that is obscure in it has at least to be attempted in the same way that all else hard of understanding has to be cleared up. I perceive, moreover, that by this view we must in fact quite coincide with Butler in this important part of his scheme, that we also require to look upon those parts of Christianity which are its "difficulties"

as having been to a certain extent expressly calculated, if it is better not to call them expressly designed, to clear up, or expound, former existing "difficulties" of similar sort. That is,—not by any means that they were *directly* designed by God, although we may say, by a large figure, when we think of the entire scheme of things, that they were *indirectly* designed by Him;—but that they constituted the effort made by human intelligence, in its meditating upon such kind of "difficulties", to find out for itself the way in which they might be expounded. Thus, the supposition on the part of the relaters of Hebrew story that God had directly commanded the Israelites to plunder and slay, however gratuitous we believe it to be in point of fact, was not gratuitous, but a most legitimate effort of human cogitation, when we take it,—as *we* do now take it,—as simply the first endeavour of the advancing mind of man to conceive to itself how such events should have come about. However unsatisfactory the effort at explanation appears to present intelligence, it is just what was to be expected that it should be so; and the making of it at that time forms always a real step in the progress of human understanding with regard to such sort of puzzling occurrences, which, when taken as the part of the "law" of mental progress which we are now seeking to make it out to be, may well be taken as a general Providential benefit. But Butler's interpretation of the effort throws all the blame of the unsatisfactoriness immediately upon God, instead of upon man. The way in which the principle he has gone upon has led him to scheme out the Providence of the matter, has been that which instead of showing the event, as that of progress, in a direct course, has been really showing it in a reverse course.

In order for us truly to scheme out for ourselves what is the actual scheme of general Providence, we must bear in mind that *our* scheme must be formed upon the same plan that *that* is. Our interpreting scheme must go through the same several processes of first synthesis, and then analysis, with regard to our images of events, that in the outer world of circumstance

had been acted out by the actual events. There must be gone through, as well as in that outer world, so also in this mental world of ours, the always requisite course which is no other any where than always the same sort of one:—namely, in this case, of first, the gathering together of miscellaneous notions; then, the elimination of irrelevant particular notions; and lastly, the combination into a distinct notional whole, which however,—let me now specially remark,—is *not*, and cannot in the nature of things be, a *distinct* whole, until there shall have been farther made out respecting it the subsequently-arising need for a division of its substance into *parts of a whole*. According to this general rule then, let us consider, had already been made out in human thought, previously to Butler's entering upon his own special scheme of interpretation, that notion of the Government of the Universe and of Religion in general, which he appeals to as standing naturally prior to the consideration of Christianity, and which in consequence he assumes as the dogmatic basis to his own theory of Analogy. That is, there had already taken place with regard to that prior notion, the sub-ordering out of the general conception into minor points of consideration, which had brought the human mind into contact with the puzzling matters which as yet lay destitute of explanation. Then,—this being the case,—I say it is evident that Butler, when he endeavoured as he did to fulfil the proof of the Analogy he was asserting, could not help seeing that Christianity, in order to be the Explanatory scheme of the prior scheme which he took it to be, must also itself be a Scheme altogether corresponding to the natural Scheme of things. While, however, I say that my view entirely coincides with his so far, *here* I just trace the difference that my view brings,—altogether, as I cannot help thinking, for the better. The fact of the Christian Scheme's showing in itself the "difficulties" as to immorality, &c., which Butler took as conveying a special sort of *sanction* to the existence of those irregularities in the natural world, I take merely and simply as the inevitable effect

of the Christian Scheme's having obtained in itself the degree of organization, which showed that the human mind, at the time of the natural origin of that Scheme, had come to feel the systematic seeking of explanation for them a necessity to it. And thus, also, I perfectly recognize why it is, as Butler so constantly insists, that there is the need that there is, in all our consideration of Christianity, of always treating it *as* a scheme; seeing that, as I now explain it, it is only in consequence of its being this internally-regulated, though always self-connected thing that it is, that it in fact has the ground within it that it has of *being* the important matter of consideration that it is. Christianity, when it is seen as thus, by its own internal regulation as a scheme, brought into a certain correspondence such as is requisite with the general scheme attributed to Providence—I am as willing to take up the idea after Butler as he was to propound it,—*does* show itself as the Key in regard to the laying open to our understanding of the Plan of Universal Nature;—but then I do *not* agree with him in thinking it a key of expressly divine manufacture. I vary with him solely, but nevertheless as I think, most importantly, in thinking that the key was but the beginning attempt of imperfect human nature at learning *how* to construct a key.

But, more than this: I must apply the very same mode of judging to Butler's own case. The reason why I now, as the mass of others who have treated the same subject have done, take Butler's work for that which affords the special point to rest examination upon, is precisely that *it* also furnishes a scheme,—an internally-regulated plan, thence wrought out as a whole,—which is to be to us as a Key for the understanding of Christianity. But I find, here also, that while it is, indeed, such a Key, it is still an imperfect one; and for the very same reason that Christianity itself was such, in regard to its own pretension. As Christianity, though to a degree internally-regulated, was not sufficiently so to meet the real requisition of being the interpreter of natural difficulties that should effectually

explain them away; so I complain of Butler's scheme to interpret Christianity, that neither does it so thoroughly enter into the details of its object as would really make it an adequate scheme of interpretation. His reading of the Plan of Salvation which Christianity constructed upon its own sense of human difficulties, to my estimation so far evades the entering upon the true nature of the difficulties, which a more thorough attention to their detailed realities would have obliged him to enter upon, that his beginning scheme, as a scheme, of this sort, requires the following up by another. And thus, by my seeing this of him, am I in fact helped in the learning of what is the real way of the unfolding of this sort of knowledge to mankind.

But in order to follow out this only object of my now making this comparison of Butler's station of thought with my own, let me take up again the thread of the description I have begun to trace out as what I myself conceive to be the natural plan of working out the peculiar kind of generalization which I suppose that the Christian scheme actually is. For by so doing only can I show what I am specially desirous of showing, as to how the failure I attribute to Butler was really the inevitable necessity of his mental position *historically* considered:—which way of considering it, every one must at once perceive, is the only way of making it available for the exhibition of the consecutive process of the raising up of one station of thought after another, of which the work of development consists. The matter which I wish in this manner to show as it were in visible demonstration, is this: that if the station occupied by Butler really lay, as the course of the natural development of the Christian generalization seems upon a general view of it consistently to show that it requires to be judged as lying, *within* the range of the historical period apparently allotted by Providence as that which was the befitting duration of Christianity,—then, it is at once evident *why* he could by no means take that entire view of Christianity which alone could have rendered his scheme respecting it an adequate one.

I have traced the natural process, let it be remembered, up to the great turning-point of faith-formation which constituted the all-important crisis of integral transmutation to it.—But here there is an observation which I may perhaps be allowed to pause a moment in making. It seems to me that the change of constitution thus asserted in the nature of faith is connected with, and indeed indicated by, a circumstance that is actually of habitual remark amongst all of us, however little it be generally suspected of being in any way involved in a sort of explanation like the present. I allude to the double meaning that lies wrapt up in the very name of “faith,” and that thence causes the notorious confusion of ideas respecting it which it seems to me that nothing else except the explanation here urged can clear up. “Faith” stands at once for the sentiment existing in the breast of the believer, and for the form of thought towards which the sentiment is directed: for the belief, and the matter of the belief. And this is, I say, just what *must* have happened, if my view of the growth of faith be a true one. Both meanings, I aver, are by it shown to be in fact as legitimate and inevitable as common practise assumes them to be; while the only thing required is merely that we hold them distinctly assorted to the occasion. For while it was the state of things that the emotive material for the form was yet only in the act of accumulating, faith could only be pure sentiment. But it is evident that as soon as ever the accumulation had gained its sufficiency, and thence the half-mechanical, half-chemical, transaction had taken place which gave a new direction to its career, and a new, that is, an intellectual character to its substance, there must of necessity have begun to be in the matter of faith, henceforth to be considered, the two different kinds of operation, which belong severally to our separate functions of sentiment and of reason. And therefore must it have happened, that since that epoch it should have been, as it notoriously is, as proper a use of speech to say, on the one hand, that “our faith is the Christian creed”, as it has been, both before and

since, to say on the other hand, that our "faith is in God:"—so long, that is, as we always own to ourselves that the one kind of faith is of quite opposite nature to the other. I say, *since* that epoch the proper use of speech has been such; for before it had come to pass that faith had wrought out for itself a form, it is manifest there was nothing in existence of which it could be said that there was a creed to believe in.—The matter of faith, I say, is faith itself: it is only different just thus far, that it has been inwardly transmuted, and outwardly re-moulded, to the degree of giving it the substantiality and distinctness which enable the intellect henceforth to lay hold of it.

It was accordingly just the sign of this intellectual handling, in the origination to Christianity of its now familiar tangible dogmas, that formed the ostensible fact which makes us now sensible of what it was that constituted the culmination of the generalization. In ecclesiastical history, the "turning-point" is indicated as that which occupied two or three centuries,—say, from the second to the fifth of our era. During this period the collected essence of human religious needs, let us imagine, was occupied in the working out of its transmutation into the matter of intellectual scrutiny. But after it was over, let us suppose,—*now* was the event such that the Christian creed came forth and presented itself as first finished into what might be accounted a well-compacted whole:—a whole, namely, that had moreover a life in it; and that had a life in it just *because* there was also a plan in it. And for the very same reason too, was it farther that which fame has so loudly reported it to be,—an acting thing in the world;—a genuine individual force;—and continued to be such (shall we fix the period?) for the space of ten centuries. But how was it when the time arrived for a Luther to be called into being?—That time arrived, I would say, for this reason, that now had begun to set in that which could not in the nature of things but occur as the reaction from, and necessary counter-action to, the heretofore prevailing of the original stage of synthesis in the matter:

namely, the stage of analysis. For whatever is intellectual, as we have supposed the transmuted emotion now really to have become, *must*, by the very fact of its being such, be henceforth subject to that process of dividing and sub-dividing which indeed alone is intellectual action, properly so called. And accordingly, as soon as this stage *had* set in, the whole of Christian faith, already dogmatically marked out as it was, could not do otherwise than fall, constantly more and more conspicuously, into the parts so designed for it; in consequence of which at the time of the Reformation this ramification had, as we know, become so extensive, that not the minutest section of the creed was there that had not been brought out into day-light for investigation. But as soon as this *had* been done, is it not plain that the work of analysis, as far as the continued flourishing of proper Christianity was concerned, was really over? Decay was beginning, though still in the manner that had even a special haleness and heartiness in it. For not only to destroy, but also to take up, these ramified sections of the creed, one after another,—thoroughly to eliminate from them every thing that, long-lived as their parent stock had been, by this time bore upon them the stamp of a by-gone and now over-passed intelligence; and yet by so doing to be *also* effecting the preservation of the core of its degree of ripened genuine truth:—this, I say, none of us can miss to recognize to have been the proper function of Protestantism. Still Protestantism was thus itself but a thing of only desultory fragments at the beginning. I would say that it was truly the mere *heresy* that the Church called it, until there had arrived to it this, which did not however arrive till long after its beginning: namely, that it came to have the true consciousness of its mission. And *that* was surely,—as now we come to the point specially requiring our present notice,—when the anti-ecclesiastical principle, having worked its way through, one by one, the entire series of particular doctrines, had at last caught hold of the one general clue that served for

the interpretation of one and all of them. The attainment of this focus-like position of command over its own powers was identical with the acquiring of a scheme of its own to Protestantism, the destitution of which, previously attached to it, had been that which had caused the so-insufficiently-connected assemblage of newly-starting ideas to be hitherto but as a mere nothing on its own account. But the instant the attainment *had* been made, and the scheme *had* been asserted,—thenceforth precisely does the true reading of ecclesiastical history show, as I would say, that the antagonism to the proper form of Christianity had itself also become the distinct individual force, that in *its* turn could also act in the world with real historical effect.

And Butler is the person whom I have assumed to be the representative man who did so possess himself of this needful focus-station, and who did thereby bring into complete, though only beginning existence, the actual principle of Non-Catholicism. He it was who, during the fifteen years of his pondering over the composition of his "Analogy", first learned how to take the large practical view of Christianity that embraced every consideration respecting it in one grasp; and who consequently did thence gather, out of the vaguely-extended historical substance that it was as it lay before him, that actuality of recognition as to the Purport of it which, for all its negativeness of character, did nevertheless so truly afford him as it did the somewhat, which he could not help feeling sure that no impugnors to it that might any where arise would find it so easy as they might think it to set aside. He had brought the principle of analytic reasoning to a head; and, by means of it, did see the "somewhat" he was in quest of:—only, as I have to allege against him, he was looking upon the wrong side of it to enable him to judge of the real nature of it. For it was in the necessity of things that standing in the position regarding Christianity that I am showing he did, he could not but think that he was maintaining the proper form

of Christianity, all the time that he was making good the instrument really calculated and destined to destroy it. He was, just from the want of the knowledge that has only come to us now (as we shall see more particularly in the next chapter), looking upon Christianity as if it were that which it was not:—and was accordingly all at wrongs with himself in his whole dealing with it. There had been a precession of ideas in the character of Christianity,—the precession of the express reversing sort that I have been describing,—which had taken place since Christianity had really been the sort of thing which he still took it for. He thought the original composition of Christianity was that which would stand analytic reasoning upon; while in fact, as I say, the original composition was that work of merely synthetic feeling, which analytic reason, being essentially opposed to, *can* only in its nature destroy:—the work of destruction being to me, all the time, that which is explained and vindicated by the fact of religion's being the *growing* thing, the idea of which to Butler was an idea not yet above his horizon. And thus it is that I argue, however true it is that reason is not really opposed to religion, except in so far as the peculiar exercise of reason is naturally appropriate to the division of human intelligence which is naturally distinguished from religion in respect of its being by peculiarity science;—yet that most true is it, *historically*, that the reason which Butler used was opposed to the religion which Butler believed: simply because the due qualities required in each had not then been yet rightly assorted. And therefore I say that *his* setting up as he did analytic reason, in express collision with the embodiment of scarcely more than synthetic feeling which the Christian religion in historic propriety must be counted as being, was in truth, as to the prevailing and ostensible character of his work, nothing more than a carrying to its height of the destructive element proper on the other hand to Protestantism. I say, as to the *ostensible* character, both of Butler's work, and of entire Protestantism;

for, as I am trying to show, the latent character in them which gives the true value to both of them now, was of necessity hidden at the time. And hence, while Protestantism, as mere Non-Catholicism, was the matter of so far inferior duration, and of constitution so altogether incommensurate with the actual assumption of a position of true rivalry with the historic Church: it was,—and eminently Butler, as the finisher of it, was,—fulfilling a most essential work towards preparing the way for a Form of Religion to come, that in the true course of developmental progress might be, not indeed a rival to, but a veritable successor of, Catholicism. By his strong and firm exercise of Intellect upon Religion, Butler did for us what it is in the universal nature of Intellect to do: he directed mental effort upon the *abstracting* of the existing Form of it. He turned human thought upon the first loosening, and then separating, and lastly of sweeping away the rubbish of dead encumbrance that hitherto had been lingering upon the Form; and this was, I say, the clearing of the ground for the one now in waiting to be the occupier of it.

For,—let me return to say,—the position of argument adopted by Butler *does* indeed appear to me as exactly that which may be accounted for as I am here doing. The nucleus which he took for his scheme in the principle of Analogy, *was* that which, only regarded in an exactly contrary light, and taken as working in an exactly contrary mode to that in which Butler considered it as working,—*does* still form the nucleus for our scheme also. His decisive assumption of the broad natural ground of analogical probability as that which is the true ground for judging Christianity upon, shows itself to us evidently,—however little wittingly it may have been such to himself,—as virtually the making out of what stands as the final case against miracle:—which is indeed the same thing as the final case against the Catholic plan of Christianity, which was thoroughly and consistently based upon the principle of miracle. For, when he, by the necessity of his mode of

demonstration, made clear to the thinking world,—as surely I may say that it *has* been the verdict of the thinking world that he did make clear,—that the law of miracle, if applied to the whole of nature, as it must in reason be applied if it be applied at all, affords to us a view of nature which is only every where alike pervaded by difficulties that, so explained, are irreconcilable both with reason and with conscience:—when, I say, he made *this* clear, he left to us plainly no alternative to be any longer hesitated upon by us, but that the rejection of miracle, and of Catholicism *with* miracle, must be made by us forthwith and utterly.* But this is, in fact, nothing more or less than the acquiring of the experience which determines for us the matter wherein our own to-be-attempted scheme of explanation must characteristically differ from the Catholic. It is, in precise truth, a sketching out of our own scheme for us in the negative. And is not this the very mode of looking at the wrong side of the matter which *is* accounted for, as I *have* accounted for it, by the actual position which I suppose him to have occupied *within* the sphere of that which to be seen rightly of necessity required to be looked upon, as entirely past, from the *outside*?

By only following out Butler's plan of thought just in the reverse mode thus seen to be called for, I do consider therefore that this historical sketch of my own colouring shows that we

* In my Essay on *The Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy*, I have pointed out what I cannot help considering as the indication of Butler's own consciousness of the character of un-religiousness thus pertaining to his system; namely, the sort of hankering which he appears to have shown in the latter part of his life towards the un-intellectual positivism of Roman Catholicism. But such hankering, supposing it to have existed, is still more note-worthy from the present point of view. For, regarded in the light of general development, it appears as in fact a true testimony to what is always the need of genuine religion; though still it would be that which actual dereliction of intellectual perception always must be, a seeking of religion in the unhappy method of a retrograde direction.

shall really be working upon the very ground that he, and Protestantism in general, have been preparing for us; and thereby indeed that we shall be working out upon the very tracing of *his* negative, a scheme which shall in the end be, as it already seems to have the capacity of being, a scheme which shall have the degree of substance, and of destined duration within it, that *shall* entitle it to stand, positive religious system with system, as a true matter of comparison with Roman Catholic Christianity. For this at all events is made certain by the historical manner of viewing, that for an effectual comparison of *such* sort,—namely, of scheme with scheme,—it is exactly *not* with the semi-supernatural, semi-rationalistic mode of arranging his thoughts that Butler has adopted, that we must consider ourselves dealing. And hence our own thought gains thus much of regulation, that henceforth it is this characteristic type of Christianity only which we shall have to understand as implied by the “orthodoxy” with which we contrast ourselves:—though in fact it will never be more than that matter of general average in Christianity, which actually underlies Catholicism and Protestantism alike, that we shall here have any concern with.—But still, while the larger sort of continuity requiring to be made by our present scheme is thus only with the historically-certified standard type of Christianity, it is not at all the less on that account the necessity that the lesser continuity with Protestant intellect should have been made out, as I think that I have made it out. If religion is eminently *more* a matter of feeling than of intellect, still under the present view of religion, the intellectual part of the matter is, in the gaining of the new characteristic for religion, the thing that is upon the spot even the specially important thing with us. And therefore it is that I have felt that *without* the making out of this lesser continuity with Butler and Protestantism,—all the time that I condemn their fragmentary amendment upon Catholic supernaturalism as that which is nothing worth *except*

as leading to amendment in the mass,—I should remain destitute of that means towards the final gaining of the larger continuity, which *must* depend upon the showing that all their intellectual and therefore to a degree non-religious work, was still in regard to the specially intellectual mode of religion we are seeking, work that as far as it went was really done for us.—Let me, accordingly, now show, in a brief recapitulation, the manner in which my subject has, by means of this comparison, become thus far arranged.

The purpose I have now before me being to gain a general view of the nature of religious progress, it is evident that the watching of the method by which Protestantism characterized itself must be the directest aid we can have to such purpose; and what this method *has* showed, through the comparison made with it,—or rather that it has confirmed,—I should say is plainly this: that the progress never varies from being always that same event of increase to human consciousness in the matter that it has been theoretically surmised to be. What we are endeavouring to get at by removing the inadequate Christian scheme of what is the actual Scheme of Providence in the matter of human religion, is that we *may* adequately discern what that Natural Scheme is; but after all, the prime thing that we must recognize is, that there is no other actual distinction in the case of the different schemings,—though a most important distinction it still actually is,—than simply what lies between the consciousness and the unconsciousness of man's own always present working in the matter. For the fact, according to my mapping out of it, is merely this, that during the synthetic part of the construction of the generalization which I take to constitute Nature's Scheme in the matter, the very circumstance of man's being but the blind agent that he was in effecting it, was that which alone and in itself compelled the practice we have fallen into of attributing it to Nature, and not to man. And if this is so, as it seems to me evidently so,—then, I say, it is also self-evident that the

deliberate human effort to understand the work that was in course of doing, which constituted the latter analytic or *de-structive* side of the entire operation, could only, in the very manner of it, be that forming of schemes in regard to it, the rights of which *must* be, that in the end the mind framing them should come to know both them, and that at which they aimed, as its own work. For it is clear, that at first even these deliberate schemes to know what had to be known, were but an unconscious sort of schemes:—just as the consequence of that special semblance in the nature of religion of its lying *apart* from the individual minds dealing with it, which I have endeavoured to account for (p. 78). And accordingly it was the overcoming of the semblance which could alone bring the required adequacy with regard to their own intention into these schemes. For the reason that formed the scheme was at first but a semi-reason:—it was only that which we have seen to be intellect in its merely first, or purely subjective, stage. This it was which employed itself in the original creation of the proper formal substance of religion, the body of dogmas:—which had no sooner been devised than, by the fact of their being devised, they constituted henceforth what stands as the intellectual skeleton of Christianity,—its creed. But this original layer of human scheming to understand the Scheme of Providence could be but the *first* layer: the substance for farther scheming to rest upon, and,—much *more* than to rest upon—to *operate* upon. And the manifestation of the fact was that just dwelt upon: namely, that while the original, or proper scheme of (Catholic) Christianity had its range of Providential duration down to the time for the Reformation, the only thing that was in waiting for it to come to the time of its cessation, as a governing scheme for human thought, was that a new and better quality of reasoning power should come to be developed in the human mind: which should be precisely when the intellect of man had acquired the faculty of distinct self-consciousness, which we have seen coincident with the arriving at the higher kind of intellectual capacity



constituting its abstract or objective stage. And I suppose that in fact it is only just *now* that such stage is fully reached ; when, accordingly, a new scheme that may give a new version to the former scheme,—an abstracted essence of all that was valuable in the former scheme, and under conditions that will enable it to go on developing itself into a form as altogether nobler as it is a more intellectual one,—has the capability of being produced to purpose. For while the first Reformers had but the beginning prescience of the need of such version, without more of synthetic material at hand to them towards the construction of such new scheme, than was barely sufficient to effect nothing more than their own bit-by-bit improvement upon the former ; not even the final Reformer who set up once for all the principle of Analogical Reasoning, as that which had the rightful sovereignty of acting as the controller of any and every scheme that should henceforth claim to set itself up in matters of religion, was able to do more towards the work, than—*except* for the laying down of this principle,—just showing to us, precisely in the way of a warning, what is that which our scheme, to be successful, must *not* be.

And now, having taken this first, or historical, aspect of the matter, it is necessary that we should turn to the companion or inner aspect. For, in fact, has not the need of the latter made itself sufficiently obvious even thus far, in the perplexity which it must be apparent that I have been striving to overcome already in the last paragraph?—I mean, in regard to the verbal difficulty of fitting words to thoughts naturally at variance with one another as they actually stand : which difficulty, in regard to the leading terms here in question, is, as I have so repeatedly insisted, the special phenomenon that is the ostensible signifier of the change in our state of mind. For, observe:—if, in returning to the matter of the larger con-

tinuity with previous religion which consists in the comparison of entire system with system, I endeavour to express what is the inner spirit of the contrast thus to be perceived, I find it to be just that which on the first general presentation I may indeed unequivocally state thus: that our feeling now in the new system remains, to at least a certain extent, homogeneous with former religious feeling, at the same time that our rationale for the feeling has become exactly reversed. But the instant that I seek to show what I intend by this assertion, the yet un-mastered equivocation starts uppermost. For the reason why Christians hold their religion to be divine, is, that it is *opposed* to what is natural and human; while we, in exact contradiction to them, acknowledge a divineness in ours, precisely on the sole ground that we find that it is natural and human. And thus it is evident that the making out of a more accurate definition of these terms has become indeed the very matter that is at present identical for us with the obtaining of the inner aspect of our subject. It will, in fact, as will immediately appear, bring us to the consideration of the mode of regarding religion in a general light, which has been as notoriously set forth by a set of thinkers opposed to the theological method, as Butler's mode has been notorious according to that method; while yet, according to the present view, it is that which is equally needful of present correction.

This, then, I would say, is the fact that becomes apparent when we do examine the nature of the equivocation, and that, in becoming apparent, also explains it:—just that the mode of defining which to the orthodox was a thing of the utmost simplicity, has to us become the thing of manifold requisition which it is in every case the nature of matter of increased attention to become. For to the orthodox, if we consider, the meaning given to the word “divine” is obviously that which has no other kind of determination in it than simply the general one which consists in the superficial limitation bestowed upon it by the contrary general idea. In their whole religious

philosophy they have but one correlation of any import to be considered by them; and that is, the one between what is super-natural and super-human and what is merely natural and merely human. But from our point of view there are no less than three correlations to be taken into account. And they are, as I conceive, the following.—First, the one between the “divine” and the “natural”:—this, although we retain it from our orthodox custom, has nevertheless sunk into the secondary kind of distinction which relates only to the different mood of mind under which we consider one and the same thing. Both terms relate to the entire constitution of the Universe; but we use the term “natural” in speaking of it when the tone of our thought is scientific, and the term “divine” when it is religious: this is the sole shade of difference that we recognize between them.—But there is a primary distinction in the second correlation we use: that, namely, between the “divine” and the “human”. The distinction is that which arises to us when, in comparing the works of men with those of general nature, we find in the former a want of that orderly arrangement which we have noted as being the characteristic sign belonging to the latter. We come, by means of this comparison, to consider it as the characteristic of men’s works that they should be disorderly: that is, that their results should be isolated results,—results that are limited within their own sphere, and not carried forward into harmony with general results (—for this, it seems to me, is the essential character of disorder, as assuredly the recognition of it is the essential point of development-principle—). If we take the well-known line as an illustration, “To err is human, to forgive divine,” the interpretation that I would give to the poet’s meaning is this:—Whereas error is a thing that occurs to man while he follows the dictates of his nature only in their ordinary state, which is that of inorganization into the obedience due to general ordination; “to forgive” is a thing that implies the rising into the superior condition to which it is proper to ignore all merely personal



considerations, and to judge in the same way that an universal spirit might be supposed to judge.

But now the third correlation is one that takes altogether new ground, not so much as broken up by the orthodox, but of the quite peculiar significance with us which might thence be naturally expected. And that is, the one based upon the comparative merits of one class of human operations compared with another class of the same. With the orthodox there was no distinction except that works such as were not divine were human. But we, in addition to this general, or outer limitation, have an interior one. From our new meaning of the word "divine" we see that there may be *degrees* in the human attainment of the quality: human works may be severally more or less divine. And of course the same holds good as to that absence of divine orderliness characteristic of nature, which (absence) is characteristic of men. Hence, according to the true rule of classification, seeing that the proper term employed by our language whereby to express human operations in general is *art*, it follows that whenever this characteristic humaneness is the thing that we want to signify, in contradistinction to the divine-ness which is intrinsically the same thing as natural-ness, we have to express the former by the word *artificial*. The correlation between the *artificial* and the *natural*, I say, is exactly the one which meets the need of our case now that we have learned to regard the construction of religious theories in this light of their being simply works of human art, so unthought-of by the orthodox. While to the latter there could be but one interpretation of God's ways, that of His "word"; and but one interpretation of His "word", that of His immediately-infused spirit: to us there is the plan of a succession of interpretations,—call them "revelations" if you will, but at all events of individual entire systems of explanation, apart from, although essentially bound up together with, one another, and ascending in their degrees of value according to the ascending character of the mind that creates them, or to

which they are "revealed". Which of these expressions we have to use depends upon the aspect we are regarding. We are now attending to the human aspect, (as a little while ago we attended to the general,) and therefore the proper phrase to us is that the human mind is the actual creator. And this new correlation gives us exactly the term that represents for us that difference between one genuine religious creed, and another also genuine in its way, which orthodoxy had never the need of representing.

Observe how happily the genius of language helps us to the kind of distinction we want, by its expressing here, through its means of terminology, that quality in Art which all our hitherto-gained experience has taught us to know as the special defect in Art!—Art that is perfect ought to call no attention to its being Art, such as *is* implied as being called, by the application to it of the character of *artificial*.* Perfect art ought to approach so closely to nature, (—that is, human operation to general operation,—) that however requiring to be distinctly perceived as different from nature,—without which it would not *be* Art,—it shall induce us to take pleasure in hiding the fact from ourselves, and cajoling ourselves into the self-delusion of calling it *natural*. There is a world of beautiful ambiguity wrapt up in the idea, and which, from the very fact of its being such, makes the charm of it to us:—asserting by it, as we do, for the instant, that our own domain of fancy, wherein we reign as sovereign creator, is really a nature to us of our own, boundless and perfect as that model one, which we choose to hide behind us, in this our temporary exultation of self-expression. But the more prominent design of the term *natural* is, that the

* It is true that the proper correlative to *natural* should be *artful*, if the word were ever used by us in this sense, as I suppose it was originally used. May it not be inferred that when the nature of art has been sufficiently analysed, the original sense will be restored, and thus the newly-required correlation be obtained in addition to the former, between the *artificial* and the *artful*?



Art contained in the work considered by us is banished out of our consideration by its own perfectness. And so also, notoriously, does the employment of the distinction hence in itself imply the arrival of the speaker at a point of view respecting Art, where he is upon higher ground than that upon which no such distinction was felt to be needed. For the rude artist, whose work is in the highest degree *artificial*, is the one who also finds a merit in its artificialness; but none the less is it true that it is the accomplished artist, who makes it his most strenuous effort to hide his art, that is still the only one really conducing to the true honour of his art. And yet at the same time that this avoidance of artificialness is the express aim of the latter in regard to his own works of art, it is he who has also the more perfect consciousness than any body else, how inevitably necessary it is, as the general law of the matter, that all practice of art should begin by going through its season of artificialness at the starting.

Apply this to Art in religion, and see how through one apparent paradox after another, the clear image of progress marks itself out through the identical phenomena. I have said first that Christianity is divine because it is natural. I said next that although it is natural, it is also artificial. I finish by the crowning paradox, that precisely because it is artificial it is all the time natural. That is to say,—and how do all paradoxes melt away in the saying of it!—it is nothing but what is in the natural and divine course of things, that human efforts of this, as of every other kind, should have their stages of imperfection at the beginning. It is as right and proper in the constitution of our creeds as in every other work of art, that there should be artificialness in the first instance, however the same quality is seen as deserving of condemnation when we measure it by the intrinsic standard adapted to an advanced position of religious art.

It is exactly this kind of condemnation, and no other, that I conceive we are required to adjudge with regard to Chris-

tianity, when we hold it up as we are required to do by this new principle of ours, as no longer an instantaneously-conveyed impression, a sun-painted image of Divine truth, but henceforth only a laborious striving towards such portraiture on the part of man. Looking upon it, as now we may do, as a specimen of such striving, which from its thorough accomplishment of all that belonged to its own "scheme", may be counted as an entire and finished work of human art, we find that it is still but an *artificial* piece of art.* It is not that which has to be condemned as *false* with regard to the aim set before it, but as that whose mode of fulfilling its aim was defective in proportion to the defectiveness of the instrumentation employed for the purpose. The scheme of it is unmistakeably over-burdened with, and disguised by, the disorderly nature of the portion of humanity under whose hands it had its beginning construction. As the symbol for the expression of human needs that was devised at the time when those needs were of the nature of the most selfish animal instincts, it has a coarseness, and cumbrousness, and obtrusive conspicuousness of selfishness in it, that can only be repugnant to the finer kind of consciousness which belongs to the religious nature under culture. And with regard, moreover, to the peculiar charm that I have just referred to as the proper indication of high art, *this* also is here present, and with a flavour, truly, of moral exquisiteness in no way inferior to the æsthetic. Superiority in art, I have said, comes with the consciousness on the part of the artist, at once that his work of art cannot and ought not to be like nature, and yet that he has to direct his best efforts to tend towards making it so. And so is it, I urge you to observe, with creed-formation, under the present view of it. The human mind, setting itself to body forth its needs, desires to do it with an

* So also I would say that Butler's "scheme" of Analogy was an *artificial* scheme. His plan of the interpretation of Christianity had the very same sort of defect that I believe to find in Christianity itself, as the interpretation of Nature.

absolute truth. But this is impossible to it: a symbol of truth is all that lies within its ability. And such symbol is religion:—while the true character of religion is, that by means of it the aim of man is reduced to the limitation of seeking to bring his own sense of things into harmony with the general sense of things, attributed by him to God. But religion, on the other hand, is by the nature of it that which is appropriate to man only in so far as he stands *apart* from the generality of things:—his symbol must always be a human symbol, and can never be a general symbol. And thus the human mind, in the constitution of its religion, must to the last be sensible within itself of a tone of difference from the general harmony, that, for all its efforts to conform, will persistently appear either to sink it below, or to raise it above, the general pitch, according to the mood under which it is estimated.—Perhaps, in fact, out of such vibratory differences comes the real quality that is the essence of the universal harmony!—But, in order to have such an effect, the oscillations must assuredly be only of the gentleness which belongs solely to the “artful”, the delicious, species of equivocation here pointed out. The strong contradiction asserted by orthodoxy between human apprehension and divine apprehension, was that which could only produce from the alternation the sense of most grating discord. And herein, accordingly, I argue, do we possess ourselves of the real instructiveness to be gathered out of this parallel with general Art: namely, that it does thus give to us so precise a feeling of what the character of the amelioration is that orthodoxy is in need of.

But then, as I have intimated, this æsthetic mode of estimating religion, so utterly un-orthodox as it is, has at the same time its own peculiar danger to be avoided;—which danger, however, has nevertheless, as I have to allage, *not* been sufficiently avoided by æsthetic thinkers. The sole possibility of gaining real benefit out of the parallel depends always, I conceive, upon our confining it to the aspect of the matter to

which it is alone appropriate; while, if not so confined, the reason appears to me equally clear, why not only the parallel must mislead us, but why it has moreover within it that special quality of repulsiveness which I cannot help agreeing with the orthodox that all correct feeling in the matter must of necessity take exception against. For, to consider creed-formation as a work of human Art *except* upon the individually-human aspect of it, is that which falls expressly under the condemnation which rests with the using of an *in-organic similitude* where precisely the contrary was the sort in a special manner required. Creed-formation taken as a general fact pertaining to abstract humanity, of necessity demands a similitude that shall take into account the effect of Time regarding it. And for this reason nothing less than the idea of Growth can in any way serve for it. The similitude of human Art, *so applied*, is therefore, from the mere mechanicalness of its suggestion, that which is and must be of the degree of inadequacy that on that very account cannot but be repugnant.—It may indeed be retorted, upon first thought, that the very same objection applies to the individual aspect. But, upon farther consideration, the difference will soon make itself evident. It is quite true that there is an effect of Time present also in the matter of individual creed-formation; but still it is to be noted that it occurs in that smallness of proportion to other effects, which causes that, in conformity with general rule, it may be *allowably* ignored. For, reflect:—an individual man, working out his creed for himself, does most truly see it painting itself, by gradual increase, upon his consciousness, in the very mode of an ordinary picture in the act of becoming completed; while the other side of the matter, which if it did occur to him would break up the resemblance, is that which in the nature of things scarcely ever does occur to him:—just because rarely, if at all, does it happen that the individual creed-former lives to see his finished picture in the natural act of thenceforth analytically dispersing itself! And if this be true of the individual man,

so is it also exactly in the same way true of the mass of humanity considered individually. For the entire labour of abstract humanity towards this same object, *before* we generalize it, is nothing to us but an accumulated succession of such individual pictures, each of them requiring to be judged of in precisely no other than the same light in which it appeared to its individual creator. If one man, looking upon his own creed, sees it as a picture, so does the mass of individual men see the general creed, upon the side of it next to them, as a general picture. But, on the other hand, the express character of the generalization upon religion which comes, or ought to come, when religion is looked upon *as* a generalization, is by its own peculiarity solely this, that it enforces upon us the dropping of all suggestion of the individuality which, though it has occurred, is now (chemically) obliterated for it. This altogether changed estimation of religion must be taken solely upon its own ground;—and that is, as a growing thing, with a life of its own: amending itself, indeed, in a true relation of regard to the needs of its several upholders, but still entirely severed from any unity of composition with those individual creeds of dying men, which died out in fact each of them together with its separate creator.—And yet, neither, again, does the generalization itself live for ever!—for here is the point where the present view comes into its two-fold collision with Positivism and Orthodoxy at once. If the generalized result of human creed-formation *were* such as lived for ever, æsthetic Positivism would have, after all, the same right to its mechanical figure, of religious creed-formation constituting the finished work of Art effected by the general mind of undying humanity, which Orthodoxy has, on the other hand, in attributing the same to the immediate workmanship of the pencil and fingers of Deity. But in so figuring out their thought, I say that both of them will presently find themselves at issue with the tracings of the really divine design laid out by Providence; and not only, as just seen by us, in human history, but as we may

now also see, in the right reason of the matter. For whatever has an independent *life* of its own, *must*, in right reason, have a corresponding *death* also specially its own. And therefore,—I finish my argument,—just as much are Positivists bound to admit the recognition of this natural termination into their estimation of the character of the natural production of Christianity, as the orthodox of Butler's school are bound to admit it upon their own ground of Analogy. The conception of the disciples of Comte as to the abstraction of Humanity painting out its one reflected Image of Self in universal Religion, is indeed the necessary first stage of the view here aimed at; but I argue that the preciseness necessary to its being an adequate conception, cannot be gained until the actual division of the stock of Religion into the marked stages existing upon it, is also allowed for in our principle. And these stages are only to be recognized through what is here insisted upon: the at once breaking-up, and maintaining, of the undeviating line of religious progress, through the life and death succession of abstract forms, that thus *does* actually fulfil the analogy with concrete existences in the most perfect manner that theory can require.

This then forms the completing of what I must call the first faint outline of my scheme. The seeing, as I have just done, how the death of the Christian generalization is a fact the proving of whose natural authenticity is as important as the proving of that of its life, is the obtaining of the hint as to the actual limitation of termination, which combined with the previous limitations as to origin, and general constitution, makes out in a certain way the conception of Wholeness which has been desired;—while, as to the peculiar character required in the conception, *this* also has been added as far as can be done in the mode of general indication. For is it not evident,

that if Christianity,—the truly defined Form of Intellect which I am asserting it to be,—has really been that gaining of a certain regulated scheme on the part of human thought as to the dealings of general Providence with men, especially in regard to the “difficulties” found in it, which I here take it for: so also it has been in so far shown as the eminently *noble* thing which it lies within my purpose to prove it?—while all that I shall be able to add henceforth farther to the same effect will only be a deepening of the same conclusion: that is, all which I can say in the way of showing that subsequent scheming of men has only been the carrying on of the work of which Christianity made but the beginning. Thus far, therefore, I consider that my proposition is made out. But yet more than this, I have also gained the general character of that which is to be considered as the outward sign of the need of farther scheming being required to take the place of Christianity.

For if, putting the opposite views of the matter together, I inquire *wherein* consists the *artificiality* in the Christian mode of symbolizing out the character of Providence, the answer has already been brought out in every direction, that it is accounted for, as universally as obviously, by the originally pervading custom of Catholicism,—thence only bit-by-bit expunged out of Christianity by Protestantism,—of over-laying the subject designed to be symbolized by the purely arbitrary supplementation of the idea of *Miracle*. What true artist is there that does not at once feel, by means of his own special instinct, that the *unity of design* which he knows is every where that which really distinguishes genuine Art from that which is not genuine Art, cannot by possibility co-exist with the supposition that *Miracle* pre-supposes: namely, that there can be in existence at once more than One order of things! And, accordingly, as long as there remains this most un-necessary pre-supposition in religion, to the slightest shade of a degree, it must be protested, as I *do* protest, that the proper character of *Miracle* is still present, repudiate it in words as

the most rationalistic self-imagined naturalist may! — But it is manifest, I repeat, that for the last three or four hundred years, or ever since the Reforming influence set in fully to operate upon religion, the holding of the gratuitous assumption has been becoming incessantly less firm. Miracle as to the theorized nature of Deity has been constantly vanishing into mysticism:—the three persons in the Godhead, not three but one, have more and more been changing from the realistic image of the three acknowledged divine incomprehensibles, into the image of the human mode of comprehending, or not-comprehending, those incomprehensibles. Miracle as to the moral fact of the taking away of Sin, has been constantly merging itself more and more entirely into the method of ordinary improvement:—no longer does Christ lift away bodily the heap of human transgression in a single effort, that has no recognition in it whatever of the need of Time; but it is becoming constantly more and more intimately admitted that any such removal, if it *could* have been effected, would have had a result the direct contrary to what is known by us as improvement. And so of all other concomitant parts of the Christian scheme. From one and all Miracle is being daily shelved away as an idea that in fact simply impedes our true understanding of whatever matter is associated with it; while, as the corresponding fact, just as the artificial device *does* thus, and with accelerating speed, fall away, and become forgotten, so also *does* the natural element that is freed from it, take upon itself a new kind of increased strength and coherence.

But then, *if* this be the case,—now comes this farther question to be asked:—why then, if *this be* the case, must there, after all, occur to the Christian scheme such catastrophe of conclusion as that which we are now figuring as its *death*? If Christianity be indeed thus capable, as it has hitherto shown itself to be, of casting out of itself the element of error that has been all along the damaging part of its constitution, what is there to prevent it, when that error shall have once been fully

banished, from remaining as a thing that, so far from having done its work, and coming to an end, may on the contrary go on enduring and improving itself for ever?

To this question, however,—pregnant of signification as it is,—an answer, both definite and as I believe sufficing, lies already in waiting to be returned;—though, from the matter into which it will lead us, it is one which it will be better to reserve to be treated in a separate chapter. There is in Christianity, as I shall there have to maintain, a source of defect, deeper still than Miracle, which is even *so* deep as that Christianity can by no means rid itself of it as long as ever it continues to be a Form;—though yet,—for this is also of equal need to be noted respecting it,—it is that of which the obviousness is not at all less observable than the profundity. For nothing could be a more effectual proof of the perfectness of the scheme, as a scheme, at which the Christian Form has arrived, than this is: that the transcendental root of decay within it, as I would call it, *has*, in spite of its depth, and the pure metaphysicalness of character consequently belonging to it, nevertheless attained to the depicting of itself upon the very surface of that Form. And yet that it *has* done so, is so immediately visible,—at least upon the principle here adopted,—that I think I may safely say that no one, looking out for it with such purpose as the present, could for an instant hesitate as to laying his finger down at once upon it, and saying,—“*Here* precisely is it that Christianity has been tried by Time, and found wanting.”

CHAPTER II.

THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN CHRISTIANITY WHICH HAS NECESSITATED ITS FORMAL DISSOLUTION.

It will at once be understood by those who are accustomed to the rational analysis of the Christian system, that the error of which I speak is that which is represented by the ecclesiastical dogma of the "Fall of Man". It is here that, as I allege, there exists a dilemma of self-contradiction and of inherent self-destructiveness so palpable, that no one who will fully consider it, and who will fully resolve with himself to do justice to it, can rationally admit any opening for alternative to the catastrophe of dissolution. The case, as I would state it, against the dogma, or rather against the system containing the dogma, is this, that an assertion is made by it as to the absolute facts of human history which, although it is contradictory to all that has now become scientifically known as to those facts, has nevertheless so perfectly interwoven its consequences through the whole substance of Christianity as that they can by no possibility be separated from it. Alike the perfectness of the scheme, forbidding the elimination that would save it, on the one hand,—and on the other, the transcendental character of the error, making any process of gradually softening it away out of the question,—combine together to place the dogma specially embodying the error beyond the reach of rectifi-

cation. Any degree of rectification short of flat denial would be attempted to no purpose; and yet, if the doctrine *be* denied, Christianity must logically fall to pieces.

This conclusion seems at least theoretically so inevitable as to make any demur to it appear impossible. The only doubt, one would say, that can exist in the matter, is that which lies within the statement of the dilemma. But even there, surely very little is there needing to be said, in the way of strengthening propositions, that scarcely any one would be found at the present day to dispute. With regard to the scientific side of the matter, asserted as cancelling the doctrine of the "Fall", I have indeed nothing here that lies within my purpose to do, except just to assert it. It stands to me as an established fact, which, let those question it who may, is to me involved in my very principle. But neither upon the other side does there seem any thing material in the statement that requires support. Hardly can it be needed to go over the old, well-trodden ground, to show how this doctrine is a fundamental and all-pervading one. It is probably because the ground of argument in proving it such *has* been so abundantly well-trodden heretofore, that it has become the prevailing custom with Christian writers now-a-days to ignore as they do any necessity of farther attending to it. And yet, in their practice of eschewing the old track,—though everybody will agree with them thus far, that it is an eminently desirable change to set aside former discussions upon "Plans of Salvation", while this is done only for the sake of the better method of upholding Christianity, which consists in discussing "Plans for the working out of Salvation",—it cannot but be perceived that there really is a slur cast tacitly upon somewhat pertaining to the making out of the logical foundation. And this, however it may occur, does certainly imply a point somewhere at which we must make a stand; since the casting of a tacit slur is obviously incompatible with that rendering of "full justice" to the matter before us, which I have made one of the postulates of my assertion. But the fact is, that there is one

part of the question, upon which our consideration is now requisite, that I believe, when we have considered, will show even the occasion for this slur. We are not now upon personal ground. Our aim is only that of enlightening our own perception as to what has been the general continuity of thought amongst the minds that have successively carried on the working out of Christianity. And therefore even when personal blame or personal merit seems to arise before our view, its only purport is now to guide us towards the defect or otherwise in the principle concerned.

The point I allude to is, how it was possible that a logical foundation with such an express contradiction to natural truth contained even in a latent manner within it, could ever have been rationally adopted as it was for their religious scheme by rational men. You perceive by this stating it, how there *are* in fact involved in the point personal considerations, though still the requirement is, as ever, to keep the personal subordinate to the general. For this reason, therefore, as on every other account, we shall do best to recur again to Butler, and continue to take him as the standard mind in the matter, to the consideration of whose method of proceeding we may confine ourselves. For upon this especial point of the systematic foundation of Christianity, at all events, there is nothing which prevents him from standing as the exponent of the entire body of rational defenders of Christianity, without any distinction whatever; since there is no class of them, Catholic or otherwise, that does not accept the idea of the "Fall" as an understood condition of their belief: Unitarianism alone, which does *not* accept it, being that which perforce must upon this logical ground be excluded from forming any part of proper Christianity. And with regard to Butler's individual qualification for this representative position, we have, on the one hand, that known resolution of his to see the whole truth of the matter that was to be seen, which in itself gives every where the true stamp of a mind that *deserves* to be a standard mind; and on

the other, we have the peculiar evidence of the needed nicety of intellectual perception, which is afforded by his virtual (if not actual) acknowledgment of the insufficiency of the proof on which he nevertheless rested;—while it is also the case, requisite for us, that the historical circumstance upon which he did rest upon this point, was such as has been in no way affected by the subsequent discoveries that have so eminently affected the other parts of his scheme.——Thus, then, dealing with him, let us, in order that we *may* make his experience avail to us, consider,—all the time that we are expressly remembering how his experience could *not* be as our own,—what, however, the position of mind actually was, in which he found himself, when he desired to lay out the plan of his "Analogy". I believe it may be stated thus:—Scripture, which presented to him a revealed religion that was (as he considered) in harmony with natural religion, and in so far was supported on that ground of internal self-consistency which he (justly) estimated as the strongest of all *a priori* proof of its absolute truth, gave to him as the ultimate cause of that revealed religion the asserted fact of mankind's existing, prior to that revelation, in "a state of apostacy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin."—Now it is obvious that this offered him but two courses to pursue. The one was to set himself to compare the assertion of Scripture with the general history of mankind; and according to modern principle this would have been the legitimate course, which would indeed have ended by showing him, as we think, how utterly Scripture was at fault in the assertion. But this treatment we see was not that which was chosen by him. The intention of the "Analogy" was on the contrary limited to showing how, assuming that Scripture was right, or at all events could not be shown to be wrong, a consistent theory of Providential arrangement might, with whatever defects, still, as a mere theory, be in some measure substantially made out respecting the entire fact of the case:—for all these limitations to the character of his theory Butler himself admits.

And, judging by the event, perhaps after all he was by this choice of proceeding conferring a greater benefit upon the world than he could have done in the other way. Nay, judged in this light, it would even seem *certain* that he must have done so. For it is evident that he was thereby fulfilling a need that had become one for mankind as well as it was one for himself: that need being to get their belief fairly spread out in the manner of a rational scheme, if only that they might see whether it could stand the hitherto un-needed process; and if it did stand the process,—as to a certain measure it *did*,—that they might farther see what, if any, were the defects in it,—as we say there actually were defects to an abundant extent. And now, for our special purpose, let us see how this theory, under this representation of it, stood with regard to the fundamental matter of it.

Having begun by taking the assertion of Scripture as to man's apostacy and ruin, as upon strong presumption from the character of Scripture a statement of absolute fact, he adduces as the external support to that presumptive proof, (and that, merely as it were incidentally, in a passage occurring in the Conclusion to his work,) the following:—"The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances; inferred, that human nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and, in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the world, these appearances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it";—while in another passage he explains that the real original source of the belief which he thus obscurely alludes to here, was the existence of a primitive revelation, respecting which he says that "there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history" (*Analogy*, Part I. ch. vi.). This is, if I am not mistaken, the whole of importance upon the subject to be found in the book.

Now, if we look upon this treatment of the subject in an argumentative manner, nothing is easier than to show the meagreness and inadequacy of it. If it *were* an absolute fact that "the sense both of their condition and duty" had become "so greatly corrupted amongst men" as Butler supposes it had, certainly it *was* most logically necessary that this should give occasion, as he said it did, for "an additional dispensation of Providence". If mankind had really no power implanted within it to right its own mistakes,—to amend its own deficiencies,—in a word, to *grow* in mental ability:—then truly it *was* a case that required the new sort of system which—not however in the asserted harmony with, but in express contradiction to, the former system,—must be "proved by miracle", and contain in it "many things appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected"; a dispensation "carried on by a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world". But then to say that the world had no power to recover itself, was the begging of the whole question; since the statement of Scripture, until it had undergone its own trial of proof, was no more than its own statement. And to take as a sufficing confirmation to this the mere tradition, or hint of a tradition, that he does, is the resting of a conclusion of such amazing magnitude upon a basis of such utter insignificance, as seems almost enough to raise our moral indignation, and cause us at once to repudiate the rank we have assigned to Butler as exhibiting a standard mind.—But this mood, I say, is entirely changed for us now that we are coming to recognize in *his* thought that which naturally had to develope into our own. Under the larger view that belongs to our present principle, there are a multitude of considerations to be taken into account. To every mind, whether then or now, it is not the following out of any one consideration that is the thing required, but the striking of a true balance between considerations; as well as the dealing with them in right order. To *our* modern inductive sense, Butler's theory, in its lack of external evidence, lacked

that which had the only right to constitute it the rational theory it was intended to be. But the fact *to him* was that the position occupied by Scripture rendered a true inductive sense impossible. A dogmatic theory, in so far as it was such, required no support at all from human history, and in seeking it even to the degree he did, Butler was actually false to the real character of *his* theory. We must observe, however, how careful he was in *his* mode of seeking it. He did not in the least bend *his own* attention towards the fact to which the tradition referred. The only fact he regarded was that there *was* such a tradition;—which was indeed sure ground in itself, and such as I have just remarked has been in no way subsequently impugned. There *was* such a tradition, namely, of both the fact of man's apostacy, and of the knowledge of it having been communicated by revelation;—and Butler, looking back upon it in the light of his Christianity, esteemed also respecting it that it "fell in with natural appearances." The real strength to him of the evidence therefore always remained within his Christianity. It was not only Scripture that asserted the "Fall", but Butler's Christianity that also asserted it. And remembering how much stronger the weight of his religious feeling was to him than his desire towards historical knowledge, we cannot wonder, nor even blame, that the balance was struck by him as it was. The logic involved in his religion told backwards, with a force that was inevitable.

But, more than this, there was the difficulty occasioned to him by the non-assortment as yet of the grounds of evidence which are respectively external and internal. We must bear in mind that in the "Analogy" the basis of man's apostacy is not the only support to the logical belief in Christianity, but is associated with the internal basis which consists in the human instincts on behalf of a just government of the world, and of a destined future life. The three matters are woven together; and by their being so, as I have to object, are made to lose their true value, and even, if the case be duly reasoned out, to

nullify one another. And here, let us remember to observe, we come in fact to the point which, as I suggested, accounts for the slur cast by modern writers upon the external basis. They have probably felt that the internal kind of "revelation", offered as the testifier of Christianity, was incomparably stronger than the outer kind relied upon conjointly with it by Butler; and yet that the fact of there being an inner "revelation" constantly present with man through his instincts, is an effectual exclusion to the idea of his "apostacy", which was the purport of the other "revelation". Hence they have naturally let the latter go. But then, with what consequence?—at least, with what *tendency* to a consequence that must in the nature of things follow?—Is it not evident that this relying of theirs *solely* upon the one-sided matter of internal evidence, must end by the reducing of religion purely to that figment of the human mind, which our natural feeling tells us is a non-reality? It is a leading into the ground of what I should call real Scepticism and real Atheism: from which the actual preventative, and the sole preventative, is the appreciation of the symbolic character of religion as it has here been described; since symbolism of right and essentially preserves, and does *not* let go, the due connexion with outer fact, notwithstanding its increasing the distance of the connexion. And the danger of this event was truly latent in the theory from the beginning; just as the other danger, of falling flat into collision with historical science, actually occurring to it, was also latent. The source of it, unsuspected then, is, as I believe, the natural contradiction which by the law of our mind must for ever set apart inner experience from outer; and which under proper mental regulation is the true means of all our growth in knowledge. The impediment to its true regulation is, however, precisely this supposition of the experience thus gained having come *directly* from God, and therefore having no need of the correction proper to all human experience. It was the assumption that the ideas in question were matters of express "revelation",

that really is the only thing which has made all that there is of difficulty in the matter. If *this* assumption be only set aside,—and also if the considerations be attended to with their proper distinctness, and in their right order,—I think we shall easily see, how the difficulty in dealing with the dilemma, that was indeed so great in Butler's time, has even entirely vanished away in ours. I will, accordingly, now state the manner in which I am myself here proposing to deal with it:—that is, as far as regards solely the historical basis. For the internal one I leave to be considered when alone it seems to be naturally called into consideration: namely, when in the course of things it shall present itself in connexion with the actual interior details of Christianity.

The fact is that I find, provided it be taken in my own manner, the very same historical basis that served Butler will also serve me: being taken, that is, in exactly the reversed fashion which the reversed nature of my rationale, for the due accordance with itself, of necessity demands. "For when it is thus taken, it happens, as the change of aspect cannot *but* cause it to happen, that the very matter which was fatal to his theory, turns to become what is the strength of mine. I take the floating tradition, just as he represented it, and find nevertheless that precisely the existence of such a tradition is the very fact in the world's mental history, which according to all reason *must*, under the new light of the conviction of the law of progress, have been that which gave occasion for the new "dispensation" of Christianity. Just because it *was* a *false* tradition, was there need in the world of a *true* one. If the world had started with a correct notion as to the mode of its own divine ordering, there would have been nothing to set it upon meditating to find the means of acquiring one. Christianity would not have been wanted, and Christianity would not have existed. That there should have been a tradition upon the subject at all, is just the fact that shows this much, that mankind had begun, in a certain rude and inadequate

manner, natural to barbarians, to arrange their conceptions in the mode of a religious generalization: and this, I say, *was* precisely the beginning that gave Christianity something to proceed upon,—or, which is the same thing, that gave to it an adequate basis.

The vagueness of the fact, you perceive, is so far from being an objection to the sort of theory that I am proposing to build, that it is altogether in its favour. Dogmatic theory, though it did not in the least care to prove what *was* fact, nevertheless required the supposition of absolute fact in the matter of the tradition. My theory is addressed merely to understanding the growth of the mind's manner of forming its own religious ideas; and therefore the floating, untrue notion contained in the tradition, is the very basis that adapts itself to the theoretic organism by which I hope to supersede all the former dogmatism.—But then, am I upon my guard as to the other side, which requires of me to prevent this basis from being a *merely* arbitrary one?—Yes, I return: because even while I do thus call the notion contained in the tradition a false one, I am always meaning nothing more than that it is *relatively* untrue. I do still believe, that is, that it had the certain relationship, however distant, to absolute fact, which I take to constitute the essential character of all symbolic ideas whatever. And it will presently be my object to explain, in what this to me so sovereignly important a point, of actual relationship, consisted:—being to me, as it is, that which I feel to be giving the positive quality of *reality* to my creed, the possession of which is the peculiar matter that I offer as its advantage over the phantom-like unreality which belongs to the opposite method, of taking human ideas as *mere* figments of the human mind. But for the present, it must suffice only just to refer to it in this way of mere assertion.

Thus then, I think, has been shown what we required: namely, how the needed continuity with Butler is really still

maintained by us, (upon this express point before us,) even in our contradiction of him; and so how we are really justifying him, even while we blame him.* But there is this of singularity, as we may also observe, not without an even special desirableness of being attended to, how by this means we are actually, as it were, turning the tables upon his position in another matter. I mean, in the practical moral that has been derived by him out of his theory. Acknowledging, as he does, the lack of demonstration afforded by it, he concludes, we remember, that the Divine Author to whom he attributes it, must have expressly planned such lack of demonstration in order to try the faith of men; and thence accordingly he infers that it is the *duty* of men to believe upon insufficient evidence. But, if the above be correct, we have seen that just this very kind of obligation, though indeed an entirely mistaken one in this way that Butler took it, as a *morally-religious* one, was indeed a *true* obligation in his own case as an *intellectual* one. For the result we have come to about him is precisely this, that he was compelled to form a theory upon an insufficient basis; and not only this, but compelled moreover to give the facile credence to it which is a positive delinquency in reason:—just because there was upon him the necessity,—the Providential necessity,—of forming a theory of some kind or other. The human mind of his age was feeling that it could not get on any longer without trying to understand, what Catholicism had been on the contrary so quite contented to do without understanding. And therefore it seized upon the basis it was looking out for, mere prejudice as it was, just as it came to hand, and made the best it

* The difficulty of here dealing with the *blame* and the *no-blame* of the matter, is one that can hardly escape observation for its striking illustration of what I have called the law of contrary aspects, arising out of the effect of Time needing to be taken into account, in addition to the proper matter of approbation or non-approbation. It is scarcely possible to steer expression so as to keep quite clear of running foul upon self-stultification, either on one or the other hand!

could of it, simply because no better was to be had. What else, that was more advisable, could have been done? The prejudice was strong enough to bear the sort of arguing that Butler wanted to put upon it. Nay, it has held together for the same purpose till—even till just *now*, when truly men *have* come at last to perceive that it will bear the arguing upon no longer:—when they feel it to be, in fact, slipping away of its own accord beneath their feet. And this, I say, *has* been the real *duty* of the matter, and the real following out of Providential indications, if only it be observed that men must, farther, continue the same spirit of obedience, and not now close their minds to perceive the new sort of indications that have come about. Quite true is it, I would argue in the very spirit of Butler, that although *then*, believing as men did upon insufficient evidence, they believed upon peril to their faith, still they believed in the manner that Providence then would have them. But *now*,—I cannot refrain from urging the remonstrance:—so changed is *now* the state of the case, that to go on relying upon that same shaking basis any longer,—even tacitly,—is become a rashness of such obviously wilful blindness, as cannot help being exclaimed against as even an irreligious insult that Providence itself is being made the object of!

Yes:—it was indeed natural enough that a speculative thinker, a century and a half ago, should hold himself excused from opening up the whole ground of ancient history and natural science, yet unexplored, before he should begin to arrange his rule of conception as to the matter of religion and morals that was so much more of immediate interest to him,—that was indeed of immediate exigency to him. But is not the case different now that all that work has been done! Providence itself, we may say, has revealed that which was before only dimly suspected as requiring to be known. The discoveries brought to light of geology and comparative physiology, on the one hand; the principle of development, historically blending those new lights into a consistent system of general interpreta-

tion, on the other; acting together as they have done upon the sphere of theology, notwithstanding their action being of the outside kind that it is, have still succeeded in so undermining that sphere at its false foundation, that henceforth it is notoriously no longer the rational defenders of Christianity merely, but the whole body of Christians, that cannot, in spite of themselves, help owing to their feeling to the very centre the movement of the giving way, going on in the mass underneath them:—which mass once having tumbled, nothing plainly will be, or can be, left for them to cling to, except exactly these now-scorned abstract principles, which so happily the world's thinkers are now occupied in making fast for them.—For this is the image *in terrorem* that *will* occur, notwithstanding the manifest artificiality of it.—But why, let us ask?—Why does it so necessarily occur, except for this reason: that there is really an artificial obstruction raised by the conduct of the present day, which does indeed act as a preventative against Christianity's following out the natural course that is the one proper to it? Why should not Christianity be allowed to die the natural death that must be proper to it, when Providence tells us so plainly as it does that the time is come for it to die! If this natural course were allowed, and with real piety submitted to, there would be none of this sensation of inner tremor, and of outer convulsion. One form would pass away, and another would come; and, except the watchful thinkers, scarcely would there be any member of the religious community of men, who would be called upon to pay any attention to it:—save, indeed, for this, which most certainly has no terror in it, that all of them would feel that breathing of a new and a larger life within their religion, which would assure them, that the old foundation, in its departing from them, was only giving way in favour of another altogether better.

But here there arises another point, lying upon the scientific side of the matter. I cannot help thinking, that as soon

as we do make the full admission to ourselves of the analogy of the course proper to the Christian creed with that of all natural organisms, we are led into the means, if the analogy be duly carried out, of even perceiving the mode of that entire ordering of the first framing of it, in respect to the underlying agency concerned in it, with which, if history has indeed nothing to do, yet most certainly religious science is called upon to inquire into. The former shows to us the putting together of the Creed as effected by the ministration of Fathers and Councils; and this indeed is the giving of the sort of consideration to the subject which does make the religious Form a literally human construction, instead of an organism. It makes it a logical *building*; and it is the rights of the matter that it should do so: seeing that the express effort of deliberate intention on the part of men towards the forming of their own Creed, which is the object of history, is represented by this figure in its own exact propriety;—for all its having been charged just now as a *fault* in orthodoxy so to have reduced the matter of religion. It is again the need of distinguishing the separate aspects which is the thing in question. For observe this:—the orthodox notion which I am combating was, not that *men*, but that the *Divine Author* of their “Plan of Salvation”, had so produced it, as that He might be thought of as piling one piece of logic upon another piece, in order to it, in the same way that in reality human thought *had* had to do: which sort of edifice, if it had existed, was indeed such as could not have come to the sort of natural death which I have said it ought to come to; but which instead would really, if it were destined to an end at all, have arrived at it by the very means that I have reprobated, of a merely mechanical crumbling away, and falling to pieces. But what I am urging is, that this figure, *except* in the historical mode, is utterly out of place as painting the true course of the matter. Upon the present scheme, all sign of arbitrary deliberation is that which as expressly requires to be absent from our generalization

respecting the growth of religious thought, as it is absent in the event of growth as it occurs—*before* history begins to do its human work upon it. For the way in which God *really thought out His plan*, is by our principle not so much as attempted to be fathomed; while all that does actually present itself as an indication of that plan is, we see, altogether free from what we habitually consider signs of direct or express intention. The natural construction of Christianity shows from the beginning as having been matter of the purest impulse. It was all along a work of *feeling*;—not only in the original gradual assimilation of external impressions, but even also, after the transmutation of character undergone by them, in the very acting of the human deliberate intellect upon them, which converted them finally into the form of completed dogma. And now the point which is my immediate object is this:—In history, the dogma of the “Fall” was notoriously the last of all the dogmas constituting the Creed that came to its full perfection. We know that it was not perfectly made out, as to the logic of it, till the time of Augustine, at the beginning of the fifth century. Is this, then, the contradiction that it seems to be, to the asserted fact of its forming intrinsically the logical *basis* of Christianity?—Certainly, proper logic would say that it was so. But then I, who am in this manner of viewing repudiating proper logic, seem to discern how that which is opposed to logic, and is actually the right method of now viewing my subject, *does* show how this very circumstance, looking so illogical, is really only a filling up of that which I suppose the right thing to be filled up,—namely, the analogy of organic formation in general. For I appeal to physiologists, whether it is not the case, that there is every appearance of its being the proper law of Forms, (so far as it can be guessed at hitherto,) that the organic principle which is earliest in its intrinsic assimilation, *must* thence on the contrary be the latest to make out for itself any development that is special? Because, the principle which is earliest of assimilation, must by the same fact be the one most univer-

sally diffused, the being of which is evidently equivalent to the being necessary to the general life of the organism: and therefore it seems but a natural consequence, that the very fact of its showing itself outwardly in the manner of a special development, when it does do so, forms in itself the proof that its power as an universal component is coming to an end:—seeing that, of necessity, as soon as the general organism *has* parted with its general component principle, there can but be for it a general setting in of decline. And,—supposing that this really is a true view of the case,—just in a similar way is it, I would say, that we shall find an altogether natural reading as to the event of the Creed. The final formalization as to the “Fall”, coming as a key-stone to all the rest, is that which I suppose to give the entireness of perfection belonging to its intrinsic capability, which, precisely from such character, is also that which, once having been obtained, leaves nothing more in the way of growth, to be done, except only that new kind of inner growth, solely possible to be carried on at the expense of the outer part’s decay.

Nay, we may even go at once to the very depth of the cause of existence to the organism at all, including its entire course of transmutation and resolution. Is it not true, I appeal again to the same physiologists, that the identical fact which I have assigned as the acting motive with Butler and his compeers for the framing of their religious scheme,—namely, the “intellectual necessity” of the case,—is really one in harmony with what must be estimated as the actual cause of universal forms? *A present need to formalize upon a foundation that will hereafter be found an inadequate one:*—is it not surely upon occasion similar to this that all forms whatever must have been originally called into being! Forms are everywhere that which expressly by the temporariness of their existence, have it in them to fulfil the universal purpose of nature which consists in growth.—Limiting ourselves, however, to our immediate object, it is at all events plain how the

analogy of formation in this respect, derived from the attributed cause of the orthodox interpretation of Christianity, holds good with regard to what I am attributing as the cause of Christianity itself. It is the very same necessity that occurred to Butler that I am conceiving to have occurred, only minus the intelligence, to the actual originators of Christianity. Just as Butler was obliged to begin his theory of explanation, under a so far defective as to be absolutely mistaken view of the natural facts of the case: so also I suppose were those myriad creators of Christianity, whom we have imagined, obliged to begin their unconscious working *towards* the dogmatic construction of the creed of future ages, under a defective and absolutely mistaken view of the natural facts that had served to themselves as the basis of their own state of belief and emotion. They began their creation of Christianity, not indeed because they had a *dogmatic* belief in the "Fall",—that was a thing to come hereafter;—but still because they had a generally diffused notion of it. And thus, I would say, did it come about, that just on account of its falseness did this notion give to them the mental discomfort which impelled them onwards for the correcting of it:—which correction, however, when it was at last found out, as it must be found out, to be nothing possibly less than an utter extinction, could only end in the dissolution of the entire work,—though, indeed, a dissolution which must still be gradual, on account of the time which is required for the correcting and destroying influence to establish itself generally within the circle of the various departments of human cogitation. So that by the same time that the decay has completed itself,—or rather step-by-step preceding it,—will also arrive the completion of the transcendental rectification.

And this brings us to what I consider an entire simplification, as to the general view we are now taking of what is condemnable in the matter of Christianity. For the element of Miracle, which we have seen generally to represent the whole

of the rectifiable portion of the error contained in it, we now see to have been altogether the consequence inevitable upon the original defect. Our examination of Butler has shown us, how what in the last chapter was said to be deeper as a defect than Miracle, may now be set down as the ascertained *cause* of the latter; while our hint as to the science of the matter suggests the likewise inevitable process as to the mode in which the elimination of Miracle, at the same time that it is rescuing and preserving the latent truth obscured by its artificial coating, also prepares, and finally on a sudden, effects, the reversion of the false foundation,—which very act constitutes the laying of a new one. And the advantage of this manner of drawing out the case to me is this most desirable one: namely, that I am now enabled at once to set forth the actual purport of the scheme upon which I am about to work, side by side with that which I am endeavouring to supplant, and thus to show precisely wherein lies the general parallelism and asserted superiority which I lay claim to. The case between the old principle and the new, I would say, stands simply thus:—Orthodoxy asserted that Christianity consisted in the presentation of a Divine Mediatorship to make up, in a supernatural manner, for what nothing else could make up, namely, for the effects of a supposed state of human ruin, believed in on the faith of an earlier and inferior kind of revelation to its own kind;—our Comparativism asserts, that Christianity was neither more nor less than the Natural Medium, by which has been carried on the work that, according to all the probable inference that our experience is able to make on the matter, could also not have been carried on by any other means: the work, namely, which truly implies the exact contrary to a “Fall” at the base of it, consisting, as it does, in one uniform course of ordinary moral improvement.

This definite comparison, then, now gained, we shall scarcely have occasion any more to refer to Butler; but I cannot quit him without adding this farther word, as to the peculiarity of the

method of arrangement to his thought which his theology forced upon him; and which was, as I conceive, so obviously to his disadvantage, as that I need not doubt of general sympathy in setting it forth as such. I mean, the compulsion experienced under the theological mode of thought,—and experienced by defenders and impugnors alike, and still more in the mood of private meditation than in that of controversial discussion,—of carrying over any difficulty found incapable of being disposed of by ordinary considerations, thereupon immediately into the dread region of “metaphysics”. No means allowed was there under this inexorable rule of the case, of pronouncing any verdict supposed to be sufficient for the justice of the matter, unless first the unhappy phantoms of Free-will and Fate,—condemned spirits for at all events this, that they have proved *themselves* the indubitable Origin of incalculable Evil to human brains,—had been duly evoked, and ad libitum tormented, upon one side and another of the question! And thus accordingly has even Butler, all averse as he evidently is by nature to the principle of the spiritual torture, found himself constrainedly forbidden to carry through his argument straightforward as doubtless he would have himself have preferred, and as most assuredly would have been preferred by the majority of his readers, and has been instead compelled into that long parenthetical dealing of his, so puzzling to an inferior order of minds, with the “objections” to his scheme “which men may fancy they have from notions of Necessity.”—Now, from all such “metaphysical” diversion, the present view entirely exonerates us. We have turned our back upon the dim inane of “metaphysics”, technically so-named, once and for ever; and however all too airy our speculations may for the future be possibly accused of being, they will at all events have for their repose a ground that is solidly recognized as proper for human tread. The region to which we are bound is simply the legitimate one which concerns the historical matter of the course taken in the unfolding of human conceptions.

CHAPTER III.

THE PECULIAR STRENGTH OF CHRISTIANITY, WHICH HAS FORMED THE INTRINSIC CORRECTION TO ITS OWN ERROR.

BUT now there is another general matter which requires to be specialized upon equal terms with the preceding before we can yet proceed to details. In the last chapter we fixed our attention upon the basis of Christianity, and there marked out the precise error which showed itself logically as the cause of the decay of the religious form; we have now to make out, with such definiteness as we can, what there is in the finished condition of Christianity which, upon still the general consideration of the subject, gives us the right to say, with the positiveness that we have said, that the decay of the form is not also the utter extinction of the religion.

It will be seen, indeed, that this amounts in fact to only the same thing as saying, that we require to turn round and consider the identical matter of the last chapter in its contrary aspect. Already there we found it to be an essential part of the fact of the notion of the "Fall"'s being the basis of Christianity, not only that it pervaded in its consequences the entire substance of Christianity, but also, that the diffusion had for its result the logical contradiction of itself. And hence our present object is not so much a different one, as to show how to that same result there is another bearing, which

is indeed necessary to give it any actual pertinency to our subject. We are not aiming in religion merely to set ourselves right in a logical matter! The resting in such a sort of correction, if we *did* rest in it, would most truly be the token to us of an extinction of our religion. And therefore what we do indispensably want, is a correction that *shall* be of the properly religious kind: that is to say, one which is addressed peculiarly to our emotive and moral nature. For it is manifest that it is only when such a correction as this is present, that religion can be proved to have in it the force which has been here attributed to it: of going on, namely, to embody itself in farther creation of form, and by so doing of affording to us the same essential sign of continuity, now forwards, that we have before had backwards.

But this is evident upon the face of the matter, that a correction of this new sort is a thing of such utter vagueness as must entirely fail of the same kind of expression as the previous one. For although it is true that the transcendental cause of the notion of the "Fall" (yet untraced by us) was itself as vague as the matter we are now about, (—and if it had not been so, there would have been no means of that infinitesimal diffusion throughout Christianity which is the condition of our supposition,—) still the notion of the "Fall" had, through its final exhibition in the mode of dogma, obtained once and for all its appropriate rational terms, enabling us with all clearness to speak about it. But how is it in the present case? Tell ourselves that what we want to state is—how the human mind at the present day, represented by the myriads of its living constituent members, feels impressed upon itself the surviving result out of the experience undergone by the multiplied generations of constituent minds that have successively taken up the experience since the starting of the Christian form, with regard to this diffused essence of the form:—tell ourselves, I say, that what we want is the whole of this result brought together under a single phrase of intelligent expression,—and shall we not be

apt in the first instance, to laugh a little at ourselves for the modesty of the demand! It is in the nature of things that average ideas of the kind now required,—that is, respecting matter so little tangible as that of moral experience,—can, in the ordinary course of things, only grow up gradually into the general mind of the human race, and by no means be expressly invented in order to serve a special purpose. So that the demand now made, which is in fact that of the average quality in Christianity, which, when expressed, shall serve as representing the saving moral counterpart contained in it to meet the destructive intellectual mistake, may well seem at first such as can only rationally be set aside as absurd on account of its pure unreasonableness. And yet,—judging by my own experience,—the instant after we shall have so set it aside, may I not suppose that the same reflection will arise in the case of nine persons out of ten as this which has arisen to me:—the thing after all has been done for us, and is no more to seek! There is a familiar phrase, perfectly pointed to answer the matter of our demand, that has been lying in the mouths of all of us ever since Christianity began to be at all a thing of expression. Paul has told us,—or rather some disciple of Paul that at all events in this instance has manifested the genuine tone of Paul's mind,—that the spirit of Christianity is that which is “the spirit of power, and of love, and of a sound mind” (2nd Tim. i. 7). It might well have happened that Paul himself, the master-genius of Christianity in dogma, *should* also have farther shown the spiritual effect of his lightning conversion in this manner of a flash of peculiar moral insight:—giving, in this way that belongs to all genius, the central core of the matter, that has for the average minds of men to be only slowly elaborated by a long subsequent process, which, when it is accomplished, will but stand after all as the confirmation of the original expression. But still, even in such case, the test of the truth of the genius would have lain in that subsequent confirmation: so that whosoever were the words, they stand,

as I find them, upon the very ground, and no other than the very ground, that I require: that of an average general opinion. And accordingly it is better for my purpose that they should represent, as I believe they do, the feeling of early Christendom, rather than purely that of Paul. In any case, however, I feel that I may take them safely as that which I want: namely, as expressing in a manner hardly possible to be questioned, that vague something which I am wishing to speak about, but which a moment ago I seemed to have no means of speaking about. They say for me, what it has been that Christian believers, as the entire body of them, have felt in the sure way of their own living experience, as to what Christianity as a general influence has done for them. And this is furnishing me, not indeed with a logical definition, which would serve, like that of the "Fall", to dogmatize upon, if such were the kind of demonstration that we were bent upon,—but still with such as precisely does afford the manner and degree of distinctness that we do require for our purpose. All that is needful for me therefore to do, being thus furnished, is to show the method of my own appropriation of the Apostolic idea. I have to translate it, you remember, into the thought that lies outside of, and as I believe, beyond, the idea of Christian believers.

My argument, then, I would lay out thus:—Taking it as a basis of fact,—that is, of actual occurrence in human nature, proved such by the consenting voice of the whole of general experience that lay within the legitimate duration of Christianity,—that the general result out of Christianity *has* been the obtaining of a spirit of power, and love, and soundness, it follows that, previously to Christianity, there must have existed a condition of human nature that was deficient in these qualities: that is, a condition of feebleness, and fear, and of mental infirmity in general. But then, is not this moreover exactly what we have been prepared on former grounds to expect? Is it not, I ask, exactly what the moral instinct of all of us tells us *must* have been the condition, that by any means could have

tallied with the species of intellect, that, at the beginning of Christianity, satisfied itself with laying the erroneous basis for it? I argue that we have here precisely the meeting of the two ends of our demonstration, which proves them both to be of the true order. Such condition of unsoundness my whole perception, moral and intellectual, tells me *must* have been that which belonged to the human beings, who not only invented, but actually solaced themselves by inventing, a scheme of things which is to us so dismally the contrary to solace, as this gospel of degeneracy,—this doctrine of degradation,—contained in the aboriginal theory of the primordial “Fall”! For that it *was* a gospel to them, is testified by the very fact of their having taken it home, as they did, to their very hearts:—of which fact, again, the very existence of Christianity is itself the standing witness.

By this mode of statement, however, it is evident how far I am from carrying out the thought of my text according to what would have been the interpretation of its own day upon it. With regard to the Apostolic intention in the matter, my proposition has placed itself in the dilemma as follows:—While I accept the assertion of Paul, or of Paul's representative, as to the nature of Christian influence, as a tried and established one, I find it to be a counter-fact of experience, that this same proof has been gained at the expense of that fundamental portion of Paul's doctrine, which Paul himself would have been the last in the world to consent to part with. I come, in fact, exactly into the same kind of conflicting parallelism with the orthodoxy of the Apostle, that I have already come into with that of Butler. And it is obvious that neither can I do otherwise in this case, than say over again just the same that I did in the former. But then, I appeal even to the warmest Christian, wherein is the inappropriateness, if I do so apply the same kind of condemnation? My averment is simply this:—If Paul had had the same knowledge of the manner of the progressive culture of the human mind, which modern Psychology has

revealed to ourselves, he could not have helped seeing the total insufficiency, and even irrelevancy, of the cause to which he himself attributed that pristine condition,—namely, the theologically-conceived fact of the “Fall”;—any more than Butler could have helped seeing its falseness upon historic ground, if historic information had not been wanting also to him. Such information, however, being, as it was, eminently wanting in the case of Paul, he could not but rest contented with that dogmatical mode of handling the matter through purely subjective logic, which is here assigned as the essential character and proper intellectual defect of all orthodoxy. And in such circumstances, it is plain that the theological device which he actually constructed upon his own presumptive view of the case, was truly the most serviceable one that possibly he could have formed. Are we to suppose that Paul, any more than Butler, (—how much *less* so!—) was to have waited before he formed the theory of “Human Redemption out of its accredited Ruin”, that has proved its degree of absolute truth by satisfying eighteen centuries of human existence, just until the page of past experience had been duly unfolded to him up to the true requirement, unknown to him, of an inductive philosophy! No: he did the best thing that his Providential exigency permitted him (—for we shall see hereafter that by no means was there wanting to him the natural exigency that should impel him to his actual dogmatization—). He attributed the long course of improvement, of which he but saw the two extremes, —soundness with Christianity, and un-soundness with un-Christianity,—all in a heap, *directly* to God, where at all events he was safe in attributing it. We, thanks to that same Providence, have now the means, or somewhat of the means, of eliminating the crude *directness* out of the proposition; which operation, as I said before, will, as soon as it is properly accomplished, leave the natural truth of the matter behind unobscured, with only the one necessary destruction effected, of the transcendental falsehood of the case.

What we have therefore to do is, while availing ourselves of Paul's moral insight as our landmark, to concentrate our attention upon the *course* of mental history which his pure subjectivity (resting, as pure subjectivity always does, upon a supposed *fixed* position of things,) made appear so unnecessary to him; and we must try by this means to gain for *that* also somewhat of a definite image. That is, we must try to gain it in so far as the degree of definiteness shall not interfere with the *vagueness* that is really the only thing properly in place (—for such is the mode of distinction that pursues us of necessity under Comparativism!). It is the fact of the case, that the very circumstance of the incisive terms in which Christians feel themselves able to speak concerning their religion, is so far from being a credit to it from our point of view, that it is, on the contrary, the express sign of narrowness and real misapprehension in the matter. Accordingly, I repeat that there is nothing actually against the scheme now seeking as the successor to that of Christians, on account of this matter of the present unsubstantiality of the mere *general impression*, which is being taken as a really more fitting basis for the sort of moral argumentation now followed than the dogmatic assertion of Christianity. Christianity itself is here regarded as only a generalization which has gained its actual degree of consolidation out of a state of *mere general impression* to begin with; and hence the true accuracy in the treatment of it must be of the same kind. In generalizing upon facts such as these of mental experience, and of mental experience the greater part of the course of which, as we shall find, leads us into un-historical ages, whose exploring, in the lack of history, *can* only be carried on in the non-inductive mode of almost unaided subjective sympathy, speculation must be as purely speculative,—as completely transcendental in its character,—nearly as speculation can be. That is, (—always excepting the basis of analogical connexion with universal law, without which, speculation has no claim to real rationality:—) theory respecting such facts,

however wrought up into all the clearness that theory *as* theory permits of, must never for an instant be forgotten to be *mere* theory.

This sort of theoretic clearness is then our bounden immediate object: the finding of an image, namely, such as will really enable our thought to handle its matter with the kind of accuracy befitting it. And how are we to set about this?—Surely, in the same manner that all our general ideas are gained. We must make due comparison of our present general idea, with other general ideas of the same kind. We must obtain by this means a new general idea, that shall be still more general than any of them: a generalization upon a new and higher level, which from its commanding position shall suffice in so far to afford a real substantiation, as to all the rest, so, specially for our purpose, to the one we have in hand.

For this end, then, take the following suggestions, as showing the way in which I see that my own generalizing instinct has gone to work. Take them, I say, *as* suggestions; and then, if you will also consider them in the manner that is necessary to be observed,—that is, if notwithstanding the widely independent spheres out of which they are gathered, you will, as much as possible, hold them all present together in one single act of thought:—you will, I think, perceive, whether or not you accept it, what is the nature of the confirmation which I do believe that this aiming after a higher generalization will really in this present case afford us.

Begin, then, by taking notice of that first minor generalization which I have already tacitly super-imposed upon Paul's definition. Out of the three qualities given by him, I have instinctively settled upon one which I assume to be the most general, and in so far to include within itself the whole meaning that is essential to the other two. "*Soundness*" is that quality respecting which I have determined that, whenever I speak of it, I cannot do otherwise than consider that the ideas of "power" and of "love" are involved together with it:—this

is my first reflection. The next to be borne in mind is the suggestion as to the low moral condition, likely to have been that which was satisfied with taking the law of nature to have been that of proclivity. And next, à propos to the repugnance that this false notion as to the laws of nature must occasion you, bethink yourself farther to go directly to nature, and glance as to what actually *are* her laws. Ask her, expressly, what is her opinion about the matter we are now speculating upon. Beg her, now that we, her human subjects, really feel a necessity for some law as to the manner in which our mental growth comports itself, that she will *give* us a law respecting it;—and, having asked her, listen to the voice within yourself which I say you cannot misdoubt to be her answer:—"I have no law to give, but that which I have given; behold the lilies of the field, and the fowls of the air, how *they* grow." Finish, accordingly, by following out the reference. Cast your glance, far and wide, over the whole sphere of growth, bodily and mental. You will see, that every where is there evidence, at once, of this much of certain by way of rule, that the more developed any where be the substance, the more is it also *sound*:—of *this* fact, at all events, you will feel no room for a moment's hesitation. But what goes with the soundness? Raise your thought now, I say, in the manner proper to the forming of all general ideas; and the following is, I conceive, the suggestion that must naturally spring. The matter concomitant with the soundness, by which the more highly organized forms have their marked superiority over the less highly organized,—even latently surmisable if the forms be of the vegetable class, but at all events plainly to be noted amongst animals,—consists, eminently above every other characteristic, in the fact of their being able to stand erect, and (as animals) to look straight-forward before them, in the same direction as that in which when advancing their body requires to advance;—while, in the moral department of human nature, when we come to this top-most matter of the survey, the characteristic has a fulness of significance

yet more eminent than in any other department. The soundness intrinsically incident to the moral nature, is Courage: (—or, the ability to make obstructions in the road of advancing no actual hindrance to advancing;—) and what is Courage, in the apprehension we are habitually compelled to form of it, other than the noble strength of bearing which results from the having cast away the coward's sneaking tendency to be perpetually looking *behind* him?—Here then stop: put all these considerations together, and I ask if there is not present to you an inevitable anticipation as to what is to be judged of the kind of progress now in question with us?—Just in a similar manner, I conclude for my own part, does the strength derived to the human constitution out of Christianity consist in the mind's having learned, as the peculiar result of Christianity, to hold its attention turned away from an habitually dwelling, as the doctrine of the "Fall" implies it heretofore to have dwelt, upon the Past portion of Time, and in its having now acquired the tendency to dwell instead habitually upon the Future.

I told you that the idea I was in quest of was as transcendental as it was vague; and do you find it otherwise! The great difficulty in uttering it, I repeat, is only in finding how to say it vaguely enough!—Mark that I am speaking only of a *habit*:—just of a tendency, amidst the multitudinous oscillations of the thoughts within us, to rest with a predominant degree of vehemence upon the thoughts which lead us onwards towards events yet to come, and which it is therefore practicably desirable that our thoughts should be made to bear upon; rather than upon the thoughts which have reference to the sphere of action that, being over and gone, has by much not an equality of practical importance for us. It is *this* which I mean by having our mental eyes planted in front of our forehead, to look the same way that we are going. Progress is by the plan of Nature, according to the view we take of her by hypothesis, set towards the Future: human thought, to be in harmony with Nature, must thence, in respect of its general habit, turn itself

the same way. To look the same way as Nature looks, is, however, also by our hypothesis, the only genuine purport of Religion. Until, therefore, the human mind *had* obtained the soundness of constitution coincident with this religious habit, it was irreligious in respect of the true character of Religion. It was only in the state preparatory to its falling into the habit that makes the legitimate state of Religion. You see how, in fact,—I call upon you to observe once more,—how in fact I come round to the very same point with Paul, notwithstanding the more transcendental ground I have entered upon for my demonstration!

For, let me remind you,—in order to show you how this more transcendental ground does really constitute, upon my principle, the authoritative kind of generalization that we laid out to be sought for,—of what I have explained in my Introduction as to the intrinsic nature of mental growth. I have there stated (pp. 87—89,) that mental progress consists universally in the making acquisition of recognition as to the effect of Time; giving this as the manner of it, that the recognition comes as the consequence of an alternate passing from the mental attitude of emotional belief, into that of purer intelligence; and the reverse:—the transition being made by means of the creation of Forms; while the nature of Forms implies the existence of a *reverse current* in the vital flood that maintains them, occurring during the latter stages of their prevalence, compared with that which the flood bore in their beginning stage. Very well: then just such a *reverse current* is that which the change of habit above described, when considered as a permanent one, requires to be figured. It is a new direction given to the prevailing thoughts of men. And observe, that although in fact the progress towards the new habit is so gradual, that there needs but the supposition of one single degree of weight in the oscillations towards the new side of the matter, to give the preponderance which forms the determi-

nation of the habit:—still, looking upon the matter as a general effect, our thoughts cannot avoid painting the change of habit as that which places the state of mind in a total opposition to former state: just as we have been led to speak of the rise and fall of the tide, as an abstract occurrence to the whole body of the sea, notwithstanding the absence of any such occurrence in regard to the individual variations in the magnitude of the waves which really constitute the change of tide.—The propriety of the phrase then being taken as admitted, may I not also assume that it is evident how the present interpretation of the operation of Christianity is exactly the consistent continuation which the already-propounded scheme was in want of? As I before stated that the whole result of the Christian Form was the gaining of a recognition of the effect of Time in general, as to the matter in question: so I now show how, out of the two currents employed in the constitution of the Form, the one current adapts itself specially to the recognition of Time in one of its aspects, the reverse current specially to that of Time in its contrary aspect. While the Form, namely, is in the act of growing, or, otherwise speaking, while Emotion is prevalent, I conceive that Time is chiefly dwelt upon as Time in the Past; and, on the other hand, while the Form is decaying, or while the Intellectual fruit is ripening, I suppose that Time begins to be appreciated in its phase of the Future. And it is this appropriateness of arrangement, as I feel it to be, which seems to me to give the sort of sanction which I have alluded to, as that of which this sort of argument is solely capable.

But I may go farther,—at least, as far as the merest hint towards the fact may suffice,—and say, that this new character perceived in the transaction of Form-creation, gives us in reality the transcendental distinction that serves for the ultimate cause of separation at all within the entire field of mental operations: that, namely, which has sorted them from the beginning under the two great classes assigned as those of Science and Religion. For I would say that, as a prime definition, it is thus that it is

sufficing to describe them :—Whatever operation has its final result in bending the mind in the direction towards the Future, is of the nature of Religion ;—Whatever has its proper determination in leading the mind towards the Past,—towards that portion of Time in which the scientifically-discernible causes of all things that exist really lie,—is of the true character of Science. To the one belongs, of right, Aspiration ; Investigation, to the other. And by the present idea of the *reverse current* acting in all creation of Forms,—on the part of the one class as well as the other,—is it not at once conceivable how in fact *one* single impulse in human nature may keep both parts of human nature going ! While Religion is declining, the direction of prevailing force throughout the entire mind is that which, in the ex-religious part of it, is promoting the creation of a new Form of Scientific thought ; whose realization, as soon as it has been obtained, and whose decline consequent upon its realization, will form the contrary turn of the tide, which will thereafter be found to employ itself once more in the developing of a new mode of Religion. A two-fold operation—a grand oscillation,—that may be supposed to go on for ever !—and that, under the law of Progress, must for ever give a constantly deepened re-actionary impulse, to cause new Religion to fit itself correspondingly to advanced Science ; and new Science, in turn, to go beyond itself in order to compete with purer and larger Religion !—But I must not suffer myself, at least at present, to be carried away into so enticing a theme of anticipation. Considerations will presently arise that will, as I believe, essentially deepen this general hint of a scheme ; but as this mere outline it had better now remain.

This much, however, is indispensable to add for present explanation :—such an alteration as that contemplated is what can only *begin* to exist, as the permanent condition of the mind, *after* the alternation shall have been once fairly set afoot. And that is scarcely yet ! For, you observe that I am supposing Religion to be only just now arrived, or rather arriving,

at the character which gives to it its true footing. (Probably, the very same is also the case with Science; but with that I must not here meddle.) Till Religion had fully and permanently settled itself into the direction which made the Future a matter of greater importance to it than the Past, I consider that its proper career had not been begun. And hence, accordingly, comes the value that I attach to Christianity, as having been the actual means of so rectifying it. For all the whole history of Religion in the world hitherto, I take to be but in fact a mere preparation for the beginning of what will first be a real life to Religion!—Still, how many persons are there in the world that are yet ready to see this?

Let us now, however, settle down to the point immediate with us. If I have sufficiently traced my scheme as to its outline, this was only as the preliminary to the incomparably more important matter, of showing how it is not to rest as the mere metaphysical figment that it looks like at present. The pure speculation that I have thrown out as to the mode of the mind's growth, is, I must now go on to explain, not only that which I conceive to be analogically consistent with nature's general laws, but which has also, according to my own conviction, already expressed, that true relationship, of the requisite symbolic sort, with actual natural fact, which does indeed preserve it from the mere imaginatively-fictitious character, and give to it on the contrary the precise kind of substantiation which alone the case seems to admit of,—that is, a high degree of *a-priori* probability. I allude, it will be remembered, to the same real matter of occurrence which I have before mentioned as affording the basis for the primæval symbol of the "Fall"; and which consequently, by my own principle, *must* likewise contain in it the basis for my own present symbol. And this will inevitably bring us back into the legitimate ground of natural demonstration which can alone afford the true support to the above metaphysics. Let me repeat to you how the case

stands:—I have supposed that the human mind, in seeking to form a true generalization as to its own relation to the Whole of things, began by making a (comparatively-speaking) unwholesome and delusive generalization; and as the means which may be conjectured as having operated in bringing about the existing remedy to the mistake, I have offered the foregoing speculative solution. But the question obviously remains,—is there any thing in nature which may be considered as suggesting the source of the remedial oscillation? Assuming that the fact of Religion's beginning in a wrong direction *may* have been a sufficient cause, through the discomfort which it occasioned, of driving the mind towards the seeking of Religion in a right direction, yet still we must inquire what was it that *made* it begin by making such a mistake? Surely, if the idea be a valid one, there must be recognizable in it the determining influence which originally did necessitate this giving of religious importance to the Past, which, having occurred, set the mind of man off into the pendulum alternation that was to be so essentially concerned in its entire thereafter destination:—seeing that if the determination had been the other way, it would appear that, mental alternation being wanting, neither would there have been any creation of mental Forms, nor consequently any mental life at all, except the stationary one which would *not* have been life!—And, I say, there *is* such a recognizable influence. Not indeed immediately discernible:—it is true that at the first glance there is no directly ostensible cause why, seeing that the real design of the inspiring force in human nature is taken for granted as set once and for ever *from* the Past and *towards* the Future, the human mind should, nevertheless, have been compelled to start with a false impression as to the fact. But I am now going to show what I consider *is* such a cause:—and one, moreover, that, once accepted as such, has within it what, as I believe, cannot fail to carry along with it, in addition, the whole of the results that I have here made pending to it. And one, not now, I repeat, of the

abstruse sort. For if my foregoing theorization upon the general nature of Christianity, has indeed led me into subtleties that may naturally seem to many persons altogether too far away, for any likelihood in them, from having any real connexion, to be esteemed such, with so plain and practical a matter of experience as Religion ought to be to us: I shall, at all events, in what follows,—passing on, as we are now ready to do, into the interior examination of Christianity,—ask my reader for nothing more than to enter with me into ground that is, of all others, the most familiar and at home to the experience of every one of us.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIONAL VIEW OF THE DOCTRINAL NOTIONS COMPONENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

SECTION I.—THE NOTION OF THE “FALL”.

To get at the real and sufficing explanation of Religion's having acquired the sort of realization that it has done,—namely, that of a Form, needed to bring about the reversing of an originally false and discomfiting feeling of Religion,—it seems to me that we have only to recur to that matter of ordinary circumstance, which is in fact the one matter that prevails over the entire region of circumstance: regulating, as it does, in every department of nature, and, as is here maintained, without the least diminishing of the community of its application when it comes to be the sphere of Mind that we are contemplating, the very fact of existence's being the actual thing we find it. And that circumstance is, the ordination by which, in the linking on of the successive generations of individual beings to one another, it is in every case the rule of the matter, that the life of the Parent is made to over-wrap midway that of the Child.

For, as soon as we consider it, I urge that there is in this ordination that which *can* only be counted as the compulsion towards deceptive impression in this especial matter of the influence of Time, which it is simply impossible that the human mind should have escaped. It is surely self-evident, that the child, as soon as ever it begins to think, can by no means

think otherwise than that the being which has stood in such manifest position of superiority towards itself as its parent has done, should possess the same superiority in absolute fact. The case of its own condition is such, that the first striving to gain an idea of the relation between itself and its parent, when the child does begin so to strive, *can* do no otherwise than exhibit, upon the psychical image called forth by the striving, a precise inversion of the real truth of the case, as it has to be hereafter made out by the mind. And here, reader,—in spite of the familiar ground I promised,—you will perceive with me how necessary it is that we should hold ourselves clear as to what the gaining of a relational idea is. You remember that the object now immediate with us is, not how the child learns what its parent is to it, but how the child learns to *generalize*. I do not think it can be questioned that this matter of its relation to its parent is that which I assume it to be, the very first matter which must have called forth the effort to generalize; and therefore, proceeding upon the assumption, I now make the proposition,—which involves the whole of my scheme of the interpretation of Christianity,—that it is the proper character of all generalizations whatever, as of this Christian generalization in especial, to be determined in the same way as the original effort at generalization was determined; and that, not merely in the way of imitation, or of simply taking up a habit that had been once begun, but because a common necessity has in every case given the same determination. When the child,—the child of beginning rationality in the human race,—confined itself to the thought, "My parent is superior to me", it was making an assertion that may even be said to be *absolutely true*, inasmuch as there was nothing in it that advanced into a region of thought where first impression came into the conflict with absolute truth that should convict it of being *absolutely false*.—in other words, its assertion had as yet nothing that called into question the recognition of Time. But when once it went on to generalize, even thus far as to say, "My parent is a superior

being to me", immediately the falsity arose. And suppose it to go on to the extent of saying, "Fathers in general are superior beings to children in general", the falsity becomes manifestly all the greater in proportion. And I conceive the same event to be universal. In every forming of a relational idea, whatever it be, I conceive that the essence of the transaction is, the bringing of the original perception, taking cognizance only of the phenomena respecting Space, into one that takes cognizance of Time also: *beginning* with that superficial appreciation of Time, which Circumstance—the Circumstance of Parentage, which I hold to be as common to Ideas as to animate Beings,—renders of necessity an erroneous appreciation.

To make good this indispensable postulate of the matter,—this prime claim upon Universal Analogy, wherein lies the sole but sovereign strength of my principle,—I ought now to show *how* the Parentage is common: *how* it is that the rule of the matter is just as applicable in the region of mind as in that of corporeal life.—Probably, the proof has been amply made out already, if it were not that my ignorance forbids me to know where to refer to for it!—But, in fact, a very few words will suffice. The sphere of mind, as distinguished from that of matter, is, as just said, separated from the latter by the mere fact of its being now Ideas, instead of animate Beings, whose relation is inquired after. And farther to show how it is really the case that every Idea begets another Idea,—how every newly-gained image in the mind has had its parent image as truly as ever the human child has had its human parent,—I do not think it is necessary to go in fact much beyond what I have already said at p. 29. In every forming of a new image *without* a sensible object to paint from, there is the subjective necessity imposed upon the mind of fulfilling a conformity to some previous image, which is the actual cause that makes all abstract ideas in their nature to a certain extent *relational* ones, as they are. The *conformity to previous example* is the thing primarily aimed at. And is not this, I ask, precisely the same

thing as attributing an *authority* to that previous example, which is the essence of mental parentage? That previous example, already fully ripened in the mind, enforces upon the newly-dawning example a requisition to elaborate itself into likeness to the parent example, as that which *must* be done, before the mind shall go on to add new addition of improvement in this present case. And hence it is the fact, that though it is the law of the matter that the mind *should* hereafter take this farther step, which will actually nullify the sense of authority that was so necessary to begin with, the mind cannot, in the nature of things, be aware of the nullification before it does come. And this, I say, is the very repetition of the falsity that lay in the original type of relational ideas. While the new idea is forming, the already formed one hedges it round, and forcibly controls it; and this *is* being a parent to it.

It is even desirable to glance so far forward into the whole domain of the subject of ratiocination, as to catch a presentiment of the manner in which *this* great branch of human knowledge will afford finally (—must I say "*may* afford", or may I not rather say, "*must* afford"?—) exactly the same kind of large confirmation, that I claimed in my Introduction out of the history of Philosophy? (p. 15.)—I am now desiring to prove how the great religious generalization of the world could not help perforce beginning with that undue reliance upon, or worship of, the Past, which forms the essential spirit of Theology, but is essentially contradicted by Reason. And may I not say that the History of Logic has shown precisely a similar season of error taking place,—and even in the manner of constituting a perfectly defined era,—in the progressive *course* of men's practice of Logic? As long as logicians possessed it as the prevailing habit of their mind, that they should give the predominant degree of their attention to that stage in their logical development which consisted in working out the *conformity* to previous ideas, their logic was of the kind that rested mainly upon *Deduction*,—upon the following out of logical *authority*.

But as soon as the balance settled towards the contrary and better extreme,—of seeking out the New, instead of merely copying out over again the Old,—logic rose into the higher character that has acquired its name of *Induction*. And here also, as heretofore, I may make the always-requisite conclusion with regard to Development-principle: that it is *this*, and *this* alone, which reveals to us how the two stages, of first prevailing Deduction, and then prevailing Induction, meet at once with their only proper consummation, when it comes to be recognized how each stage was the right one in its proper place. If it was, as I argue it was, a moral falsity to begin with that undue leaning to past logical experience, the moral falsity could no more have done without existing as it did in the first place, than it could do without being reversed in the second place. —But this is a travelling too far, and perhaps too boldly, out of our immediate road.

Let us then now return to, and fix our attention exclusively upon, the matter of the primary example of the forming of relational ideas before us. My proposition is, as I beg once more to state it, that in the history of this formation, when we come to unfold it,—or in so far as we come to unfold it,—we shall find the essential explanation of the entire operation of Religion.

And, first, let this be the point that our thinking dwells upon:—How is it that we admit that this relational idea of Parentage, or rather of the progressive potency affected by Parentage, actually stands to *ourselves*, aided, as the idea actually has been, by the degree of enlightenment now possessed by us? Is it not the fact that it stands just thus:—*not* that we have altogether got clear of the original misapprehension, which indeed it is an utter impossibility that we should get altogether clear of, being the natural and therefore inevitable impression, as a *first* impression, that it must for ever remain to be;—but that we have learned, by means of our deepened

acquaintance with our own nature and that of mind in general, to reduce the overwhelming importance of the falsity which it had when first it took possession of the mind, into what is now nothing at all more than what we may call a pleasant puzzle for the mind? How else can we now think of the question, as to how it really is, that, of the two constituent parts of parentage, it is in fact the *child* that is actually the *elder*.being of the two! It is not a little curious,—one cannot help remarking,—how this unwonted idea, simple as it is as soon as systematically adopted, has kept continually presenting itself every now and then, in the course of literature, precisely with that forced and disconnected effect which comes as from an unlooked-for, and quite capricious, spirt of inspiration! Sages of old (if I am not mistaken,) began the propounding of the idea out of the depths of their own most solid meditations; but even at the present day, it still occasionally utters itself, as to the ordinary field of authorship and conversation, with the tenacious air of being an original remark!—We are going, however, at all events now, and here, to take it as that which has had all the originality long ago flattened out of it. It stands to us as, in its own peculiar sense, a mere plain matter of recognized fact. And, accordingly, being such, the question we have to proceed to upon it, is, as I have just said,—*how* and *why* is it that we have compassed the arrival at the recognition?

Notoriously,—we must answer,—through our being now able, as the consequence of our attained power of abstraction, not attained by the human mind in general until that mind had grown up to a certain stage of its development, to entertain the conception, only now fully established as a conception, of mankind as being a constituted *Race*. And for this reason: that, by means of this conception, and by that alone, can be done what of necessity requires to be done in the case:—namely, the making of the comparison, instituted between the lives of parent and child, at that special point in the lives of each, which in fact alone affords the just ground of comparison:

which is, obviously, the point of mid-vigour. Those persons who have as yet no power of abstraction cannot, it is manifest, raise themselves up to that ground; and are therefore self-evidently incapable of forming a comparison that can be a just one. And this, as it is the case still with the child and the unreflecting adult of our own day,—and as it must be farther the case, as a *surface* impression, to the very highest class of mind that mind can ever come to belong to,—was, to the beginning condition of mankind, the state of the case that was universal. But moreover,—for it is *here* precisely that lies the knot of the original difficulty:—those early beings had present with them no means,—no straightforward means,—of *arriving at* the requisite point. The express fact of their condition was, that the phenomena that in the first instance had to serve as their sole accessible guide, were such as by their nature could do nothing else than mislead them. How, we have to consider, was it that the infant thought of mankind, so circumstanced, could actually manage to effect its transit, as it *has* effected it, to the proper station where first it could learn how those fallacious phenomena could be interpreted rightly?

Plainly, the difficulty *could* solve itself only thus:—the struggling mind had to travel back, *through* the idea actually encompassing it of Superiority-in-the-Past, till it had as it were *turned the corner* of the over-wrapping parental influence, and thence recurred *on the other side of the latter* to the level of experience such as really corresponded with the experience from which it started. Thus, and thus only, could it really find the balance that lay equally between the parties whose cases had to be weighed;—while, as we have to bear in mind, the attaining of the just balance of the matter is virtually an identical thing with accomplishing the act of abstraction, which the primitive beings needed, but were incapable of. And let us also remember how the use of *reflection* is always, in fact, this same one of enabling us to see round corners. What else is the meaning of it? Reflection is universally the focus-like

blending of the lines of mental vision into the direction contrary to their primitive one, the spectrum afforded by which is what only in our impeded mental circumstances enables us to render the lines available to us. The true command of *this* idea, I repeat, is the only way of solving the knot of difficulty that meets us also still, as it met those primitive beings at first, interwoven into the entire sphere of our mental constitution! And, eminently, observe how it brings us into concurrence with two separate matters, each of them bearing upon our present subject, and that are moreover each of them of prime importance in their several departments. On the one hand,—that is, in respect of Psychological knowledge,—it is a result of analysis, little now disputed, that all Religious Forms are intrinsically of the character that belongs, characteristically, to acts of reflection, or imagination: the peculiarity of the mythological investment, as distinguished from the investment of ordinary ideas, being simply this, that in the former the image is permanently exhibited, as retaining, and upon a large and obvious scale, the character originally impressed upon it, habitually lost by the others. On the other hand, it is a result of Criticism, as certain in its way as the other, that the effect (intellectually considered) of Christianity, or of the one of Religious Forms which has the acknowledged right to stand as the representative of all others, *has* been precisely to convey that very kind of abstraction into the human mind which we here see that the human mind was exactly in need of. It was Christianity, namely, that first brought about the abstract sense of Humanity, which was the very idea of *Race* that we have just now found to be the thing in requisition. These two considerations, put together, afford, I say, once more the corroborative check upon the principle of our interpretation, at all events in the abstract view of it, that has the right to confirm us in our sense of its theoretic consistency.

But let us turn to the companion view of the matter,—to the moral, or individual side of it,—and see if the consistency is not

confirmed yet still more effectually. If the admitted purport of religious agency agrees with the present theory in its intellectual aspect, I think we shall be satisfied that the moral aspect of it is in harmony even more decisive. For consider: what *does* show itself to be the state of the case, as between Parent and Child, which our theory is concerned with, when, ceasing to look at it, as we have done in this chapter hitherto, from the *outside*, we try to gain a general idea of the experience in question from the *inside*? The ease stands undeniably thus: the two members of the correlation exist in the economy of Nature in the character of two independent egoisms, respecting which there is, for the express meaning of their being bound up together, this peculiarity, that in the universal struggle for existence proper to the essential nature of egoisms, *as* egoisms, the one member has at starting an overpowering advantage over the other. It must be remembered,—for the objection naturally to be made to this statement is so obvious that it had better be disposed of at once,—that in this matter of Religion with which we are dealing, we are concerned with that part of human nature alone which lies apart from, and higher than, the remaining portion which man has merely in common with the brute. And therefore it is that, as long as we hold ourselves to our exclusive subject, we are obliged (except in a certain limited manner, as will appear hereafter,) to appear to ignore what nevertheless we do not in the least really ignore:—I mean, of course, the sphere of the affections which are such as are rightly to be classed as animal or sensual affections. The necessity of holding the spheres apart, is precisely that we may come to be able at last to see the true kind of connexion between them. And to this consideration must besides be added, that the constituting of the superiority in the character of the affections generally belonging to human nature, as compared with the corresponding affections as they belong to the brute, is the very function that it is my object here to attribute to man's possession of Religion,—the specially-human

affection that the latter incontrovertibly is: the one species of emotion that alone has the peculiarity of being adapted to consort with the pure intelligence, which, also, no other being than man has any share in. Here then, I say, —putting these considerations together,—we have our case made altogether complete in its statement, and in a guise which surely no one can find fault with me for rejoicing in as I do, on account of the perfect harmony which I find it to bear with the long hitherto-established mode of the general appreciation of Religion. Assuming, as I say we must, that the original human sense of the relation between parent and child was, in regard to the very peculiarity of the human-ness of it, that distressingly painful one which so unevenly-balanced a relation could only prove itself to be: then, I argue, the amelioration to the suffering, obtained, as is here supposed, under the influence of Religion,—or, at least, of Religion of such character as is here attributed to Religion,—is a supposition whose fitness we may well feel to give a degree of the needed self-consistency to our scheme, that we ought in fact to take as sufficing. The galling sense of the suffering could, by the natural law of things, only result in an unceasing effort towards the rectification of the natural unfairness of condition which was the source of the suffering;—the existence of such effort, under the circumstances of beginning human life, could only cause for the infant race a kind of moral atmosphere which, compared with our own, we now see to have necessarily been one altogether pervaded with feeling of bitter instinctive hostility: and of hostility (—for let us not omit to notice this, which is eminently the part of the matter that is special to our purpose,—of hostility) that was not only directed on the part of one section of human beings towards the other section, but that was also directed on the part of both sections towards the Maker of human beings in general;—and, finally, the influence required to soften the hostility, of both sorts, by the bringing of that sort of hostility which is the fundamental sort into just

the condition of merely emulative and helpful rivalry, which we know to be the most desirable condition possible for different sections of human beings to lie under, is precisely that which we have experimentally learned through Christianity to have been actually established as in living operation in the world: namely, the influence by which the relation between the contending parties is gradually becoming ennobled, in the manner of the conversion of its pristine bitterness into the newly-instituted substitute for it, which is the spirit of Love; and of Love of the kind which, from the henceforth spirituality of its nature, is as truly religious in its character, or capable of being directed towards God, as it is certainly also deeply appropriate to the strictly human occupation of the sentiment, as mutually entertained between fellow-beings.

The universal function of Religion, in the most transcendental sense of it, is that it has to bring the human soul into a conscious acquiescence with the position in which the human being is placed:—this is an assertion which no one will for an instant dispute. But I conceive that an equal indisputableness belongs to the following:—that the most universal and deepest of all sources of human discontent, and difficulty of reconciliation with assigned position, lies with this distribution of being in the mode we are considering: the source of discontent being transparent to us upon the face of it, when we consider what the nature of the distribution is. For it is this, that things are so ordered, that the course of being, taken as a whole, consists of successive generations of being, of which the condition of existence, as pertaining to each several generation of them, is precisely that each one shall strive to maintain that permanence for its own existence which, if it *were* maintained, would destroy the condition of succession upon which the existence of the whole, as a whole, has been established. Here, accordingly, we have what it is impossible for us to avoid recognizing as the one deepest dilemma of all, which all others that we have, or ever can have, to deal with, *must* rest upon, and take their

determination from, as their actually ultimate foundation. A compulsion, constantly in force, through which each generation of being,—each individual member of the generation,—has been made, by the very necessity of the life breathed into it, to desire its own permanency, and yet which has been commanded, without power of resisting the command, to yield up that which it desires in favour of a new one!—through which, parents have no means of escaping to surrender all their actual advantage up to the possession of children, who, owing all to them, have it in their birth-right to supersede them!—through which, children have thence their own share of actual enjoyment to such extent cramped and crushed, in effect of the parental jealousy, that what ought to be the pleasure-bestowing means of improvement, has been experienced as a practical torture!—through which, as the inevitable consequence of all this, there has been engendered, on the part of both classes of sufferers alike, a general spirit of rebellion against the ordination which has made the discord necessary:—*this*, I say, is the one fundamental fact of the case which is *the* one that requires to be held by us steadily, and at first *solely*, in our view, when we set ourselves to know what it is that Religion has had to do—nay, that Religion has already done,—in the world. We know now,—we know, because experience has taught us,—that it was *this* state of things which, existing in the beginning, had in it the need to become transmuted, in the very way that experience has also shown us that through Christianity it *has* actually been put in the way of becoming transmuted. And that is, into the recognition, on the part of both the two contending parties, that in this very ordination under which they are groaning, lies in fact the greatest of all blessings of which as human beings we have to be conscious, and in return for which we ought therefore most of all to lift up our spirits in thankfulness for the lot that abides with us. This is the full merit,—but an ample merit I think it!—that in all I am going to say, I shall have to attribute to Christianity, as carrying out the real nature

of Religion. *Here*, upon the battle-field of the parental and filial egoisms, eminently above every other sphere of its exercise whatever, is it that I say the real and proper glory of Religion is to be seen,—in the victory, namely, which it there enables the “natural” man to gain over himself. And to see that Christianity *has* done this, or has done so much towards this effect as it *has* done, is, I argue, the owning of an amount of benefit in it so enormous, as that, rightly considered, far indeed surpasses any other benefit that has been hitherto accustomed to be attributed to it. For observe that *this* is the proposition which I have laid out to maintain:—Through no other means *than* Religion, I assert, is there any possibility whatever to be discerned in Nature that the victory *should* have been accomplished.

Once more, then, I ask you to lay this proposition, for our guidance, side-by-side with the view which Christianity, in the degree of consciousness inherent within itself, took of its own object.—Christianity, as to the average sense of it, supposed that it was *God*, who, finding the state of man’s nature displeasing to Him, contrived thence a means of reconciling Himself to it.—The doctrine that I am maintaining, proposes, on the contrary, this: that it is simply *man*, who, upon his finding that the general, or divine, disposition of things is unpleasing to him, betakes, or needs to betake himself thence, *so* to bend his own inclination into the attitude of submission in the matter, as that he may thereby make out for himself an effectual reconciliation with his destiny.

And now, we have to proceed to the details of the matter. We have laid down, that through intellectual Christianity we become acquainted with the condition of Humanity, as a Race; and that through moral Christianity, we are tending towards reconciliation with the terms of that condition. And, accordingly, as the first of these views was obtained by abstract

speculation, so now I am hoping to show an exactly corresponding result for the second, in the mode of an exhibition of individual experience. Having, therefore, this plan of our investigation complete for us upon both sides, let us see how far the detailed considerations which we have now to draw forth, will answer the demand put upon them to make the principle of the general statement good.

The first point for examination, it must be remembered, is to ascertain *how* it was that the Form of Religion which ended by conveying the knowledge and reconciliation required, was itself urged upon the acceptance of mankind,—that is, of recent mankind,—in consequence of the imperative instincts that made our predecessors in misery without them. And to get at this, we must endeavour to bring before ourselves in as lively a manner as possible the early condition of this special mutual relation, which we have been seeing as effectively the prime cause of the whole movement. Christianity began, we have noted, in the institution of the notion of a "Fall"; we have to go on to inquire *how* such a notion, false as we now know it to be, came to be then in requisition. That is, we have to try and enter so thoroughly into the circumstances of early fatherhood and sonship, as that we may thereby appreciate *how* the primitive institution of religion, whatever the difference of its character to ourselves, really was to those early beings so veritable a boon, as that modern defenders of the doctrine, like Butler, are in fact justified, as I would say from their own point of view they *are* justified, in postulating it, as they have done, as the fruit of a genuine primæval revelation.

What, then, is the spectacle that in those early ages meets us?—One, I aver, that does in all truth imply a dilemma of the most intricate painfulness. We see the barbarian father as (in all except the mere animal fondness not now in question,) the despot and physical tyrant, confirmed in his disposition as such from his having no means of being aware of it; the barbarian child, as crouching, and resenting the tyranny, helplessly

limited to such ineffectual resistance to its thralldom, from its powerlessness to discern any thing better for it to do. And to make the plight, as would seem, utterly pitiable, and as it were desperate, we see Nature herself, with that seeming cruelty which she always exercises upon the feeble, placing an apparently fatal check upon the development of mental enlightenment in either of them. For the natural remedy, that *ought* to supply the counteraction to physical oppression and slavish submission, is solely the mutual interchange of rational sentiment in the giving and receiving of parental counsel; but *here* the case is, that the influence thence to be obtained is such as works altogether in conjunction with, instead of in opposition to, the operation of the animal passions: that is, in the strengthening of the feeling of personal egoism:—the result of all which is, notably, a general effect of depression, acting upon the energy of the new candidate for existence. The true part of the rational father is, by the aid of his own experience, to encourage his son to do better in life than himself: to the irrational father, however, this is as plainly impossible in the nature of things, as we see it to be contradicted by the practice that is habitual every where around us. Is it not notoriously the bearing of all the rebuke hurled so unsparingly upon the heads of offspring by coarse-minded parents, even at this day, that “they will never be the men their fathers were!” And the accusation, I think we cannot doubt (—let the point be well considered,—) is precisely that upon which all the over-bearingness of the primitive father *must* have turned, so soon as ever he began to condescend, in the way of conversation, to explain the cause of it at all to his son. It seems to me indeed probable, as may be more plainly seen hereafter, that it was the special need of self-justification in this respect (demanded by the father’s kindlier feelings,) that first set human beings in any way upon the task of the working out of moral abstractions, in this earliest of all instances of it. Waiving this matter, however, for the present, it is at all events clear that the accusation

referred to must necessarily have occurred, as an habitual one, and that it must as inevitably have formed, whenever it did occur, the constant maintainer of the soreness incident to the natural circumstance of the bitterly unequal rivalry; while the fact is still that Nature,—so far as yet from bestowing that compensatory gift of what we compliment her by calling "natural feeling" upon the parent, but simply following instead her own custom of siding always with the one of contending parties which is the stronger,—takes away from the egotistically-blinded tyrant even, as at first appears, all chance of ever finding himself out to be in the wrong! We know now,—*we*, to whom she has begun the unfolding of her secret purposes,—that the very oppositeness of her first operations was owing to the fact of her being already employed upon the remedy finally to be secured to meet the evil: that, if she was expressly deluding the parent by the mode in which she gave him his first acquaintance with the being of his child, it was because no otherwise could she compel his own being into the mould, that would alone give to him the character that is the far more essential one than that at present under consideration to make him a true parent. If it had *not* been that she acted as she did, by inserting the feeble bud of the infant life upon the stem of midway strength belonging to the parent, is it not obvious and certain that never could the parent have been brought to learn, even at any period of future degree of enlightenment whatever, that "natural" lesson, as we now so happily esteem it, of what it really is to *love* a child? And accordingly we see how the interchange of dependence and protection, merely as such, if as yet unequal to this final purpose, was nevertheless from the beginning the sole means of preparing the way for it. Still,—to return to our point:—it is evident that as long as the riddle was yet unread, and remained unreadable from the want of faculties to read, the express delusion put upon the parent's understanding was for the time the unsurmountable obstacle to his rational escape out of the difficulty which his false impression laid him

under; and all the more so for the deepened extent of the influence of that false impression, beyond what has already been noticed, which must also be attended to. The fact is, that the delusion acts as strongly in the way of stifling the efficiency of those incipient beneficent feelings in the barbarian father, which when kindled become the true feeders of rational improvement, as it does in promoting the actual force of his existing animal passions and rude egoism. Let us suppose an interval to occur during the habitual sway of the latter, as certain intervals *must* have occurred, where a happier mood brought the better part of him uppermost, and when accordingly the ordinary scornful rebuke was exchanged for the pondering of the tenderest anxiety. It would *now* be as natural to him to encourage, as *then* it was to depress; but however he may be well disposed, he has not the means! To the father who, by the time that he has come to think at all of such a thing as comparison between his own life and that of his son, is himself in the state of having already turned the point of midway vigour in his own career, and of henceforth dwelling upon the side of life when all his actual experience is that of daily decline, has not Nature, I ask, made it clearly impossible, so long as actual experience is the *only* experience he has, that he should judge justly respecting the career of his son? She has planted them upon opposite sides of the steep of life,—the crowning top of which is moreover lost to mental apprehension in the case of both of them, immersed as it is in the unthoughtfulness of passionate activity to the one, and of babyhood to the other; and curtained within whose intellectual mists, it was hence the fitting necessity of things that the whole brood of family affections should not only have had first to be born, but should require to remain, for their cherishing, continuously, as in their nestling home:—how, I say, is it to be thought possible that between the two travellers, *so* parted, there should still be the capability of discernment into opposite condition, surmounting this existing obstacle to discernment, which should really

enable the one of them whose path is carrying him sliding down the farther verge, nevertheless duly to make allowance for the difference presenting itself to him whose part it is to mount! No wonder, in truth, must we esteem it, that hence it *should* be the case that the father, in feeling such slippery hold as he does of his own existence, and all the more sensibly on account of the contrast which memory keeps thrusting before him, in brighter and brighter colours, of the joyous power that belonged to him in time that is *past*, should fail to believe in the *future* in store for his child! He, the strong man that he persists in desiring to consider himself, knows well how vain it would be for him *now* to contend with the difficulties that once he overcame: how shall he suppose that one he sees so much more impotent shall ever be able to contend, so as to overcome! The feeble thing at his feet, which has not limbs that can hold it upright, how shall he suppose it capable of prevailing in manly sports, and struggles with savage beasts, and more savage human enemies, as he, the father, has aforetime been wont to prevail?—No: it is a thing to him which, if he must forbid himself to wish to crush at once out of life, as the vehemence of his compassionate scorn might compel him, yet he must sorrowfully weep over, as totally unable to cope with the trials that he himself has encountered. Instead of being able to cheer on his child to the struggle, by telling how the combat was won on his own part, he can only communicate of the despondency that becomes more and more heavy to himself, and teach, according to the depth of his own conviction, that his hapless descendant has nothing for it but to submit to the ordination of fate, which has made it in every way less likely for him to prosper than it was for his predecessor.

And on the other hand, to the Child how does the matter stand?—It might be expected that here would be found the action of a counter egoism, that, when once it had emerged out of the subordination which, as long as it lasted, would keep

it powerless of expression, would tend to rectify the mistake of the Father. But no: this natural consequence is stopped the instant it begins to work, by the fact that immediately the new egoism has obtained the power of self-assertion, the condition in which it stands is reversed. The Child has itself become the Father; and all its energy of rationality will henceforth be much more strenuously bestowed in enforcing the prerogatives of paternity upon the generation that is to come after it, than in disputing them with the generation that has gone before.

What then can be more plain, than that the one thing needed for both Father and Child, is the capacity of imaging by reflection the condition which is apart to either of them from the experience of the moment; of which sort of experience, without such enlargement, it is the so evident character that it absorbs all judgment within the bounds of its own narrowness? And observe, this is the improvement which even thus far in the matter we may discern to be gradually making its way, if we look close enough. But can we doubt, even already in theory, in the interest of which direction the reflection will first succeed in being obtained? All experience has at every moment an intrinsic two-fold bearing: towards its precedents, and towards its consequents. And of the two parts of experience severally thus engaged, is it not as plain as any thing theoretically can be plain, that where there is a balance so unequally weighted as is here the case, the strain upon attention must be upon the same side that Nature herself has so partially favoured: *—the side, namely, attached to the

* I am aware here of a kind of ridicule likely to rest upon my exposition, which it seems to me I ought not to try to defend it from. It will naturally occur to every reader, that it is the simplest thing possible that the Past, which has actually had its status in the world, should be more impressive than the Future which as yet has had no status there. But the fact is, that the very necessity of General views, from their religious character, is to take events under the sense of the omnipresent Now. In considering the Plan of universal life, as a Plan, I assert there is no *a priori* right to attach greater importance to the one

interest of the Past, supported by the instincts of over-wrapping paternity, and not the side of the Future, which has no other representative than those of puny infancy!

We know, indeed, that it *has* been so;—still, however, does there remain to be done *that*, which accordingly let us now set about doing. Let us, namely, only see *how* it *must* have been so. That is, knowing it to be so, as we do, in hitherto only the vague un-checked manner of experience taken in the general mass, let us convince ourselves of the validity of our impression by following it into detail.

The main impediment to the growth of abstraction, we see, is the force of irritated egoism, which, on the part of the child, being crushed into outward silence in the first instance, carries itself forward, as a state of irrational indignation, to relieve itself upon the head of a new victim, as yet unborn; thus propagating a continual current of oppression. Every thing, therefore, it follows, which tends to diminish the egoism, is indirectly an aid to abstraction. And this, surely, is it not eminently the work that, as already noted, is of right allotted to the affections to perform? while this, also, is a matter of farther note, now to be heeded, that these, characteristically, have their proper representation in the actual plan of Nature, in one solely out of the two phases of parentage: in that feminine side of the relation, namely, which I have hitherto advisedly ignored,—just for this reason, that the sort of culture under consideration, was, from its regard only to intellect and intellectual feeling, really *not* associated, in the rule of things, with the proper province of women in the period of human history referred to. Direct spiritual influence could in no way proceed from the extremely low state of mental development

differentiation out of the Now than to the other. And therefore if my exposition appears ridiculous from adhering to this transcendental aspect, in contradiction to the common-sense aspect of the same matter, I believe it is, still, simply the necessity of the case.

naturally coincident with the condition of household slavery inevitable to women in barbarous times. But then, *indirectly*, this is no cause at all preventative to their having afforded the real aid towards such development, which the nature of things made the peculiar requisition of the case. For still it *was* their office, even in the depth of their beginning incapacity for *direct* furtherance, then, as ever afterwards, to smooth the ground in which alone spiritual wisdom could take its root. Without the assistance of the Mother, most truly it would seem as if it must have remained for ever a problem impossible of fulfilment, that any thing should actually have been found of capability to soften away the antagonism, that hence would have endured to the last as the effectual impediment to all and every degree of mutual understanding, to be arrived at between the father and the son. But—independently of this part of the matter, lying within the consideration of the division of human nature into the sexes, which, for the simplification of the subject, it is most desirable to leave altogether out of sight for the present,—the fact is, that nature has also secretly laid the design of a similar assistance, that is to act even *directly*, though more slowly, within the nature of the male half of humanity themselves: namely, by infusing, as it were, a seed of womanliness, that ripens in the father's own being, as soon as the force of physical manhood has once had its full play, and thence begun to abate. The tyrant, grown old and feeble, would be forced to *tremble*,—the woman's part!—and before his very sons. And hence, in time, accommodating themselves to the necessity, tyrants would learn to make provision beforehand for the season of retribution, just by forbearing somewhat of the full exercise of their own opportunity of oppression, while strength yet remained with them. Gradually from this would come the kindly feeling on the part of sons towards their humbled fathers, of compassionate protection, exactly as if the relation had now been reversed, and the parents had taken the place of children to the latter. And at

last would come a deliberate restraint, put upon the verbal expression of egoism, that had so long been the spur to keep the relation in its state of lively contention. The father would learn the courtesy to waive the exhibition of his own personal merits as the means of triumph over his son, and would refer instead to those which had been described to him by his own father; and it is easy to conceive how the deeper and deeper into the background the boast of superiority was thus removed, the less and less would it be received as matter of offence by the personality of the pupil-listener. Still less, however, would be the occasion of irritating suggestions, when the parent-teacher was rendered incapable of possible rivalry for the future, by his lying at the time under the burden of old age; and yet less still, when it was no longer the father, but the father of the father, who was the speaker. It is from the lips of the aged grand-sire alone, that must first have fallen the counsel that would come to youth with the novel apprehension of Wisdom. For, ceasing now at last to listen at all under the influence of crude personal *fear*, he would begin to know what it was to *revere*.* And *this* experience having been attained, close upon the human mind, we feel at once, must have been the tangible development of genuine religion.

The ideal picture of youth stimulated to the sense of glory by the tales of old, delivered glowing from the enthusiastic memory of honoured age,—while the influence of the mother is entirely a combining one to maintain the attitude of respectful attention in the minds of her children; and even the father is also perforce drawn into the group, by a willing moment of cessation from the deeds of war which he holds to be the general rightful occupation for himself:—forms, as every one instantly feels, the noblest conception of any that we can represent to ourselves of the primitive domestic condition. And yet how inevitable it was, that the brighter the glorification that was

* To *fear by reflection*:—this, I suppose, is in fact the etymological meaning of the word to *revere*.

thus being imparted to the thought of times that were gone by, the deeper was the gloom that at the same time was being thrown over the future, and even the present!—seeing that the now debilitated chief, like Nestor,—or warrior-bard, like Ossian,—could only finish off the moral of his tale, by an humiliating pity for the “degenerate days” that had fallen to the lot of his auditors. And what *must* have been the practical effect of teaching such as this,—what else *could* it have been, except persistently to maintain in the minds of youth their own opposite egoism, even in the very act of softening its primitive harshness? The religious worship of ancestors, resulting out of this heroic exaltation of the primitive fathers of mankind, *could* only be the feeble and ineffective superstition that naturally moulded itself according to that which was its origin,—the garrulous boast of senility.

If, then, we conceive the youth now driven, as he must sooner or later have been, by the disdainful condemnation of his own merits, into a contemplative inquisition as to the justice of it; without having, however, as yet the slightest notion of questioning its truth: is it not necessary that the instinctive defence upon which he would fall back must have been this following retort of of impiety:—“If I am a being so degraded, whose is the fault but that of the god-like fathers who begot me”,—or, more abstractly, “of the father-gods who made me?”—And this complaint, once started, I say *could* only end in the doctrinal adjustment contained in the notion of the “Fall”. The natural import of that notion, in fact, I would define as consisting in this very thing: it is *the working out of the necessary separation (differentiation) of the idea of the father as deity, from the idea of the father as concrete man, effected as UNDER PRESSURE OF THE BATTLING EGOISMS.*

For, first, as regards the general necessity of the abstraction being made at all: it is impossible that the continual shifting of the idea of the father, backwards upon the grandfather in the first place, and thence upon fathers more and more remote,

should not end by the forming of an excessively vague sense of a Father who comprises within himself every one of the individual fathers, and yet who is something quite different from any one of them:—and this is the abstraction in question. It is the mental creation of a Being, which, indefinite as it is, is thence all the more capable of being conceived as immeasurably more glorious, and especially more terrible, than any of the individual representatives of the superior power and authority attached, as of characteristic necessity, to the proper idea of a father. And hence, secondly, with regard to the conflicting egoisms:—while, on the one hand, it is the tendency of unjust rebuke (especially when urged home to the youth with the practical object of stirring him on to action in life,) to excite resentment, which, more and more, is felt to be rightfully directed against the framing of his natural constitution: that is, against his father and ancestors in the character of his own *Maker*:—on the other hand, this much more just kind of resentment than the personal, intrinsically considered, is slavishly kept down from expressing itself, in consequence of the superstitious subjection required by the notion of the Abstract Father as alone at present it is understood. The youth feels his own amenability to rebuke, in consequence of the inability in which he truly finds himself to fulfil the demand which the boastful comparison makes upon him; he is compelled by nature to resent the injustice done to him by the rebuke; he dares not, however, cast the resentment where most reasonably it ought to be made to fall. And the result of the complication is this inevitable one,—most advantageous as a temporary arrangement, however revolting to the ripened moral sense of our own times,—that he must flatter his supposed Abstract Tyrant, by throwing all the blame in the matter of his own short-comings—*not upon himself!* very far from it: *this* is the very last thing that it ever occurs to human beings to think of! it is the thing that it takes ages of Christian experience ever to suggest to human nature!—not upon himself, but upon his remote ancestors. He acknowledges, as according

to his own notion it is becoming in him to acknowledge respecting the Sovereign Creator, that He made men just as they ought to be, that is, perfect, at the beginning; while, all the time, he is equally cajoling the egoism belonging to himself which is determined at all events to shift the blame off his own shoulders, and also gratifying his own instinct of resentment by flinging the blame back upon the very objects which have been so obnoxiously presented to him as models. "If those boasted ancestors of mine", it is a pleasure to him to be able to mutter to himself, "were really so much better constituted than I am, why were they, after all, so much greater fools than ever I would have been in their place! Let *me* only have had the chance that Adam had, and see if ever *I* would have fallen!" This is the inevitable spirit implied by the doctrinal fiction; and the rendering it into utterance so distinct as is therein afforded, must accordingly, I argue, have conveyed at the time precisely the kind of malignant satisfaction that was called for. It was the very unworthiness of the notion, you see I conceive, that made it just the thing that was wanted, and that constituted it thence the full embodiment of the actual state of mind with regard to each of these its essential points: the grossness of the existing egoism, and the modicum of abstract principle yet attained. For there is in it the yielded admission (compulsively obtained) of the higher worth residing in former predecessors, and yet in such way yielded as to afford not the least concession that really affects the personality of the admitter;—there is the decided recognition of actual degeneracy, without the slightest confession of blame residing in self;—and there is, at the same time, the beginning counteraction to the crass egoism, in the acknowledgment of permanent Power and Greatness, such as might not dare to be tampered with in the way of blame, that, I consider, perfectly represents the religious feeling in the matter, such as it was then only capable of being maintained.

It was, accordingly, this adaptation of the notion of the "Fall" to the state of mental need, that I would therefore say

secured to it a firm rooting, once for all, as the foundation of every kind of religious belief henceforth to be ever possessed by mankind. For, observe, it is thus that I gain the very same kind of backward-telling logical force, on behalf of this present way of my treating the traditional basis that I hold in common with the orthodox, that they have made so much use of upon theirs. Theologians found that it was a thing consistent with the character that they had learned, experimentally, to attribute to God, that He should be credited with having imparted to early mankind a proper "revelation" respecting this supposed inferiority of then-existing condition to previous-existing condition; building up their argument to that effect upon the power of conclusions subsequently gained through later and riper "revelation." But so do I also avail myself of exactly the same kind of retrospective conclusiveness, when I say, as I here do, that the making out for themselves of this notion of their "fallen condition", as I have here supposed the case of it to have been, on the part of those only naturally self-instructed human beings,—and with an actual religious advantage to themselves in so doing, that is confirmed as such to us by the farther advantage to which it was preparatory,—is likewise to us a fact that, in a quite parallel manner with orthodox experience, helps to bear out all *our* experimentally-obtained convictions as to what belongs to the consistency of character, no longer vaguely stated by us as residing in *God*, but residing specially in human nature on the one hand, and in the nature of religion on the other.

Let me, however, earnestly entreat your attention, above all, to *this*:—Supposing the foregoing representation to be the mainly correct one for which I assume it, how significant is the sign with which it already furnishes us, as to what is, and has been, the actual method employed by Natural Providence in this work of the developing within us of our religious faculties! We have seen before, in the way of general principle, how it is in the nature of things that effects are brought to pass through

counter-action of facts of directly opposite sort: at the same time, also, that to the human agent in the matter, the sort of consciousness present to him in the transaction is that which is entirely alien from the real bearing of the transaction;—but here we have an example of such process, in immediate presentation, which, notwithstanding the preparation our principle has afforded for it, *will* awaken within us the feeling as of what was *not* to be expected. Could we have believed that it should have been, in truth, through the very means of nothing else than the passionate *Self-ism* of man, that should really have been effected for him that totally antagonistic principle to Self-ism, which in fact was from its very antagonism to serve exactly as the *remedy* for itself! And yet,—if the above be true,—is it not evident how this has been the case? The very result of the party struggle here imagined between the two great classes of human beings, when considered as that effect in mass which comes out of the multitudinously-accumulated heap of consequences from all these petty individual irritations, is none other than *this*: the intrinsically fixing, and fixing for ever, of that which is to be henceforth for men the solely adequate character of the Symbol to be appropriated to the as yet only just dawning Abstraction of Deity. Never, it seems to me, after the conception should have once arisen in the way that I have supposed, could there be any possibility of Deity being thought of, in the manner of a settled and generally-accepted image, otherwise than thus symbolized: namely, under this form of human Paternity. And that Deity *should* be so thought of,—that this Symbol *should* so have been definitely fixed,—who is there that will dispute it to have been a fact amid the events of the history of human Intellect, that is in very deed identical with what we must count as the actual birth of Religion? So to prove it will, at all events, be the thread of my entire demonstration to follow. But, *if* it be so,—*if* Religion be also that rightful antagonist to, and remedy for, Self-ism, which I think nobody will, any more than the

preceding assertion, dispute:—how, then, I repeat, must we marvel, and admire as we marvel, that this so wondrous a work of remedy should indeed have been brought about, nevertheless, by means that to us appear so altogether unworthy of being employed to such end!—true as it is also, that it is at the same time evident to us how, according to the existing ordination of things, there was no *other* means present which *could* have been employed for such end. For what can be more palpable than that, if this work of definite Symbolization had *not* been thus brought about, through the agency of the low instinct to which I have attributed it, nothing certainly was there at that period in the condition of the agent which we *should* be disposed to think the right one to be employed in the matter,—namely, the power of direct Thought,—that would not in itself have utterly failed to accomplish it!

SECTION II.—THE NOTION OF DIVINE PATERNITY, CONSIDERED AS TO ITS ORIGIN, TRACED BACK INTO THE CONDITION OF PRÆ-RELIGION.

WE have now arrived at that point in our investigation, where, I believe, it becomes first obvious what is the natural range that actually belongs to the subject we have undertaken:—a range, namely, that, as we shall presently consider, will carry us, when duly followed out, into even much remoter depths of human experience than those which we have been hitherto searching. For our proper object (as, we have to remember,

it was indeed laid out from the beginning, but certainly as it has now, at all events, become plainly perceptible,) is, notwithstanding its being pursued under the circumstantially-determined form of an examination of the doctrines of Christianity, really the same thing as an investigation into the natural origin of Religion Universal. And, low as we have already gone, we are still far from having penetrated deep enough for the actual finding of this. But the ground here becomes of such extreme and solemn importance,—as who could do otherwise than esteem it!—that it is impossible to be too careful as to the security of the principles by which we are abiding. It seems to me therefore necessary here to make a certain pause, with regard to those principles, before proceeding any farther with the analysis. I must ask the reader, with the view to being actually furnished with what is purely indispensable for any degree of success at all in the latter, to suffer me first to dwell and at some length, as well as with the utmost caution, upon two matters of general consideration: of very different nature, indeed, from one another, but which, I believe I may say, are equally with one another of the highest necessity to be held by us with firmness and accuracy, before we can hope to gain any thing upon the road that we are taking.

The first, then, of these relates to the *typical* character of our investigation. It will, I hope, not be forgotten that I have already insisted, in the way of general principle, upon the essentialness of our regarding it in this light; but at this special point we come to the matter where there is such peculiar need of the immediate application of the principle,—that is, where there is such peculiar need of due self-consciousness as to this mode of our own thought in the matter,—that the call for an explicit attention to the principle has become imperative. We are now come to what we may consider the crucial station of difficulty with regard to History. We have, here if ever, to make out distinctly for ourselves what indeed is the position which we are to feel ourselves legitimately bound to assume

towards it, in the analogically-probable suggestions which we are setting ourselves to work out, through theory, in the mode that we know to be really an illegitimate invasion into the province belonging to History, which, if History were really present there in power to maintain its own, we should call down upon ourselves ignominious expulsion for the venturing upon. And this is the same thing, manifestly, as what I have just said: namely, that we must gain a nicety of entire consciousness within ourselves, as to the way in which we *should* have to answer to History, if History *were* there in presence to claim his own:—how far we must own ourselves entirely amenable to his jurisdiction; how far, on the other hand, we must still hold to our right, as aliens, to remain in a certain subordinate independence upon him.

I say, “as aliens”;—for is it not clear that in a case like this present one, our actual quest is of an exactly contrary nature to that which History, in itself, has any power to teach us? If it were the facts of human occurrences, of which History properly consists, that we were bent upon ascertaining for their own sake, the “law to ourselves” that we should frame in the matter would be one of perfect self-surrender,—of unconditional abandonment of all pre-conceived notions, *except* in so far as these should appear to enable us to fill up, with always analogical probability, the historical blank before us. But *now* our object is, instead of this, to discover only the History of Principle,—of Religious Principle: human facts are therefore not of the slightest consequence to us, *except* only as they lend themselves to guiding—as we must always acknowledge they have the sole and sovereign right of guiding,—our own constructive images respecting that birth and progress of Principle, which can be dealt with in no other way than by such images.—And, accordingly, I trust that in what I have said in the foregoing chapter, no reader will for an instant suppose that I was conceiving myself actually to re-produce any thing like a *direct* expression of human feeling, as having really taken

place in the manner that I have stated. Such an interpretation would, in fact, be so fatal to the integrity of my whole scheme, that, little likely as it is that it should have been made, I must be allowed expressly to guard myself against it. The *unconsciousness* on the part of the human beings who are the producers of the growth of religious principle, is so indispensable a point, that it is especially needful to be seen borne out in the detailed, as well as in the theoretic, scheme; and yet this the supposition of *direct* expression upon the subject would utterly stultify. But, moreover, consider this:—not only would it have been a thing of the most evident *unnaturalness*, to attribute to beings so low in the scale of intelligence as those in question, an intellectual effort such as that of deliberately working out a theoretic satisfaction for their wounded egoism: but it is also a fact of the sort that my scheme especially rests upon, that direct expression was, in itself, a *natural impossibility* at the period of time concerned. For, until the final period had arrived when the notion of the “Fall” had received its destined embodiment in tangible dogma,—which we know did not take place till far hereafter in the progress of Christian faith,—there were still unexistent the very words and phrases by which alone it was possible that the notion *should* be directly talked about. And the special desirableness of attending to this is the following:—only thus can we make ourselves aware of the extreme tenuity of the influence which it is here believed was the real influence at work in the creation of Religion: *here* believed, I say, in pointed contradistinction from what is asserted of the character of the influence by the orthodox. *They* suppose religious effects to be brought about by sudden, violent, miraculous, accessions of progress; *we*, always, by a movement that is infinitely gradual. And therefore I argue that it is just the vague sort of sentiment that is, as here supposed, destitute as yet of connexion with language, although it still is capable of association with practical feeling, that accordingly has the extremely feeble degree of efficiency, though still a real

efficiency, which is just what our theoretic consistency requires. And surely also it is that which is in the plainest accordance with the actual probabilities of savage life, that the influence exercised upon these rude beings by religious conceptions *should* have formed but the minutest fragment, when compared with that exercised by their subjects of interest in general. Gross objects of animal enjoyment or revenge were that which *all but* filled up their lives!—But so also it is this very minuteness which by my scheme is the only thing in the case that could have been effective. For,—bear this well in mind:—the only result in the way of religious formation which I have indeed assigned to this minute influence to fulfil, is simply this: the determining, out of two directions that are seemingly both possible, the one direction in which the course of religious development should thenceforward have to flow. Is it not evident, I ask you, that for an effect such as this, no influence conceivable could have been actually adapted, except exactly what has been now described: that is, as proceeding out of this same tacit working of the almost insensible energy derived from the existing amount of incipient savage intelligence?—for the conceiving of which, it is indeed true, we need rightfully to carry back our thought even into ages that are very far in advance of those counted as historical.

But this is not the only way in which our theoretic consistency is in danger of betraying itself, the instant that, through a supposed necessity attached to our due allegiance to historical truth, we lapse into the real un-truth of conceiving that what we have to aim towards is the actual facts of human life, instead of the typical image of those facts,—the instant that we confound, and thereby falsify, the history of Religion, as if it were *not* the essentially different thing that it is from the history of human beings. As the *unnaturalness* just repudiated would have formed a *general* falsification with regard to what my theory assumes as the true course of religious progress, so there is a most stringently observable *particular* falsification

of the same kind, to which I have to note that the subject is liable; and not only this, but into which I have to show that orthodox thought has actually, in a most notable manner, fallen:—the exhibition of which has indeed constituted the immediate occasion for our need of at present dwelling upon this matter of subtle distinction. Before, however, I proceed to point it out,—or, rather, as the necessary step for the enabling myself to point it out,—let me say thus much as to the mode in which I consider that my own scheme is rendered clear from the liability in question. It is quite open to any one who should attend to the description in my foregoing chapter, to object that, passing over the matter of verbal expression which I have just answered, there is still the following charge against it: namely, that, if not as to the direct use of words, yet at all events in respect of the general mode of religious feeling, there must have been intended by me,—or, if there was not, there ought to have been,—some actual resemblance of an accurate kind to the hidden historical fact of the case, which makes it a matter of accusation that no precise example of such a process is any where to be found by us, look for it whether we may amongst existing tribes of savages, or in our record of any of those that have formerly replenished the earth.—Now, to this, there is already an answer lying ready, which may perhaps be sufficient as a general one, just in merely resting the case upon the same general rule which comparative science has amply established, with regard to the survival of other kinds of organic specimens; acknowledging (as surely there can be reason to acknowledge,) no restriction whatever to its application when the specimens are now those of ideal formations, instead of, as heretofore ordinarily treated of, concrete formations. I mean, the rule that typical perfection, such as is in its nature appropriate to an age now long past, has, in the very fact of its being such, that which destroys the probability of the organic specimens possessing it being now extant, either within the range of actual existence, or in preserved remembrance:

on the one hand, because the typical perfection which was appropriate to a past age is of the highest unlikelihood to occur in our own age; on the other hand, because the typical perfection which *may* be supposed to have occurred when it *was* appropriate, was, from the very reason of its *being* that typical perfection, subject to the inevitable consequence of being speedily merged into the altered character which naturally *must* have ensued for the carrying on and ripening of the type. Under this rule, I say, I have an answer already supplied me, that if, in those early ages, which alone I have in this case within my own contemplation, there should have actually occurred a process of religious development in close resemblance to the speculative type I have afforded, it would still have been the really natural course of things that all distinct trace of it would now remain hidden from us.—But yet, however just a reply this reference may, and I think does, afford, upon the general ground of the matter, I fully admit that it is, and upon my own view in especial, entirely inadequate to stand as dealing with the particular truth of the facts of the case.

For the peculiar conflict I have now come into with orthodox thought is this: that when, in bringing my speculative view to bear upon the facts of human experience as they *do* lie before us historically-determined in the matter, I proceed, as it is required of me to proceed, to make question as to which out of the whole number of the particular nations of the earth it is likely that the *nearest* approach to typical perfection should have occurred amongst: it so happens that the one upon which orthodoxy has so unhesitatingly fixed as its own typical specimen, is precisely the one above all others that I find I must *not* fix upon for mine. Nor, indeed, is there any whatever of difficulty, upon my principle, that such contradiction *should* have arisen; but rather is it,—granting me my own principles,—exactly that which should have been expected to have arisen. For, looking at the religious facts which human history spreads out before us, as it so spreads them out, it was inevitable that

orthodoxy, upon its own principle, *could* think nothing else than that the one case of special or, as I should express the same idea, of *typical* development, was that of the Hebrews. If religion, I say, had really come in the way that orthodoxy supposes it to have come,—that is, as a perfect whole at once, all in the mass,—it *was* only to the Hebrews that the reception of it could possibly be attributed. And yet, observe how, for a considerable time past, there has befallen this natural supposition one of those dilemmas which always come for the checking and rectifying of suppositions that are not true ones: I mean, the dilemma produced by the extended knowledge of history, which in this case has made it generally apparent to all well-informed persons, that this fundamental scheme as to the worldly course of religion has undergone a decided critical conviction of being an erroneous one. Few persons at all versed in the subject will now care to dispute, that the notion of the “Fall” was so far from being native to the Hebrew thought, that there was even a quite peculiar obviousness, to be felt the instant the orthodox pre-possession gave way, in expressly the very fact of its being otherwise: that is, in its being received by the Hebrews expressly in the manner of an external graft,—that graft being also, as we know, derived in truth out of a soil that lay as much farther East than the Hebrew in point of contemplative illumination, as it did in geographical position. Fully, however, as this decision may have been critically admitted, I must protest that the entire import of the fact does not, and cannot, make itself manifest, until solely it be considered under the here-maintained recognition of the principle of development. Under any view different from this, it seems to me that the “obviousness” of the bearing of the circumstance in question loses all its point. It is only when we have thoroughly acknowledged as our postulated assumption this two-fold thing,—namely, that, on the one hand, the tendency to form religious ideas was that which lay diffused through the universal mind of human beings, and was

therefore antecedently capable of taking a definite and permanent arrangement in any sphere of human habitation whatsoever into which circumstances might determinately lead it;—and, on the other, that the final character to which religious formation has by the nature of it to attain, is really that which development-principle has argued it to be:—it is only, I say, when both these assumptions are embraced by us, that we are actually in a state of thought that does allow us to see the mode of interpretation to be put upon the facts of the matter, such as does actually bring out their bearing in an effectually adequate manner. For, let me ask you to consider:—with a floating universal tendency like that just supposed, naturally therefore liable to the common circumstance of all variously-constituted (so to speak) *solutionary* ideas, of settling down into the primary assortment of its heterogeneous elements into two separate combinations of opposite elements;—and with a final character also (teleologically) in prospect for it, in accordance with which we are already impressed with the notion, that religion is what it is, solely as the consequence of having, as we have been instinctively compelled to pre-conjecture, grown up to this point out of its being originally a combination of determined opposites of mental tendencies:—what can to us be more self-evidently explicable, though certainly it is *not* so without such pre-conceptions, that the facility of *receptiveness* in the Hebrew mind which criticism has exhibited it to us as displaying towards the thought which was naturally alien to it, was indeed that which simply resulted out of the even peculiar *unfitness* within itself for the *originating* of such thought?—how can we help perceiving by intuition that the very possession of this quite opposite tendency to that which was presented for acceptance, was the precise thing which rendered the amalgamation of the opposites so eminently the sort of union, which Nature was so willing as she has shown us that she was, to put her most notable sanction upon! But, yet farther, is not this also additionally self-evident?—just as the Hebrews were in themselves the

farthest of all people from being naturally addicted to the mode of abstrusely glancing through the far-off region of intellectual images, through which alone it could have come to pass that the universally-floating religious conception should have gathered itself as it did into shape; so were they nevertheless those who did in themselves beyond all others possess the mental quality that forms, in a positive manner, the natural substratum to fitly support such tendency: and that is, the substratum of an imperturbable personal consciousness, and of complacency in self as self, which is the notorious characteristic that no one will deny that the Hebrews did bear,—or, at all events, that they did bear when regarded as a nation. For, as to the necessity of the existence of such a substratum, is it to be at all more supposed that, missing it, the Oriental sphere in which the Christian notion of the “Fall” had its actual root, could have brought the notion into the degree of energetic life that it did actually come into, than is seen to have happened in the case of any other of the abstrusely-disposed nations, of whom we have historical glimpses of their having feebly striven towards it? Eminently, for instance, does the “golden ages” of the Grecians form exactly such a specimen as it may be conceived that the notion might have come to, in the highest character that it was possible for it to reach, so long as it remained in destitution of the element that alone had the power within it to achieve for the notion that which was requisite to it. Equally, I imagine, was also the Oriental thought in a similar manner liable to have been frustrated of its destination, unless, just by the unique circumstance of its conjunction with the mental mould of the “favoured” sons of Israel, it had been enabled to do that which we know it did: namely, to settle down with a decisiveness that determined the associated locality for the psychical fact of this special belief, in the world’s history, thenceforth and for ever. And thus, therefore, you perceive, comes out what I intend as the peculiarity belonging to the present view, when estimated in its entirety. It is the

now-apparent fact of this *doubleness of origin* to the religious conception, which now shows it as an actual impossibility, as before it was shown only as an extreme improbability, that the mode of origin derived speculatively should indeed correspond with any preciseness to that exhibited historically. The case, in its two aspects, has become arranged to me thus:—*Because* of this duplicity in its foundation, enhancing the difficulty of tracing out any speculatively-estimated origin at all, into now the actually-insurmountable degree of difficulty of tracing it back as divided into its two several departments, is it that we have now to be even so much *more* on our guard against the delusiveness of history, in respect of our object, than we at first saw ourselves to be:—this is the one way of looking at the matter. And the other is the following:—*Because*, likewise, nothing would do for Religion than that, in its perfectness, it should be able to combine within itself all that belongs to the essentially opposite views of life, which can only be accounted for as proceeding from essentially opposed characteristics, existing within the constituted dispositions of human beings: so also, and *therefore* is it, I say, that it now appears, and appears as in justification of history, how nothing else than in fact just such an event as this which history *does* show to us, in this union brought about between the Hebrew concreteness and the Oriental abstruseness, could really be supposed to have been in any way capable of effecting for the world that which we know it *has* effected. And that is, the work of actually laying down that solidly-composed foundation, to serve as a true basis of religious formation, of which, moreover, considered as upon an effective scale, we know also, with a perfect obviousness of experience, that the world *has* indeed seen but this one solitary example.

But, even yet, this is not all. Very far is even this from being the whole of the principle of the matter that comes here, as it were, to the very touch. We know, and ought at this point to be sensibly alive to the feeling that we know, that the

matter which is here implied as being that intrinsically associated with the institution of the fundamental notion of the "Fall", and which gives to it in fact the entire amount of importance in regard to ourselves which it possesses, is the farther institution of the sovereign doctrine of Monotheism. This, too, critical readers of the world's history have long habituated themselves to see as a graft from the far East, only externally appropriated by the Hebrews. But in what manner has it been considered as associated with that other notion, in whose company it came?—It is *this* which, I urge, is now the point of critically leading importance to us. Let me beg the reader, once more, to remember what I have said, in general terms, in my Introduction (p. 48,) as to the matter which to myself has appeared to give a not otherwise given consistency to the construction to be put upon the subject. The principle I have there asserted is that which maintains, that in every case it is always the form that creates the belief, and never the belief that creates the form. And now, for the crucial application of it, I appeal to every student of the matter, whether the advent of Monotheism into the world, if it be taken as in accordance with this principle, is not indeed thereby explained with a naturalness, such as the contrary principle might and must labour in vain to give to it. It has been hitherto common to speak upon the matter as if the notion of the "Fall" were that which in itself implied the notion of Monotheism, as if the latter had been a *previously* existing notion to itself; whereas to me, the very essence of the matter is that the contrary was the actual state of the case. According to my view, it was expressly the *settling down* of what I have called the *solutionary*, or *floating* sense of Deity, which was the act constituted by this same notion of the "Fall"; and which, *after* the act had been consummated,—that is, after the notion of the "Fall" had once been thoroughly believed by men,—and not *before*, produced as its result the permanent consolidation of the idea of Monotheism. Not that I deny, what indeed it

would be absurd to deny, that in *logic* it is always and inevitably Monotheism that must be taken as in itself the rational root of Christianity. But simply, that here again is an instance of the contradiction in aspect that for ever requires to be taken into account on the subject. What logic sees and must see as the *cause*, it is indispensable upon development-principle that we should see logic is in error in so seeing. The natural fact of the matter is that which the reversed point of view from which logic is compelled to look out, cannot help showing as exactly that which it is *not*:—namely, as the natural *root* of that of which really it is the *issue*.

Setting logic, however, aside:—see now, as the best vindication of the present assertion that it would be in any way possible to obtain, how evidently straight-forward is the course here proposed, when it comes to be realized by our thought in detail. For, supposing that the working out of the idea of the Abstract Father *had* actually its beginning, more nearly approaching than in any other instance to the speculative prototype of such working which has been described in the last chapter, *within the Oriental mind*:—what else, let any one consider, is there that *could* have happened to the idea except this, that it should have gone on continually extending itself, so as incessantly to include within its representation a greater and greater amount of the number of individual fathers so represented; the increase taking place just in proportion as the Oriental mind became acquainted with them? Surely it is that which is manifestly nothing more than in the most obvious nature of things, that the idea *must* have gone on so extending itself—being, as it was, in this case, remember, un-stopped by the only thing that might have had power to stop it, namely, the circumstance of a crude nationality of disposition, such as we see precisely did *not* belong, and in fact *could* not belong, to the abstrusely-constituted Oriental mind:—I say that it is manifest that, being thus un-stopped, the idea *must* have gone on extending itself, until precisely it came to be the case, that the ideal family included,

so far at least as the *intention* of the matter was concerned, the whole amount of human beings in existence, whether esteemed as nations or as individuals.—And, then, on the other hand, remember also this, that we have seen there to have been no other mode, naturally open to men, by which this generalization *could* have been brought about, except that which included the view of human nature standing depicted for us in the story of the “Fall”. In the *story*, I say: for otherwise,—that is, remaining as the mere floating notion that it was, *before* it came to be fixed into a *story*,—there was nothing present by which the human mind had means of taking the grasp, through which first so vast, but so rare, an abstraction should become really available to it. Just to give that power of grasp was the thing now wanting. And yet it is certain that, even supposing that the story was indeed fully constructed, or rendered complete in itself, by the same Orientals whose invention at all events lay the germ of it, it did not nevertheless succeed in flourishing,—or, at all events, in fructifying,—as long as it remained exclusively within their own hands. There was not, as we have seen, in possession with them the affective substantiality that alone could make of the notion a really tangible one. It remained but as the mere pre-sentiment of a notion, before the event occurred that the realistic Hebrews took it up, and by their cherishing of it within their own cordial self-ism, made a self of it also.—Once, therefore, this adoption *having* taken place:—once the idea *having* fairly been grafted, as it were bodily, upon the egotistic solidity, and concrete moral consciousness, that belonged of specialty to the compact aggregation of the seed of Abraham: and then, I say, it was indeed that the idea began the sort of really living existence, which—do not think it a sinking of the subject into littleness, that I thus hint out the mode of it,—thence made requisite for itself the obtaining of a *name*:—since a most truly significant fact it is, that ideas which have *not* been registered, and therein at the same time christened, might always, as far as history is concerned, as well

have never been born!—But, in addition to their presentation of the infant notion thus to the font of the lingual baptism, the Hebrews gave moreover to it the *earnest belief*, which constituted the true rearing of it.

Now, in the usual mode of the critical explanation of the matter, in which it seems to me that rationalistic expounders have still failed in bringing the adequate degree of correction to the primitive orthodox explanation, the true character of the event that *has* its certain, however defective, representation under the latter, appears totally driven out of sight. It is spoken of as a matter of ordinary acquisition, that the Hebrews gained their Monotheism from the enlightened nations amongst whom they spent their captivity (—I say, *their* Monotheism, because every one admits that it is the special Hebrew form of Monotheism that we are compelled to think of as the representative form, of all others, whenever we use the term Monotheism—). But, I aver, there is in this mode of viewing the matter a radical incapability of meeting the phenomena that notoriously occurred in the case, both that ensued upon, and that accompanied the event. It was surely the exact contrary to what is *ordinary*, that the Hebrews should, in so short a space of time as that occupied by their residence amongst the Persians and Assyrians, have compassed so vast a degree of mental enlargement, as is implied by the consummation in question upon their previous ideas having been arrived at by them through only an ordinary process. If we consider the wide difference there actually is between this Monotheistic acknowledgment of a Universal Father, and that of the mere Hebrew Jehovah, I think it cannot but be felt that the intervening space of conception requiring to be surmounted between the two, was that which by no possibility could, in only the common method of mental improvement, have been over-passed by the Hebrew people during only the seventy years of their captivity. There was in their own native conception that degree of intense personalism, respecting the merely magnified

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human being whom, first under patriarchal, and then under national conditions, they pleased themselves with considering as their own particular Patron, that it seems evident nothing less than an external irruption of new ideas, not only ready grown, but such as came upon them with the peculiar violence belonging to the impetus of opposite characteristics impelled to rush together, can rightly be imagined as having been able within such short space of time to break through. Previously to this so pointedly, so much *more* than ordinarily, *outward* influence, the Hebrews,—let us well note it to ourselves,—had not even made a beginning towards genuine spiritual thought. They had nothing that in fact in any way deserved to be counted as a religion. Where a religion, or the beginning of a religion, should have been, *they* amongst men to an eminently special degree, had only a worldly theocracy of such utterly crude sort of worldliness, that in itself it had no likelihood whatever of ever rising out of its worldliness:—so that, *if* the circumstances of Hebrew history had been that the Hebrew mind should have missed the Oriental graft that actually lighted upon it, scarcely is it possible for us to doubt that the Hebrew mind would have remained,—not to say just as much as, but even very much more than, the early Grecian mind so remained,—arrested, namely, in that which was to it only the preliminary stage of pre-religion, without ever, to the end of time, being able to reach the point of development where first the Monotheistic condition of true religion alone becomes possible. But this strong probability, afforded by our historic sense of what is the natural course of things, is at once as it were certified by the principle here maintained, that the true fulfilment of what religion requires to be, *could* not in any way have been brought about *except* thus by arriving at its final constitution through the co-operation of at first distinct and opposite principles. —Then, now is it not plain how, as I have said, this view brings the reconciliation with—though, as ever, in believed improvement upon—

the orthodox view? It has been, I would assert, a *true* instinct with which, all along, the latter has maintained, as it has done, on the part of our Hebrew religious ancestors, that the religious knowledge which came to them as so great an acknowledged benefit, was indeed an *imparted*, and not an *acquired* knowledge. For see,—I ask you again to observe,—the still-continued naturalness that, as *our* recognized sign of truth here, as always, in the matter, so clearly belongs to the whole event, thus interpreted! Once *having* received the foreign accession, as a not indeed *super-natural* accession, but only in *this* respect not *ordinary*, that it was simply *extra-ordinary*, nothing *else* was there in the matter that does not show itself as purely ordinary. Not otherwise than thus, but still eminently thus, does the event still figure to us as precisely the indication of “selection”, made on the part of purely natural Providence, that *may* truly be taken as the result of the blessing of circumstance, pronounced, as in the so-called original “design” of things, upon this undeniably “peculiar” people! The doctrinal catastrophe to which the “Providential” circumstances attending the Hebrews actually formed the induction, was surely that which, from its incalculable importance to the general culture of mankind, *may* well, and on the grounds of barest reason, be held yet as a genuine stamp of the “grace”, and seal of the “election” bestowed upon them! For consider, once more, in what the catastrophe consisted,—what it was that was contained, and contained as of necessity, in the very act of their compassing the reception of the outwardly-afforded ideas:—nothing less, remember, than the sudden clenching of all previous uncertain imaginations of divine beings, and hierarchies of gods,—all the whole heap of wandering fancies of Baalim, and of Sovereignty as gained over the demon hosts of heaven,—into henceforth the stable concentration of the One Only God:—attended, indeed, by that which was its indispensable logical counterpart, or the black shadow that was impossible not to be cast by the concreteness of the new Ideal, the rival, although subordi-

nated, Principle of Evil; but otherwise such as had swept the whole field of religious conception clear before it. This, I say,—all this vast amount of intellectual progress,—was effected, as it were, in the very act of the assimilation of the unwonted notions circumstantially presented to them. Not, however, as if the Monotheism were such as was perfect in its own nature at the starting:—the very fact of this black shadow is the vivid sign of its imperfection! It is the express point of what we claim as our superiority over the orthodox notion that the Providence in which we believe does *not* effect perfection in any thing at starting. But still, I say, we have here, in this strange newness manifestly afforded by the conception to the Hebrews, that which did actually constitute it to them the effective Catastrophe I have called it; and which, being such, could not but carry forward, as we know it did, the sensation made upon themselves, through them into the world.

Then now, in order to gain an abstract moral out of this, let us relapse once more into the mood of self-consciousness, and observe what is the general suggestion thence reflected back to us. Is it not this:—that by our finding ourselves thus again in the position of mingled parallelism and conflict with orthodox conception, now arising from our abiding in this manner by always the acknowledgment of the one main fact in the matter, of *peculiarity* in the Providential determination of the case, we come, namely, to the crisis of feeling ourselves arrived actually at the point of mental experience, which has been already premised in our principle as needing to be arrived at? I mean, the point of realizing to ourselves the peculiar sign of true elevation in our Religion, considered as religious Art, which is the same as what, in regard to Art in general, we have learned to estimate as universally the sign of *high Art*. For,—as to the need of making this introspective observation a matter of express attention,—it is not enough, in regard to our object, that we content ourselves with simply recognizing, as

we have now been doing, the eminent necessity of thus following out accurately the insisted-upon *typical*, or, as it is otherwise to be expressed, *mythical* interpretation of history, as that which can alone enable us to procure out of history a true gathering of specifically-different Religious history: but, as regards the true sense which rests within ourselves of our own Religion, it is additionally necessary, that we should learn to estimate, as in itself, what is the proper nature of this mental construction, the Myth:—I mean, that we should, consciously, own, and not only own, but moreover delight in owning to ourselves, what is the extreme beauty, as well as utility, of the Myth,—the extreme beauty of it, let me rather say, that precisely is such *because* of the delicate peculiarity that belongs to the also extreme utility of it. If it was the natural course of things, as we here take it to have been, that out of an ocean, or atmosphere, or rather an ocean-atmosphere, of vaguely-floating images, of infinitesimal minuteness, was the real origin of the definitely condensed ideas that we now possess: so is the mythical faculty within us the mental function which precisely corresponds with the circumstantial fact. Once gathered into a *story*, that primitive ocean of conception remains as faithfully preserved in substance for the purpose of our now needed work of analysis to be exercised upon it, as it has, we know, hitherto remained for the exercise of the continuous belief entertained towards it on the part of general Christendom. By means of it we have still the sympathy with the *feeling* of that heretofore belief, which, as so often protested, alone enables us to judge justly respecting the belief. We are able,—do you not feel?—to compass that so admittedly-desirable quality of duplicity in mental vision, pertaining to all imaginative power of elevated kind, which in this case shows itself—in indeed the *not* so admittedly-desirable a character as I urge that it *ought* to be admitted to be,—as the mental phenomenon of believing and not-believing in the very same act of the mind: without which ability,—is it not evident?—we should, as soon as we ceased to

believe, have been utterly cut off from that connexion with belief, missing which, we should now be in the isolated condition, unapproved of, and unblessed by nature, into which I protest that by the present view we are shown *not* to have fallen. By means of the Myth, and our own conscious entertainment of the Myth, and by that alone, is really preserved the Religious Unity which is the greatest of all catholic necessities to Religion:—as, in the present instance of this notion of the “Fall”, it is so manifestly to be seen, as the inherent state of the case, how the existence of the notion as preserved for us within the familiar tale of Genesis, is that which alone has enabled us to realize the sentiment of early humanity in the way that solely renders it available to us: namely, as showing its relation to our own sentiment. Holding, as we are thankful to do, firmly by our own end of religious development, yet, through the instrumentation of the mythic function, we may still feel vibrating within us the very life of the mythic embodiment, that had its spring in human nature at the other end of the fibre. The Myth is the artfully-constructed organ for the sense of Unity, which grows out of the doubleness of our mental perceptions, just in the same way as the trueness of single physical perception depends upon our regarding our bodily object as we know that we do, with two of our different senses at once. Sympathy, to credit our religious fiction as real;—intelligence, to discern that it is ideal:—these two combined give to us alone the faculty to carry out, and to realize to ourselves, I say, the high fascination of carrying out, that which constitutes the true nature of proper Religious Art. They confer upon us what I have called the “delicious equivocation” of high Art, which here consists in the harmony-creating oscillation between the present *sense* of the actual, and the echoed *memory* of the actual*:—that vibrating flavour, of infinitely delicate balance,

* I have described this oscillation at p. 107, as lying between the senses severally of the personally human, and of the general element, in religious symbolization. I hope, however, it is evident,—in order to

which, just as much as it turns instantly to quality that is revoltingly nauseous, if it be adulterated by the smallest particle of the falsehood of intentional sophistry, most truly is the purest of all luxuries of a spiritually-intellectual sort when tasted in its own integrity: that is, when we are all the time conscious that, in spite of the duplicity, we are aiming at nothing whatever but truth,—and at truth of expression, as much as at truth of thought.

But then I must also notice, as an altogether different thing, that there is in existence another kind of equivocation, so much less desirable than this, that in fact it has to be known as springing precisely out of the imperfection, instead of, as here, out of the advanced state of the imaginative faculty, but which still is deserving of our directing our attention upon it; chiefly, indeed, for the purpose that we may thence be sufficiently clear as to our making the requisite distinction to keep it apart from that desirable sort, but also, to a certain degree, for its own sake, that we may note, in passing, the curious kind of casual perplexity that it is apt to bring into all researches like the present. And that is, the following. Endeavour as we may to fulfil the condition which the research by its nature requires of us, and therefore to reverse our former apprehension as to the realism of those old-world pictures now in question, of the Garden of Eden, and the World's Creation, and to banish them bodily, as we ought to do, into the sphere of idealism which we now adjudge to be the one rightly belonging to them;—while the historical void thus obtained, if it were obtained, we would willingly fill with scenes that should seem to bear some genuine relation, however slight, towards the now-

the recognizing of a coincidence between the two descriptions,—how in fact the human element is always identical with the work of idealization, as first in the constructing, so now in the comprehending of the construction; while also the general element is manifestly the same with that now classed as the *real*.

acquired scientific probabilities of the case:—yet so thoroughly have these first occupants distempered themselves, as it were, with the strength of primæval colouring, upon the walls of our inner chambers, that no voluntary effort whatever of which we are now capable can suffice to displace them! Try as we will to paint for ourselves anew the condition of men, when an Adam was as yet not so much as thought of amongst them,—when the real visions of antiquity ought to show us beings who, so far from having their opening sense of things swayed by God-given notions of Paradise, were really dowered with only memories that had been handed down from brute progenitors:—try as we will, I say, to body these new conceptions forth, yet still, for all the aid that a Lyell, a Darwin, a Huxley, a Max Müller, may afford us, that indelible image of the Mosaic Creation will persist in maintaining its prepossession;—and keeps peeping over the shoulders of the innovators, exactly as in the ghostly photographs just now paraded as the evidence of spiritual sittings!—And yet how easily does the embarrassment thus occasioned us unriddle itself! Let me ask you: supposing this latter vulgar pretence were being actually urged upon us, and farther in a case in which obtrusion was made by it into feelings that we hold sacred, do you not perceive how, even at the very time that we should (—may I not say, *all* of us, or must I only say, *most* of us?—) at once condemn the profaneness of it, yet we should still, if called upon to inquire into the mode of making such pretence, value the scientific fact,—namely, of the tenaciousness of the original impression, that was the source of the ghostly persistency?—Just so, then, I argue, must we deal in our estimation of these similarly pertinacious shadows of by-gone ideals. If we would preserve the rectitude sufficient to our mental vision, just this, I say, and nothing more, is the rule that is needed for us. We must hold them as much deserving of preservation in the one light, as we consider them liable to indignant repudiation when offered for retention in the other.

Surely, however, is it thus rendered evident, how it is in truth through this method, and this method alone, of reducing, as we are now trying to reduce, the antique portraiture of the venerable Form once borne by our ancestral Religion, into the character rightfully belonging to it, that we are actually effecting for it the object of such inevitable desire to us as that of henceforth enshrining it for perpetuity! For, useless, and worse than useless, as that portraiture would be, if perversely insisted upon as still serving to us for our own religious standard, yet legitimately is it always precious on its true ground of presenting us with a specimen of what was the pristine religious Art. Thus, and thus only, I say, is it evident that whatever *was* indeed true and venerable in regard to it at the beginning, must remain in the same light till the end of human existence. But, much more than this, it is even the case, as the present view compels all its upholders to feel, and as has been here so often repeated, that by thus learning to consider it, the value of it grows into value of the new sort which, as such, very far surpasses the former. For the fact is,—the fact in which, you remember, we have here all along rejoiced,—that in the striving to realize how the myth is a mental fancy, nothing at all other than mental fancies in general, we bring it to the terms where, at all events, we have cordial certainty of being able to recognize it as exactly the thing that the human mind *was* in want of. Long ago, we have known it as the manifest Law of the mind, that through nothing else except through *images* of this very kind have men ever succeeded in emerging, so far as they may have emerged, out of primitive brutishness into their present state of advance. Mental images, and nothing else than this, has it been, in every case, that has formed universally the exalting, the refining, the saving, the creating, of our souls! Equally, therefore, because it *was* a belief, and because it was *only* a belief, must we now see that there has existed what stands as the real value attaching to the mythic tale of Eden. In the time when it was actually believed, it furnished to the mind the only means it could

possibly have possessed of reflecting upon, and so of correcting, its own original impression as to its condition: to us, by whom it is actually believed no longer, it furnishes, on the other hand, that indispensable embodiment, without which *we*, as I am aiming to show, should be, equally, without the means that are just as necessary to *us* also, of rightly understanding *our* own religious condition. And *how* it is such,—*how* it is this indispensable instrument to *us*,—I may now sum up the present matter by expressing thus:—It is that which, by means of the peculiarity in its mode of delineation which forms its special *fidelity* of delineation, serves us as a reliable exhibition of what we have henceforth to build upon, as constituting,—and not only then, for those beginning ages of religious development, but all along, and for our own selves at the present day,—the actual character, or true characteristic quality, of the power intrinsically contained in Religion:—and in this respect: that it shows to us, namely, as it does, in this so patently *typal* a manifestation of the earliest process of religious working, *how* it was that Religion originally came, as our human instinct of the matter has so long made us intuitively aware that it *did* come, in the way of rescue to the poor, trembling, baby soul of man, out of a state that was the natural maintainer of such pitiable-ness of human condition simply for this, that it was destitute of Religion.

But why use an expression like this:—the “*trembling baby soul of man!*”—Why, it will be said, need we *so* to direct our reflection upon the matter, as thus to thrust upon *babyhood* an association that, happily for ourselves, has become so entirely irrelevant, as to right-minded persons this indisputably is, with all our own properly-appropriated ideas of “*smiling infancy*”?—The incongruity, I call upon you earnestly to observe, is neither a casual one, nor one that must by any means be lightly passed

over. And therefore is it,—that is, on account of the utter importance to our subject which it actually possesses,—that I have made it the second of those two points, (of, remember, totally opposite character,) the consideration of which I stated at the beginning of this section as being the necessary preparation for farther progress in our investigation. For, as the matter just dealt with concerned itself with merely the superficial adjustment of the considerations belonging to the province of the æsthetic religious imagination; the present matter, on the contrary, having to deal with the intrinsic quality,—the intrinsic *repugnancy*, let me at once call it,—which it must be fully admitted that this present mode of viewing religion has in it the liability to cause to strike upon previous feelings respecting religion, will address itself most certainly to what every one must own as the very heart of the subject.

It has become already sufficiently apparent, I believe I may suppose, to the mind of any one attending to it, how the entire tendency of our speculation hitherto has indeed carried out the warning which our first theoretic statement gave us (p. 187,) as to what was to be expected in the matter: that is, as to our finding that the primitive character of religion was in truth thoroughly involved in, and permeated by, the base sentiment of *Fear*. But the new matter now to note, and to account for, is, I repeat, the peculiar *repugnancy* to our natural feeling, which, though I am going to argue that it *must* arise, now that we are bringing the subject home to ourselves in detail, had at least no obvious necessity of being called forth in the mere theoretic view of it.

The manner of its arising is this:—*since* it *has* become apparent what is the tendency of our speculation, the consequence is, there has opened upon us a gleam as to final result, for which indeed nothing as yet *has* adequately prepared us. And that is the following;—*If*, the farther and farther we retreat in our examination of religion, the more and more we *do* thus see it to be basely involved in the sentiment of *Fear*,

what is to hinder us from finding at last that it is *totally* involved in the same low principle?—how are we to be stopped from arriving at a stage where Religion was actually *nothing but* Fear? And this,—reflect,—is it not in truth the same thing as saying, in abstract statement, that our own present Religion had its origin out of pure Fear?—a result which, nevertheless, I most entirely accord with the whole religious world of the present day, is one that goes immediately and utterly against all our present feelings of Religion.—This, then, to reconcile,—this repugnance to those feelings, namely, to enable ourselves to overcome,—is the object now for us to be occupied with: since, until the repugnance *is* overcome, it is plain both that we must, and that we ought, to stumble against the position that we have brought ourselves into. And therefore, I say again, above all things let us encounter it *fully*.

It is true that this forms only another instance of the contradiction between subjective and abstract presentations of one identical thought, which by this time we have been amply taught, in a general way, to expect everywhere; but it is the particular and detailed explanation which we are now looking out for. And now that the question is one of the intimate feeling that this is, we *can* no longer set it aside with the same easy sort of surrender up to general principle, that we could while it was merely logical correctness that was concerned.

Let the difficulty then be fully entertained. And, being so, I believe it will be seen that it stands thus:—Not only is it true that Religion was, as just stated, originally derived out of Fear, but it is to be moreover admitted that it is in like manner continuously maintained by always the agency of the self-same principle. From the very beginning until the actual present, we have to own that it has been Fear which has been universally the proper Causer of Religion. *This*, accordingly, is the proposition, observe, to the reconciliation with which our adverse instinct needs now to be brought. But,—*here* is the advantage of giving full statement to it:—do you not already perceive,

even thus already in the very stating of it, in what way is going to appear more plainly presently, upon closer examination, that in fact that closer examination is the only thing required to bring about the reconciliation for us? For let not *this* mistake be for a moment held to by the reader,—apt as it is, and must be, to occur upon the surface,—that what I have said is the same thing as if I had said that Religion is Fear. The fact is, that my proposition is exactly the reverse.

Only bear in mind, I must still urge upon you, that it will help us nothing towards the clearing up of this difficulty to consult our own present consciousness, and (subjectively) to ask ourselves out of what kind of feeling it is that our own truest feelings of religion arise. The very condition of the case, as here maintained, is, that the fundamental constitution of religion is for ourselves totally changed from what it was at its primitive institution. Through the form of Christian development, my assertion is, Religious Love has been actually created. And what is this but saying, that before the operation of that form, it must be seen, and allowed for, that the human mind knew not of such a thing as Religious Love? You see, therefore, at once how it is that, upon this supposition, the contradiction in the aspects has arisen. It is the *passage* of the human mind out of the one state into the other, and *not* the consideration of actual position, that is the thing now engaging us; and for this reason is it that we are compelled, as I assert we are, to accept objectively the very statement that a true morality causes to shock our subjectivity.

This is the foundation arrangement to our thought. And to follow up the foundation occurs this:—Every new idea needs its concrete image (—for surely it may be said that the relational view of Christianity *does* constitute a *new* view, more or less, to all of us—):—very well, then; and so is there actually in readiness that very image, which our struggling attempt to realize this new relational conception of the matter, *may* immediately avail itself of. The objective view has, already instituted, a

myth of its own, and one that has for some time past been even fully in vogue amongst enlightened Christians themselves, that, if it is not exactly adequate to the development view as with us more abstractly carried out, yet is still sufficiently so for the present purpose:—and that is, the myth by which the course of human improvement has been represented as the “Education of the Human Race.” This current notion, I say, is just the myth by which Positivism, in embodying the sense of mental acquisition as a progressive thing, has practically in a tacit manner superseded the old myth of Creation.—Taking it up, then, to work with upon our own account, the question before us settles itself now into this form, immediately to be felt as a truly-serving one:—*How* is it that Providence has manifested its mode of teaching mankind? And my proposition respecting it is, that regard to absolute fact does indeed oblige us to take for answer to it, this: namely, that Providence *has* truly reared the human mind in the manner that did make it, as just depicted, *tremble* while it was a baby,—however true it may be, and happily is, that, as the effect of such training, the pupil has at last learned how to stand upright under its correction *without* trembling, and in only the state of softened awe which is the becoming attitude towards its Teacher, now that the mind, out of its babyhood, has passed on into its manhood.

And here it is not trifling with our subject, but on the contrary, a most rigid pursuit of that which is of highest importance in it, expressly to note, though it can be done only in passing, the following:—that our own preferable association, a little while ago alluded to, of “baby smiles” with Infancy, has in truth become such to us, notoriously, as a rule, *not* in connection with the idea of a father’s rational instruction, but only with that of the playful endearments of the mother. The history of the affections, which depends, in its own special mode, entirely upon our recognition of the fact, here purposely ignored, of the separation of womanhood out of the general mass of humanity, and consequently upon our seeing that the province

of the mother and the affections, is a quite distinct one from that of the father and of the intellect, however there is all the time a common nature and a close intimacy of relation always existing between the two:—the history of the affections, I say, would, if it were carried out, show a very different mode of advance appropriate to it, from that to be seen in the spiritualized sentiment now in question with us. But still the difference would be of the kind that would lie only in this: the mother, characteristically, *coaxes* her children into learning; the father, either by force or by threats, *constrains* them. For, I urge, not in any case can it be said that the effort to learn arises in a manner that is purely spontaneous on the part of the child, and free from external influence of some kind or another. But thus comes back the question, of *what* kind?—the question which is now our point. It is evident, as the result of experience, that if we seek to estimate what has been the effect of cultivation in regard to our notion of education, it is precisely this: that it has been seen advisable, that constantly more and more the nature of the inducement employed should be changed from the violent kind, first employed, to that which is milder;—and that the means of rendering it thus desirably milder has been always the admitting, to be blended up into the matter, of the affections. We, in these happier later days of educational progress, are become convinced, that is to say, that the training of youthful powers does actually succeed better when under the influence of affective stimulus, than when under the scourge of physical apprehension. Such *being* then our conviction, *why* is it, we have to inquire,—for here, I repeat, lies our stumbling-block:—*why* is it that the great Education of Religion, as figured to have been carried on by the Father of our spirits, should have needed, as it seems it did, to have at all events *begun* in a manner that we now see to be unworthy even of mortal instructors?

Now, provided that we follow out the present principle, by taking the same method with this difficulty that we have found

serviceable in all similar difficulties, it appears plain that there is, here again, an immediate answer to be given, as the reason of the fact, that as far as it goes,—that is, as a merely general answer,—must at once be owned as sufficient. I mean, that the instant we have rendered our view of religion comprehensive enough to take in the whole course of religion, which development-principle does qualify it for, though no other principle does, we may indeed discern that steadfast matter of uniform progress within it, out of the lower mode into the higher, which, abstractly from individual considerations, evidently justifies the beginning by the end. But here also again, it is as evidently true, that this general explanation does *not* convey the peculiar sort of even mere intellectual satisfaction that we require,—does not so much as touch the original “*Why it should be so*” that lay in our feeling of the matter. To reach even this, however, I think is within our power, if we only go a step farther. For, let us consider, what is it that really forms the difficulty of the case? It is granted, that it consists in the crossing of one of our best instincts. But then, if we can come to see how the crossing really belongs to a general principle of nature, that is in itself so wide and so deep, as to include within its sphere the source of every one of our acknowledged blessings, over and above its including also of our crosses;—and a principle, moreover, so well established, as such, in our philosophy in other respects, that it may be felt, safely, to carry a weight of implicit reliability along with it:—then, I say, there is no longer any possibility of reasonable dissatisfaction remaining in the matter, but it may be said that the full sense of intellectual reconciliation with the fact has been obtained. And this takes place, I conceive, as soon as we bethink ourselves of the following principle as being that under which, by a due classification of ideas, we ought really to range the present fact: namely, that *pleasurable sensation never does in any case occur, except only in the one mode of re-action out of painful disturbance*; while also, as a corollary, it is only as the

similar result out of a state of proper *quietude* at the beginning,—that is, of *uninterrupted quietude*,—that *sensation at all has any* existence. Assume this principle as a law, and follow it as a guide, and it seems to me that we must inevitably find even that degree of particularized conformity to apparently universal ordination, that makes opposition to it on the part of our own judgment a manifest folly to ourselves. If it become evident,—and this is what I say it *will*,—how all along, through the entire series of experiences in question, both those which we willingly accept as delightful, and those which we shrink from as odious, and in the branch of the affections also, altogether in common with those that belong to the intelligence:—how, I say, there has been throughout all but one uniform influence at work; and that of the kind which, from the satisfactory testimony borne in behalf of it by the sort of experience where originally we became acquainted with it, (namely, the physical,) we have, or ought to have, no difficulty in now *continuing* to recognize as in constant operation:—then, I argue, the mode of our perception of the inherent *necessity of things* contained in the matter, is that which our best instincts no longer *can* strive against. Considered intrinsically, I appeal to you to revolve the thought well to yourself, whether it is not indeed true, that the very impulse which causes the babe to cling to its mother's breast,—forming thereby manifestly the root, out of which spring thenceforth into being all forms to be ever subsequently taken by any kind of the affections whatever,—*must*, in fact, and in right reason, be as imperatively classed under the proper designation of *Fear*, as must be the most thoroughly conscious terror of the adult! The one kind of change, that is constant in all matter of mental progress, must indeed be allowed for: namely, that at every stage of advance the sensation of Fear, once having been established, becomes incessantly more and more abstract, and therein more and more consciously entertained by the individual person affected by it; while also, according to the preceding corollary, the actual

beginning of the sensation is, by parity of reasoning, only itself likewise an abstraction out of what, though not indeed actually a sensation, still was that which prepared the way for a sensation. But, except for this kind of change, I will now try to exhibit the manner in which I think it is proved that there is in existence no other.

Let us begin at the bottom of the series, and consider, for instance, the nature of Hunger. It is, obviously, a bodily demand; but is not *this*, I ask, equally obvious respecting it, that it is still of that nature, that in order to get itself relieved, it can act successfully only in fact through the institution, superinduced upon itself, of a so-to-speak mental demand? This institution, then, let us thus paint:—the movement which, in order to such relief, is required (by the fact of the existence of living beings at all) to be consequent upon the sensation of hunger, is only brought into play precisely by the fact of there occurring an abstract repetition of the sensation,—that is to say, a repetition of the sensation transferred into what it is more convenient to begin *now* by calling, as it will have to be called hereafter, when the higher part of the series is in question, the *psychical* department of the constitution. Hunger, therefore, we must take note, causes movement to remove hunger only when it has become the *dread* of hunger, instead of hunger itself: since this is the very meaning of the abstract repetition of the bodily sensation. And that it should do so,—that is, that the abstract repetition should have the absolute power of propagating motion into the muscles, &c., which the bodily sensation had not,—there is, I conceive, an adequate cause, to find which we have only to recur to the common law of mechanics: namely this, that it is essentially in the nature of a violent shock to paralyse, while it is only the not-violent influence that really serves to do that which is the proper means of propagating movement of the vital sort now in question: namely, that sets up a re-action. This, then, is the first point. But the second that I take to rest upon,

comprising the other element upon which, together with the first, my whole explanation is based, has, I believe, an equal measure of the same kind of accordance with purely mechanical law. I mean, that when the two several conditions, of the immediate bodily sense of hunger, and the mental reflection of the same, are once instituted, there ensues, in continual operation, a state of oscillation between them:—unappreciable, indeed, as long as the compound sensation is felt by us in the mass, but tending always to that distinct separation of the different portions of the sensation, which, when made, will bring appreciableness along with it. What I consider, therefore, as the transaction, is as follows:—Directly that the keen sense of present pain of hunger subsides, and is replaced by merely the psychical repetition of it, the state is such that the psychical sense *can* now make the comparison with its previous condition (probably by a subordinate oscillation of its own,) which when violently impressed it could *not*, but which, being made, effects for it the cognizance of the difference actually instituted between present bodily uneasiness and former bodily quietude; while from this cognizance of difference, again, results the psychical restlessness, which comes as the echo to the physical, by oscillation with which the general movement of the muscular system, to remove hunger, has finally to be set on foot. And this I take to form, in fact, the general type that belongs to the entire series of the operations, which it is now my object to show as *being* thus analogous. For, in my view,—except, as I have said, for the matter of increase in degree of abstractness and of consciousness,—the state I have described is equally fulfilled at each several stage that forms the series, however little accustomed we have been to recognize its identity, and consequently, however various be the designations we have familiarly applied to it. If it occur under condition of ripened consciousness, we call it, and with an entire distinctness in our use of the term, a *desire*, deliberately directed towards the return into what had

been the previous state of tranquility;—as, if it occurred at the other extreme of the series, or under condition purely mechanical, we should speak of it, and with the like definiteness, as simply a re-actionary tendency to recover a broken equilibrium. But, in the more uncertain ground of condition where, if instances occur within it, as I say with regard to the instances now in question that they do, we can only describe their position by saying that they occur somewhere between those extremes,—*here*, I say, it is only natural, and nothing against the principle I am maintaining, that there should be the difficulty of sorting out ideas respecting them that there is; although still I maintain that the true arrangement must in the end show itself to be, that this same peculiar mode of suffering which we know as the instinctive sentiment of *fear*, however little likely to be at first thought of as holding a serial connection with the two modes of impression just described, really has such connexion, only varied as now lying under mean condition, instead of, as then, under that which was extreme. For what else is, or can be, *fear*, other than that of which I have given the type: namely, the psychical reflection of physical suffering, to which is added this special characteristic, that it forms of right the preliminary stage to the awakening of function to remove the object of fear? Let it not, indeed, be supposed that I am thus overlooking the peculiar difficulty really in question, the coping with which is, on the contrary, my express object:—I perfectly recognize that the “peculiarity” of *suffering* being now attached to the impression, is that which *does* rightly constitute a peculiarity. But, as I found to be the case once before, (p. 78,) I find myself now again, perforce, compelled to contradict myself by saying that what I have asserted as *no change*, is indeed a change, of *sub-specific* kind. And the manner in which I am going to account for it will also, you will find, be of the same sort: it will always be of the sort, namely, that, once and ever, I have taken as accounting for every one of these constantly-occurring cases of phenomenal

contradiction; arising, notwithstanding, out of the only constant following out of an uniform mode of proceeding. For, observe how the kind of change that I *have* allowed—namely, in degree of abstractness and consciousness—must, in the nature of things have worked. There being no sense of suffering concerned at either extreme of the series, I have thus far already explained, that the sense of suffering had its *beginning* through a distinct separation being made into the different *portions* of the sensation. That is to say, the individual affected has its attention enforced upon the sensation, just as the consequence of a certain prolongation and greater variety of character induced into it, which causes the perfecting of the entire operation to be *arrested* at its separate stages. When it is to the infant, or the insect, that the sensation of Hunger occurs, not only does the psychical reflection intervene, but the psychical reflection performs also its office of driving the individual to seek its food, without however in either case any mental appreciation being induced, simply for this: that the premonitory feeling is instantaneously absorbed into the action induced to ensue upon it. And accordingly, I think it is plain how it can be only to the kinds of existence more advanced than these, that the transitional stage comes to be in itself the thing of separate importance that we are now considering it as being. But the chief matter of note,—the main point of the difficulty,—is the way in which the suffering has, in order to the individual's reaching the final character in the series, to be again rendered absent from the transaction: absolutely, that is, to reverse itself, and cease to be suffering! And thus then, I meet it. Remember, that the condition to success in the transaction is always this: that the re-action engendered be sufficient for its purpose; that purpose being, as you will also bear in mind, to remove whatever it is that forms the existing obstacle to the individual's content. Very well: then is not this the same thing as the following?—what is required, in order that the mental rest-

lessness, or struggle of the being to right itself, may avail for that purpose, is, that it effect a "correlation" out of the condition which is merely a passive recipiency of disturbing action, into that which is an active counter-action to the disturbance. Is it not evident, that it is only in proportion as it *does* effect such "correlation", that it *does* likewise attain to whatever it attains of true *success* in the matter? But surely also it is plain, how the fact of this "correlation," *when* it does take place, is that which in itself causes an utterly new mode of sensation in the experience entertained by the individual in the matter! And just for this:—whereas the passive recipiency of disturbance is *Pain*, the active counter-action to it is, and must be, *Pleasure*. For all action—all exercise of function whatsoever, normally carried on,—is *Pleasure*; and *this* exercise of function, in especial, is, and must be, the source of the highest kind of *Pleasure*.

I do not suppose there is any need that I should seek out a special proof, how such "correlation" might take place; since it seems to me only a manifest sequence upon the idea of a merely just over-balancing weight of energy having been arrived at, on the part of the newly-growing function,—which, that it *should* be arrived at, is again only a matter that forms the very hypothesis of progress. I will therefore hasten forward to draw out the exact result at which I am aiming. The reason for the disappearance of *suffering*, as a characteristic sensation, at the higher stages of the series, is, obviously from the foregoing, that now the portion of the oscillation between received disturbance, and effort to remove disturbance, which rests with the *former*, has become so insignificant compared with that which rests with the *latter*, as that the sensation attached to the former may be said to be really merged into that which is attached to the latter. It is thus, I have imagined, that has arisen the phenomenon so little to be expected, as that out of one uniform operation should have been effected a change that is absolutely from experience of one character into that

which is directly its opposite. For throughout the whole series of oscillatory operations, the sole fact of variation required to account for the whole actual change in the phenomena, you perceive, is indeed simply this, now pointed out: namely, that in the lower stages the physical half of the transaction, being the predominant one, causes the prevailing character to be that of passivity, which is pain; while in the higher stages, the fact of its being the psychical half that gains the upper hand, is marked by the converting of the endurance into pleasurable re-action. Then now, putting together our data, let us consider these two things:—let us remember, on the one hand, that Fear has been laid down by us as in its proper nature that which forms the mental counterpart to Pain;—let us hold fast, on the other hand, by the philosophic conclusion, unrepugnantly now admitted amongst all of us, that in every kind of sentient action in the world which is known as physical, it is universally Pain that is the prime mover:—and why, I ask, seeing what we have just seen as to the common power of transmutation in the two, shall we any longer be offended at the principle, that, in like manner to its counterpart, so also is Fear the prime mover in all action whatever that is mental? We have gained the analogy that surely, as far as abstract principle can go, sets every thing straight; and that hence leaves no longer the least degree of contradiction, such as our moral instincts have really the right to complain of. As Pain, without any essential change in its nature, except only the tempering and refining of it, arrives at a certain point at that variation in the balance of its constituent elements, which causes the general character of it to mount up at once into absolute Pleasure; so may Fear by the very law of its constitution, and with only the same kind of modification as in the other case, dilate itself suddenly at last into the quivering joy of Hope! And if Hope is indeed that which we have learned to consider it, the most exquisite of all mental sensations in

possession with us,—then, surely, the existence and active exercise of Fear, which is the proper parent of Hope, *cannot* any longer be murmured against.

It is thus, you observe, the removing of all idea of *arbitrariness* out this employment of Fear, as the instrument of the "Education of the human race", that I am urging as the filling up of our principle, that really suffices to vindicate the employment to us. But only, remember, in an abstract manner. Let it not be supposed for a moment that in the above I have been confounding abstract intellectual satisfaction with personal satisfaction. I fully recognize that it is the natural instinct of the matter, that even the very drawing out of what we may count as intellectual satisfaction in the special matter we are upon, only makes us the more vividly conscious of a lurking discontent, that from its *being* thus hitherto ignored, grows thence as it were into the necessity of becoming importunate for recognition. And so important do I esteem this recognition, that in fact this result of drawing it out into the due expression, under which it may be effectually dealt with, is to me of much greater value than any which may lie purely in the demonstration for its own sake. Very sure am I, that only when the personal discontent is fully expressed and allowed for, can we gain any real understanding even of how the intellectual part of the matter lies before us. Abstract satisfaction is *not* the same thing as personal satisfaction;—and in the foregoing, you remember, the thing at which I aimed was the removal of the difficulty which consisted in the crossing of our *best* instincts: while, most certainly, I do *not* think of our peculiarly personal instincts as being those which are our *best* instincts;—but still, so far am I from here intending to pass over what, if not best, is still eminently most pressing to us, that the chief, and only immediate object, with which I have now attempted the foregoing, has been that I might, as previously stated, bring the principle, when it shall have been

thus prepared, to bear upon that matter of the continuation of our subject, presently to be resumed, that will indeed, as will appear, relates expressly to what is personal with all of us.

The case present with us has been, you will remember, that the occasion of the rousing the sense of repugnancy within us, was the bringing of the view respecting the actual cause of Religion into that abstract view where it *does* affect ourselves, in common with all our fellow beings. As long as we looked back upon Fear as connected only with far-removed occupiers of human conditions, the matter seemed of little immediate concern. But the instant the matter wore a form of universal application, our instincts respecting it started up into alarm. And *why* they have done so,—*why*, in fact, they had just cause for doing so,—is what we have now farther to see: since the truth is, that very far is the above from bringing us to the point of appreciation that is really adequate to the matter, even supposing that it may, as far as it goes, be indeed admitted as representing the actual-general state of the case. For you will have perceived, that, notwithstanding that the tracing of the scheme as to the ameliorating nature of the causative principle of Religion, was made out expressly with a view to the subject of Religion, I have found myself obliged to qualify my delineation of the amelioration with conditions that precisely exclude Religion from participating in the full effect of it! And *this* is the reason, I call upon you to consider, *why* personal satisfaction cannot go along with the abstract. The very nature of Religion forbids it. Paradoxical as it sounds, the only kind of success which it lies within the possibility of Religion to achieve, is, that it frustrate itself! And yet why should I call this a paradox, when in fact it is the plainest meaning that can be given in any way to Religion, to say thus that it is the very thing to which success, otherwise counted as success, is an inherent impossibility? Consisting, as we all know that Religion does, in Aspiration, is there any thing that is really *less* paradoxical, than in saying that if success in

attaining its end *were* possible, Aspiration being extinguished, Religion in the very same act would also cease to be Religion, and therein would therefore cease to be!

We saw, before, that the peculiarly intellectual part of Religion had in it the necessity of starting with that, in its general view of things, which was an actual falsity;—it was a naturally-accompanying discovery that the moral side of Religion should also be compelled to begin with an unworthy motive-principle that should have in course of time to be reversed:—according to that universal mode of Nature, needing every time to be spelt out afresh, by which every where ends are worked out by means that are contrary to the ends. But now the self-frustrating character that belongs so specially to Religion, as to make it solely what it is, comes with a force so essential, that in truth if we do not allow it to pervade our whole sense respecting it, we shall make nothing of the entire matter of the portion of our subject which has now to follow:—the portion which, as I have said, is eminently *the* part of pressing personal concern to us.

The matter, upon the threshold of which we have now only just entered, has, I urge, been hitherto treated by us,—that is, by mankind in general,—in the way that is really destructive to religious feeling, of supposing that Fear, in relation to Religion, was actually capable of fulfilling the transmutation inherently proper to it, circumstances permitting, into Hope. To me, on the contrary, the result of all the reflection that I have been able to make, has been, that just for this reason, that circumstances do *not* permit, is it the case that there has occurred what *has* occurred:—namely, that the truncation, so-to-speak, of Hope, as to the actual *object* of Hope, in question in the matter, has been the source of the creation of the diverted-spirituality of object in the nature of Religion, which really gives the sole value to Religion. Fear, in the case of Religion, being deprived of the actual power of transition into Hope, which indeed implies that the success in the removing of the

object of Fear was that which the intellect should see as within reach, never consequently actually ceases to be Fear; although it shows within itself still that amelioration undergone in the course of Religion's passing on always, as it does, on the road from Fear and towards Hope, which is marked by the gaining of what we may call a prevailing degree of *Hopefulness* in the mode of the mind's religious regard towards the Future, as contrasted from what had been a prevailing degree of *Fearfulness*. And a most valid change this is!—since, just what the sensation of Hunger has grown into, (to keep to our original example,) when it has become the animal luxury of healthful appetite, with appropriate food spread out in reach of the palate, compared with the craving voracity of the original pang:—such, we may say, is the blessed yearning of spiritual aspiration, with its appropriate enjoyment now found within access, compared with the primitive sense of fierce destitution that first drove human nature at all to seek, in spiritual things, the counteractive replenishment that it was destined to seek, against the evil that was ever to press upon it in the physical. A *hopeful* Religion is a spiritual Religion; while a *fearing* Religion is that which holds down the soul to corporealism. But still, if Fear could have been actually extinguished, the proper counteraction to Fear, which I say Religion essentially is, would have no longer any thing to counteract, and would therefore cease to exist.

Here, then, is the limitation to be rigorously preserved by us in all that we have yet to seek:—simply, this so apparent a truism, that Religion, in all that is required of it, must not be required to do that which reason shows us would be a nullification of itself. It was indeed formerly supposed that Religion had within itself the prerogative to control the whole field of outer circumstance,—to alter, for individual benefit, the entire disposition of things laid out as under Nature's general law. But scarcely will *this* be adhered to, at least in abstract principle, by even the merely average intelligence of the present

day. The only demand therefore is,—and truly it is a great demand!—that the abstract principle be suffered to do that which it is its highest and most indispensable function to do: namely, to act as a control upon personal self-willedness.

We began, first of all, with seeing it as the prime introductory point to be assumed as the guiding principle of our subject, that the proper aim of Religion upon its purely intellectual or abstract side, was an unattainable one: namely, that nothing ever can give to us the true Knowledge of God which nevertheless Religion binds us ever to seek. This was our hypothesis:—ground that had been already amply prepared for us. But we are coming now to ground that has *not* been already so well prepared; however it be, as I believe it to be, such as in itself is equally sure. The properly personal aim of Religion is surely to be owned as unattainable in reality as the intellectual. I have already argued, upon the first-considered department, that notwithstanding the self-frustration encountered by the Intellect, still has the unattainableness of its object not in the least impeded both the serviceableness and the intrinsic truth of Religion:—I am going to argue, in the same way, that just such will be the case with our sense of Religion that is morally personal.

We may, then, now return to the point where the digression into these two points of preliminary principle seemed necessary. Having seen, on the one hand, what is the needed character of pure speculativeness in our quest; and, on the other, the abstract unobjectionableness of the principle which has henceforth to embody itself vitally as the very heart of our speculation: we are, as I hope, in the sufficient state of preparation for resuming the search we have entered upon as to the primitive history of religion. And let me ask you to observe

this, that in what I have heretofore said, I am quite aware of its utter insufficiency as it stands. I see as well as doubtless you have seen, that I have done nothing at all more than point to what appears to me as the sufficing cause of the *mould* taken by religious principle in the beginning of its career. The original source whence religious movement in the mind should at all have taken place, is still to seek;—though surely close enough at hand!—But it will be convenient shortly to recapitulate the ground already gone over.

Enough for our purpose may be concisely summed up thus:—The human mind, advancing upon its march of improvement, or, in other words, commencing its acquisition of a sense of the operation of Time (these being, you remember, essentially equivalent propositions with us); and, making such advance under that which was the condition Providentially prescribed to it, of the battling egoisms of Parent and Child: could actually effect such advance in no other way, than, in the first instance, by giving itself up to the idea of a Sovereign Potency residing in ages gone by. And the result was the primeval Form of religion which, however genuine and salutary at the time, was nevertheless, according to the standard by which we have now to measure our terms, in comparing that past kind of religion with what religion ought to be, an influence most feeble, and even actually depressing to the energies of men:—just as its fundamental principle of Superiority-in-the-Past was essentially false, and therefore such as, to those recognizing its falseness, it would be a manifest self-contradiction to associate with any quality other than that of feebleness. The kind of religion accruing from this originally erroneous, and as yet un-corrected, notion of the actual relationship of things in the cosmical ordering of the whole, was, namely, but that which it is evidently natural that it should have been,—the gospel of self-degradation, instinct with servility and humiliation, which formed the appropriate basis to be hereafter so gloriously contrasted, as it was contrasted, by the spirit of

aspiration destined to proceed in the riper structure of religion out of Christianity.

But beyond this historical perception as to the baseness of the character of religion in its earliest form of manifestation, we have gone on to recognize it for the abstract principle of the matter, so far as analogical probability goes, that Fear is the very origin, and constantly influential producer of Religion. What remains for us now, therefore, to do, is to set before ourselves distinctly the precise fact in Nature which, by the natural constitution of things, actually formed the Circumstantial Object upon which this human Fear, both primeval and permanent, has rested.

The prime-moving Fear which even now is at work in the bosoms of every one of us, making Religion the consequence upon itself that we cannot part with if we would, is the Fear of Death. *Death* is the thought that, unescapable as it is, makes it for ever impossible to us to cease thinking also about God. As long as we have to *die*, we must also, unless we cease to be thinking beings at all, have *that* to think of, which is outside of, and superior to, the thought of Death. *Here* is it, I say, that lies the Origin of Religion which in every way we shall find adequate to stand as the rational foundation our intellect is seeking, *if* only the moral control I have lately spoken of be duly gained:—that is, if we be indeed armed against making our personal predilections the obstacle that shall prevent our accepting such understanding.

We have been hitherto demanding of Religion (—it is the truth of the matter that cannot be denied!—) that it should remove the great Object of our universal Fear away from us!—No: not thus is it that Religion will give answer to us, according to any view of Religion that makes it *not only* a personally-craving impulse, but *also* a mode of rational seeking for Divine intelligence upon the matter. The Religion that *does* accord with Divine intelligence, is that which for ever requires from its professors, not the persisting cry of entreaty

for the passing away of the actual cup of agony, but the final submission in this matter of suffering, (so deep in human nature that human nature could not exist without it,) that *here* also the suffering mortal must resign himself, and say "Not my will, but a Higher will, be done!" If it cannot do for us the effecting of *this* spirit, Religion, I say, must deny itself, as having proved itself really of nothing worth. We *must* die:—if we cannot yet make the offering up of our life a voluntary surrender towards that Supreme Ordering of things, which, if we do not actually see, yet we cordially believe, to be Good,—if we cannot *yet*, I say, do and believe thus, let us, at all events, then lay open our souls that a help may come to our unbelief: as I, for one, feel assured that it *will* come.

Truly, however, I admit, as I have already signified the necessity of admitting, that we are here falling upon the most deadly contradiction to our Intuitions! Every kind of previous obstacle that has hitherto opposed itself, in the course of this new rendering of the purport of Religion, as residing in the character of our acknowledged instincts, is but as nothing when compared with that greatest of all obstacles of the kind, now lying full in the path-way before us. Are we then still,—the question has come,—to pass on, and seemingly trample upon *this* instinct, which I have not the least intention of here disputing as really the deep-laid, and all but universal prompting of our nature that it is commonly asserted to be,—the human desire for Immortality!—But the fact is, as I have intimated, that the ruthlessness apparent in the treatment here pursued, is exactly that which does not really exist. It is assuredly my object, so far from in any way trampling upon, or, what I think is as reprehensible, *avoiding* the instinct, most fully now to encounter and seek to do it justice. Have I not, as every human being has, the fullest of personal interest to do it justice! If I had within my compass of known possibility, any means by which I could wring out from Nature any sign of a consent to my own instinctive desire, that this my personal self, which

is to me all that I am able actually to feel out of the sum of happiness and nobleness existent, was really endowed with the authoritative permission of Nature to live and enjoy itself for ever,—am I not ready as any Christians can be, thankfully to echo the pæan of self-gratulation that thus would arise to me as to them, for the victory seeming to be obtained over the natural annihilator of my personal enjoyment! Certainly, my natural egoism would snatch at the boon as what it could not choose but seize upon, if only it were offered.—But, if it is *not* offered?—Must I therefore lapse back from what is indeed even the *Christian* standard, and suffer myself weakly and impiously to repine, as the *old-covenant* hero repined, “It would have been good for me never to have been born”?—Surely, to murmur *now*, after all that these intervening ages have done for us in the way of strengthening our religious dispositions, just as Job in his *own* time more excusably murmured, would be indeed a sinking of ourselves as much beneath Job, as our present condition of religious progress is, or ought to be, better than his was.

If it was an intrinsic truth as to the nature of Religion, that it should convey to human beings, (as we just now saw,) in place of the satisfaction sought out by them in regard to religious matters, constantly nothing else than an Internal Substitute for the actual satisfaction:—so, I say, now that we bring this abstract principle to bear upon the real matter now in question with us, (—namely, this matter of Death, the religiousness of the nature of which, if it be doubted, is indeed that which I am going to prove:—) it has become with us as it were the even self-evident hypothesis, implying every thing that is logically necessary in nothing more than the very stating of it, that the human intuition in respect of this peculiar matter of Religious Fear is that which *must* have to be thwarted. This, I argue, is the inevitable proposition, that as matter of general reason, in regard to the proper consistency belonging to the general Plan of the Whole of things, is what reason, *as* reason,

cannot do otherwise than be satisfied with. And yet, since there is here also, as well as in the recent tracing out of the first abstract principle, a kind of intellectual satisfaction, that, though intellectual, is still *not* so purely such, as that this hypothetical statement *can* alone serve it:—so, I say, there is to be had, here just as there, the kind of confirmation in detail, that *will* effectually support the statement;—and that thus will, to a very great extent, help us onward *towards* the sort of morally personal satisfaction, which though by hypothesis it is unattainable, is by hypothesis, also, capable of being to a certain extent approximated. But before proceeding to this matter of detail, it is necessary to deal a little farther with the notion in ordinary prevalence upon the subject.

There is, in truth, it appears to me, a prevailing conception as to the matter, that forms an actual fallacy, of the kind that we need above every thing to see distinctly as such, before we can hope to come to a real understanding:—I mean, the conception as to “intuition”. There is, in the ordinary employment of this term, a degree of assumption implied as to the facts of the case, which, according to my view, I cannot help regarding as most specially a vivid instance of the inevitable resting in error, which by natural law constitutes always the first stage of all our abstract or relational ideas. The word “intuition” implies, indeed, even *per se*, that there is actually an outward fact in correspondence with the human conception. If it be supposed to mean *an inward teaching*, it implies both a teacher and a lesson as already existing things, to which the circumstance alone remaining in requisition is that the human mind be capable of receiving the inculcation. If it be supposed to mean *a looking into* things, still there is the same implication: namely, that there is a truth of the kind imagined, waiting ready to be looked into. And this is begging the whole question. The shifting of the meaning which I say is requisite, is that it should be made to contain within it an acknowledgment of the mind’s subjection to the universal condition of

mind, that it is its *own impression* of things without, and never the things themselves, with which it has to deal. The omission of this acknowledgment, I urge, throws us back at once and completely into the sphere of miracle:—utterly disclaimed, as I am aware that such relapse is, by those of the present day who, in setting forth the value of Religion by Intuition, regard it as in that respect specially adapted as the antagonistic notion to Religion by Miracle. Direct communication of *any* kind, I invite such to consider, is of the very essence of Miracle; and therefore, if we sufficiently reflect, that which relates to *truth*, not at all less than that which relates to any other matter of bestowal. Direct communication of truth, if we consider it, would form, I say, as manifest an infringement upon the acknowledged law of Experience, as any other sort of infringement that we can conceive to ourselves. Knowledge that has *indeed* been naturally gained, must, according to what has been found here as the true law of Experience, have consisted in this only: a symbolical interpretation put by the human mind upon the impressions, of whatever sort they might be, externally offered to it. And accordingly, the passing over of the recognition of this essential part of the transaction, the intermediate symbolism, whenever we do pass it over, must, by this view, cause us to remain as fully within the region of proper supernaturalism as if we had never imagined ourselves to have abandoned it. I say therefore, earnestly,—if there is *here* a point where of all others the thing needed by us is *truth*, and where to deceive ourselves is a mischief to our moral nature greater than any other we can undergo, let us take heed how we suffer ourselves to rely implicitly upon what Nature would seem, through our intellect, to be thus bidding us specially not to rely implicitly upon. If the matter really lie as is tending now to appear, the *intuition* we feel, all of us, towards an everlasting existence, is that which has been instilled into us by the teaching, precisely, of those out of the mass of our instincts which, instead of being the most trustworthy, are in fact the

least so. And accordingly, in this case, the only security for us practically, can be in the following out the rule that I have before signified: namely, in using our intellectual perception as the legitimate guide which Nature has provided us with for the controlling of those specially personal promptings of ours.

To make the ground we are going upon sure, it seems to me therefore much better to limit the terms we use to such as point the certainty of the matter to that particular wherein alone we can prove the right to make assertion of certainty; and this, it is evident, we may do, if we restrict ourselves to the saying that what we recognize in ourselves, is simply the *instinctive desire* for Immortality. Thus being limited, the natural impulse will indeed, as I have wished to give warning, acquire a character totally the reverse of that hitherto attributed to it; but this, I still say, is, by the present principle, a change that in no way implies—that is indeed the contrary from implying—an actual *extinction*, as taking place with regard to what has so long proved itself the incontestible vivifier of all our highest powers of life. It is not here—I mean, it is not in this first part of my present work,—that I can enter, as I hope to do later, into the practical delineation of what the belief I speak of grows into, when carried on under the operation of this change in its character; but this much I must say at once, as indeed belonging to the general scheme of thought requiring to be here laid out:—there is really, in the limitation and correction here aimed at of the idea as generally entertained, not at all more of a tendency to crush the hope of Immortality in its true character out of the human heart, than I have before protested that the same kind of correction as to the ordinary idea of obtaining real knowledge of God, was in fact the Atheism that it cannot help appearing to be in the eyes of orthodox believers. Let us say that our Hope of Immortality requires to be known by us now as a Symbolical Hope, instead of as a real Hope:—I maintain that the real benefit of the Hope will *increase* within us, just by its thus attaining that which

is every where else the sign of elevation,—the higher abstractness, namely, in *itself*, which is always accompanied by a deeper consciousness in *ourselves* as to the absolute truth of it. / For as to the prime fact of there being an absolute truth in the instinct,—of Nature's sort, though not of our sort,—I think it will suffice to refer to the following idea thus generally expressed, as that which I believe indicates the clue which in time Nature will reveal to us: namely, that the continuity of the Life now within us, although truly preserved as to the fact of its being carried forward into new existence without the diminishing of any thing that forms its absolute essence, will nevertheless be so changed as to all the attributes that make us know it as *our* Life, as to render it in fact a mere figure of speech so to denominate it. And empty as this symbolical Hope naturally appears of the *kind* of vivifying effect experienced heretofore, while we have adhered to the figure of speech as if the truth it contained were a literal truth, yet still the finding that there is a genuine relation between the symbol and the thing symbolized (—how otherwise would it be a symbol?—surely if any logic in the world is clear, it is that a symbol could not arise without that certain resemblance to actual fact in the matter, which resemblance in truth alone makes it a symbol!—) the finding, I say, that there is this genuine relation between the symbolical Hope of living for ever in an existence that is properly and personally our own, and the Hope that appears an absolutely true one, that our proper personal existence will for ever retain a certain and vital connexion with all existence that has to come after it, is an explanation of our Hope that, I allege, ought both to satisfy ourselves and to vindicate Nature, as to at all events this which I say is the main point,—namely, as to there being, with certainty, nothing that we have the right to consider as *delusive* in it.

To pass on, then, to the matter of the general consistency with the whole Plan of Nature, of the "intuition", henceforth taken as meaning indeed, as here proposed, nothing whatever

beyond the implanted instinct, to be regarded solely as the "Desire for Immortality";—it appears to me plain that, when thus limited, there is really no ground at all on which we can properly set it apart in any way from the desire of continued Life which acts upon us universally, and which is indeed the condition of our feeling towards Life which alone makes any measure of continuation of Life a possibility. But, avoiding the teleological argument, let us look upon the matter simply as to the natural origin and growth of the feeling. To say that a being in a state of content with actual position, desires an indefinite continuation of that position, seems to me so inevitable a proposition, (making allowance for a certain necessary anthropomorphism in the statement of it,) that we ought to class it in fact as the first Law of Motion in the mind:—a Law, namely, of *vis inertia*, quite as applicable here as in the crudest physics. The mind in a state of actual content, desires, or expects, to continue in that state for ever, unless outward prohibition forbids it so to expect. It is difficult, indeed, to keep the phrases we use down to the point required. By saying the mind "desires" or "expects", I do not in the least mean any conscious desire or expectation to be implied; and by saying the mind expects continuance "for ever", I do not in the least mean that the mind requires to have any sense of Infinity such as the accomplished reason of the present day entertains it. I mean only, that the mind, as a universal rule, thinks not of any arrest to, or diversion of, its actually appreciated condition, unless such arrest or diversion be externally enforced upon it. In this sense it is obvious that the *lowest* human faculty has the most perfect, just because the most undisturbed, sense of Infinity. It has not yet begun to take cognizance of any of those forms of limitation, the recognition of which is always that which constitutes Thought. The expectation of a new-born babe, or of an ignorant savage, to live for ever, is of a very different *kind* from the supposed intuition of an enlightened adult; but still it has the one

characteristic needed, that the mind possessed by it sees no cause of limitation. And until the mental *vis inertia* of its state of rest is overcome, how is it possible that it ever should see any cause for it! If the Post-pliocene savage was in this respect upon the same terms of immortal anticipation with the religious believer of to-day, the explanation of the community of trust between them seems to me to have its true interpretation, not in the nobleness of the savage mind,—except comparatively with the degree of brutishness that was incapable of such a thing as anticipation at all,—but in the still incapacity or reluctance of the modern religionist to submit his natural desire to the limitation which increased knowledge of the will of Nature in the matter must bring to him. Not even yet,—not even after the thousands of centuries that geological explorings show us to have intervened since first of all the mind of man began to speculate respecting its own Futurity,—not even yet have we learned to offer up truly from our hearts the prayer towards the Ordainer of our Futurity, which Religion, if true Religion, ought to enable us to offer up,—“Teach me the measure of my days, that I may know how frail I am!”

The fact in human nature, thus, which I consider we have before us to go upon, is that which we must pourtray to ourselves as follows:—The intuitive Desire for Immortality, limited, as we have now limited it, to mean nothing *more* than a desire, is in truth but the reverse side of the otherwise-named Fear of Death; except for this, which does indeed carry it the one essential, however to ordinary thought scarcely perceptible, step beyond the merely nominal distinction, which consists in the first starting of the change in the quality of anticipation, already described as the passing out of the condition of Fearfulness into that of Hopefulness. And these two circumstances, taken together, give to the matter an entire simpleness. The acquiring of this new aspect to itself, on the part of that which is always one and the same sentiment,

shows to us at once the mode in which we see that Nature may have worked out the problem we are inquiring into. The Desire of Immortality has, by the universal consent of all events Christian experience, become associated, and to all appearance indelibly so, with the presence of Religion. And for such associate, then, do I also unreservedly take it. For the instant that Fear converts itself into Desire,—or rather, in proportion as it does, with infinite gradualness, *begin* so to convert itself,—I perceive how it is possible, under the milder action of the at-first too much perturbing shock upon the moral nature, for there to be the instituting of the marked re-actionary influence which I am supposing that Religion is. I perceive, that is,—to state the matter comprehensively,—how a naturally implanted sentiment, that could not help arising within man as soon as he began to be man, and that must also, by the same necessity, continue for ever to abide with him as long as he continues to be man, is, and by still no other than the same necessity, the likewise natural awakener within him of all those higher faculties, now classed by us in regard to this especial bearing as Religion, the exercise of which, although it cannot in the nature of the case surmount the Fear, yet counteracts it by so great benefit of an opposite kind to the Fear, as truly supports the claim experimentally put forth by Religion, to have done a better thing for us than if it *had* surmounted the Fear.

The Fear of Death, I say, let us freely acknowledge to ourselves, is that which we must count as an absolute Pain. But then, I argue, so far from this being truly a rational objection with regard to the beneficence of its ordination, it is simply that which brings the present matter of our consideration into a perfect accordance with the general mode of ordination, which otherwise we have abundantly recognized as beneficent. For, (—let me be pardoned the iteration, if it be felt unnecessary:—) is it possible that the disturbance of mental *vis inertiae*, supposing it to occur, should do otherwise than inflict Pain?—is it, again, possible that the interruption to actual content, which

the prospect of cessation to actual content forms, should act otherwise than as a disturbance to mental *vis inertiae*?—and these two things being admitted, is there indeed any thing else, as a final result, than the foregoing, that *can* rationally and morally be required in the case? The only thing, I say, that we *can* have a right to demand of the Pain, is that it be calculated to stir up the counteraction which, here as elsewhere, shall be in itself, from the very fact of the activity that constitutes its nature, of the transmuted character belonging to the sphere of Pleasure. And this character surely *does* belong to that noble degree of Fortitude, which shall suffice, in the manner here required, for the surmounting to this extent of the actual feeling of *Self*;—while, though it be true, as it is evidently true, that it is but in the rarest exceptional cases, that such effect of transition as this is really experienced as having been accomplished by Religion, yet no one will dispute that it is notoriously within the capability of Religion to *tend* to effect it. And this is, in fact, all that my principle asks for. That the effect towards which Religion is directed should *not* be gained all at once, is the special point that really gives the validity I claim to the whole plan. The one thing meanwhile, and the clearly simple thing, that I have asserted to form the needed matter of discrimination to us in the case, is merely this:—that whereas in its refined character, as happily known by us in some measure now, Religion acts towards the counteracting of the Fear of Death in a manner that is successful, or self-overcoming, in proportion as it is rendered more gentle and elevated by its conjunction with our more loving and purer sympathies; Religion, in the character that originally belonged to it, worked towards the same end in a manner that was inadequate to its purpose, in proportion as its operation was, on the contrary, rude, violent, and external.

There is, however, another kind of matter upon which an equally careful adjustment of our manner of thinking has become needful: I mean, respecting the peculiarity of the *mould*

into which we have made it our beginning position that Religion is to be esteemed as having betaken itself, in order to the obtaining for itself a working form. We have taken it as our fundamental notion of the function of Religion, that it has to create within us an acquiescence in the lot divinely ordained for us; while we have seen that the pre-eminent matter in which our own will comes into conflict with the divine ordination, is that mode of successive existence which compels the truncating of egotistic enjoyment of existence, in favour of the on-coming generation of existing beings, which stands to the actual generation in the filial relation: all this enforcing upon us, as the problem hence requiring to be accomplished, the final palliation of the originally battling temper of the respective egoisms of parent and child, into the spirit that shall consist of *mutual love*, established between them. But have we, I would suggest to you to reflect, sufficiently regulated our notion as to what it is that mutual love between parent and child really implies? How entirely different, I would invite you to consider, are the characters of the two component parts of this "mutual love"—the love, namely, as entertained by the parent, and that as entertained by the child,—from one another! Is not the Filial love, in its proper character, even an expressly *adverse* thing from the Parental? So far from there being any thing like the parity of constitution that the phrase of "mutual love" on the surface implies, the case is as utterly otherwise as the condition of the several beings has been seen to be dissimilar. We have noted a little while ago, how, in the earliest beginning of life to the infant, the movement that impels it even towards its mother, is properly Fear; while much more obviously is it the case that all the subsequent motives that specially bind the child, as a child, in connexion with the controllers of its child-like existence, are of the same nature. But to the parent the exact reverse is the case. The parent *loves* from the beginning. And yet, still, on the other hand, the sort of love with which the parent begins, is that which never, to the last,

loses the character of mere spontaneous animalism that of right marks it as parental love. Filial love, on the contrary, when it does come, is an abstract sentiment. So far from being possessed, like the Parental, as a gift of nature, at the hour of the birth of circumstance that calls for it, it is a thing which has to be distinctly created, in the proper manner of all original creation:—by outward influences, namely, imbibed within the limits of the individual's own experience. A child, I repeat,—let us think well if the assertion is possible to be questioned:—is never drawn instinctively towards its parent, *except* through the sense of actual need. And even when the attraction *has* grown to be an abstract one,—that is, when the child desires, or loves, the parent, no longer for what the parent gives, but for what the parent is,—still, the motive is radically only of the same kind as ever of seeking for a resource from evil feared to be otherwise encountered.* The child's love, that is to say, never in truth turns back from what is its natural course, namely, onwards towards its own child, so as to compass the act of *re-flecting* itself upon the fostering beings behind it, which constitutes the child's proper share in the compound work of "mutual love",—never, I say, affords to its parent even this kind of secondary and rarefied love, *except* when it happens that there occur what is indeed the obvious condition required every where to bring about reflection; and that is, some solid obstruction to the child's anticipation of ordinary content, encountered by it in front.

Such obstruction, incomparably beyond all other kinds of human disappointment whatever, is Death! Death is it which, because it is the source of the fear to us that is of all fears the Master-fear, stands to us as the one sufficing representative of all objects of inferior fear in general. And hence is it Death also which, I infer, forms at the same time the one eminent

* As when the sinner of grown-up years is brought to feel that the remembrance of his mother's image is an influence that *saves* him out of present iniquity.

Reflector, which,—just as in the individual case, so likewise in the all-comprehensive general case,—serves the great purpose to human beings in the mass, of compelling attention, by means of the interruption it brings to individual enjoyment, backwards upon that which has been the cause of the enjoyment. Thus, I say then, does the giving heed to the difference existing between Filial and Parental love, afford to us the clue for the whole problem now before us. Since Religion in general is the general result of the check put upon human Self-ism, by this solid obstruction of Death, raised by Divinely-ordained circumstance as necessary to be encountered by the Intuitive Desire proper to that Self-ism: the result being of the special nature of that same *reflected*, or abstractly-intellectual love, which in the course of the struggle between the parental and filial egoisms here under concern, constitutes the kind of love appropriate to the child and not to the parent:—it follows that the phase of Religion which becomes the elevated and comparatively successful phase, is that which is arrived at precisely on account of the Filial share in the mutual love required to soften the conflict, becoming of the two shares the predominant one. This fact once recognized, it seems to me truly that whatever there has been hitherto of right to puzzle us in the matter, is clearly done away with. For, if it is not quite simple to see the whole bearing of the fact at once,—as, indeed, it is not,—consider this:—the very existence of filial love at all, is that which in itself implies that the parental love in question has also, on its own side, so far improved itself as to have reached as near to an abstract character as its nature will admit of; and just for this reason, that the affective movement within one and the same individual, does, as we have noted, pass from being of the one kind onward into the other kind. Filial love is, however, as we know, chiefly composed of gratitude; and hence the above is the same as saying this, that children that have been grateful to their own parents, are likely to place their own offspring in a similar mood towards themselves. Surely, then,

this is the causing of the course of generations henceforth to run with a smoothness that never could have been known as long as the predominant sentiment concerned in the matter was limited to being *only* that of parental fondness or pride. The entire tone of the mutual relationship is raised; and this, again,—what is it but saying that henceforth father and children alike,—or, in other words, the whole mass of human beings,—have risen, in respect to this matter, into a marked advance of harmony with what is religiously considered as the Divine regulation of things?—And, then, as a second consideration, observe, on the other hand, how to meet the need here implied, is the following provision in the case:—the special function which Religion has been seen to have had enforced upon it by its natural mould, *was* precisely this of holding up an Ideal of the Parental character, such as that, in consequence of the contemplation of it, Filial love could not but, when the course of the entire operation in question should have been completed, become developed.

Still, however, there is a third consideration, that, it is true, has a degree more of intricacy in it, and that has thence,—if I may venture to say so,—been the source of a misunderstanding that few indeed of us,—that *none* of us, without express attention,—can get rid of:—just because it belongs to the kind of matter that human thought *must* take erroneously in the first place. Say that the function of Religion is that just stated: still, there is in the course of religious progress that decided specific, or (as I have rather called it,) sub-specific change in the mode of its function, that acts here exactly, as it were, in the manner of a turning inside-out of the matter,—such as, indeed, *must* exist, in order to enforce that reversal to our thought which, by my principle, is what all marked progress in our thought ever does require. The Ideal presented by Religion to the human mind has, I say, accordingly, in the course of religious development, to exhibit that entire disguise of the conditions that were involved in the original constitu-

tion of it, (—and what else but such disguise does the very meaning of *involution* signify?—) that it is impossible, previously to rectifying inquisition into the matter, to conceive how what offers itself as the Ideal at the one end of the development, is really of identical constitution with what comes out of it at the other end. The point of difficulty that is here fluctuating in the mental balance is this:—is it the Ideal respecting human relations that is finally to convey to us knowledge respecting *God*; or is it the God-like Ideal that is finally to teach us the truth respecting *human relations*? Orthodoxy has asserted the former; Positivism maintains the latter. But the present view alone is it, I assert, that in taking up both aspects assort the matter within the true distinctions. Both effects, I would say, undoubtedly follow. The learning to honour Paternity, in an abstract manner, is most assuredly the true means to the inducing of a practical reverence for individual human parents; and such reverence may be said indeed, always with truth, to be of the nature of *religious* reverence. But most assuredly it is *not* Religion, according to what we, in our ripened sense of it, ought to esteem as Religion. To confound it *with* Religion, is a mistake that it seems to me positivists fall into, which I cannot help considering as more grievous than any which results from the mere rudeness of the notion with which the orthodox have contented themselves. Religion, except as it belongs to what is estimated as general, in the sense as nearly approaching to the proper idea of *universal* as the speaker's mind is capable of, appears to me a nullity; while, also, I see an evident occasion for the confusion it seems to me to betray,—pertaining to the disguise of primitive conditions just spoken of,—arising out of the neglect of the peculiar principle which has here been taken as the fundamental one. I mean, in the confounding of the Idea that ought to be held as Symbol, with the reality that it symbolizes. Now such delusion, being that to which human thought has been liable all along, was of necessity the crudest of all at the beginning.

To the primitive beings who wrought out the actual initiation of the religious function at all within the human mind, there was an excess of concreteness present in the idea of the Abstract Father that made up almost the whole of it: that is, there was no capability of distinction whatever as to the two offices that ought finally to be fulfilled in the several directions which are human and religious. But now, the acquiring of the actual apprehension of what the nature of Symbol is, ought, if truly carried out, effectually to remove all such confusion. If the notion of abstract Paternity,—so far divested as it has now been of its original concreteness as to *be*, in the minds of philosophic thinkers, this pure abstraction:—if even this, I say, be employed, as it appears to me to be employed by positivists, as in any degree *itself* the object of religious homage, that homage, by whichever of the most enlightened of the followers of Comte that it be paid, is by my principle as flat an idolatry in reality as any that was rendered by the crudest of the original worshippers (see above, pp. 17, 18). Nay, more than this:—if the homage paid to Paternity be considered, as by the mass of the opponents of Positivism, as merely that which takes it for an adequate representation of the actual mode of government pursued by a Divine Being, *as a Divine Being*: still, I argue, there remains the identical charge to be made against it. Only when the notion of Paternity is taken as fully a *symbolical* one, does the matter acquire the aspect that can here be regarded as properly religious:—that is to say, as containing what our hypothesis respecting religion requires, namely, that it respect a somewhat that is utterly inaccessible to our perception *except* under the disguise of symbol. To honour Paternity simply in respect of its being that best of Divine institutions, which accordingly has, according to our own apprehension of the accessible facts of the matter, the right to take the representative position in constituting our habitually-serving notion of Divine character,—*this*, I say, seems to me of the very essence of Religion, according to the very ripest meaning

the course of religious development has by this time led us to affix to it.

Here, then is the point which I have sought by this explanation to set straight. While the foregoing is the condition belonging of right to Present Religion, the conditions involved in Primitive Religion are those which we are to be prepared to see offering an aspect so apparently alien in nature as the following:—Whereas at our own stage of improvement, even so far as we have gone already forward in it, it is the express fact of the case, that the Fear of Death stirs within us, characteristically, much more eminently the idea of the Father in heaven, who was the ultimate Appointer of Death, than that of the human parent, the circumstance of whose existence as such was merely the instrumental occasion of our having the need to die; it was the original fact of the case, which in truth it is no contradiction, but only a clearing up of the matter, to offer as such, that it was exactly a *similar* influence which in the beginning should have caused the contrary effect, to which we shall presently have to see that the existing circumstances limited it. The religious effect, I argue, may well be esteemed by us as uniform, however we may find that in the beginning it was as much more unrefined, and immediate, and corporeal, than it is now, as the Fear of Death, its acting cause, was itself more rude, and violent, and more near in its character to simple bodily fear. And that is to say,—to include all in one word,—it is evident that the corporeal character must go on deepening until we shall have tracked it precisely into the matter of its very earliest manifestation.—Thither, accordingly, we must now trace it; since it is thus only that we shall gain that which is the still unattained point with us: of seeing, namely, how it was originally possible that the lowest kind of religion should have been able to spring out of that which was in itself no religion at all.

And for this purpose we must, as I have already said, do this:—we must, in the first place, resolutely denude ourselves

of all the orthodox prepossessions as to the beginning of religion which have heretofore occupied the ground. Paradise, we must remember, has been altogether abolished,—rolled away before us as a scenic scroll,—and all the mythic folds of Oriental story have been swept asunder, as by an “Open Sesame” of psychological magic. We have driven our Adam and Eve out utterly from their Garden of bliss, whose angels and whose serpent will be visible to us henceforth never again, except only in our reveries of voluntary self-delusion. We have placed ourselves in presence solely of that which is to us as the image of Creating Nature, who, with her instrument of Fear in her hand, pointed towards the Common Object of human terror, is becoming revealed to us as thereby compelling, unhurriedly but unrestingly, the human constitution onwards:—not now, indeed, as with the flaming sword of Gabriel, upon a course that is *down* from tip-top enjoyment of God-like innocence, into the dreary depths of continual degeneration; but upon one whose direction is ever *upwards*,—whose leading, moreover, is towards a state in which, having gained it, scarcely shall men any longer seem to be driven; since the urgency that impels them to mount, shall be more and more likening itself to the sole in-springing longing to mount.

If we consider the point steadfastly, as I would invite you now to do, is it not evident, I refer to you, that there is most truly, in this matter of the actual institution of the Fear of Death, amongst the brute-descended race of men, that which *does* give to it the specialty of significance I am asserting?—is there not, I would say, that which plainly does mark out the epoch signalized by it, as forming in reality an epoch such as no other arrived at in the course of human history, of whatever possible nature it be, can by any means approach to equal in respect of the degree of its importance? It forms, I aver, that which is manifestly to be recognized as the true dawning point of spiritual life:—spiritual life, remember, in the act of being born into a world which, before it was born, contained

in it nothing but utterly animal life! Do not, I pray you, conceive any longer of such things as angels hymning its arrival from on high!—Think only soberly, but think with intention thus:—*how* did it come; and what was the meaning of its coming? What was the difference implied by its coming?—Is it not this?—While brutes had been going on dying their brutish deaths, and indeed not, so far as the higher kind of them were concerned, without the feeling of fear as to a certain extent connected with it, still their fear was such as rested only upon the immediate agent and circumstances of the dying. And this they might have, and obviously did have, without the faintest imagining of what Death was. But even to men,—to the men that, let us suppose, had become so far developed out of brutes, that it seems wrongful to count them any longer as brutes, though we have nothing yet by which we can rightfully say that they are otherwise:—even to these candidates for humanity, I would suggest, have we ever yet thought of realizing, *how* slowly, *how* imperceptibly creeping on, must have been the advent of experience as to such an image? Long after they had come to the possession of the corporeal organization, and to the habits of life, which, so far as they went, might seem to convey the human distinction, I say it is evident there must have continued wanting any such experience. For what was the nature of those habits but this, that (except as they were connected with the matter of household provision, and gratification of the affective impulses, not to be considered of here,) they necessitated an entire engrossment of attention upon active warfare:—that is to say, upon an internecine struggle with one another, which brought Death upon them in the manner of forming the consequence out of bodily combat with bodily foes? *Here*, obviously, then, was no spiritual knowledge as yet likely to be gained! As long as this state of things was the case,—and for the estimate of the length of it we must carry our thought into geological eras,—nothing at all was there present to experience that had within it the slightest

capability of tending towards awakening the thought which is the proper thought of Death: namely, as the thing that is abstractly independent of the bodily means of Death. To know it as that which has nothing intrinsically to do with such sort of bodily encounter; as that which will come of its own accord, whether or not it happen that its coming be in a slight degree hastened by such method of the human courting of it:—*this* is the mental acquisition which, to have grown upon the world by its own power, in the absence of any divine revelation respecting it, *must* truly have taken all that amount of time, all those ages of difficult advancement, with the idea of which indeed we are becoming familiarized, as in every case the condition that is of necessity implied whenever there is in question the establishment of what constitutes newness of species.—It is very true, that while the whole number of adult men were, in the mass of them, engaged in warfare, there was still a large proportion of women and children, not to speak of the rare cases of aged men, who must have died by what we call natural causes. But then, on the one hand, women and children were so insignificant,—so little able to speculate concerning themselves, and so little objects of the serious kind of interest which might have served to awaken speculation regarding them, to those connected with them who did possess the somewhat higher thinking capacity;—and, on the other hand, there was such total ignorance every where as to what natural causes were, that they should require being set apart as such:—that I think we may safely assume, that the matter would not begin to take any thing like a definite form of apprehension in the minds of the men, until it had for some certain time been remarked upon as that which affected themselves. And this again, it is impossible not to see, could not be until the practice of warfare had made a decided subsidence in favour of the domestic occupations of life. It could not assuredly be, as long as it was the case that the one idea of manly life, presented to rising youth by their model sires, was that of enabling

them successfully to kill, just in order that they might not be killed. An idea of this sort, held up as an Ideal, was that which could only hold back the mind from arriving at the abstraction we have in view. The idea of Death, as long as Death remained that which had to come from mortal enemies, was in its nature a thing not to be dwelt upon—I need not say, with thought of dread, but not to be dwelt upon with thought at all. That is, not with thought that rested upon itself; since its inevitable effect, the instant it was started, was to carry over attention immediately to the called-for means of bodily resistance. It was only when this practical result was cut off from all power of supervening,—it was only when it came to be realized, as a quite new order of experience, that it was an actual fact of generally liable occurrence, that men did sometimes die without there being any possibility that a bodily enemy should have had access to them; and therefore when an awful presentiment must have come creeping over the realizers, that the secret Slayer was a terrific Mystery whom human powers would avail them nought to deal with:—it was only now, but now it was most certainly, that attention on the part of these newly stimulated gazers into the Unknown would be riveted towards the stimulating fact, exactly in the same manner as that of a fascinated animal, when even upon the latter is there induced, as so notoriously there is commonly induced, the sudden agony of superstitious alarm. Whatever there is no present means of accounting for, if it be of pain-causing nature, *must* excite superstitious alarm; to the animal, however, the effect remains of necessity arrested in the pre-thoughtful condition proper to the case. But the human animal in question was that which had the power of dealing with, and making something out of his terror!—The idea, then, once recognized of this Mysterious Slayer, was, I say, such as it is manifest that men, except at intervals, could by no possibility ever again succeed in averting their thinking powers from gazing upon. And therefore, do I conceive also, must this

surely have been that which formed the over-mastering occasion to them; of thence effecting at once the enlargement of their thinking faculties into the new capacity we have now in question. This was it, namely, I suppose, which raised the thinking function henceforth to the ability of resting upon the high level of relational ideas, which, as soon as it *was* possessed, was ever after to form the distinctive attribute of human rationality. Brutes, apparently, possess abstract ideas of inferior kind: that is, they appear to hold general notions as to what are merely sensible qualities of things. But abstraction that has regard to *the general condition of things*, is of sure certainty that which makes the glory of human reason alone. And in the matter before us there is, I urge, at once the sufficing cause, and the intelligible means, for the bringing about of the great effect. Never could the mere sight of beauty and serviceableness in creation, have awakened in a savage mind really that species of inquiry as to a Creator, which has been poetically suggested for it, and which is natural to ourselves,—just for this, that the savage was as yet destitute both of the power of admiration, and of investigating the source of admiration. But the terror of Death was a stimulus that *could* act upon him, and that *must* have acted upon him. It was that from which he could not escape; and it was that which could not do otherwise than, being experienced, set his hitherto uncalled-forth imagination to labour towards discovering what had been the cause of it. The panic was that which, having seized hold upon him, would not let him alone to lie still under it.—Neither, observe, is there any unnatural suddenness, implied by the starting of the new function, when we consider it in this way. For, on the contrary, there is nothing that may not be most readily perceived, as to the gradually on-coming growth of idea thus taking place. It is that which, with the materials at hand, and with a simple following out of the rule that we know to belong universally to the growth of abstract ideas, may most evidently be seen to have been that which *must* naturally

have ensued. For consider:—the savage who had never entertained any thing like a relational idea before, could still do, and could not help doing, this: tormented as he was by his new suspicion as to the mysterious Destroyer, he could not but be driven into forming a host of conjectures as to its nature, of some wild and fleeting sort whatever. But however wild and fleeting, it could not be that they would fleet without leaving their trace behind them. Each image whatever, in its falling away, would leave upon its track certain fragmentary impressions; and these, amassed together, would at last, as it were of their own accord,—I mean, without voluntary effort on the part of the savage,—grow to suffice for the filling up of the abstract shape that the savage's mind was in quest of. And mark how, thus, by the very nature of the materials, is in this way enforced the excessive concreteness of the abstraction, which, I say, because it was such, makes the transition out of that which was no abstraction, so natural and so imperceptible. The image in this way associated with Death would be, it is evident, so remote from anything like the abstract idea we now entertain of it, that it seems a wrongfulness of language almost to speak of it as being an abstraction;—though an abstraction it still so certainly was. It would be the portraiture of a certain kind of Death-bringer, vaguely enough defined, which would however have this obvious tangibleness of attribute about it, that it would do nothing more than repeat, in exaggerated and distorted proportions, features already known. It would form merely this,—a ghostly and ghastly embodiment, pieced together as a general reflection out of all the minor horrors that had been previously heaped up in memory or imagination, as gathered from experiences of individual enemies and death-bestowers. If we could indeed see it as it really presented itself to the semi-brutish man, in its uttermost grossness of original concreteness, it was in all probability thus that it was shaped: namely, in the likeness of a cannibal god, whose ferocity to possess himself of human flesh for his food, was

witnessed to their perception by the bones which so speedily became the sole remnant of the bodies which any where fell under his teeth. He was a hidden monster, that, never seen, was still for ever surmised in the apprehension of each several anticipated victim, as lurking somewhere, always at hand, and always doubtless on the watch,—ready at any moment to glide out of its darkness, spring upon him unawares, and devour him.

Is not this, then, truly, the sort of fear that here our demonstration requires? Is it not truly, that is to say, the sort of fear which, while manifestly a spiritual fear, is still hardly other than a bodily fear?—But, taking it as such, let us go on to the mainly important consideration respecting it. Let us see in what manner, being such, it must have acted, as I am asserting that it did act, in procuring its own remedy. Certainly, I say, the way in which it would act, would be the way in which we see that a fear of such sort does familiarly act, whenever it occurs still amongst our own selves; and that is the following:—it would act, namely, by throwing men forcibly back upon the sphere of those domestic relations, which have precisely the function, as they *alone* have it, to soothe ills—all ills whatever—that in their nature are of the kind to be esteemed specially *personal*. If it be the case, that even to guard against bodily enemies obvious necessity compels men to herd themselves together: I say it is not at all less necessary in fact, though it *be* less obviously so,—nay, I say it is even *more* necessary in fact,—that men should use the very same kind of defence, when the danger to be defended from is of the kind that attacks the inner sense of human beings. Be this, however, only observed: just because the necessity is, as I say, really stronger, and not less strong, than in the physical case, so also is the kind of union with fellow beings that is required, needed to be likewise a closer and more immediately personal sort of union, than the vague social connexion which is found indeed sufficing in regard to mere outward evils. Put the question home to our own closest-lying circle of experience, and

does it not tell us with an instinctive response, that when the case be to meet the emergency of a terror like the concretely-spiritual one now in question, nothing whatever but recourse to the family affections is the thing that in any way will serve? What is plainer than this:—the child that is frightened rushes to its mother's lap; and therefore, the savage man that was frightened, in so far as he was the child in respect to human nature in general, must be held imaged by us as having crouched up for protection against his spiritual fear, to the circle in general of the domestic influences,—those influences, I repeat, which are, in any case whatever of universal experience, the notoriously surest means in human possession of stifling mental pain of the immediate sort? Very well then: here reveals itself what surely we cannot mistake as forming the initial movement of the whole transaction. It is thus, I conceive,—thus, observe, in the manner of what shows as an all-but merest bodily instinct,—that first begins the action of the great motive power, the object of which was to *drive* human nature in the direction it requires.

But I do not suppose, as you will feel immediately that explanation needs to be made, that this action is by any means directly carried on. According to our present sense of the propriety of things, it is the name of *father* that, amongst the holders of domestic relations, stands distinctively as the legitimate synonym for *protection*. And yet the case is actually, that, in the initial condition supposed, the father is amongst the several members of the domestic circle, the one whom we cannot help seeing as the very last to whom the terrified savage, whose terror was of the sort now considered, would desire to betake himself to cling to. Whenever it happened that the special terror arose,—that is, as we may suppose for the rule of the case, every time it happened that the dangerous shades of night approached: every time that, together with the daily vanishing of day-light, the youthful savages must have felt the horror of the secret Enemy creeping over them, so as to

cause them, habitually, to dread committing themselves to sleep, lest they should wake to find themselves within his claws:—the victims of the misery must have been perfectly aware, as we are supposing their condition, that the strong paternal arm which *might* have sheltered them against bodily attack, could do nothing for them in that way now. And in the absence of such power of help, the case remains that his characteristic sternness would make him the being that naturally they would feel the least desirable for them to be near. Much preferably, therefore, would they huddle together with the companions whose similar weakness to their own would bring them the solace of sympathy, and whose fondness would put it out of their mind. When, however, the case was such that it could *not* be put out of their mind,—when the superstition was at that height which could *not* be lulled so as to admit of possible repose:—still, even then, it would be the contrary to the hard-headed man of arms, that they would be impelled to have recourse to. They would go, of certainty, instead, to whisper their fears into the inclined ear of some one of the aged members of their community,—some medicine-man or woman, who could in return afford them a *charm*.—And had *this*,—it will be objected,—any thing to do with what we are now concerned with? Had a *charm* really any thing connected with it that was not even directly opposed to what ought to be thought of as having gone towards the creation of genuine religion?—Yes: I would say; it had indeed thus much to do with it: it led at all events to the habitual regard to, and honouring of, aged persons, as aged persons;—and hence, to the honouring of age, as age. It is not to be doubted that this recurrence to the medicine-crones, whose existence we know forms the regular accompaniment of savage institutions wherever such occur, did indeed afford to the consulters a measure of that which they sought for: namely, an alleviation in regard to that which was to them immediate spiritual pain. Perhaps, in fact, it may be impossible to us now, on account of the extent of the mass

of such instances of benefit, to estimate with any adequacy to ourselves, how great a proportion of the honour paid to age in primeval times, was indeed owing to the gratitude paid, in genuine coin, in return for the felt relief, received from imaginary agonies, as to that which had no existence!—Was, however, I would ask, the honour at all less a fact, and was the fact a fact less one of exceeding benefit, for its having had precisely this unsubstantiality at its foundation? Surely, we cannot be so self-wedded to our own fancies as so to mis-count it!—But, we have the matter already drawn out in system from our previous consideration:—do you not recall it?—The honour paid to age, when enriched, as we have seen that it otherwise was enriched, by means of affectionate intercourse, and cultivated, as we have seen it was cultivated, by means of traditional instruction, was the express instrument that was the natural bringing about of the ideal abstraction of Paternity that has been described:—that Ideal which, in the end, was to be as sovereignly efficient as the counterpoise to superstitious fear, as the idea of the mere individual human father was, in the beginning, so entirely and specially unavailing for the purpose. And thus, therefore, occurred what in fact amounts to the whole of what the present theory has asserted. In this way was really induced the first essential change in the mode of thought directed towards the Parent, which constituted the beginning operation of the entire series of operations to be thereafter undergone respecting it. For this beginning stage being accomplished,—this making, namely, out of the human father an ideal substitute for the human father, to do that which the human father was wanted to do, but which he was not able to do:—this beginning stage, I say, being once accomplished, there was accomplished the prime event which is the only thing that our explanation of the subsequent course of things has hitherto been logically waiting for. There is, truly, the obtaining of the actually original motive force required to give the start to religion in human nature:—the impulse,

namely, which may manifestly have sufficed, to so act upon the stream of opening human intelligence, as to cause it effectively to fill up the mould which we have seen that the constituted state of things had prepared for it. And this done, I repeat, nothing at all else is there that is not of the simplest traceable sequence. For, consider:—in the very same act,—I mean of thus filling up the mould of religious formation, under the driving impulse of the constantly-acting motive of the fear of Death:—in this very same act, there is effected the birth of the idea antagonistic to the fear of Death, destined to do battle with it for ever hereafter, which idea moreover, in entering upon such destiny, has upon its own side the prerogative of advantageous terms in regard to the battle which are by the very nature of the case these: namely, that this later-born antagonist has all along, through the entire course of the struggle, the same bearing of the mighty General Force of Nature acting in its favour, which we see it to have here at its initiation. The later-born, upon the principle of Progress, is, as such, every where, and essentially, the stronger. And thus, I say, have we indeed made good the veritable rise of genuine Religion. Together with the dawning conception of a Father, really abstracted above conditions of Humanity, we have the never-to-be-effaced settlement of a point of Ideal Resistance to the corporeally-crushing influence of the recognized Necessity of Dying, which, bidden as it is by the law of Nature to go on, ever and ever, increasing in the vantage power originally possessed by it, will and must accordingly for ever constitute the true centre of vital energy in the human mind; and which the human mind, so far from ever coming to require to ignore, must, on the contrary, be thence for ever more and more conscious of possessing, and of needing to possess.

But, moreover, as the case stands, neither are we without that which may surely be taken as even a sort of historical corroboration to this theoretically-founded scheme. May we

not, indeed, I would ask, consider to be such the fact, so felicitously made apparent through the suggestive showing of recent lingual speculation, that exactly such condition as that here supposed to have been necessary in order to the creation of religious thought, is by all rules of probability to be inferred as having actually occurred where this theory would require it to have occurred: namely, amongst that one of the primitive tribes of men which is now recognized to have been the progenitor of every one of the nations of the earth, whose religious development, as well as general enlightenment, has been notoriously pre-eminent in history? The great Aryan family, of which it is now received as one of the most highly significant of its distinctive traces, that it has bequeathed in common to every one of its descendants, amongst other verbal signs of things which none of them could do without, *this*, of significance beyond what can in any way belong to any other, of the henceforth thus for ever indestructible name of "*God*",—is also known, through similar indications, as having been precisely marked by that characteristic determination in regard to the primitive habits of life belonging to its members, which has been here urged as the sole condition possible to afford the abstract estimation of that which is the only preparative for the arriving at a sense of Deity,—namely, of Death. They were, that is to say, a *peaceful* tribe:—peaceful, at all events, comparatively with contemporaneous tribes, and with themselves at previous eras of their existence.

And there is yet another confirmation to this view, of different sort, but to my mind quite as forcible. I mean, the extreme simplicity of arrangement which it brings to all our ideas of ancient mythologies. According to my principle, there is uniformly, along the entire series of religious formations, under whatever peculiarity of circumstantial modification entertained, but this one distinction, as a primary one, necessary: whether, out of the two essential elements of religion, the one which

consists in the fear of Death be the stronger, or the one which consists in the recognition of the Paternal character of God (or, of the Unknown Causation of things). If the first, the character of the religious form will be fetishistic, or such as is pervaded by fear, and administered through "charms"; if the latter, the form will be held in its proper subordination to the essence of the form, and the accompanying feeling will be the spiritual love which can do without "charms". In proportion as religion is elevated, the symbol is recognized as the symbol; in the very lowest stages the fetishistic element is so predominant, if not so purely the only one, that the symbol is worshipped *almost* literally on its own account. I say "almost", because that a symbol should be worshipped with entire strictness of meaning on its own account, is out of the nature of things. Worship only begins to be worship when there has also begun to be recognized that there lies an unknown essence, whatever it be, somewhere behind the form. Under the lowest kind of Fetishism, when, say as an example that a savage is seized with superstitious fear upon the sight of an uncouth pebble, or weird shape of a rock or tree:—I should account for it by supposing much rather that he took the object for an indication of the neighbourhood of the Mystic Enemy, than that he took it for the Enemy himself. The pebble might have been dropt, the tree might have been bent, on occasion of the Destroyer's having been lately passing that way. And even otherwise,—that is, if he did take it for the Enemy himself,—he would be sure to explain the fact to himself by saying that it was only *one* of the ways in which the Dread Being was in the habit of showing himself: which brings the principle of the matter to the same thing. There was at all events, in every case, a one single essence imagined as underlying the various existing manifestations. And the recognition that the idea of Death was uniformly the thing that constituted that essence, accounts, I consider, with simple consistency for that which might otherwise seem unaccountable in the case, namely, the extent of abstraction

implied as present in minds that were so rude. For, you perceive, the truth of the case thus shown is, that the abstraction, however produced by the minds of men, like all other abstractions, had still an outer fact, far more plainly such than can be predicated in the case of any other abstraction, that eminently favoured its being so early produced into its due recognition of abstractness. That *Virtue*, for instance, should acquire a definite individuality for its idea, was hindered by an enormous amount of variation in the apprehension that different beings are compelled to form respecting it. But that which constitutes the individuality of the idea of Death, is of the utmost possible simplicity, and invariableness, that can be imagined as occurring in any abstract idea whatever:—whence, I argue, it obviously must have taken place, as it apparently did take place, the first of all in the history of the development of abstract ideas,—I mean, of relationary abstract ideas. But then, what follows but this?—the natural uniformity of conception as to Death, could not but render it, as to the essence of it, a Monotheism, in fact, from the very beginning. There must have been, that is, a Monotheism latent, as a natural foundation, even in the very rudest Fetishism, which hence could not but, when it should come to have worked out the consequence naturally contained in itself, produce as the proper antagonist to itself the Monotheism also requisite, though not at first so obviously requisite, to the counterposed idea. And hence, observe, how immediately the intricacy as to our ordinary classification, or want of classification, of human religions, disposes of itself. It is evident that the present view casts aside at once the whole region of belief which appears historically as Polytheism, as that which, when rightly regarded, forms but a nullity,—a mere accident,—taken in relation to what forms intrinsic development. It stands as nothing more than this,—just the phenomenon which marked that there had been a frustration, or arrest, of the true development. For, as to our idea of what true development is, nothing, I say, in the whole

world of human conception is there that can ever interfere with this:—As there is but One Death in the world, so neither did it lie in the possibility of things, that to a mind come to its right understanding of the fact, there should be more than One God and Father of the world.

This, however, is but the general effect of the proposed classification, to be followed out by corresponding reduction in another way. After we have thus summarily disposed of Polytheism, there is another large mass of mythology, still requiring to be separated and set aside, upon, I consider, equally valid ground. And that is, the eminently most intellectual of all ancient forms, which consisted in the worship of the sun, moon, and stars:—just for this reason, that it was, in fact, precisely *too* intellectual to have within it any right to be counted as belonging to religion, under the true character of religion. Except as long as it remained in its lowest fetishistic stage,—for then indeed it did belong to the common stock of what, if it was not yet religion, was still the proper antecedent to religion: the common stock, namely, that was not yet ridden of the destined to be eliminated elements, whose elimination could alone enable it to proceed, as of right, into the development proper to it:—except, I say, so long as it remained thus in its gross beginning stage, this sort of Sabæan worship is so far from having any thing really to do with religion, that it is manifest, its proper termination, under development actually adapted to it, lies in nothing else than just astronomical science:—a quite opposite thing, truly, to that which is the sole legitimate sphere of religion, namely, the self-knowledge of the human soul!—As to its fetishistic stage, it is obvious that as long as the homage received by the heavenly bodies was merely the trembling effort at placation, accompanied by bribery of victims, which signified their being regarded, on the same terms with the pebble, as nothing beyond the indication, or actual and accidental presentation, of the One Death-bestower, there was nothing at all to mark their worship as having any

peculiarity of character its own:—except indeed this, which, inappreciable as it was at the time, is to us, looking back upon it, the most pertinent of all characteristics: the worship was such as that by no possibility could any human sentiment of the affective kind ever come to mingle with the homage. No sense of the Fatherly nature could by any means conceivable arrive to become associated with objects that were, as these, only the cold and distant potentates of the firmament. And hence was it indeed, we may consider, that to all appearance the Hebrew instinct set itself so strongly, and, in a religious sense, so rightfully, as it did, against them. Their steadfast, undeviating impartiality made them, truly, (—so must those self-petted children of the “promise” have set forth their representation of the fact,—) fit objects to be held in adoration by the “Gentiles”; but, for themselves, (—and here, I say, their religious instinct, as such, was justified:—for themselves) there must be a Deity who would have for them a special and individual favour. Such was, I repeat, the *true* instinct of religion; and well was it, I consider too, for humanity in general that they had it. Never otherwise than in similar manner, it is my confirmed conviction, could there have been obtained by the mind of our race that sense of distinct individualism, *per se*, without which the full measure of its present stature could never have been reached.

The sole developmental distinction, therefore, that I would at all preserve as needed in a just classification of the entire subject, is simply that which lies in the one fact of the successive forms being marked by an increasing prevalence of the element of Filial feeling towards Deity, over that which in its grossness forms fetishistic superstition. Taken in series, we have:—first, pure Fetishism; then, Fetishism, allayed by the recognition of God as a tyrannical, passionate, very human-like Father in heaven; lastly, Fetishism entirely, or all but entirely, merged into the acknowledgment of God as a Father of the character that needs to be attributed to one who is freed

from human imperfections:—these, at least, are such as may pass for broad distinctions which, if by no means close to their purpose, will at all events serve for practical use. For, you perceive, I consider that there is in fact a tinge of Fetishism left even in the purest attainable form of religion;—and just, as is evident, for this reason: from the inherent necessity there is, that wherever religion is, there *must* also be a form of religion. Or, if the word offends us, shall we,—as we may,—get rid of it thus? We may say that the Fetishism, always latent, shows itself even under the highest form, whenever there occurs a greater degree of attention to the form than the case absolutely requires: that is, greater than just so much as recognizes its need to be present as nothing more than the means of holding the essence. Any respect to it that goes at all beyond this, is, as I have already so strongly protested; that which brings down upon us the condemnation of idolatry, which not the utmost purity of intellectualism can save us from, at all more than the most degrading coarseness.

But still, in seeing this, we must especially not omit to bear in mind what has been already intimated respecting original condition: namely this, that however difficult it may be to measure accurately the proportion of the two elements in the present more enlightened forms of faith, in the beginning state of faith, or before any forms had begun to be instituted, it is literally impossible to distinguish them. The institution of forms has in fact been precisely, in itself, the sorting of ideas respecting them. For here we meet with the puzzle that in all subjects of this kind so long habitually baffles us, that we require to hold ourselves in mindfulness of how the ideas that have evolved themselves into their true elemental antagonism for us, were originally blended up all together in an indistinguishable confusion. To the minds of pre-religionists, we must remember, the ideas of the Being who was the Death-causer, and of the Father who is the Life-giver, must inevitably have for the time run in one common stream of turbid imagination

together. And, indeed it is to be noted how much of actual evidence of this having been the fact, is really betrayed in the stamp borne by the traces of the rudest kind of idolatries, as they have been preserved to us. Wherever bloody sacrifices are shown as supposed to be acceptable, we have, at all events, the certain sign, that this state of unorganism to religious conception continued to be the yet unsurmounted state. Saturn devouring his children, was essentially a fetishistic idea ; Jupiter, on the other hand, who ruled by equity, and loved to spare, was an effort being made towards a properly religious notion : but, in the retention of the two, again, within the compass of one combined mythic picturing, have we not a hint as to the farther manner in which simply the absence of carrying out the required differentiation of the antagonist elements of the conception, may be seen to account for all the mythologic phenomena extant ? Not caring to work out the distinction, the Grecian mind, at the time in which it held by these two anachronisms of mythic imagery in one, satisfied itself by the compromise, of such purely dramatic nature, as that Jupiter, being the wiser son of Saturn, had shown his superiority and his wisdom by turning his father out of his kingdom.—Without, however, stopping to entangle ourselves amidst Grecian fables, there is this clear point which we may take hold of, as defining with sufficient precision the nature of the era which, whenever it occurred, and in proportion to the definiteness with which it occurred, may be assumed as having been marked by the differentiation in question taking place together with it : and that is, the time when the idea of the Paternal Being was so far elevated, by the influence of culture, out of that of the pure Tyrant that it was at first, as to cause there to be a natural moral impossibility that the horror permanently associated with the idea of the Destroyer, should any longer co-exist with it under one and the same image. For observe the stages, as they lie when viewed backwards from our own day. The idea of Death, which was the earliest formed, has now arrived at

having fairly worked itself out into the true character requisite for it, of a spiritual abstraction perfectly understood by us as such. The idea of Deity, corresponding to it, *ought*, by my view, to be in like manner regarded in the very same light; but, as the case stands,—this idea, namely, lying short, and in chronological propriety so lying, of having arrived at the same capability of perfection with the other,—it remains, in the apprehension of the majority of existing believers, held with an utter indignation aloof from what is supposed such degradation to be encountered by it. It is indeed the fact, let me stop to observe, that in the theological way of viewing the matter, the actual dispute, as between the orthodox and us, precisely turns upon the degree in which either idea may be said to have driven the other into the same kind of imagined destruction:—that is, *they* believe us to have adhered to Death, rejecting God; themselves to have adhered to God, rejecting Death:—while the truth of the case (as I esteem it,) all the time is, that the one idea, just as much as the other, is inherently incapable of destruction. *If* the idea of Death *could* be rejected, that of God, I say, *might* be rejected also; but the *if* is one which Nature has put to scorn. The only matter, therefore, which, I say, really admits of consideration with regard to the two, is this: which of them is to be held by men as having the greater weight.—Now, when the differentiation had just begun, it is evident, three cases were liable. The least desirable was, that the idea of Death should continuously remain mightier than the idea of the Father. But if to any extended period it did so continue, the result accruing could only be that the latter, feebly struggling as it was into birth, would be extinguished, and Fetishism thus be enabled to assert itself in permanence:—permanence, that is, in relation to the time appropriate for its existence, as in association with an average degree of extant civilization; which we may suppose to have been—shall we say, through the ages counting from the Post-pliocene formation in geology, up to the meditated sacrifice

of Isaac?—The second case, however, would be, that the two notions should be estimated as on a footing of equality; and hence would result the Oriental dualism, which is known to have attained so extensive a sway over early mankind, and to have reached, even then, a height of moral purity which makes it worthy of our present admiration; but still which was nevertheless—except only for the powerful influence which it served to infuse into the remaining form of thought,—utterly barren of power contained within itself of progressing farther with its development.—The third case is accordingly the sole one to our actual purpose; and that is, the one in which the spiritual essence of Deity is seen to have been from the beginning the inherently-destined prevailer over the spiritual essence of Destruction. It was the form that, precisely from its being such, could not help approving itself to the temper of strong self-confidence residing with the humanism of the Hebrews. And how evidently has the unfolded circumstance of the case, in regard to the latter, shown us also the mode of this third form's availing itself actually of the second! The Ahrimanes of the Persians, seized upon as its idea was by the Judean captives to be appropriated as their own, was still so seized only to be dragged upon the spot down into the rank of subjection to Jehovah; the obtaining of which triumph formed indeed the only terms upon which these engrained scorners of their own enslavers could have been made in any way to condescend to admit a god of Gentile creation within their own theology. And from the admission, such as it was, came, as we know, the enlargement into their own narrowness of conception, which prepared the real perpetuation of the idea of the hostile Deity, in the only way in which actual progression of religious ideas permitted of its being perpetuated: namely, as the Satan of Christianity. For this union with the dualistic abstraction of the East was it, I conceive, that, by means of the mythic tale hitherto considered, produced all that onset of fertile idealization upon the subject, which, it may be said, worked onwards

the evolution of human thought so far as to fill up the space that lay before the coming of the second great era of Gentile amalgamation: that, namely, with the Hellenic thought, which, when it had taken place, was to bring about a new evolution, incomparably mightier in its consequences still.

To that second era, therefore, with all its immensely-enhanced intricacy, we have now to pass on;—though always, as I must again remind the reader, with this cautionary reflection to be attended to, that in fact we require to hold ourselves in such frame as will preserve us aware that we have little really to do with any such thing as eras of transition at all in the matter. We must again compel ourselves to forget, except as again shall arise the occasion for incidental reference, which it is that is ordinarily considered, or may be more correctly considered, the Hebrew share in the doctrine that comes before us, and which the Oriental, or the Grecian; and only remember that what we are dealing with is human development in general, and *per se*. As a preparation, however, let me first give the following as a summing up of the position that we have gained by the investigation of this present section.

We have, in fact, done no more than come back to the same point that we occupied at the close of the last section. Our matter having lain in the consideration of the actual origin of religion in the previously un-religious constitution of human nature, the whole of progress that we have made with our subject is this: that, in returning to the epoch when we have made it a settled position that the principle of the "Fall" was accepted by mankind (circumstantially represented by the Hebrews,) as a then admittedly-desirable arrangement of human speculation, we now add, as I would hope, the greater clearness in respect to the same fact, that we see how forcible is the bearing of the terms of the myth upon the peculiar mental facts that we have now been tracing as constituting actually the

state of pre-religion.* The point which carries the central force of the story in Genesis is, that *because* of the having dis-

* In using this indispensable word, I am not without feeling, as the reader may feel, how the use I am making of it, under the present principle, is that which is altogether unauthorized by the general analogy of our language, in regard, for instance, to such words as *pre-sentiment*, *pre-existence*; though it is true a partial sanction is given by the modern word *pre-historic*, and an even perfect sanction is afforded, or might be afforded, by the word *pre-humanity*, if employed to signify the condition of *ape-hood*. But, in here using the word *pre-religion*, not only is it not *previous-religion* but *that-which-was-previous-to-religion* that I wish to express, but moreover I have an especial object present with me to call attention to the sort of face-to-face opposition I intend as existing between religion and what I call *pre-religion*. And hence it was my instinctive impulse to have recourse to the Latin prefix, which seems to have within it this special force, not, at all events hitherto, naturalized in the English. But here occurs this reflection, which seems so notably apt to my subject, that I cannot help offering it to the reader's consideration. The antecedent to religion that should be qualified as *præ-stans*, is that which to the Latin mind would have signified something *more excellent* than religion! Is not this fact then,—I mean, of the interchangeableness of meaning thus apparent, in the manner of thinking of that early people, between what was prior in point of time, and what was in itself of superior worth,—that which I may consider as peculiarly significant of the primitive feeling as to the effect of Time which I have been here discussing? It seems to me, in truth, the history of this little preposition contains within itself an epitome of the entire history of relational conceptions now the subject with us!—But, at all events, let me invite you specially to try in your own mind the effect of this: whether the interchangeableness of meaning, namely, is not a singularly felicitous example in indication of the presence of that very same natural puzzle, which has been here before referred to, respecting the child's being older than its father. We have, indeed, exactly the corresponding equivocation in our own language. To *go before*, is the association, in fact, which at once natural practice and natural reflection both will and must connect with personal pre-eminence. And observe, as long as we are speaking only in reference to contemporaries, or beings the consideration of whom calls into no question the idea of Time;—or, at all events, as long as our thought remains in the merely subjective mood in which, even if other than contemporaries are dragged into presentation, it is still under

obeyed the command of God, came Death into the world, as to be thence in itself the leading sign of all our woe:—which is indeed an attempt at forming a rationale of the dealings of Providence, that has now approved itself as manifestly false, as the transcendental belief contained in it with regard to the inherent effect of Time was also false!—But, on the other hand, let us regard it as simply the ignorant speculation that it was, and, I aver, we shall find in it, by only putting ourselves into the mental position that its framers were in, an even positive and equally manifest *truth*! And this, I suggest, may be drawn out as follows:—The Creator made men perfect, and perfectly happy, at the beginning (—this was the postulate of necessity indispensable—); but, being so, they were also then of necessity free from the fear of Death,—of Death, remember, who was the rival monarch, and who, in having, at the same time that he was a monarch, also the diabolic nature which made him for ever demand human beings as his prey, was accordingly intent upon royally satiating his appetite by entrapping them any

relation to *self* as the starting point of contemplation:—no equivocation in the matter exists. But let the mood of our thought become abstract, and the question of Time come in, and watch in yourself, I say, the effect of the transition that has been instantaneously necessitated. Supposing contemporary friends, or beings rendered for the instant mentally such, die, or are called into that which we esteem as Futurity, do we not say of them instinctively, that they have gone *before us*?—Suppose, however, we turn our thought in a manner abstractedly from personal feelings to those generations fore-elaped that have with precisely a similar truth gone also *before us*:—and can we, I ask, avoid nevertheless depicting the case to ourselves as that they are lying *behind us*?—Nay, is it not a quite similar predicament to this, of yet more ordinary kind, that occurs in so homely a reference to Time as is this?—namely, that when notes are being compared as to the matter of a clock that goes too slowly or too fast, scarcely can it be avoided that between any two persons whatever that shall be so engaged, there shall not arise some momentary perplexity, as to the mode of speech to be employed, whether in fact it is *before* or *after* the true time that the clock should be said to be.

where and every where into his clutches. They then having, by hypothesis, suffered themselves in actual fact to be thus seduced away from the sway, which was the rightful sway, of the Father-God, what could, or must have been, the expression as to the sentence thence pronounced, except just the inevitable one as it stands: namely, that from that hour (of dis-allegiance), they and their descendants should surely *die*? But again, as to *why* they had suffered themselves so to be seduced as to call down such a sentence upon them,—*here* it is, I say, that lies the singular specimen of the necessity in human thought to project outwardly what really lies within itself, that, in affording at once the requisite enlightenment as to the fact truly under representation, we may and ought to take as the *truth* I have just called it. It *was*, surely, a fact that mankind had fallen under the conscious Fear of Death, just as the consequence of their gaining what is the real thing that it is manifest they *had* gained: namely, *the abstract knowledge of Death*. Recognizing this, how simple, I say, and at the same time how *true*, in a mythical sense, is the turn given to the representation, that whereas under the Sovereign ordination which had maintained effect upon them *before* that knowledge was obtained, they *were* free from the impression of the sentence of Death (—free, that is, if not as angels, yet as brutes are free!—) yet, together with the knowledge, the sentence, as to their impression of it, *did* come. In that previous condition, the institution of Death, as an institution, was in very deed a nullity in human comprehension; and it was only the necessary way of figuring the fact, to do so by saying that it had also been a nullity in the Divine intention.

SECTION III.—THE NOTION OF DIVINE PATERNITY AS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NOTION OF DIVINE SONSHIP.

ONCE again, I must entreat the reader to remember the difference which my theory essentially implies between the notion contained in the primitive *Story* of the "Fall", and the Christian Dogma of the fifth century, which was finally wrought up out of it. Between the two, we must never forget, lies the whole substance of Christianity, as regards, in fact, the manifestation of it that we know was successively unfolded to human experience. And, in consequence, just as much as Christianity, taken as a whole, differed when it was completed, from what it was when it was making its beginning, does in like manner every one of its component doctrines proportionately differ. We are in truth,—let it not be thought unnecessary that I remind you,—under the special dilemma in our proceeding to treat of the latter, that not only are they intermingled with one another in that manner, proper to a scheme as a scheme, that makes it almost impossible to speak of them at all in isolation, but the very thought under which we think of them, and the very language in which we are obliged to express ourselves respecting them, are imbued with conditions which intrinsically falsify, instead of faithfully representing, that which it is our object to interpret. This difficulty forms, indeed, as we have seen, so inevitable an accompaniment of the case, that the only thing we can do is to keep it constantly present in our memory, so as to make the allowance required by it with all the fullness and fairness that we are able.

To set against this difficulty, however, on the other hand, we have, as we must not fail to remember, the countervailing advantage in our actual position, which reduces the temporary

obstruction to a thing as of no moment in comparison with it. And that is what I have already so strongly insisted upon, that by means of our being now able to look back, as we are, upon the working out of the Christian scheme, in the light of the experience gained subsequently to that working out, and upon the whole scheme thus as an accomplished fact, we have the possibility of understanding it, which in no conceivable way could have been possessed while it was yet only in the act of being worked out.

Looking back, then, now upon the mass of Christian doctrine with this object in view,—namely, of exercising upon it the power of analysis which I claim thus as become the possibility to us that will, or at all events that might, really enable us to draw out from the mass of seeming entanglement, such threads of meaning as may indeed serve as an effectual guide towards a true entering into the nature of its purport,—I will now state the result of my own thinking, as to the mode in which such analysis appears to me to become the most availing for such end. With a design so slight as mine is towards the degree of comprehension to be aimed at, I find in fact that the whole of the general matter of Christianity which needs to be referred to, in order to the filling out of what so extremely feeble an attempt at a scheme requires, may be taken as included under the three following leading considerations:—of which the first alone I propose to take as the subject of the present section, while the others must be reserved for the sections that are to succeed.

First, the realization of the idea of Divine Fatherhood, which takes place by means of the obtaining of a counter idea of Divine Sonship;—

Secondly, the institution within human nature of that which had been previously the entirely un-comprehended sense of Sin;—

And thirdly, the settling of the current of human attention, in an established manner, predominantly in the direction

which, with respect either to actions or to sentient condition, regards Consequences preferably to Causes.

I might otherwise describe this arrangement as forming a separation of the elements of Christianity into those which are severally the doctrinal, the moral, and the peculiarly-personal. But the fact is, that whatever distinction be made is still, from the actual interweaving of its parts, so essentially the contrary to accurate, that the less be made of it, as distinction, the better, except in so far as concerns immediate convenience. The only real accuracy in the matter lies, as I stated in the beginning, in our preserving as to it the very extremity of vagueness, which indeed has its true correspondence only in the pure tenuity of metaphysics! And singularly, moreover, in accordance with such fact, must we see to be the experience constantly occurring in regard to it:—how the mind, namely, that is in quest of accuracy, *does* indeed feel itself wontedly, and as in the natural course of things, driven accordingly into that sphere! I am now,—let me tell the experience immediate to myself,—with all the directness of purpose I am capable of, bent upon simply following on the track which shall enable me to enter into the ordinary feelings that have occupied my fellow-beings; and yet the case is, that the more I so endeavour, the more I am forced to perceive that actually there is no means present to me of getting at them, *except* by the ascending to that generally considered un-ordinary sphere. Just as it was with Christianity itself, so, I say, are we practically made to feel, whenever we put ourselves in the way of the experience, is it with our comprehension of Christianity. There was distinctness in the pure theological notion of it; and, according to my conviction, there may be distinctness in the purely metaphysical notion of it; but every where between them lies the same mass of entanglement in our conceptions, that lay originally in the space that actually intervened between what was the founding of the notions, and what was the founding of the dogmas.

Because this is so, then, is it, or appears it to me to be, necessary to do that now which I must beg the reader to have patience with me for doing;—and that is, for going over once more the metaphysical principles that I consider to be involved in my subject: modified, however, by the addition of those fresh items of principle which I feel to be now called into requisition, that will, indeed, I may perhaps hope, furnish within itself sufficient vindication for the repetition. If I had attempted to lay down the whole at the beginning,—as a true systematic method would seem to require to be done,—I am conscious that I should have carried myself far beyond the reach of my ability to deal properly with it. And therefore I have followed what I find to be the best practical rule in the case: namely,—except for the larger matters of principle that I *have* laid down in my Introduction,—to seek out the immediate principle as it comes to be found wanted.

The thing demanded of mental progress is, that the mind shall have permanently extended itself in regard to its sense of Space and Time:—this is the fundamental proposition.—The next is, as to the mode of such extension; and I have stated it to consist in the creation of Forms, of which it is the prime characteristic that they end by leaving the mind in a reversed position with regard to Circumstance from that which it held when they began. The projection of the inner mental being into free contact with circumstance (which is the rationale of the form,) causes the increase in the inner sense of Space; and the effect of the reversed position finally acquired is that which gives, through comparison with former position, the idea of change, or of successive condition, which is the essence of the sense of Time.—The third proposition is, that the mind has no consciousness of its operation till it is completed: that is to say, till the increase as to Time is registered. And the aspect under which the effect is known, is the attaining of the recognition of Growth, as being the work of Time.—But, fourthly: the nature of advancing culture of mind is, that atten-

tion is made to *rest* upon these supposititious, or abstract, agents of human improvement. They are idolized, not indeed as a cruder stage of mind would have idolized them, into concrete *beings*, but into the *home* of concrete beings. Space becomes the habitation of God*; Time becomes the habitation of deified man, that is, of a deified *Me*, who am henceforth an Immortal being. And the rationale of the so sorting of the ideas is, that in the creation of the ideas, as just stated, the essence of the idea of God is that He is every where present at the same moment, or an Ever-present Now; while the idea of Self is, that it is a thing of successive growth, to which as long as no termination is perceptible, it can be apprehended only as under the unlimited condition of possessing existence that is to be continuous for ever.—And thence, fifthly: as these two deified ideas come to be dwelt upon, they, like all other ideas, become subject to the inevitable discrimination of *parts*. The idea of God is divided in the manner that at first is the forming of a dualism, but which cannot end till it is constituted into a Triad. The idea of the *Me*, in accordance with a corresponding necessity, is likewise divided,—much more confusedly and complexly than the other, in consequence of its lying,

* Not that the idea of God does not belong to Time, as well as to Space; but the idea of God does belong to Space characteristically, as required to distinguish it from the idea of the Ego. The theological idea of God fills all Space with one small exception: the ground occupied by the Ego which contemplates Him. He also, it is true, fills all Time; but, in its own apprehension, so does likewise the Ego. That is to say, the Ego supposes itself to fill all Time except only where its existence is limited by the idea of God, out of which it needs to acknowledge itself to have sprung:—which acknowledgment does, in fact, amount to what we must allow for as a virtual exclusion of Time Past as pertaining to Self, leaving to Self the strict possession of only the Present and the Future. The metaphysical necessity which it is manifest that we have to regard as governing the formation of conception in the case, was simply that the two ideas should be essentially complimentary to one another, and therefore that when taken together they should be such as would make up the whole of things.

as it does, amidst a pressing environment of fellow-beings similar to Self; but still it is divided—into, Myself as now existing; Myself as ancestrally existing in Time Past; Myself as somehow or other, but the “how” yet unknown, existing in Time Future.

Now, though it is plainly the human necessity of the case that the two complimentary ideas of God and of the Ego should appear to be essentially separate, we must bear in mind that there is no such necessity absolutely. All that we are entitled to say absolutely is, that the human mind, in its proper striving towards knowledge in general, is compelled so to separate the ideas. And this also is an absolute fact: of the two ideas, the mind forms the idea, such as it is, respecting God, before it can begin to form an idea respecting itself. According to this, then, let us state the matter as that Self shall be counted as forming the final object (—not that it is necessarily so, but that we will choose for the present so to consider it—). The mind, we will say, is aiming to separate the knowledge of itself into the three parts marked by the three divisions of Time appropriate to it. Well, we have already seen how it was in the nature of things that human attention, in its opening effort, was driven to rest prevalingly upon Time Past,—just as the accompanying necessity to its doing that other necessary thing, of making out for itself an abstract sense of protecting influence above it, identical with Paternity. The gaining of the sense of God as a Father was, in truth, the same thing as the gaining of a sense with regard to Time Past;—true as it is, all the time, that the mind cannot actually become aware of the fact, till it shall have come round again to the point, after having progressed to take in the entire circle of considerations involved in the fact. But then, if the knowledge of God as a Father is identical with the procuring of knowledge as to Time Past, the obtaining of knowledge as to Time Future can come only with the knowledge of God as a Son. And moreover,—by the corresponding corollary to the one just expressed,—neither in fact can the knowledge of

the Father, as the Father, come in the manner of a conscious, or of a true and sufficing knowledge, until it *has* additionally occurred that we have known Him also as a Son.

But let us turn round to the other aspect of the same thing, which shows the personal metaphysics of the matter, just as the foregoing has shown the abstract. Let us drop the idea of Time as matter of conscious recognition, and suffer our thought to be purely subjective.—I find myself, as it were, alone in Space:—alone, that is, with God. In my whole universe of conception there are but these two beings: myself and God.—For it is, indeed, as necessary to transcendental speculation as it is to ordinary religious feeling, so to arrange itself: transcendental speculation and ordinary religious feeling are perfectly at one in the matter, and with a perfect incontrovertibility as to their propriety in so being. No one in the world capacitated for either of them will for an instant dispute that the experience is as stated. The humblest subject of religion cannot *but* perceive that the intimate concern of religion is, and can be, only that which lies between himself and his Maker, without reference to any other being whatever. The transcendentalist, with only the same inevitableness, seizes upon it as the one only clear basis to all subsequent thought, that *this* is the case: namely, that besides the *Me*, there is, and can be, only the *Not-me*:—and the *Not-me* is identical with Deity.—But, supposing myself standing thus, in isolated self-ism, face-to-face with the idea of God:—what is He to me?—how am I to get at Him?—what means are there to me of breaking through the utter inaccessibility of sympathy which holds Him aloof from me?—He is a notion that it is impossible for human nature to endure for more than the shortest period of continuance!—This, I say, is what both must and does arrive:—the bond of strained subjectivity, as if of its own necessity, bursts itself asunder; and then the relief that is needed instantaneously follows;—for what *but* such relief is the letting in, that *must* hence take place, of human analogies, into the matter of the unendurable solitariness—the matter in

itself unendurable on account of the solitariness involved in it,—that it was, previously to the admission? The soul, I say, when it is thus lightened of its strain, by that which is the bringing in of the remembrance of its earthly environment, becomes in the instant aware of what it is that it really needs in the case: becomes aware, that is, that what it wants of God is that it may know Him as a Father;—and this consciousness as to its want is, I urge, the sort of relief, really such, that is in truth the *only* relief that the case admits of. This, however, being the case,—being so according to surely the undeniable experience of all persons that have ever been concerned in the matter,—how can we help adding farther to our perception respecting it, that which reason so clearly proffers as an even intrinsic necessity in it that we have to acknowledge,—in this mode of experience, I mean, to which there seems so plainly to exist in nature no imaginable alternative? How—let me ask any one to consider,—in the case of being *without* such remembrance of earthly environment could there be any possibility of the event of its arriving to us to conceive of such relation, as held by Deity towards us?—An individual soul, alone with God, I maintain, could NEVER attain to such conception.

What then follows!—What follows, I ask, but this, that the recognition of fellow-beings has systematically to be admitted as the indispensable step towards the realizing even of individual union with God?—And now comes the matter which is the key to the whole of Christianity, in so far as it stands apart, in ordinary estimation, from what is counted as *natural* religion! “Why”, it may be said,—as so frequently it is said,—“should we need to know any thing more about God than that He is a Father, when the *natural* limit to the desire actually instinctive with us, is merely thus determined, that we *should* know Him thus as a Father?”—Simply for this, I answer,—and so also, I bear in mind, has Orthodoxy answered:—simply for this, that desire as we may, we have no means of fulfilling our desire. So to know Him, *except* for the means

to it which Providentially *have* occurred, I perfectly own, in accordance with the orthodox, is a natural impossibility. For,—to continue the explanation that I have only just entered upon in the above,—the instant that the idea of fellow-beings *has* obtruded itself, as it *must* obtrude itself, between Self and God, the result is the idea of a second kind of relation, which, as on the one hand it is the means of giving the relation to God which we desire Him to have, so, on the other hand, will not allow such relation to exist without being attended by its own kind of relation in conjunction with it. For if God is a Father, He can be so only by the family of human beings existing as *Brothers*. A little while ago, (at pp. 171, 172,) in tracing the process of abstraction through which the conception of the Abstract Father was practically wrought out, we saw how it was obtained through the images of a number of fathers, of fathers of the father, and so on back into a continued succession of examples of fatherhood; but the fact is apparent, that the instant the effect is gained, and there is accordingly realized the idea of a Being whose abstract paternity embraces the whole number of the individual fathers,—by the same act the *fathers* are converted into *brothers*! This, therefore, is, it appears to me, the reason of the natural necessity, and the necessity never to be got rid of, that we cannot in any way possess what we would have in God, unless in admitting our fellows to share in the possession. It seems to me clear, that by no possible means except this could there ever have taken place, what nevertheless we are compelled to infer must have taken place: namely, that the concrete relationship of the human father should actually have suggested, as it can only be rationally considered as having suggested, that of the Divine Parent.

Here, then, we feel ourselves plunged at once into the innermost heart of the Christian Mysteries. As the Abstract Father could not be, without the brotherhood of human fathers as the accompaniment to His idea, so is it also a necessity,

plainly recognizable to the mode of human thinking, that the human brotherhood should first have had cognizance taken of it by the human mind under the aspect of the Abstract Son,—without which, indeed, the idea of the Abstract Father is, abstractly, a non-entity:—of a Son, therefore, whose generation was indeed manifestly as eternal as the existence of the Father himself. The very dogma of dogmas which was confessedly the stumbling-block to human reason, when taken as representing the absolute constitution of Deity, becomes thus, by the doing of what is merely the assumed necessity of the treatment of the subject to be done, simple to the most ordinary level of common intelligence: that is, by its being taken as showing only the working of human thought in regard to Deity. And, let me remark, it is observable how fully this explanation in fact accounts for what Mr. Jowett has called the “sound instinct” of the Christian Church, in relation to the chief matter of controversy with the outlying members of the Church, who for their rationalizing tendencies have been habitually stigmatized as seceders from the Church:—I mean, the controversy as to the real or non-real humanity of Christ. The reason for the proper Deity of the Son, is here seen to rest exactly upon the same ground, in the really natural view, as that for the proper Deity of the Father. The growth of the idea of the Abstract Father having been gained, as we have seen, through the imaging of a succession of fathers in the light of brothers, there is a natural *reductio ad absurdum* in the taking of the parentage of Deity in a concrete sense, which for ever holds aloof the ideal conception from actually lapsing again into what must be counted as a really human conception. But there is just the same inherent contradictoriness in the relation attributed to the ideal Son, which equally requires us to retain the Christ apart from an actual station amongst those who are called his brethren. A significant sign of the latent impossibility of so doing, lies in fact in the inappropriateness of the practice familiar to all believers in common,—Unitarian heretics as well

as Orthodox conformists,—of calling him the *Elder Brother* of mankind, at the very same time that he is specially marked out as having appeared only in the “latter ages” of mankind’s history. But the orthodox have at all events the consistency of plainly acknowledging the essential contradiction which, represented as it is in their doctrine of the double nature of Christ, making him real God and real man in simultaneous condition, confessedly sets reason at defiance.

And yet is this not evident?—However wrong a thing—at least, however undesirable a thing, it is to set reason at defiance, still the fact is, at all events, as Comparativism enables us to judge of it, that nothing else but such defiance was possible at the time. Orthodoxy is shown to have been right in doing the wrong to reason that it did! If reason was not then strong enough to maintain the struggle with religious feeling which was to be the means of the bettering of both of them, it was the legitimate consequence that reason should have to succumb. But that is no cause why reason should not rise up to again assert itself, as soon as it feels itself to have become sufficiently furnished; and furnished, indeed, not only to enter anew upon the encounter, but to come out of it with possession of the victory.

Let it be remembered always that it is only just now, according to my principle, that we have the means present to us of looking back upon the course of religious development, which, while it was in the act of proceeding, was the matter of mere blind instinct; and then, I say, former difficulties vanish. While the human mind was as yet but working its way through the intermediate knowledge of Christ, the really final object upon which we now know, abstractly, that its instinct was alone solely bent,—that is, the knowledge of God as its Father,—was one, as I would depict the matter, simply not possible to it until just it should have obtained that greater degree of advance, not only intellectual, but of the general mental nature, which the mediatorial knowledge of Christ was expressly the

natural means of affording to it. The self-contradiction inherent in the nature of religion (met, as we have seen, in the actual human history of the case, by the double nature of the constitution transmitted into Christianity by the Gentilized Hebrews, who had grown to be abstractly-capable,—or capable of abstraction,—and not-capable, at one and the same time,) required that for a long time, under the acting of Christian conditions, there should continue to be extant nothing but the contest between “natural reason” and “spiritual faith”, which notoriously *has* constituted the substance of the whole intellectual movement that has formed the life of the Christian Church:—the meaning of which struggle, however, when we have come to the ability of interpreting it, shows itself as merely that mode of first the one contending party, and then the other, gaining that small measure of advance to its own share of truth, which, when the whole effect of the alternate accessions is brought together, exhibits the destined end resulting from it of enabling them both at last to coincide in one common representation of truth. In favour of the retention of the proper humanity of Christ in the compound idea of his Divine Manhood, there was indeed the manifest ground which has given such plain common-sense support to the Unitarian side of the argument respecting it, in the fact of the floating religious idea’s having become associated,—accidentally, as it were, according to *our* estimation,—with the tangible personality of the Hebrew individual Jesus: since (at least under the view which I have heretofore stated myself as following with regard to the historical character to be attributed to Jesus,) this association was in truth so felicitously appropriate, as, it would seem, must continue to stand as marking the true point of circumstantial contact between the idealism and the actuality of the matter to the end of time. It was truly, I would maintain, at the moment when the spiritual thought was brought to bear upon the head of the Nazarene “fulfiller of all righteousness” pertaining to the Jews, that the Son of Mary was really

to his followers become henceforth the Son of the living God. The day that he was first so thought of,—that day, truly may we say, was he indeed so begotten.—But, independently of this “accident”, there was in addition the moral need involved in the belief of Christ, (which will be the subject of our next section,) which had in fact a much deeper effect than this of merely historical circumstance, in preserving that integrity of humanness in the nature of Christ, which made the belief the special religious agency that it was.

On the other hand, for the preserving of the contrary side of the belief which regards the proper *divinity* of Christ, it is an easy way of figuring the fact involved, to say that it was, as it were, the dramatic necessity of the case, that the Abstract Son should be of similar nature with the Abstract Father. But my object is to show how I conceive, that the necessity of his being such was that which we may actually trace in the much more satisfactory manner, of seeing how it pertained to the very manner of the growth of the idea. I have just said, in general terms, that its growth was a thing that held close relation with the general advance of the human mind and heart:—let us now attend more particularly to the historical working out of the event, and see in what way this advance presents itself in the case of the subjects of the advance circumstantially chosen to be affected by it.

I believe I may without hesitation make the assertion, that before the Oriental graft of thought had been received by the Hebrews, which was represented by the notion of the “Fall”, the whole tenour of their sacred writings bears witness to their utter lack of any idea as to their God being really also esteemably their Father. The idea but just begins dimly to be at work in the pages of the later prophets who, we know, wrote *after* the captivity; as when Malachi says (ch. i. v. 6,) “If I be a father, where is mine honour?”—or, as in Psalm ciii. 13, where it is said, “Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth

them that fear him."* And this was what upon my scheme, just as upon the Christian, must indeed be counted as that *prophetic prescience* of the sense of Divine Fatherhood which could be properly realized only through the revelation of his Son, which it is ordinarily described as being, much rather than as requiring to be taken as implying any distinct acquisition of knowledge as having been arrived at. But before the captivity had taken place, there was no idea of the kind, we may say, even under suspicion. And it must be noted that to this fact there is a two-fold aspect, which in fact marks a quality of superiority in the Hebrew disposition on the one side, just as much as goes against the religious proficiency of the nation on the other. When the event occurred that the notion of the Divine Father ripened as it were precociously, as it did eminently amongst the Grecians, we know that there was that coarse sensualism in it which is the peculiar stigma of the Grecian mythology, caused by the showing of the gods as literally the bodily progenitors of the human offspring. From this, however, the Hebrews were happily saved, expressly, as I conceive, by their very slowness of intellect, and want of religious imagination. With them, accordingly, was this so special an advantage over all other religious workers in the world:—the God-like Son, needed in the case, was not born until a "body" of the right sort had been "prepared for him."—Even back into the patriarchal times, when we may consider that the idea of Paternal Deity was in a latent manner already fashioning itself, so as to be in waiting for the correlative idea that was to draw it out into ostensible reception hereafter:—even at that extremely rude period of the transaction, there seems to have been with the Hebrews that feeling of the just requirement of the case,

* It is true there occurs in 2nd Samuel, vii. 14, the following expression, of similar kind, respecting Solomon—"I will be his father, and he shall be my son:"—but I do not think, from the manner of its occurrence, that much stress needs to be laid upon it as forming any really valid exception to the above statement.

which has authorized the orthodox mode of carrying the attribution of the prophetic prescience to the very beginning of the people's existence as a people; and which, rationally, has indeed a natural enough explanation in the recorded traces handed down as to the great favourite of Eastern tradition who was the actual father of the nation. If amongst the children of Jacob who inherited the "promise" by having excluded from the "promise" their brethren who were the children of Esau; and whose father Jacob was himself the inheritor of it only through *his* father Isaac's having in like manner excluded Ishmael:—if, I say, amongst these limited descendants of Abraham there was still, notwithstanding the narrowness of mind and heart implied by the exclusiveness, a marked superiority as to the characteristic just mentioned, that we cannot but recognize in the nature of the family God possessed by them above that of family Gods upon the same level of thought any where else amongst the nations of the earth, still it is a consequence that is at once sufficiently accounted for, when we call to mind the abstract lore with which Abraham is said to have been enriched during his original abode in Chaldea. It was this which, in being infused into the cast of Hebrew religion at its very earliest moulding, we may surely perceive, had plainly within it the capability of bringing about the phenomenon in which the Hebrews so justly exulted,—and exulted, according to our former conclusion, so eminently the more on account of the utter externalness of the infusion in regard to the capacity present to their own mental nature. In this manner, so truly above their own power of effecting, may really have been effected *for* the children of Abraham, that circumstance which was so justly a matter of boast for them as was this: the saving, namely, of the deity adopted by them from ever lapsing into the base corporeality of actual parentage to them, which disgraced surrounding deities. For all his being the family God that he was, the case was always that Jehovah stood in the *apartness* from the family which made him truly a God, and

not a being of human condition; and that he was so, I repeat, was only the natural sequence out of his original worshipper's having been "called", as he was, by the special predilection of circumstance, out of "Ur of the Chaldees":—this influence being indeed subsequently supported in the notable way it was, by the correspondingly abstract conceptions introduced by Moses, out of the hidden wisdom stored up within the priestly mysteries of Egypt.

And just the same, indeed, did the case remain intrinsically, when the change took place that the family God was raised into being the national God, notwithstanding that now there did occur what before had *not* occurred: namely, that although Jehovah had never in patriarchal times received what would seem to us so natural a figurative designation as that of the Father or Patriarch, he *did* now receive the figurative designation of a King:—the title being, in a manner, forced into such application by the circumstances of the political transformation. "They have rejected *me*," was the reproach conveyed by Samuel when the people began to crave a monarch who should render their government on a par with neighbouring governments (1st Sam. viii. 7)—"Ye said unto me, Nay, but a king shall reign over us; when Jehovah your God was your king" (xii. 12).—But still, is it not plain, that now under this change, as all along previously, the one matter which stands as the cause of even what is admirable in the case, just as of what is the contrary, is always this same point of the *narrowness* constitutional to the Hebrews?—obvious as it is, that the narrowness gave to the idea concerned that peculiar condensation which we must own as the merit here belonging to it, however true it is that the quality is so far from being a meritorious one in itself. It was to the last, as from the beginning, by means of their resolute exclusion of all others,—of all other *nations*, in the second place, as of all other *individuals*, in the first place,—from having any share in their own God, that the Hebrews kept him as they did,—to be a possession, as *they* thought, for

themselves, though in fact, as *we* know, for the world. Just as they had begun by cutting off from participation, first the children of Ishmael, and then the children of Esau;—and next, as we go on to find, even out of the twelve divisions of descendants of Jacob, still casting off from their fellowship all those ten of the tribes that were not actually the elect two of Judah and Benjamin:—so to the end, as in fact they had been doing all along, did they persistently refuse to do any thing with regard to the Gentiles, other than virtually ignore their existence altogether. Most illogically, indeed:—for the abstract idea of God which they clung to* as bequeathed to them by Abraham, demanded in the very terms of it, if they had been capable of comprehending them, that his sway should be one *without exception*. But in fact they were so ignorant that they had no faculty as yet whereby to discern their own irrational inconsistency! They managed the matter as all unreasoning beings—that is, as all beings who have only a dawning faculty of reason—manage. They *ignored* the Gentiles:—this is what states the case with the perfectness that leads us on to see every thing. They made out themselves to be the whole of human beings, as it were, actually, just as they had a dim consciousness that their recognition of Deity implied that they ought to be theoretically. For, it has been laid down, that no theory of true Deity can, in the nature of it, avail any thing except in so far as the subjects of Deity are taken as a *totality*. This is the hypothesis at the very base of the matter. Or, take it the other way,—since even more fundamental is the foundation when thus expressed:—it is the instinctive effort

* I do not forget what the actual history of this people, and still more the criticism that is now being exercised upon that history, has to show upon this point as to their having *not* clung to their inherited religion. But the reader will, I hope, make allowance for the degree of inaccuracy thus committed, by remembering the necessity my plan lays me under, of passing over everything except what belongs to the purest generality of the matter.

towards the conceiving of human beings *as a totality*, that in fact gives birth to the conception of Deity. And, in accordance with this requirement, such in truth *was* the presumption of the Hebrews, that they did, namely, constitute, in the eyes of Jehovah, as in their own eyes, what *was* the totality of human beings! They were, at all events, the whole of what they supposed that he considered, as they themselves considered, solely worthy of notice. And accordingly, by this to us so flagrant a self-imposition in the matter, they did, in an actually sufficing mode, notwithstanding the intrinsic illogicalness of it, nevertheless fulfil the terms that were essential to the rational condition for the holding of Deity in the abstract sense that they did;—however at the expense, as their so doing was, of all the more generous feelings due to the estimation of the general human race.

Let us pass on then to the period when the captivity had brought its marked accession of enlargement to their ideas, and observe now how the totality is still so far from being dispersed by it, as with less power of condensing assimilation it must have been, that even in the very widening of its capacity, the totality assumed by them only becomes more than ever deepened in its character of a totality! From their having been forced to compare themselves as a nation with other nations, there started forth that vivid sense respecting "Israel" which is diffused over the whole number of the later books of the Old Testament, but which has especially painted itself with an unsurpassable intensity of living feeling in the poetry of the younger Isaiah. Our Christian associations have indeed so seized upon, and possessed themselves of, the description contained in the world-hallowed fifty-third chapter of this latter prophet, that it seems almost a sacrilege to touch it critically;—while, nevertheless, it actually forms the record of the impression entertained at the time, which it is quite as necessary for us, as for Christians, to give a leading place to within our noted points of the case. Let this however be our alternative:—

precisely let us *not* touch it critically;—let us, on the contrary, in thinking of it with closest attention, think of it nevertheless in only the mode of the purest *feeling* that we can:—likely, surely, as we are, thereby to gain a far more accurate truth in this special sort of interpretation required, than the acutest of criticism could give us. Let us, I would propose, for a moment do this:—entirely forget all that belongs to our present subject, and feel ourselves into the mood that would come over us if we were in the act of listening to an exquisite performance of Handel's version of the sentiment of the chapter.—“He was despised and rejected of men!”—Ah yes!—our feeling would be:—we began with an endeavour, indeed, to think, as the intention of the composer bade us, only upon Jesus, forsaken, as he has been represented to us, by his disciples, and bound in the court of Herod;—but how speedily did the moving impetus of those tones, with their expressiveness of utter heart-loneliness, open up sources irresistibly of secret anguish that belonged to matters of purest personality to ourselves! Surely he had borne *our* griefs! The truth of the music, the truth of the prophet's words, the truth of the feeling that is the soul of both, is truth, after all, for nothing else than *this*, that it is that which is common to all human beings!—I refer to this mode of artistic representation, it will be at once perceived, simply because the music of Handel is that perfect work of art which affords the immeasurable heightening, without in any way the changing, of the character of the feeling that lies in the chapter itself. But in fact the simple reading of the chapter may suffice with sufficient perfectness in itself. All I aim to point out is that the *force* of the description arises, like that of all other descriptions, from the appeal it makes to our feelings as individuals. For thence I can argue, as it is my object to argue, that just in proportion to the depth of its impression upon our personal feeling, is it necessitated to have sprung, in the manner of all utterances of stirring emotion, out of the personal feeling of the writer. Here then is the point of

this special kind of criticism that will now expressly avail me. Let me therefore carry this conclusion with me; and now, taking up again our subject, let us once more read the chapter in accordance with it. That is, let us read it not now with a view either to our own Christianized remembrances, or to our own individual experience, but solely under the design of sympathetically realizing the feeling of the lately captive Hebrews, for whom—instead of for us, as we have been apt to suppose,—all historic truth compels us to acknowledge that the writer intended it. Thus exclusively regarded, how many of the allusions, which have been the torment of commentators, and no less the subject of torment at their hands, start up as having, in manifest likelihood, had a to-be-presumed point for those expressly-designed readers or hearers, entirely lost for us! As long as the prophet speaks of the nation of Israel, under the figure of the righteous servant of the Lord, as him who had been, in a merely general way of speaking, “smitten of God and afflicted,” and treated with human contumely in consequence, he is indeed upon ground where every human being, that has had ordinary experience of human life, can understand him. But when he more closely speaks of, for instance, the “prudence”, as well as “patience”, by which the stricken sufferer was characterized,—as the consequence of which it is so probable in itself that there should have ensued effects, of which there may well have been special examples ready in the memory of the Israelites who listened to the description when it originally fell from the prophet’s lips: such as that the “prudent” servant was “exalted and extolled”, and made “very high”, notwithstanding that “marring of his visage” which may naturally enough have followed their indulged weeping in sackcloth and ashes by the waters of Babylon, and that uncomeliness of “form” which was so likely to have been made matter of ordinary galling remark, as found belonging to slaves of foreign race, and to have been thence keenly resented by them in secret, as one of the injuries that Jehovah himself could not fail to

take account of in their behalf;—while, on the other hand, there shows itself the boastful satisfaction in the reward gained by their outward silence under rebuke, that so much of commendation and favour had been shown them, as that they had (apparently) been permitted even the honour of being allowed to share the *graves* owned by their wealthy heathen masters:—in all *this*, I say, most evidently have we quitted the ground which is general, and are upon that which is properly and solely Hebrew. Eminently may we note, moreover, how touchingly appears the mark of that which was the peculiar Jewish grievance of not being suffered to keep up the genealogical connexion recorded with regard to ancestors still under legal regulation with regard to descendants, in the complaint of the eighth verse: “who shall declare his generation?—cut off” as the succeeding clause tells us he was, “from the land of the living,” which to them was exclusively the land of Canaan:—here also occurring, observably, the incongruousness in the figure, which, little as it is of importance under the typical aspect here attached to the poetry as the rightful aspect of poetry, has nevertheless been justly found the insurmountable stumbling-block that it has under the literal understanding of the prophet’s words: namely, that even in the telling how the Lord should, in thus cutting him off, “make his soul” indeed “an offering for sin”, it is still added as part of the description that he should yet “see his seed”, should “prolong his days”, and have “the pleasure of the Lord prosper in his hand”. For, self-contradicting as this actually is upon the orthodox interpretation, upon ours it is simply the strain upon the figurative image, which is of the sort that a quick imagination on the part of the reader, never, in similar cases, finds any difficulty in passing over. Notwithstanding the typal figure of Israel’s having been made to die and be buried, as the state of immediate despair to the people required them during the emergency to consider as his fate, it was still the only natural sequence to their arising in some measure out of their despondency, that he

should be imaged as having been all the time conscious of the prosperity destined hereafter to arrive:—destined, namely, by the necessity of the figure, to arrive to himself in a condition that should be subsequent to his actual condition. That is, the dramatic compromise was necessitated, by which the “Israel” of the future was figured as the offspring of the “Israel” in present captivity.—And, will it be asked, why do I thus linger on what seems so little relevant to my proper subject as this effort to realize these particulars of then contemporary interest?—For this, I answer: solely because I want to enforce the observation it is necessary to make, as to how it was precisely this graphical particularity contained in the prophetic delineation of national circumstances, which in fact caused it to convey, as it did, to the Hebrews, (in the manner of all typical efforts of genius,) that definite impression of national character,—that now closely-outlined portraiture of what had been previously only a floating undetermined sense,—which, having been effected, produced the consequence which I am now pursuing as the one of special importance in the matter:—namely, the deepening of their already possessed feeling as to the virtual *totality* of their own nation. This fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, I conceive,—forming, as it were, the culminating point of all the poetic reflection of general Hebrew sentiment contained in the whole body of the prophetic writings,—gave to the Hebrews that peculiar sense as to their nationalism, which we know experimentally from similar cases in general, *can* only come from the institution thus afforded of a *fictitious type*. Wanting this chapter, I would say, no more would the Hebrews have had the definite consciousness which hence they had as to their own national characteristics, than we on our part should have understood as we do now what was the meaning of an “ancient Roman”, if we had not read the idealized descriptions handed down to us in the true typical fashion that they have been, of Brutus, Regulus, Cincinnatus; or of an “ancient Athenian”, if we had never had similar Plutarch

version as to Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades. The fictitious type of any nation having actually been laid down, that nation has henceforth attained its status in the mind of every one thinking of it, as at all events an image that is a distinct image, whether it be, in primitive fashion, as a *person*, or in our more abstract fashion, as simply a *thing*:—since whether it be as a *person*, or whether it be as a *thing*, is a difference of no account whatever to the principle of the matter. To the Hebrews, in their actual state of cultivation, it was of necessity that “Israel” should retain the vividness of concrete life under which alone their spiritual sense could appreciate him;—and has not the same necessity in fact remained with the religious descendants of the Hebrews, down to the very experience of to-day?—Here, however, is the result that, having arrived at it, let us now hold ourselves to:—it was in fact nothing other than a mere accordance with general rule, which caused that every Hebrew who had once possessed himself of the impression conveyed by this chapter, should ever after have a keener and more positive sense as to what was, so to speak, the nationality of his own nation, than he had before he had so possessed himself.

But imagination that has been roused in a way like this, is that which will not be stopped in its working;—and let us therefore carry on our consideration accordingly. As soon as Self has become in this way identified in the case with a special embodiment of national sentiment, it follows, as the inevitable accompaniment, that so also is there at the same time arrived the condition for the properly-developed religious dualism, which makes the Ego stand as being now effectually interpreted under that embodiment. Every Hebrew, that is, who felt himself in this manner faithfully represented, as to all that was essential in the matter to be represented, by means of the prophet’s “Israel”, willingly and entirely merged his own Ego, in religious concerns, into the representation. And accordingly we have to set down as the event of the case, that the complimen-

tary notions now arrived at by that people, of Jehovah and "Israel", were indeed to them the sufficiently adequate counterpart, for the time, of the dualism, naturally essential to religion, which consists ever in the opposition to God of what, if not, as in its origin, strictly the personal Ego, must be an admitted equivalent to the latter. For this is the indispensable point of my principle, that although the idea of a *totality* of the beings concerned is necessary to give substance to the idea of a true representative of the Ego, yet the totality need be such only in the conception of the mind conceiving it, and by no means in absolute fact.——Here again, observe, is the ever-recurring case of the old-metaphysical mode of assuming "absolute truth" in human idea as possible, which all along we have to combat with as the in-rooted mistake of orthodoxy! Never, in any instance, we have over and over again to protest, is the matter of religion, any more than any other matter, to be considered otherwise than purely relationary to the mind that entertains it!—In absolute fact, according to the only mode in which we *can* get at it,—that is, in respect to the mathematical exercise of reason,—we know it to be the actual requisition of the case, that the representation of the Ego, to *be* that totality which it assumes to be, must include every single human being of the human race; the thought of all of whom is nevertheless impossible to be held by the mind within its contemplation. And hence, even when the religious dualism comes to be entertained in the highest perfection of which it is capable, the case can still only be that the mind using it shall make a certain allowance to itself for its own infirmity, which, having been made, shall reduce the assumption in question finally thus: namely, that the individual, whoever he be, that at the time feels himself under religious influence, shall bear present with him the restraining reflection, that the "I" of which he is conscious as standing in its rightful position of solitary face-to-face opposition with God, is still only an "I" that stands upon equal terms in respect to the rightfulness of such

opposition with the entire number of fellow-beings. This being, however, the adjustment that our best actual reasoning shows to be the intrinsically desirable one, I assert that there was still existent the condition that rendered the same compromise, to an inferior extent, available, while as yet the character of the dualism remained far short of this perfection: just on account of that same mere *relativeness* of sufficiency here demanded. That is to say, the condition indispensable for the constitution of the totality reduces itself to simply this, that at the time of its assumption there shall be present in actual contemplation to the mind assuming it, no particular instance of *exception* to the totality.—Let this principle then be applied in the case of the Hebrews; and I conceive we shall find at once both where lay what we must count as the legitimate forwarding by them of the religious conception, in spite of the imperfection in their treatment of the dualism which in our eyes is so manifest; and where, on the other hand, lay what we cannot but see as their failure towards such end. As to the first, their *ignoring* of the Gentiles was not that which sufficed to altogether prevent their forming a religious notion that, as far as it went, was a genuine religious formation;—as to the second, this same *ignoring* did still cause the notion to be of the inherent poverty of construction, which would have prevented it from ever going on to ripen to any permanent purpose if it had been left to its own resources so to ripen. And by this I mean, that the dualism of Jehovah and “Israel” failed, as we know it did fail, to obtain the *third* hypostasis which should have made it into a Trinity; this being what in the nature of things it *ought* to have grown into, and also what it apparently *would* have grown into, if it had not been for the insufficiency in question. As the case was, however, the notion was obliged to remain, in respect to all that the Hebrews could do by themselves towards its working out, nothing more than the frustrated Trinity, which—like the unfinished petals of the botanical calyx, compelled to fall back upon themselves, and go to form merely the supporting cup to

hold the ripened circlet which is the ostensible flower,—was destined never to be known in the world except only as the dim preparation nutritive to the real Trinity, that was hereafter to gain the actual sovereignty over all other competitive efforts of similar human conception.

In this way was it therefore, as I urge you to consider, that the real obstacle to success with the Hebrews was evidently in a greater degree a moral than an intellectual one, even in this apparently so peculiarly intellectual a matter, as their being unable as yet to take in the idea of the true totality of human beings. Precisely from this, mainly above every other cause, did their inability really proceed, that they were doggedly determined that they *would* be held upon superior terms in the sight of God to any other beings whatever upon the earth. Had not Jacob, they assured themselves, *secured* the birth-right for them, by that seizing of his upon what they counted his righteous “precedence”? Nay, passing by that, is it not likely to have been the real event of the case, that the true superiority of Abraham, and afterwards of Moses, in their religious character, did indeed infix within their minds a legitimate consciousness respecting such superiority, that was truly a lasting heritage attached to their race? But still, giving them the full benefit of whatever claim may thus be possibly made out for them over cotemporary religionists,—or at least over such as they came in contact with,—it is clear that the superiority was that which in no way prevented the absolute inferiority in which they lay regarding both the requirement of the case, and the subsequent development that actually occurred in the case; and I think it is equally clear that we may trace the peculiar sign and source of this inferiority, in what shows itself as a tone of to us undeniable moral deficiency, pervading even what forms the very best part of their religion. For the character of the Jehovah whom they worshipped as the despotic Tyrant that *we* cannot help feeling him to be,—jealous of possible rivals to his dignity, and ruling his subjects in the way only of

favouritism*,—was that which itself as manifestly indicates the conception of a Being who was incapable of adequately filling the personage of the Father, who must form the First member of the proper Trinity, as it was indeed, in the fact of the case, hitherto destitute of the companionship of the Second person, whose revelation as the Son, all Christians will agree with me in here seeing as the indispensable means of his being actually known to the world *as* the Father. And so also was it with regard to the inherent deficiency in their notion of the "Israel" that ought to have grown into the Second person: the qualities, namely, that they aimed at were not really of the divineness that alone could make out of the person holding them a Divine person. The Christ, as the representative of Israel, towards whom the hope of the Israelites was bent, was notoriously *not* the God-like Son whom *Christians* have acknowledged as bearing the likeness of God. It was the human patriot, the moral reformer, the victorious king, of whom the former were in want; and the fulfilling of which character, in a sufficing degree of conformity with their need, as I believe we ought to recognize that it *was* fulfilled, by him upon whose head the attribution of it actually fell, accounts thence in all consistency for the kind of success by which the career of Jesus of Nazareth *was* historically attended,—based originally, as it shows itself to have been, so much rather upon the idea of him as the Son of David than as the Son of God. That is to say, his dominion, *as such*, was maintained over what came to be the Hebrew Church of Jerusalem, for a period which lasted a few years beyond the time when Jerusalem itself had become extinct:—

* It is true that in the description which Christians are wont to give of his character, the Hebrew Deity is made to appear in a light so contrary to the above as that of an unrelentingly *just*, although severe, Lawgiver; but I believe I may assert, that in this mode of painting him, they are in fact guided by later dogmatic impressions, which it is the utmost inaccuracy to attribute, as is thus virtually done, to the actual subjects of Jehovah.

and is *this* a success that is to be called success, under comparison with the matter that we are now concerned with, of the founding of a world-wide religion! For such success, I repeat, the narrowness of the Jewish sense of human brotherhood was that which, we cannot but see, made the Jews utterly incompetent.

The case may be summed up thus:—bent, as they were, upon having a theocracy for their government, a Sovereign who should indeed be God and not man, and on being therein preserved from what would have been the fatal alternative, similar to that into which heathen nations had fallen, of lowering their Jehovah into the fit state for companionship with their "Israel"; the remaining necessity was that the "Israel" itself should be adequately exalted; while this, again, being impeded by their national character, it followed that their nationalism itself must give way. Thus, accordingly, appears the course of the two-fold effect of injuriousness and benefit that I have been aiming to draw out. The obstinate resistance on the part of the Hebrews to admit the proper idea of human equality, was that which seems to have, as it were, necessitated the coming of their enlightenment in that respect to have been in the *external* manner, which we have seen to be in the nature of things the source of such peculiarity in the kind and amount of the effect hence obtained:—a result, therefore, of such manifest advantage, that in speaking of it we can hardly use other than the phraseology of the Hebrews themselves, and seem obliged to describe it by saying that, with a view to it, "the Lord had purposely hardened their hearts". It was the third—nay, rather the fourth—time, that such breaking in of foreign light had befallen them, if we may count the Chaldee infusion of abstract conception the first, and the Egyptian the second. This new amalgamation with Gentile philosophy was, however, so complete as to be that which was finally sufficing. It was of the kind that seems well to have caused it, as if by inevitable suggestion, to figure in ecclesiastical history as it has now come

to do, under the image of marriage, celebrated as between the Hebrew mother of Christianity, and its Grecian father;—and of which it may be said that the Alexandrian Jew Philo stood as the express individual that was the officiating priest. Previous to the union, let us call to mind, quite as fruitless of success that deserves to be counted as success, was the Platonic effort at the forming of a lasting Trinity, as the effort of the Hebrew prophets had been. For if there was in the Alexandrian school the full power of abstract generalization which did indeed give the just proportions to the elementary dualism, that caused it effectively to ripen into the perfect character of the Triad; still the whole composition was of a character that may be said, from its very abstractness, to have been too abstract to be of any avail. Nor is this all; but there was a radical mistake,—or rather a consequence of radical want of knowledge not then capable of being possessed,—which has become quite cognizable now, as having in truth necessitated the failure of all the Alexandrian efforts, with the sole exception of that one special effort which was destined to the prerogative of meeting its strengthening counterpart in the Hebrew sphere of idealization. The Alexandrian Trinities had it for their final aim to give explanation that should have respect to the entire range of existing things: and this was an aim that, by the present principle, could not, in the nature of things, be carried out, until there should first have been realized the conceptions of Universal Unity of Composition, and of Universal Development. Perhaps now that these *have* been attained, there is arrived the condition under which the Alexandrian effort may be repeated with the degree of advantage that *may* actually give to it success. I believe—as I may have to glance at slightly in my Second Part,—that it is necessary to make some such effort, before there can in any way be obtained the kind of sense as to general nature, which it is requisite to any completeness in our philosophy that there should be obtained. But this at all events may be stated, that

if there is now such possibility of success open to us, it is solely for this reason, that the world's experience has now taught us the lesson as to the mode of arrangement needful in regard to the entire mass of existing things, which the Alexandrians had not as yet been taught:—by which I mean the primal division that I have here expressed my belief in, as the truest representation of Nature's plan for our mental constitution, to be made between the matters which, out of all that can possibly fall under our consideration, are found to be appropriate to the one or the other of the two departments of Religion and of Science: *there* requiring, as soon as effectually sorted, to remain constantly and essentially in the apartness from (although intrinsic harmony with) the opposite division, which alone enables our thought to deal with them to any true purpose. Incognizant as the Alexandrians were of the necessity of such distinction, it is for this reason, I would say, that they failed, as they have experimentally been known to fail, in their attempts at cosmical interpretation. Where Religion was in question, I would say, they dealt with Science; where Science was in question, they aimed at Religion; or rather, made an ineffectual mixture of the two. For in forming, as they did, their tri-parted generalization into the Trinity whose conception took the proper counterpart to Deity to be "*the World*", it is evident that they included under the latter the idea of things *material* altogether in common with things that were spiritual; while the truth of the matter, as I esteem it, is, that the main amount of things material is that which has so little actually to do with the peculiar kind of dualism proper to Religion, that when taken in such religious connexion they entirely falsify the subject. The main part of things material, that is, needs to be left altogether within the domain of Science;—and there, I say, the Hebrews, who were at all events true to their exclusive principle of Religion, did in fact wisely leave them, when, knowing what it was they were in quest of so much better than the diffuse Hellenists, they stuck

fast as they did by the personal matters that regarded merely their own individual self-ism. Let us however observe how simple was the operation by which the one characteristic, in working upon the other, brought to the latter the rectification which experience has shown the only thing wanted to it! The Alexandrian Trinity, to the philosophic apprehension which devised it, consisted in fact of the dualism which was to be thus interpreted: pure Deity on the one hand; to which was opposed on the other, Deity as manifested generally in the whole of things; from both of which arose, as of necessity, the third hypostasis whose function is to form the blending idea growing out of, and at the same time accounting for, the union of the two former ones, designated by them the general "Soul of the World". From this, however, the Hebrew thought eliminated exactly what was unnecessary in it to the concrete need of men, and which in being unnecessary impeded the effect of that concrete need's being satisfied with it:—that is to say, it cut off from the general idea of the "World", or manifested Deity, all that did not precisely pertain to the special sort of manifestation of Deity that religious conception solely called for. And accordingly this happened: the Christian Trinity which *did* adapt itself to the existing need,—not only indeed of Hebrews, but of the mass of the religion-seeking tribes of men beside,—while it retained without conspicuous alteration the "pure Deity" for its First hypostasis, made this significant limitation in its Second, that it made it to consist of "manifested Deity" manifested in only just that portion of material things which was held to be, by its peculiarity, of religious concern: inasmuch as possessing the unique fitness for the affording to the Ego the means of fulfilling the religious condition towards God, which fulfilment, however indispensable, the Ego had learned to feel the necessity of shifting away from its literal self:—that is, according to the circumstantial fact of the case, the human form of him who, in pursuance of the filial character already assigned to "Israel", was in readiness

to be adopted as the acknowledged offspring of Deity. Jesus, namely, now fully received as the Son of God for which he was in the beginning only very partially received, forms henceforth the sufficing outer-moulding of the abstract representative of the Ego, whose flesh is thence the part of material things in general which forms the sole exception to the general mass, in being no impediment to his bearing the encounter with Deity which it has been found that no other human being can bear. And the Third hypostasis, farther, is that to which, as by evident sequence, just a corresponding alteration, and no other than a corresponding alteration, becomes in like manner needed: this being, as just stated, the principle that shall be able to account in a general manner for what in the second hypostasis is asserted as special. As therefore it is now stated that God manifested in the special instance of the man Jesus, forms the Second person of the Triad; so it follows that the Third must be that which recognizes a somewhat which makes manifestation possible in the case of every individual man whatever. And accordingly, instead of the irrelevant "Soul of the World",—prepared to diffuse itself into the scientific essence that dilutes religion into utter inappreciability to the religious sense,—we have the concretely-spiritual "Holy Ghost", standing as the general illuminating principle of all men, and of which, in being such, it may thence indeed be truly said, that as, on the one hand, it gave the means for the special selection of the one man Jesus, to be the representative of all other men; so, on the other, it gave likewise, subsequently to that selection, the means required by all men for the enabling of them to profit by the representation.

This, I conceive, was what had the power in it of being a working notion. I have not yet entered upon the ground of that moral feeling mixed up with the theological, which gives the true intensity to the idea of the "flesh" of the man Jesus presenting no impediment to the encounter with Deity, as I shall have to do in the next section; but even thus far,—in the

merely bare dogmatic outline with which alone we are at present concerned,—there is still perceptible, or at all events, as it seems to me, capable of being perceived, that peculiar sort of moral influence which it is now the express object with me to show as being immediately involved within the dogmatism. By the application of the principle here maintained,—though indeed not, as I believe, otherwise,—I conceive that we have the means, in this leading instance of the working of the principle, of easily discerning the very nature of that general operation, the comprehending of which forms the fundamental matter of otherwise difficulty in the whole subject: I mean, the difficulty of seeing *how* it can be that there should actually reside within dogmatic forms the causative power of bringing about moral effects, here essentially assigned to them. The point of peculiarity in the present principle which I consider gives this otherwise unpossessed facility, is that which, it will be remembered, I endeavoured to maintain with regard to the former case of the Hebrew reception of Gentile ideas: namely, the principle that the manner of the arrival of those ideas, as the external, ready-made doctrines that they were to the Hebrews, was the cause which, through its giving to the *doctrines* the active department in relation to the subsequent effect, which it would be otherwise much more in accordance with the natural course of things to attribute to the receiving *mind*, really produced the entire speciality of effect that there was in the case. And in the instance of this present leading doctrine, I would say, the manner in which this speciality of effect is in reality a *moral* one, may evidently be recognized. For the estimating of it, however, we must recall somewhat to our attention what was the actual critical history of the transaction in connexion with the production of the dogma.

It is of the utmost importance to this estimation that we bear clearly in mind, how the circumstance of the junction of modes of thought which has fallen under the apt figure of a marriage union, was literally a thing that extended over many

centuries. As soon as ever Alexandria was built, about three hundred years before Christ, we know that the Jews, who were encouraged to resort thither, began from the first to imbibe the love of abstruse speculation, unwonted to themselves, which filled its entire atmosphere. The Rabbis set about forthwith to satiate themselves with that for which their appetite was so naturally well-prepared as in this case it was,—for the wider conceptions, namely, of the world of men and things, as to which the Grecian philosophy had gone so far beyond any thing before known to them. And thus from the very beginning was felt by them that share of their own in the common benefit to accrue out of the destined union, which on the other hand the subtle-minded Greeks who conferred it could not help at the same time repaying themselves for, in the counter-share of benefit which they on their own part received from their contact with the narrow, indeed, but proportionately earnest-thoughted Hebrews: since it was this earnestness of Hebrew purpose which, as we have seen, was the needed element which, being possessed, prevented them from any longer continuing, as they had begun, to fritter themselves away in a sort of attempt that owing to the condition of the age was incapable of coming to perfection. The whole movement of the obtaining this benefit therefore, thus diffused as it was over so long a space of time, was as gradual as possible, and altogether free from the “miraculous” sort of suddenness which it is as necessary to us to repudiate as to establish the true sort. And just the same, we must also note, was still the case, when, farther on, the transaction was so much advanced, as that Philo began actually to lay out the definite compounded notion which was to be the final result: the notion, namely, which so presently after, as it proved, offered to the more liberal section of the disciples of Jesus that suggestion of the Logos, which they could not avoid seizing upon, as they did, as the idea veritably appropriate to the Master whose failure in a worldly sense had left them in so frustrated a position. Not even here, as there

had never been before, was there anything that in closely looking at it shows as the "preternatural" suddenness that, as we are arguing, would, if it *had* happened, have effectually defeated the realization of the sort of influence that in the actual case, I assert, *did* supervene. The Hebraizing of the notion was a thing carried on, if indeed rapidly, as rapidly it eminently *was* carried on, still in quite legitimate course, under the successive hands of Paul, of John, of Apollos; neither is there indeed any point at which our contemplation can arrest itself, as a decided *era*, in the growing spiritualization thus being afforded to the idea entertained of Jesus, until—after it had gone on, by the instrumentation of the Fathers of the Arian school, receiving more and more of the half-sort of Deity, which gave so sequentially a continuously-increasing condition of pre-existent glory in the Past, to match the ascension first asserted for the Christ into the heaven of the Future:—until, I say, after even this accession to his dignity was found nevertheless insufficient, and as I assert, was indeed in truth insufficient, for what was in reality the demand of the occasion. The occasion, was it not to obtain for the world a Christ who should adequately present to the human race a representative of the human race, who should as such stand upon a level of equal communion with the Father of the human race?—and for this, it is manifest, nothing less than perfect Deity is the image that would, or by any possibility could, serve. And thus were, accordingly, neither Clemens nor Origen in fact of any avail, that was final avail, any more than Paul and Apollos had been! Nothing was there that could in any way form a stoppage to the growing of the notion till the full measure of all that in them was as yet lacking to the notion had been filled up, as we know it was filled up, by Eusebius and Athanasius.—The historical crisis of the Council of Nice however, though it did thus present itself as the ostensible indication of the *inner* event of the case, was by no means the era of prime importance. I am alluding to it here only that we may note the certain parallelism

of progress, which directs us to the perceiving of how the corresponding *mental era* was actually, upon even much stronger grounds than the historical, deserving of being counted as an *era*: namely, how there was in the first place the same gradualness of process, which in the end was attended by the sudden effectiveness of accumulation that here as there constituted the realization of the crisis,—the mental era being however so far from corresponding with the historical one in point of time, that it formed the express impulse of whose action the dogmatization in question, and the Council of Nice as the culmination of the dogmatization, was the result. The signs of the inner progress are, it is true, scarcely so patent as in the latter case, but they are not difficult of being drawn forth. We have seen how the merely human Saviour was the only thing required by the Jews, as long as their demand was of the feeble however passionate sort, that belonged to them in their own natural mode of looking upon their own little tribe of men as making up sufficiently the whole amount of humanity of any concern with Deity. The main object present to them being that which solely purported that they, as a nation, should be freed from their special temporal grievance, and exalted to a triumphant station over the foes that had lorded it over them, so also the deliverer required by them was the proper human being for whom such work was befitting: that is, the human being who should have just the same sort as, and nothing more than, the specially-favouring inspiration which they had previously rejoiced in as possessed by former prophets and warrior-patriots of their own. This idea, however, if considered suitable to Jesus by the followers of Jesus, was by himself apparently rejected as so little suitable, that to him has to be attributed the large widening, and especially refining of it, which shows itself as the immediate indication of the catastrophe hastening thence to befall it: his personal emergence beyond the bounds of proper Jewish exclusiveness, being that which so manifestly opened the hearts of his followers to admit as they subse-

quently did,—whether or not by actual command from him,—the fellowship on common terms with themselves of their half-brethren the Samaritans; and which led himself to consent, though with some apparent difficulty, that his to-be-imparted blessings should be shared in by even the out-lying Canaanites;—though still it is true that it stands as a pressing rule made by him to his missionary agents, that they should *not* consider it as part of their duty to go into “the way of the Gentiles.” And so also is it the fact that although with similar self-inconsistency, and timidity of innovation, still with a nevertheless steady gaining ground of the innovation, did the advance continue its working. Even amongst the Jewish apostles of Jesus there *was* wrung from them, however unwillingly, still at last an actual consent, after the supposed resurrection of Jesus, and supposed conversion of the natural Jerusalem thence into a heavenly one, that the preaching of the hope of Israel *should* be extended—through, however, other hands than their own,—to the Gentiles. But this was the point, at which no farther could the tide be carried! Here, having arrived, the Hebrew charity, as all charity of a localized character of necessity must, signally and significantly failed. And—let us note it well!—the spirit of the charity that came in with *Paul*, was *not*, accordingly, a thing that came in the same manner that other consequences of mental enlargement had come in. It came in, specially, as *not* a gradually attained spirit. It burst forth, on the contrary, with the altogether unwontedness, and consequently the unlimitation (as appreciated by the subject of it), which always and of right does belong to the feeling that in any case arrives to us as if introduced by external revelation. The notion of the Logos, we remember, which was Paul’s distinctive notion, and which was promulgated by him in especial contradiction to the Hebrew notion of the Hebrew Messiah, was contradictory precisely in this, that it was a *general* notion. It was so utterly different from the Hebrew notion, or from any mere enlargement of it, that the localism which constituted the

Hebrewism was in its reception annihilated. Hebrewism was essentially exclusiveness, and now was come an idea which admitted of no exclusion. Whoever it might be that the All of men was to be supposed as standing for, the idea of the Logos was an idea that sufficed to cover them! And herein, therefore, lay the force of that glorious effusion of the sense of true human brotherhood, which made the Apostle of the Gentiles send abroad, as he did, the cry which rings in the ears of all of us, that in Christ there was, and should be, neither Greek, nor barbarian any longer, neither male nor female, neither bond nor free!—This I say, was the feeling so purely novel to the then world, and to the Jewish world above all other parts of the world, that I conceive its coming to have formed, in combination with the other peculiar influences of the case, the real focus of the entire event of Christianity:—the focus, that I upon my scheme, take as such in all but close concurrence with the ordinary estimation of Christians, though the manner of my so esteeming it—as this *moral* instead of *theological* point, this *natural* instead of *miraculous* point, brought to light with such special though still legitimate preparation,—is that which I feel to be doing it so far greater justice. It is not with Philo and his fellow-philosophers, any more than with the members of the Council of Nice,—important intellectual agents in the matter as the former were, even much more than the latter, in regard to the outward agency in the matter,—that the real significance of the case rests in my view, any more than in the orthodox view. *This*, in being the thing of *inner* concern that I still take it for, belongs as much as ever to the proper Apostolic originators of Christianity, and to Paul highly above all others; while at the same time, as I argue, I am really accounting for Paul's own mistake (as I consider it) in assuming the *directness* of the revelation made to him, when I point out the necessity that I do, of the gradually-prepared matter of revelation's still coming to him with what *must* have had all the effect of un-prepared suddenness. It

was the peculiarity of this effect, though nothing else, that, I conceive, really brought about the focus existing in the case; and that did so in fact, precisely for the reason that I have asserted: namely, on account of the manner of relation—reversed at the special point of the case from the ordinary manner,—which I have assigned as the true one between the acting elements in it. For while I fully see that the illumination that thus broke upon the mind of Paul, and through him upon the world, was that whose result drove circumstance before it, and thus led, first to the dogmatization, and thence to the establishment of Christianity, I still maintain that it was in itself an influence that with regard to the original promulgator was essentially a circumstantial influence. The mind of Paul, that is, notwithstanding its being the *originating* mind that it was, was nevertheless, by the necessity of its native constitution, however in the end surmounted, to a far more eminent degree a *recipient* mind. It was that which,—unlike the minds of the Alexandrian Jews who first began the movement of union, in the placidly intellectual manner that was comparatively *insensible*,—presented now to the alien stream of thought acting upon it the very strong-hold of innermost Hebrew characteristic requiring to be overcome; and which, by the combined force of constitution and circumstance, so presented it, as to afford the precise degree of resistance to the external impulse, which caused that impulse, even in the giving way to it, to be signally *felt* as such.

For what was the consequence of such mode in the transaction but this?—the matter of the feeling came into the world as a *mystery*:—*mystery* being the principle which in every case notoriously gives the peculiar force that belongs to religion as religion; and which, being such, I insist upon now, as, when explained in the way I have done, of showing it a merely natural crisis, sufficient to explain the entire phenomena of the case. If the Rabbi-instructed Apostle had arrived at the generalization respecting human brotherhood (—that is, if he *could*

have so arrived: my argument being that in the nature of things, he could *not*,—) *without* a crisis, or in the ordinary manner of intellectual acquisition, under which the event would have appeared to him as if his own mind were the chief means of the acquisition, no feeling of a practical kind, or at least that was notable as such, would have accompanied it. The notion, coming in the method proper to scientific notions, *instead* of that proper to religion, would have remained an utterly uninfluential impression:—*not* a working notion, and *not* one that engendered therefore the then-novel sort of psychical movement that we now know as distinctly *moral* sentiment: that is, personal sentiment successfully *generalized* upon. But, coming as it did,—namely, as the mystery that *had* the properly religious energy along with it,—it did indeed, I would say, make the correspondingly intense impression that *did* suffice to the actual starting of that new fact in our constitution,—that new species of feeling that “feeling generalized upon” truly was. There was brought forth, and in the manner of first creation, a new psychical being:—the one, as we know, which was destined to be, long after, christened into our nomenclature under the baptismal name of “*Philanthropy*”, however it required as yet, for centuries and centuries, to remain only as the nursling conception, in the act of being fostered into strength under the due tutelage of religious imagery.—For observe how,—to keep to the ordinary regulation of things, even in the very occurrence of the occasional and extraordinary,—as soon as ever the point of catastrophe in the transaction was passed, which made suddenness the ruling influence, the gradualness which is the proper course of human amelioration in general, entirely resumed its sway. The *era* of unwonted illumination gone by, which caused its subjects to live for the moment as passive instruments, struck blind, and implicitly guided by the Uncomprehended Spirit come down upon them, they awakened to themselves with all the hard and truly human difficulty before them, of realizing

the Spirit into Action. And this was a work of such actual slowness as that scarcely, in fact, can it be said to be even yet properly begun! Nay, the truth of the case, as my principle compels me to claim it, is, that only just now, and through the instrumentation of us unbelievers, is the original revelation brought to its own perfectness *as* a revelation, which is the necessary condition for its *being*, with any effectualness, carried forward into action! Revelation itself, with all its characteristic suddenness, cannot still be separated from the law which requires that what is really available for progress must come as the work of Time.—Conceive the nature of the work, as circumstance actually laid it out. First, there was required the growth of habit as to the fitting together in a substantial manner of the old Hebrew notion with the new Christian one; and then, when the fitting had succeeded in being accomplished, there was still to be wrought out the reversionary process, upon the now compounded notion, of turning back to eliminate out of the compound all the several particulars, one by one, that were being found experimentally to have been only of temporary, and not of enduring importance:—according, as we have seen, to the process of all refining generalizations whatever. A mass of considerations that *were* only temporary, could not *but* be gathered into the matter under growth thus circumstantially produced, however intrinsically irrelevant: which made this elimination so necessary as it was to the process, even on a par with the work of growth itself. But moreover, there was, as we have also seen, to be obtained the completing of the inner organization of the sum and substance of Christianity:—to be obtained, as we know, through the sorting and sifting machinery of controversial debate, so far as the intellectual work of dogmatization was concerned. The merest glance at ecclesiastical history is indeed sufficient to show us how much there was to be done in this way!—Letting, however, this hint at such glance suffice for the kind of estimation of the process that we want, may I not, as to our immediate object

now in view, appeal to you for the general truth of this, which I would call a summary of the moving inner source of all the superficial debate?—what is it, I would ask, that has all along caused Christianity to be the matter of intensely anxious controversy that it has been, other than this question, embodied in the original outbreak of human self-ism, expressing its alarm for its hitherto cherished, but now threatened prerogative,—“Are there *few* that be saved”?—It was, as I conceive, a thing in itself impossible, that minds which had grown up as the minds of the first Christians had done, under the notion of exclusive favouritism, could, even the highest of them, really comprehend, however they verbally accepted, and thence seemed to themselves to comprehend, the idea of a Logos-Saviour who should indeed be that which yet the very notion of the Logos required that he should be, a Saviour for *All*. If the large mind of Paul had caught a glimpse of it under his own special share of inspiration, and thence, assisted by the peculiar fervour of the crisis, had imparted to it a sufficing impulse into its proper dogmatic status, the apprehension was as almost nothing, even to him, compared with the feeling which amongst his ordinary contemporaries totally absorbed it:—the spirit of nationalism amongst the Hebrews being so oppositely apart from that of the genuine cosmopolitanism alone co-existent with this truly religious, albeit Hellenistically-derived notion, that the very instant the immediate stimulus of the publication of the New Gospel had subsided,—the instant that the original burst of jubilation for the universal “Good-will come amongst men” had scarcely ceased to vibrate in their hearts,—the flat temper of their former exclusiveness could not be prevented from falling naturally over them again. And hence came the compromise attached to Paul’s own immediate dogmatization, which so notoriously established itself in consequence as the habitually-working method of the Christian scheme. “Saviour for All”, as by the terms of his proclamation the Christ was required to be, yet the case must still be made out

that the salvation he brought was not in fact accessible to all. Room for Hebraistic favouritism, as it was demanded, so was actually left in the matter, by this arrangement: causing the exclusive spirit of the people, that might be thought to have become necessarily extinct together with the extinction of the people *as a people*, and their peculiar religion *as such religion*, to be carried forward, on the contrary, into the intimate structure of the new religion,—to the proper character of which it was so essentially opposed, as to form thence an incessant source of perturbing self-contradiction pervading the entire system of Christianity, and breaking it up into sectarian division. What else but this can we see as the cause of the latter?—human egoism, in this case the egoism in excess which is implied by its being Hebrew egoism, seeking constantly to make assertion, on its own behalf, of successively new modes of limitation, whereby the dogmatic problem should be come out of with egotistic satisfaction, however gained at the expense of those human brethren for whom, sinners though they might be, the very hypothesis of Christianity compelled it to be acknowledged that Christ died. And hence farther the terrible logic which has left its mark of reflected humanism, and Hebrew humanism, upon the character of the Christian God himself, in very defiance of Christianity, in making Him boast of himself as the arbitrary appointer of those upon whom He will have mercy, and those upon whom He will not. Just what the Hebrew nationalism was, compared with the genuine philanthropy which alone gives the true sense of Deity, is the sectarian spirit under Christianity, compared with what Christianity would be if its own terms were, or could be, thoroughly fulfilled:—so that every little denomination of Christians,—nor the little ones only, but to a degree even beyond all other sects, the great Roman sect in especial, as being in this respect of a littleness that places it much more than upon a par with the rest:—every denomination of them all, I say, whichever it may be of them that has been exulting in constituting, in regard to

its own members, *the sole body of the elect*, has been proving itself as ignorant of the true Trinity whom those members have thought themselves to be worshipping, as were the pre-Christian Jews themselves. By their taking themselves as serving in the place of the needed *totality* of God's children, they have been really dwarfing the proportions of their primely-attributed Deity, as much as they have been restricting the office of the Redeemer:—denying, that is, at once the Father and the Son! Only when the completeness of Charity is raised to be upon its required level with the completeness of Piety, it is manifest, can the announcement of Christian Salvation be really the Gospel to all men that it claims itself to be:—though here, it is true, a qualification exists, that is not to be forgotten. By no means is it hence to be considered as implied, that the salvation must in its time and mode and degree be *equal* to all men. To make such inference would be an error at least as great as the other, upon the opposite side. The fact is, that this throwing open of the terms of participation, is in itself but the necessary step preparatory to the making of the regulation to our thought required in this respect. The forming of such preparatory step constitutes the real value of the levelling of the distinctions which, from their arbitrary and egotistic character, were only impediments to the arriving at true distinctions. And yet the case is, as I maintain, that the taking of this step,—notwithstanding its constituting the very fulfilling of what Christianity in its own nature intrinsically demands,—is so entirely an act of dereliction as to every thing that belongs to the outer form and actual working of Christianity, that in itself it implies of necessity the utter extinction of that form!

Here, nevertheless, is still the ground that I rest upon:—how, I ask, is it that the larger charity, which is manifestly every where in the act of growing up amongst us, has been actually brought about, except precisely through this notion of a common Saviour, which the very maintainers of it have all the time been tacitly striving against,—brought about, that is,

in spite of their opposition? The fact has not been, I would assert,—at least, the fact has not been *so much*,—that men have become enlightened, and *therefore* have thrown down the walls of separation that have kept them from one another, as that the religious notion, put upon them by circumstantial Providence before they were competent to it, has dragged them on to the charity. Mankind called Christ a common Saviour in the beginning, just for nothing else than that the unpractical but finely-conceiving Alexandrians, many degrees beyond the rest of the world in *this* respect, had taught them to do so, before they knew the meaning of what they were saying. But it was a beautiful notion, which, like other beautiful notions, urged them on by the very force of its beauty, until at last they *are* able to understand it. Has it not been notoriously matter of experience, both historical and present, that it *has* been this conception of a common Saviour which, by its sanction added to the impulse of low personal motives, has given a definite theoretic purport to the working of those motives towards the obtaining of an actual sense of common interest, uniting in one the variously-isolated nations of mankind, which thus has, in fact, created the idea, as it has created the word, of *Humanity**,—never thought of, amongst even the wisest of

* The fact, become sufficiently notorious, of the extremely small availableness of missionary efforts, as such, to extend proper civilization in the world, does not, I consider, form any real ground of objection to this view, for two reasons:—first, because there is a manifest cause for the want of success in the developmental inappropriateness of the kind of religion ordinarily proposed to savage nations;—and secondly, for the following consideration: namely, that the very frame of mind under which it will be acknowledged by anti-religionists that the civilization *is* effectively carried on, namely that of general *Humanity*, is in truth the very thing that I am here asserting as the product of religion. So that, however it be the case, that the savage by no means gains his civilization through becoming a Christian, yet still he gains it by the indirect instrumentation of the Christianity which has in fact done the work required for him while acting upon the personality of his civilizer.

the ancients, previously to Christianity! The idea implied in the "Saviour", it must be remembered, went, by hypothesis, deeper into human nature, and was thus the source of a community correspondingly more near to universal, than any other idea calling forth, and supporting itself upon, community of interest:—except only one. For if the notion of a common *Saviour* was, as I argue it was, necessary thus to the obtaining of a practically available sense of a common nature amongst men, so was also, *a fortiori*, the notion of a common *Father*.

It is thus, accordingly, that I arrive at the point aimed at to fill up what has been the proposition argued in this section, and which I may now sum up as follows:—First,—or, rather, as the *final* object,—men required to know one another as Brothers;—but then it was the natural necessity of the case that they could not know one another as Brothers, except solely through the knowledge of having a common Father;—while, again, they could not know God as an abstract Father except through the possessed recognition of an abstract Son of the Father:—the thing then which I say *has* happened to meet their final need has been that they have *indeed* obtained such mediatorial conception of Sonship; and moreover in a mode which, however differing from their own expectation in regard to the revelation, has nevertheless *this* in favour of its authenticity,—on the one hand, that by the gradualness of the realization of the conception, attended by a culminating force in no way inconsistent with the gradualness, it has exhibited an harmony with the proper mode of the working out of all other great ideas; on the other hand, that the benefit by which the realization has been all along attended,—of the opening, namely, of the hearts of men to the sense of natural fellowship with one another,—is one of that sort which of all moral benefits whatsoever is the one whose beneficialness is the most obvious.

SECTION IV.—THE NOTION OF SIN AS MATTER OF
VICARIOUS ATONEMENT.

It sounds so simple a thing to say, as I have just done, that men had no means of knowing one another as Brothers except through the knowledge of having a common Father, that I scarcely know how to set about representing the importance I attach to the fact. I can hardly expect that others will enter with me into the surprising newness of impression, with which this seemingly so familiar and self-evident an assertion has grown upon me as containing within itself the entire revelation of, I may say, the complete purport of religion. But so it is. Think of it, I appeal to you, whether there is any possible way of attaining the same end other than this way:—whether there is any possibility, namely, of first comprehending what a natural human brother means, if not through our having that abstract or relational sense as to our possessing the same immediate parent; and then, of applying this earliest result upon the farther stage of comprehension, where the mode of abstractness and relationalism differs only by being upon so much higher a scale, without again going over an exactly parallel process: a process, that is to say, which shows the degree of its abstractness above that of the original process, in this, and nothing else, that the obtaining of sufficient ideal substance for the carrying it on, instead of being the unconscious work that it was in the first instance, needs for itself a direct seeking out and putting together of experiences, such as most certainly cannot have been accomplished, in the course of the mind's history, without an eminent consciousness of labour in the effort towards it. Whatever our own extant impression might lead us to suppose, we must, I say, find ourselves driven

to own that the relational idea of God as a Father was *not* instinctive at the beginning,—that, on the contrary, it has arrived only as the result of all these ages of the mind's struggling towards it!—while we must also own, I repeat, that the struggle has been, by the necessity of the case, involved in the gaining of the abstract sense of human Brotherhood, which likewise was in the beginning the farthest from instinctive! To make out the nature of this struggle is accordingly the sole purpose of all that we are now really engaged in. The doctrinal root of Christianity, for which we found this interpretation in the last section, essentially claims for itself to cover whatever of morality is to be found in association with it; and precisely such do I indeed find to be the true bearing of the case. If “to know Christ” was the plenitude of experience that to the orthodox brought the entire amount of knowledge that his religious condition made necessary to him, quite as much to me,—I may say now, as the final proof of my parallelism with him,—is the doctrinal principle figured under “the Christ” that which I assert will show itself as the real ultimate purpose of all the incipient workings of proper morality, growing up in combination with the doctrinal principle, which it is to be the object of this present section to deal with. Remote enough, it is true, must the orthodox acceptor of Christianity find the interpretation I am now putting upon the doctrine, from that which its own literal assertion carries with it! But still, I persuade myself, it will not be difficult to make clear what I have just stated,—provided I may do that which surely the orthodox ought not to deny that a true orthodoxy requires; and as I maintain, *my* orthodoxy, just as much as theirs. And that is, if I be allowed to carry back the “Logos” to that pre-existent state in which, upon my principle as well as upon theirs, it lay hidden in the ages that were anterior to the present mental world's creation.

Let us therefore,—to take up the subject in plain language,—resume the speculation hitherto made out as to the moral

probabilities belonging of right to the primitive development of human faculties. Let us, namely, turn back once more to the original battle-field of the egoisms;—and we shall there truly, I believe, find the whole of what concerns us. We shall find there, I conceive, the entire amount of the natural urgencies that, simply in themselves, formed the matter, to the dealing with which the Christian “key”, artificial though its *construction* may have been, was, I would say, nevertheless in its *design* most fitly adapted.

For, let this be considered:—let this be considered, I would say, with the degree of express attention that it needs to be considered with, notwithstanding its being the utterly obvious consideration that it is:—Within the primary sphere of conflict to which we have been heretofore obliged, for clearness’ sake, to limit our observation,—primary, that is, inasmuch as it belongs to human nature in the mass, as well as to the individual units composing the mass:—within this primary sphere, I say, there is contained a secondary sphere of conflict, in action at one and the same time with the other, though necessarily limited to the units, which it is plainly imperative upon us now distinctively to regard in order to add its observation into the general account. For the thing which I assert we have to lay out for ourselves to find in the matter is this:—While it is, indeed, the fundamental truth of the matter, that the oscillation between the feelings appropriate to paternity and those appropriate to childhood,—which forms the process whose progressive modification, accordingly as the being whose state is concerned passes out of the one condition into the other, makes up the actual sum of life,—is thence the vital movement pervading our whole conception of life, and of human life not exclusively of other species of life, which of necessity stamps its character as the guiding one as long as that conception remains nothing more than a *general* one: still, the instant that we begin to *particularize* even no farther than this, that we

would merely wish to set apart human life, as such, from the rest of life, there arises to us the necessity, otherwise unfelt, of perceiving that the universal oscillation, in so far as there is any thing of particularity in it in its pertinence to humanity,—as undoubtedly there is,—is in fact itself only an effect, brought about and carried on solely through the instrumentality of the minor oscillation, apparently incidental, and yet essentially necessary, which exists amongst the individual sharers in that general process (—leading, obviously, to inference which however is not to our present purpose, that the most utterly universal portion of the oscillation is in truth similarly produced—). And if this statement runs close, as every hearer of it will feel that it does, to the paradox of saying, that hence *the primary is caused by the secondary*,—why, I would answer,—and as something more than a mere retort *ad credulum*—surely this is the most evident sign that we are upon the track of the explanation that we are in need of: since what else but paradox belongs to the whole matter we are dealing with!—But, in truth, there is no paradox at all in what I have here in view. The fact aimed at will, on the contrary, show how even specially simple is its nature, immediately that we seek it in the right way. And that is, when, in natural sequence to the method adopted before, we endeavour to realize what were indeed, or at least what must in reason be assumed as having been, the family conditions whose existence first constituted the real separation of the human family from that which was only its developmental antecedent of mere animal aggregation.

Now, looking out for the salient matter that in a mode of such pure generality as we are now following can alone serve us, this observation at once occurs: the first decided sign that history presents to us, as indicative of the fact which is our object,—of human beings, namely, living together in a union that is *of a certainty* not merely gregarious, but to some true degree social,—is their partly-voluntary combination, so commonly occurring at the first appearance of distinct tribes in

history, under a Patriarch. Here therefore let us take our standing-ground; and let us make this patriarchal condition, what surely the need of the case, thus stated, makes it,—our central point of examination:—doing which, we shall, I believe, have truly every element present to us that goes to the laying of the entire germ of all subsequent formation whatever of Religion!—We must, however, forbear the consideration of the condition in itself, till we have estimated this leading matter as to its relation;—we have to consider, that is, what was the original cause of the intrinsic *need* for this difference here so ostensibly indicated, between the social family, as thus exhibited, with its partly-voluntary inducement to association mixed up into the previous acquiescence in utterly involuntary gregariousness, and the merely animal family out of which it sprang. And this, I believe it must be found, can actually be traced to nothing else than the circumstance that I am now insisting upon: namely, this of the family-members having now come as men to possess the dawning sense, not in any measure possessed before, of their being *brothers*, as well as merely parents and offspring. Surely, that there is such point of novelty to men, as men, is sufficiently plain. Brutes, it can scarcely be questioned, have no such sense. Young animals of one brood play and feed together, with indeed a pleasant apparent feeling of habitual companionship; but they do so, assuredly, without possession of the slightest recognition of the abstract notion of common parentage, which alone *can* bring the perception of brotherhood. But then, if this *be* the case, *here* is it, I urge you to observe, that the manner which we may see before us in the natural course of the onward development, brings the solution that I promised a moment ago to my paradox. If brutes are without any perception at all of brotherhood, equally are they without notion, *as* notion, of parentage itself:—since, undoubtedly true as it is that the parental relation is the one that holds primary rank in experience, yet the experience is in the first instance of purely

impulsive or animal nature; and as such, it is the state of the case, I argue, that it must remain, just until the needed event arrives, that secondary experience of brotherhood shall awaken the prior impulse, as it were, *out* of its mere impulsiveness, and thus render it the matter to the individual of distinct consciousness. This *being* done, brutes, I say, are, as the effect of its being done, become human. Still, however,—let us farther observe,—for all the magnitude of the consequence thus involved, nothing is there in any way so peculiarly special in the course of things implied, that, in the close looking at it, it should seem to deserve even the estimation of forming any notable crisis. Just this would suffice for the producing of it: that certain individuals out of the number of existing beings should have, in respect to faculties possessed in common amongst them all, an especial quality of acuteness. For what in this manner happens obviously, under our own eyes, even to the young brute that we think of only as being such? When he sees any of the number of co-offspring with himself enjoying a share of parental care that he is coveting on his own part, does he not, by an impulse that none of us thinks of misinterpreting, immediately rush upon the other as an intruder whom he must thrust out of his own way? But suppose that he have succeeded in so expelling his fellow,—which is the same thing as supposing him to be the stronger,—this only can surely happen, that on the very account of the fight he has had for it, he will enjoy the parental fondling, when he gets it, all the more. And assuming only this, I urge, we have the principle that accounts for everything! Even with the brute, such knowledge as he has of the value of his parent comes to him only in proportion as he is occasionally deprived of it—as the psychical echo of the sensations excited by the parent proves itself, that is to say, more efficient in actuality of effect than the actual physical sensations:—and so on, does a similar result occur all along. Constantly does the value go on, having once been begun to be entertained, similarly increas-

ing, and at an increasing ratio, just in proportion always to the fact,—on the one hand, that the enjoyment of the parent's being rendered acuter deepens the displeasure for its deprivation; on the other, that the sorer the struggle to overcome the deprivation, the more is heightened the satisfaction attending the return to the enjoyment. But yet, again, there is this to-be-counted notable stage in the matter, that at a certain point the enjoyment of the parent must, in the nature of things, have acquired the degree of abstractness that will bring this of novelty of effect along with it, that henceforth, the thing which is actually held in value will be at times, and as a beginning feeling, no longer exclusively the immediate benefit which the parent conveys, but the parent in himself, under the general sense of his being the provider of such benefits. For to make the notability of this event, is this consequence following upon it, that no sooner does this attachment of value for his own sake to the parent take place, than there becomes of necessity involved in it the corresponding rise of the counteractive movement, which consists in the carrying forward a portion of the affective sentiment onward to the co-offspring who, like the individual himself, are the objects of the parent's regard. And this therefore forms the institution of fraternal feeling; which, however different at this first appearance from what it has to become in the end, I would yet still assume as, even in its faintest manifestation, the unmistakable sign of the developmental change having occurred which has transferred the heretofore brute into the proper state of humanity. Nothing, indeed, is to be thought of as hereby essentially varied in regard to the principle that has been at work;—the developmental change, whatever its importance, in no way prevents the persistence of the inner fact,—or, let us call it, the *law*,—by which it was brought about: the fact, or law, let me repeat, according to which it is the case that, in one mode of its action, it is fraternal rivalry which is the thing that for ever maintains, and in maintaining enhances, the value of the parent; while,

in the counter mode, and at the same time, the value for the parent keeps intensifying the struggle which is the fruit of the rivalry. But still the *modification* which is now received by the law, from the introduction into the rivalry of the affective sentiment—sublimated, as it were, out of the primitive filial attachment,—is that which, I argue, has truly the utterness of importance in it which justifies the assigning of the developmental change thus to a dependence upon it. For the character obtained in this way for the course of progress, henceforth under the human denomination, is this purely hopeful one, that within the very circumstance of the *intensifying* of the fraternal struggle, there has manifestly been obtained a germ of capability for in the end removing out of it all its primitively-inherent bitterness. That is to say, there is engendered the quality never actually possessed by beings of lower order, which has the power of ripening hereafter for the human race into the sentiment of proper Fraternal Love.

I say, *hereafter*; for certainly such sentiment is not to be thought of as existing at the period which let us now turn to, of the patriarchal times;—not, in fact, in any degree of perfectness, as a general result amongst mankind, until a ripe era in Christian times! For the present, therefore, we have to leave it standing in front of us, as only a mark of what has to be reached in future;—while with regard to what *was* in truth the state of patriarchal conditions in this respect, we have a memorable type as to the working of the fraternal jealousies so plainly consequential upon them, in the story that will at once occur to every one of the brethren of Joseph. The moral of that story, instantaneously approving itself as such, is, as we all know, that parents *ought* to have none of the favouritism amongst their children such as *should* stir up, and such as our instinctive apprehension tells us *must* have stirred up, envy of the kind that is portrayed. And this moral, accordingly, I wish to point out, constitutes the story the type for which our purpose needs it. For is it not the fact that we must remember stands

as the very hypothesis to the case, that the father who was such in patriarchal times was the rude being who could not do what he ought to do,—the being who, on the contrary, by the very circumstance of his position in those early stages of progress, neither had, nor could have, the qualities whose presence alone could in the nature of things have sufficed to make him the head of a family whose members *should* be true brothers?—But to make this hypothetical averment clear, let us consider especially this: the case with the Patriarch was, in its peculiarity, that which precisely in itself enhanced its own difficulty. For the very nature of it was, that it rendered the father, who was as yet naturally incapable of being a true father, an even something *more* than a father, in its own aim. The Patriarch was, by the very terms of his condition, a being who, while his actual capabilities were such as little more than sufficed for the fulfilment of immediate corporeal fatherhood, was nevertheless lifted artificially into a position commensurate only with a power of abstract fatherhood, such as we are now aware is beyond the capability of any corporeal beings whatever to possess. The despotic absolutism asserted, we know is an attribute rightly fitted alone to the idea of Deity,—or, in a certain sense, to the idea of abstract Paternity which represents the idea of Deity;—and therefore the incipient mode of human political government which was basing itself upon the supposition that it *could* apply to a concrete individual being, was altogether upon a foundation that would presently need destroying. It is however manifest how there was a necessity for this false assumption:—I mean, in the gradualness with which, as we have seen, the idea of abstract fatherhood appears to have been brought about, involving the stages, at intervals, in its formation, of which it is so obvious that this idea of the Patriarch is a naturally appropriate one. For immediately that the sense as to the “father” became ever so little an abstract sense, it could not be otherwise than that beings not corporeally entitled to it should, as they did, thus crowd into connexion with those that

were, in order to avail themselves of it: the family of the father could not help enlarging itself as it did to include all, as many as ever the abstract idea *could* cover, however such as the concrete idea of the father could *not* cover. And as the consequence of this, the larger the family became, and obviously in increased ratio on account of the intrusive character of the new element, both the stronger in proportion would become the contention already existing amongst the members of it, and thence the greater the importance heaped upon the personage of the individual man, who, for all his concreteness, was compelled by the urgency of the moment, to stand for the hitherto non-existent ideal. The Ideal Being demanded by human nature as the proper fruit of development in its proper season, the immediate needs of lower sort that were being roused hurried into premature development. And hence this victimized "father" was as a god in the making. He was the clay model, in the act of being be-plastered and be-moulded by the dirty hands of his makers, the right use of which, and the right seemly use of which, could be only the employing of it as the means of framing a mould that should hereafter turn out a cleanly foundation for genuine sculpture to proceed upon (—which use is it not *experience* with us now that Nature has made of it?—). Every member of the patriarch's tribe, that became such without being naturally born such, was compelled by his circumstances to render himself correspondingly *more* than naturally submissive to him: which in its turn would spread the like unnatural level to the behaviour of those who *were* the natural members;—and thus, more or less, every one of the tribe *must* have come, as we know they all did, to feel himself indebted for every portion of worldly goods that he possessed, to that sole pleasure of the Head, which by this very means had been fostered into such character. It could only result that he felt likewise that his sole means of securing the tenure, and still more, of obtaining an increase of it, was by unlimited flattery and subserviency to the will of the Autocrat. And what else

could this offering of incense grow into but a regular office, in which the whole body of the fraternity would vie with one another in carrying it to the uttermost!—Let us however observe, how even under these vilifying circumstances was acting one principle,—*the* one principle which is here asserted as indeed the only thing, but still the rightly-needed thing, to serve in the end as the proper rectifier. All along, and as a special result of the coercion afforded by these circumstances, there was going on a growth of *intelligence* in relation to them; and this was manifestly, even in its immediate working, a widening, at all events, of the space required for the necessary affections hereafter to develope themselves in. For is it not obvious that the desire, directed towards the parental fountain of benefit, like all similar desires, must have acted strongly in enforcing the exertion of faculties to remove whatever should in general impede the gratification of the desire? When Joseph's brethren accordingly conspired how they might lay hands upon him to slay him, and how they might delude their father as to what had really occurred to him by the sight of his blood-stained coat of many colours, this showing of theirs how envy became to them indeed an effective source of ingenuity, was, I would say, a filling-up of the type of the case in a part quite as essential as any other. Nay, we need to observe that not even would this element of the type have been utterly wanting, if their resentment had been limited to that rudest sort of all, which might have consisted merely in their falling upon the dreamer as he came near to them, and pushing him straightway over into the pit;—since even here, there would have been an action effected under what was the *ulterior* view of removing him as an obstacle to their own enjoyment of the patriarch's favour; while all that implies such *ulterior* view implies in itself an exercise of abstract reflection. And still more fruitful as a source of ingenuity of deliberate kind, is the case for which we may turn for example to the instance of Jacob's own early history, where it was, as the reverse of the

case of Joseph, the feeble-bodied of the brothers that sought to supplant a merely careless or more generous rival by the sheer force of his mental craft (—though it is true that, as a typical example, the story of the hairy device for the robbing Esau of Jacob's blessing has this inadequacy, that in fact all the intellectual part of the transaction goes to the credit of Jacob's mother, while the selfishness alone rests to the share of Jacob—). But in every case, and whatever the amount of intelligence called forth, the benefit remained still that which the peculiarity of the conditions really prevented from *being* benefit, of the kind that was wanted: namely, of the kind that could come only when the final realization of Fraternal Love should have duly converted the spirit of wrathful contention, into the proper substitute for it of merely amicable emulation. Previously to this event, the nature of the ingenuity awakened amongst brothers could be only of that for-the-time positively un-beneficial character which must arise from its being employed—as, I argue, the necessity of the case enforces its being here employed,—*at the expense of one another*. And this therefore is the state, beyond which I conceive that patriarchal conditions had no means of carrying on the development of the feeling.

How then, it may be asked, is it to be seen that in such conditions lies the entire germ of later religion which I have attributed to it?—seeing that as yet nothing has been said which suffices to account for the taking place of the conversion of the fraternal jealousy into its needed final character: without which occurrence, the religious effect of the matter of the filial sentiment, as a *truly* religious effect, is absolutely *nil*. The fact is, this point, once more, like all similar points that we have been hitherto dealing with, cannot in the nature of it be arrived at, without our working round to it in the not-straight-forward method which I must assert as the law of the case. Here, as ever, the only way of getting at the principle which is to harmonize, is first to make ourselves feel the principle whose

working is in the way of opposition. And hence this is the statement that I would make of the problem. What we are required in the first place thoroughly to comprehend, is this: how it is that these two species of conflict which are our subject—these two modes, dividing the carrying on of the great Struggle of Life, which I have called, namely, the Parental and the Fraternal; and which we have recognized as forming what we must call the two separate systems of oscillations constituting, so to speak, the entire substance of life—are therein essentially at cross purposes with one another;—lie, in fact, athwart one another, exactly as the woof lies athwart the web;—are indeed capable of being interwoven together, as the substance of life implies that they are interwoven together, only because they thus *do* lie opposed to one another:—springing, as thence appears to be so conclusively inferable, on even intrinsic grounds, from sources utterly alien to one another. Till this contrariety, both of working and of nature, be fully understood, nothing at all, I urge, can be made of the principle which shall be seen as having governed the weaving.—Two things, then, I say, are there which may afford us the means of understanding it. One of them is essential to our subject, and therefore is the one that I am going to dwell upon. But, as it would be wrong to do so exclusively, I will begin by previously dismissing the other with just the following hint of allusion, which will show in fact the sole importance the latter *does* possess for our subject; and that is, just that it has for its matter what needs to be expressly seen as *not* belonging to our subject.

The Fraternal conflict has, I would say, a power of being helped to its definition, negative in regard to our subject, thus:—it has a means of ameliorating itself, apart from the amelioration which comes to it through the influence here to be insisted upon of Paternity, that is apart, namely, in this, that it belongs distinctively to the sole region of *worldly* affairs. The state of the patriarchal tribe that we have been imagining, has been, we must remember, that internal state which is

regarded as if free from outward disturbance; but supposing,—as let us now suppose,—that the tranquility should be broken up by the event of war carried on with an alien tribe: would there not immediately occur the effect of that drawing of the brethren into closer companionship, which would so clearly render their mutual friendship a matter thence of self-interest? The more of war with the world outside, the more, I say, as the manifest rule of the case, would the fraternal sentiment within become developed; and the more important, also, would the sentiment become in respect of its proportionate influence compared with that of the filial sentiment. This, I conceive, must in fact have been the proper cause which in due time formed the breaking up of the patriarchal institution, and the leading in of institutions of republican character. For the patriarch first, and afterwards the absolute monarch who takes up his place, belong clearly to the state of things where the *paternal* conflict is supreme: the conflict pertaining also of proper speciality to religion. But every form of government which tends to fraternal equality must, in a correspondingly opposite manner, depend upon the exaltation in relative importance of the *fraternal* conflict. May we not indeed even suppose that it was this which lay at the root of the distinction which forms the actually broadest of all that has ever yet been made in a political way amongst men:—the quality, I mean, which marks the character of the nations known as Semitic, as generally opposed to the Aryan? The peaceful and pastoral constitution which naturally tended to the development of religion, and which accordingly belongs to the *beginning* character of all desirable cultivation whatever for men, while its proper exhibition is, likewise everywhere, the patriarchal mode of government, in remaining, as we find it did, *permanently* fixed as the characteristic constitution of the Semitic races, stands, I would say, as the indication of the causative circumstance, that in them the primary, or *Paternal* conflict was inherently, and to the last, the prevailing one;—while amongst

the Aryans, on the contrary, there has to be recognized the tendency *not* to stop short in that beginning settlement, but to pass onward instead, out of the patriarchal mode, into the more adaptedly-warlike, and generally more active, and especially the more mentally-independent condition of development, which indicates the native tendency in their disposition to the prevalence of the Fraternal conflict. Such an event of actual distribution of circumstance, as this distinction of races would thus represent, seems surely altogether consonant with the natural mode of distribution that we know in general as such. But, at all events, no one will dispute the classification thus asserted as really belonging to the facts of human disposition; neither, with equal certainty, will any one doubt that this admitted classification testifies to the fact of the contrariety in the *elements* of human disposition, which is the point here aimed at as the immediate one to be established. The contrariety is indeed, inherently, nothing different from that which we know habitually, as lying universally between character that has the predominant stamp of Feeling upon it, and that which has the predominant stamp of Intellect. For this is the final generalization needing to be made in the matter. The Parental conflict, as I conceive, is that which characteristically assorts with, and apparently produces, the development of the emotional nature; while the Fraternal is that which mainly gives birth to the development of intelligence. And in this way, therefore, does the true ground of the separation which I am speaking of become, as I hope, sufficiently apparent. This interpretation, put upon the just stated facts of experience, shows perfectly, as I conceive, the reason why the fraternal element of disposition,—in being, as it manifestly is, the one specially appropriate to the political sphere of human affairs, with the right rational, or scientific mode of thought for its guidance,—is thereby effectually set apart from any proper inclusion within our present subject, except in *this* respect, the importance of which it is indeed the point most essential of all

with us to estimate; and that is, except in so far as the fraternal element is, by the nature of things, blended up in its working together with the paternal.

To return then to our due limitation within our proper subject, let us, in order farther to make clear the intrinsic character of the distinction in question,—proved thus to be so necessary to our proper subject,—observe the following:—If the Fraternal contest is thus, as we see, that which receives the modification essential to it out of the sphere of *worldly circumstance*; the Parental we have already seen, with what I consider abundant certainty, as possessing the contrary characteristic of owing *its* modification, of essential sort, specifically to influence which is of necessity to be denominated *spiritual influence*. If fighting with worldly foes is the matter which we need now to recognize as driving men back upon cultivation which is to end in the attainment of the temper of rightful human brotherhood; fighting with the unworldly or spiritual enemy,—which is Death,—is the thing which it is my main point to establish as the means of driving men back upon the cultivation of the filial sentiment, essentially identical in its quality with Religion. This is the ultimate opposition of *result* which I am hoping to succeed at last in making good;—but beyond its exhibition as such, may we not, let us consider, assume that we have already gained even what we may take as the primal discernible *cause* for such opposition, needed in the case? Surely we cannot be mistaken if we satisfy ourselves that such cause really does lie in the express matter that has already been noted in the very definition given of the conflicts! I mean, in the great fact there asserted of the Parental conflict's being that which the individual shares in common with general nature, while the Fraternal is that which the individual has to carry on by the sole force of his own particular energy. For what *could* hence ensue but that there should arrive to the former that effect as to its mode which, I say, when duly estimated, does indeed show to us a true source for the entire difference we have in

question? Is not the following self-evident?—the oscillation which regards the feelings incident to the several states of parentage and childhood, however it occasions to the individual the degree of disturbance to his quietude, with the proportional rousing of his personal energies to subdue the disturbance, without which the conflict asserted as such would not be a conflict, is still that which, except for this minor degree of exertion, requires nothing whatever from the individual beyond this, that he should simply wait until the change naturally inevitable to the oscillation shall have come about, which having come, there will indeed cease even that minor cause for exertion itself, in respect of there being to him no longer any disturbance in it at all to his egotistic content:—the child, which may have been indeed stirred up to some feeble species of re-action against the oppression inflicted upon him by his parent, being now passed on by Nature herself into the position where oppression is no longer a trouble to him, just because carried on henceforth by himself. And this being so, is it not plain that an almost passive endurance, combined with an almost perfect limitation of desire to make the best of actual position, is the sole mental effect likely in the nature of things to arise out of it?—such mental effect being moreover, as no one can fail to perceive, of the manifest character appropriate in regard to Religion.—But the Fraternal conflict is that where in the nature of it no such aid of general sort intervenes. It is, by the very hypothesis of its existence, a pure conflict,—a life-long struggle, in which no sort of victory will in any way arrive which has not been of the individual's own striving for. Passive enjoyment at all indulged in, in regard to the actual ease of the moment, is that which brings on immediately in the case defeat and punishment. If *not* active and combatant, the brother, as such, has a decree of fate over him, altogether irreversible, that by the very fact his prerogative as a brother is taken away from him. And thus therefore appears the final characteristic which I would take as forming the perfectly

sufficing ground of classification respecting the two conflicts: the one, that is, which sets their points of contrast in the strongest possible opposition. The *Parental* conflict, compatible as it is with the indulgence of personal ease (comparatively speaking), and with the cultivation of personal affections which in themselves are express matter of personal enjoyment, we must describe as being that which is carried on through the instrumentation of *the natural allurements of self-gratification*; the *Fraternal* as carried on,—notwithstanding the apparent paradox,—through that of *the allurements of self-sacrifice*. For what there is, as I acknowledge there is, of plainly self-contradictory in these latter terms, forms the matter, of crucial importance to the subject of the present section, which I have now to argue may nevertheless be perfectly explained, and therein justified, when considered under the utterly general principle that I am proposing with regard to it.

It is nothing against the definition, observe, I begin by protesting, according to the universal rule which I am following, that the character of Self-Sacrifice, alleged as the motive principle of the Fraternal conflict, in no way appears in the action of that conflict at the beginning. The sole thing that needs to be considered necessary is that we be able to recognize there, that which shall have the capability of *becoming* Self-Sacrifice in the end. It is indeed obvious, that the covetous and vindictive passions, which are the instruments of the fraternal warfare in question, are in their origin quite as much matter of self-indulgent impulse as the feelings pertaining to the parental affections themselves. But the real distinction that separates the classes is still, if we consider, evident in this: namely, that the impulses of the former kind have it in their express nature to rest upon objects whose bearing is abstracted out of the sphere of immediate self-ism; while the impulses of the parental sort are altogether and purely subjective. This distinction is actually one which, it must be owned, lies upon the surface of even our ordinary language, when it is so familiar as it is with

us to speak, for instance, of the "self-denial" which is exercised, say, by students, in giving up corporeal pleasure for the sake of what nevertheless is to them as instinctive a pursuit of pleasure as the lower sort of gratification would have been. The one thing, however, needing to be remembered, to give the matter its clear and decided import, is this; which is, in fact, implied in the very term of "abstract" just now, by the requisition of the case, employed: I mean, the circumstance of the phenomenal necessity which actually *compels* the instincts so classed to appear to the mind itself as *apart from self*. For the phenomenal necessity, if phenomenal it be, is still, by my principle, that which represents a *true* necessity. And therefore I argue thus: if the designation of "disinterested", as applied thus habitually, under authority of the phenomena, to pursuits of abstract kind generally acknowledged as such, be, as I acknowledge it is, a therein *rightful* designation;—so also, I infer, is there a corresponding rightfulness in employing the same class of designative terms as I am proposing to do: namely, as descriptive of the entire range of feelings in any way whatsoever connected with the following out of objective ends. And this is the making of the classification in question.

For what is it but merely a farther application of the same rule when we go on to say, as we also notoriously do,—by a slight change in the posture of our thought, together with a slight degree of additional abstractness to our thought,—that the so-called "disinterested" study is that which, in being not pursued for *our* sake, is pursued "for the study's own sake"? Thus, however, re-appears the very acknowledgment of *inducement* in the case which, I argue, completes the vindication of my definition. If this be thus justly to be said of study, which is in fact nothing else but fighting of an intellectual sort,—neither is there any thing to make any essential difference as to the propriety of terms, when we also say, as indeed we do also commonly say, that there is a "disinterested" pleasure in corporeal contention, and that this likewise is enjoyed, as it

is notoriously capable of being enjoyed, "for its own sake?" It is, we know, precisely the work proper to civilization to convert the corporeal contention *into* the intellectual; but the conversion in no way prevents that in every stage of the progress, the inherent nature of contention in general remains always the same. And thus, therefore, is made good the claim of the "allurement" which fighting has intrinsically resident within itself, that I have made for it;—while I may farther point, as the reason for such character in it, to the one prevailing law in similar cases which I have all along insisted upon. I mean, the great law, every where ruling, according to which activity is, by the very nature of it, if not actually productive of, yet that which is *tending* to be productive of, pleasure.

This ground-work of definition as to the characteristic difference between the conflicts then being now made out, let us turn to the farther preparation necessary, of examining, with care, what is indeed the case, for application to which we shall presently find this ground-work in requisition.

In connexion with the foregoing result, it must be remembered as the leading assertion in the matter, that the chief and special means of effecting the civilizing change in the nature of contention, is precisely the interaction of the Fraternal with the Parental conflict which is incessantly promoting the more perfect action of both. Let us then bear this in mind, while, doing so, we now fix our attention upon the peculiar stage of the progress which is the one under concern with us: the one, namely, which is coincident with the laying of the basis of Christianity; or, the establishment of the symbolization of Paternity as the counteracting consequence of the previously-instituted symbol of the spiritual principle of Death, embodied, as we have seen, in the myth of the "Fall". And here, as a help to bringing together the points of the case, let me be allowed to repeat the summary that I made at the end of the 2nd section of the present chapter, as to the notional arrangement implied in that story.

It was, that the sense of Death as an inevitable fate, when it first came upon mankind, came as that of a *punishment* inflicted by the Paternal Deity (—that is, of the Deity destined to be in the end a Paternal Deity; seeing that, as lately shown, the paternal character could not be actually realized for Deity till after the realized conception of a Divine Son—); and a punishment that was inflicted on account of attributed human allegiance to the rival Deity, then admitted as such, who was the original cause of Death:—Death also standing, not only as the master-evil which it was in itself, but moreover as the representative in general of the entire mass of human evil. Very well: then in now proceeding, as I am about to do, *upon* this view of the original notion, let it be also borne in mind that my ground is that of entire opposition to it. I regard it as a notion respecting which, at least as to what is important in it, we of this present day have the right to feel ourselves able to pronounce, with exactly the same decision that I have also claimed as to the asserted fact of the “Fall” in human nature, that it rests upon a positive and unmitigable error. We have no longer, I would say, the slightest shade of reason whereby to hold to the original impression. Every reason in nature, I consider, shows us, on the contrary, seek it where we will, that Death did *not* come into the world as a punishment:—did not come so, that is, in actual fact; while, for its being supposed such, there is moreover this strong corroborative testimony as to the truth of the case to be added to the direct testimony, that there is likewise every reason to show how the human mind's incapability in the first instance of true impression in the case, made it but the most natural of effects that it *should* thus have taken up, as is become apparent, with an idea that *could* only serve it just so long as until it should be able to be corrected.—This, then, being the ground now assumed, may we not safely assure ourselves that we have, at all events, this of essential importance, a clear case to go upon? We have, I would assert, a definite purpose laid out, which is that towards which we may

see that the whole working of Christianity bears the sign of being directed. For may we not manifestly state it thus?—A monster error, of most painful consequences, was, at a certain early period of human history, extant in the world, which nothing but the real knowledge of the Divine truth of the case could rectify; and on the other hand, such knowledge was of the nature that could come to men only through a religion that should in this respect be, if not a *true* religion, yet, so far as in some measure to meet this case, an *adequate* religion:—that is, by acknowledgment, it required Christianity. The world,—has it not been the express assertion of Christianity itself which may guide us to the interpretation?—the world lay groaning and travailling under the fancy that it was bound over to the Sentence of Death as being the object of its Maker's displeasure;—while to us, however, who have been in Christ Jesus, and precisely *because* we have been in Christ Jesus, there is no longer any condemnation at all in the matter: neither thought of as existing at present in the Divine Mind, nor known as having existed there ever before in times past. The whole burden of the horrible imagination has been lifted off, once and for ever, from the self-loaded shoulders of the alike pitiable and pitiful human mis-understanding.—And this accordingly, I say,—to take up the statement which has been the beginning one in this paragraph,—is the true office, enforced upon a genuine religion to perform for the world, which, when we have completed our present investigation, I believe we shall find to be in every respect identical with what I am at this moment asserting as the proper fruit of the interaction of primitive principles, now under consideration with us.

The very instant, see, that we suffer the theological formula of words respecting the mediatorial benefit obtained through Christ to give up its moral purport, even of the most immediately obvious sort, we become aware that the *means* which actually served for the removal of the burden attached to the error (as I assert it) was incontestably the special fact I am aiming

towards:—the introduction, namely, into human nature of the God-like Spirit of Self-Sacrifice: that same spirit which, notwithstanding its being so God-like in its proper final development, I am trying to prove, might nevertheless have been so basely human at the beginning, as *was* manifestly the thing which I am taking for the real foundation of it. Let me, however, now continue the course of the explanation which seems to me so clearly to show it as such.

Typically stated, observe, the condition of the human mind while lying under the imagined sentence in question, if it be arranged in the manner that my principle requires, needs to be considered thus:—while, as to the *parental* conflict, it was engaged in the general endeavour to find means of placating the wrath of the Tyrant-Father which held the infliction impending over it; as to the *fraternal*, on the other hand, the matter in which it was occupied was the contrary kind of endeavour, pervading the mass of constituent members of the holders of the condition, which concerned itself as to how each one of them should severally shake off from himself as much as was possible of the suffering incident to the infliction, and should thence, of necessity, fix as much of it as was possible upon others. In what other way than this *could* the condition have stood? This, it seems to me, *must* have been the matter of the contention, which it is needful for us to estimate as the initiatory one amongst the human brotherhood that had the beginning degree of what was genuine spirituality about it. They were all, these human brothers,—just as the first sign of their being human,—fighting amongst one another for *this* purpose: that they might, each one on his own part, persuade the Father whose rod was being held over them,—“It was my brothers that were to blame in the matter; let the punishment fall upon them, and not upon me!”

Is not this feeling, assuredly, that which is natural with beings in a low stage of advancement? Is it not the feeling which, looked upon rightly, is indeed so inevitable that it is in

no way reprehensible, while belonging to those who lawfully occupy such a stage? All the minor evils of worldly life, let us call to mind, had hitherto been removed by them, in so far as they *were* removed, only by this same two-fold process:—ever, on the one hand, the coaxing and flattering of the all-powerful Head of their tribe (human, as he then was); on the other, the putting down, through violence or fraud, of the efforts towards a similar purpose carried out on the part of rival claimants. And this *having* been their heretofore experience, how should they, at first, have supposed that other means were become necessary to them, now in regard to this greater than previous evils, just beginning to be understood by them as residing within the newly and therefore dimly comprehended mystery of Death? At this first beginning of such comprehension, let us reflect,—that is, while as yet they remained, as it is the significant circumstance of the case that they *must* have remained, in a powerlessness of compassing the requisite knowledge respecting Death, which *we* now know is this, that it forms within itself a specifically distinct kind of evil from all other evils, in respect of its being intrinsically *irremovable*, while all others are more or less *removable*:—during this first condition, I say, there lie under record to us traces of what we may under this view, with all appearance of probability, interpret as this so natural consequence: namely, that there had been, in positive action, the savage effort on the part of individuals to possess themselves of the lives—the vital properties,—of fellows, by the crude means of the supposed imbibing of them through actual cannibalism:—a species of effort, indeed, which, as acting in the slightly less barbarous manner of charms and witchcraft, can scarcely be said to have quite ceased even at our own day! Nay, in order to realize to ourselves the probability and naturalness of even this utter grossness of fraternal self-ism, let us school our fancy thus:—let us imagine for a moment that it should now, upon the spot, be discovered amongst us that in very truth Death is capable of

being removed through the passing it off upon a fellow-being:—let us find out this, I say, and how many of us will be found who will not instantly throw all their energies into the struggle to be for themselves the favoured ones, who, by thus compelling others to die for them, can escape the need of dying themselves! For, if this seem an aspersion upon the prevailing character of living beings, let it be remembered, that in this case the eager selfishness that must, at all events, be attributed to some amongst us, would render the exercise of strife upon the matter, for those even who were *not* eagerly selfish, a matter of self-preservation:—and few indeed are there certainly of us, to whom the forbearance of carrying out *this* instinct,—in the absence, observe, of any personally-affective stimulus, (for this is a necessary condition to our supposition,)—would not appear a demand that nothing less than an ideal Christ could be expected to fulfil!—If this, then, *be* the case, all objectionableness in the present statement vanishes;—while the manner of the amelioration argued as having arrived to the original mode of the contest, also becomes perfectly intelligible: seeing that the apparently contradictory course here alleged, is plainly that which the gradualness ever necessary to natural improvement involved as what could not be prevented. Since to suppose that any melioration whatever, introduced into the original savageness of human contention, could actually abrogate totally the inherent quality which depends upon the fact of the egoism that alone makes the individual an individual, would be a manifest absurdity, the only thing remaining for us to look at is the ordinary course of improvement carried on in its ordinary manner; and therefore our finding that the beginning effect of this is, under its leading aspect, the apparent *deepening* of the evil quality which I am pointing out, still shows nothing which, by my principle, does not form the perfectly consistent circumstance of the case. When, accordingly, it came to pass, as it must in time have done, that the recognition of the unavailingness of the struggle that we have been

imagining, had succeeded in putting an end to such sort of struggle; and when thence, as the consequence natural upon the cessation of such utterly gross occupation of men's endeavour there had become engendered a comparatively spiritual endeavour to occupy them in its place: still we have no need to be surprised at what in itself moreover is so intelligible as this, that even in accompanying the evident *benefit* that this change in the mode of the struggle implies, there was the result *contrary* to present benefit contained in the fact, that the circumstance of the new warfare's having become a *spiritual* warfare involved its being a warfare that was intensified as such. Let us, however, in order to balance our judgment as to the general value of the change, consider this, which I think settles at once both the fact and the reason for the fact of the general *gain* of it:—the very circumstance of Death's becoming estimated at this juncture in the light that it did of a *punishment*, with whatever falseness, is in truth the express irruption, so to speak, upon the crass solidity, or inorganism, characterizing the moral, or rather pre-moral savage nature that was carried so far forward as even into patriarchal times, which we cannot but see is the very means that alone *could* have prepared the mollification which the savageness required. For surely it is plain, that the taking of the will of any one man, as that of the Patriarch was by constitution taken, for the sole law, or standard of practical action, to the community, was, as long as that constitution remained intact, the making impossible of any *inner* sense of right. The very essence of the constitution was, the understood acknowledgment that punishment—or, the thing which serves as a controlling influence upon conduct,—was the pure matter depending upon *external favour*. And therefore can we miss seeing how the now-arriving estimation in regard to Death must have acted as the needed correction upon this coarse understanding! Essentially was the fear of Death that which,—spiritual fear, as I call it,—no one will, at all events, deny to have come

from its very beginning into the world as an *inward* feeling. It had the entire difference in it from the feeling which the outward patriarchal control awakened, which, I allege, was the source of the separation of idea, now in the act of coming into force, between the Patriarch and the dimly-discerned Being who, while of the same sort as the Patriarch, should yet be immensely different from him. All *worldly* benefit, and obviation of evil, it had been found, the Patriarch, on being placated, both could and would bestow; but here was an evil, that while on the one hand the Patriarch *could* not remove it, the Autocrat, whoever he was, of *spiritual* fate, notwithstanding that,—as they naturally assumed,—he could remove it, *if* he would, nevertheless had made manifest to them that he actually *would* not remove it. This, accordingly, was what constituted the defining to them of what spiritual fate *was*, as distinguished from every other kind of fate. It was that which had been found to be essentially *incapable of being affected by external favour that should be obtained in the same way that external favour had been hitherto obtained*; at the very same time that the intensified character constantly growing to the spiritual pain was that which made the hitherto experienced means of alleviation seem more than ever called for. For the express personality of the fear of Death could not but cause immediate application of the mythic notion embodying the fear to be made thus:—"If I am compelled to die, as I see that I am compelled, it is because the spiritual Autocrat is displeased with *me*,—with *me*, who as yet see no means whatever of diverting such displeasure!"—And here, therefore, I conceive, is the occasion upon which the beginning working of properly moral considerations is what now inevitably *must* have taken place.

In the previous section occupied with the examination of the notion of the "Fall", we made so much way with our subject as just to mark out, in a preliminary manner, how the adaptedness to actual feeling of the arrangement which threw all the *blame*, suspected as the source of the attributed punish-

ment in the matter, upon ancestors, in place of self, was that which gave the notion footing. But the point we are now come to, is obviously that where we have found that we must pursue that first position,—on the one hand, forwards, to see how the mental state which, for all the degree of satisfaction gained, was still that of enduring the actual pain of the matter, (which the theoretic casting off of blame had so slight a power, if any, of relieving,) hence compelled the constant working of the mind in the mode of self-debate respecting it, and thus led onward to the future development of the started religious notion;—on the other hand, into the *deeper* source of the matter which concerns the rise of the very idea of *blame*: obviously the key-note to the whole subject of moral feeling. We have come to what I consider is the actual starting, for human thinking, of the problem which, as no one will dispute that it has served for the occupation of our moral faculties ever since, so, I now say, was, in this its necessitated origin, the veritable cause of our ever having any moral faculties:—the problem, namely, arising out of the comparison enforced upon the human mind between condition and what it comes to know as “desert”. Let me therefore continue to make out what is now my object to maintain, as to how this idea of “desert”,—altogether an anachronism if conceived as already existing at the time in question with us,—was really the inevitable fruit of the fraternal contest arrived at the stage when the spiritual or inward considerations now being examined began to operate upon it. For, let me remind the reader, the fathers or ancestors upon whom it was the effect of the beginning religious formation to throw the whole burden of spiritual blame, are essentially the *brothers*, in a religious sense, with whom the *fraternal* contest, so far as it has any relation to our present subject, is in a special manner concerned. And for this reason is it, we may remark, that there has come to be such unanimity of feeling as there has, in taking for the natural expression of the sentiment of the believer in the mythic story, the notorious saying

as to the "sour grapes" which, "the fathers" having eaten, had "set the children's teeth on edge": the interest of *self*, on the part of the adopter of the proverb, lying, as matter of course, with the latter of the parties concerned. In this phrase, I would say, we may take as embodied, the spirit which constitutes the very essence of egotistic impiety, belonging to all ages, and found all the world over! It is *the* spirit which, I maintain, it is the express thing that religion, whenever and in so far as it is *true* religion, has the mission to cure; but which, I also maintain, religion can cure *only* through the means I am now investigating. That is to say, the only remedy which nature has provided for the meliorating of the mischievously over-egotistic temper at the root of the impiety, is the manifestly effectual remedy of the institution of the moral sense known by us now under the term of *Conscience*,—though a thing of which Hebrews and Heathens and pre-Christians generally, had and have, as I conceive, no distinct perception whatever.

To make out clearly, however, that this deficiency is an actual fact, and of the kind that I am now stating it, let me here avail myself of the illustration, than which obviously nothing could be more peculiarly appropriate to the point, of the book of Job: in which we have, by universal acknowledgment, one of the most elevated, if not *the* most elevated, of all the expressions of early moral feeling remaining to us. The purport of the poem is expressly the dealing with the matter, the *mode* of the dealing with which, by my argument, is the proper sign of the existing, or not existing, of the moral quality within the mind of the dealer, which I assert is the only means of dealing with the matter rightfully. To make the truth of this assertion of guiding principle, however, evident, let me, before we take up the poem, dwell upon it for a moment, in order to show a little farther than I have done, how the nature of the circumstance requiring to be regarded as affecting morality, was really such as I have described it. — The enforced comparison

between condition and "desert" which I conceive was the proper *cause* of moral growth, has, I would say, its primitive ineffectualness as such quite explained if we consider,—in the not-quite but nearly circular way which is necessary in the case,—that the original want of understanding of the meaning of "desert", was occasioned thus: namely, from the fact that at first the comparison was in truth nothing more than the simple one between what self desired and what self possessed, only just so far advanced out of its simplicity as that there was a recognition, barely such, of fellow-beings as the cause of there being a case for comparison. Passing, however, beyond this utter beginning of the matter,—if, in order to judge of the effectualness of the comparison in general, we consider the character of it at its opposite extreme, we shall find, I urge, the following inference meeting us, to guide us sufficiently as to what is every where the nature of deficiency in regard to it, wherever and in whatever degree such deficiency exists:—Whereas in the state of high moral cultivation under which there is presumably the means of deriving out of the comparison its *proper* result, the balance respecting it is that in which the mind making it attributes the greatest of possible weight to the sense of personal absence of merit, and the least of possible weight to the deprivations which form the personal grievance (these being, if primarily those of circumstance, yet in by far the more prevallying practical mode those which are dependent upon inter-relation with fellow-beings): thus showing that the mind engaged is indeed that which is disposed in the surest way to hold its egoism from being any impediment to its making the balance the equitable one that it ought to be;—in the low beginning of morality, we cannot but recognize that exactly the contrary, as natural to the egregious over-importance then possessed by the egoism, must have taken place. That is, there must have been the strongest possible aim to exaggerate personal claim, combined with the greatest degree of greediness in regard to the good made the object of the claim,

without there being the smallest restraint upon it of the kind that ought to have been; namely, of reluctance to commit the injustice of virtually cutting off others from upholding similar claim: making obviously the egoism of the comparing mind the most stringent of obstacles to equitable comparison. And thus accordingly, I would say, does the lack of rectitude of moral judgment, wherever existing, show itself to depend always upon this same fact, of whether the recognition of fellow-beings in the case be a *due* recognition.—Very well, then: resting upon this as affording us really the true character of the deficiency we are inquiring into, let us proceed to the examining of our illustration.

It is incontestable that the entire bearing of this venerable discussion upon the ever-pending enigma of Providential inequality in the world, does in fact testify, at all events, to the then reigning existence of the precise hypothesis which it has been here *my* object to show as a defective one, quite as much as it was the object of Job:—the hypothesis, namely, as to the *outward* nature of retribution which, I argue here, forms the erroneous assumption, naturally based upon the undue egoism pertaining to primitive human nature, which it is the express function of Conscience, as soon as it comes to be instituted within human nature, to supersede. My purpose with the poem is therefore this:—just to see if the writer of it, by his management, shows that he himself had entered, or how far, upon the recognition; because, if not, I infer that we may see in that very respect, how the failure in the poem, manifest in modern apprehension, to do effective justice to the question that occupies it, is an exhibition of precisely the *need* of a due moral sense in the matter, which is the thing that I am endeavouring to demonstrate.—The whole plan of the discussion which makes the argument of the book, observe, turns entirely upon two questions which are both of them utterly outside of what we *must* think of as inner questioning. The first matter discussed is, whether Job, in being afflicted as he was in body and

goods by the hand of the Lord, was thereby proved (as by the original hypothesis, taken for granted by Eliphaz and Bildad and Zophar, he *was* proved,) of being the convicted object of the wrath of the Lord: debated between Job and his accusers;—the second is the question, whether, Job being exonerated from such accusation of having incurred Divine displeasure, the Lord had any right so to treat him: debated with the Almighty himself. Hence, as to the first branch of discussion, the point which Job makes good against his accusers is solely that of his own unshaken assertion regarding himself. He exclaims, and with a degree of nobleness that nothing of its kind (that is, nothing in the way of a merely dignified self-confidence,) can surpass, “God forbid that I should justify you: till I die I will not remove mine integrity from me” (xxvii. 5):—although, take notice, in conjunction with this he goes on to make the protest, respecting which let me ask, which one of ourselves is there that would not morally shrink from *wishing* to possess the sort of mind that could join with him in making it?—“My heart”, he says, “shall not reproach me so long as I live!”—Now it is true that Job is made by the writer to undergo reproof for his self-assertion in the later debate; but on what ground?—for it is *here* that the matter of our moral criticism lies concentrated. I say that enlightened morality requires us to recognize that the blame really incurred by Job, was that which was involved in his virtual assumption of being, in his own person, the one human individual who, amongst all others, had at all events the certain right of being excluded from consideration as the cause of drawing down misery in general:—seeing that, in making his protest against the charge of his accusers, it is conspicuous that, in defending himself from the effect of their hypothesis, he does *not* deny the hypothesis in itself. He makes his defence, that is, of the purely personal and egotistic sort respecting which it is the office of proper morality to show us that it is *no* defence. But instead of resting the blame laid upon him on this ground, the cause for it which the writer makes

out,—quite irrelevant to the point, I should say,—is as if Job had drawn it forth by making offensive comparison, not between himself and fellow-beings, but between himself and Jehovah! “Surely,” says Elihu, “thou hast spoken in my hearing, saying, I am clean without transgression. Behold, in this thou art not just: I will answer thee, that God is greater than man.” (xxxiii. 8—12.) And in the same spirit is made out the whole of the vindication of the Divine proceedings, forming the winding up of the matter. Because Jehovah is wiser, purer, and especially more mighty than Job, therefore it was wrong in Job to question His decrees:—whereas, in *our* view, nothing whatever can possibly be so right, and so in every way improving and beneficial to us *as* to question—in the sense of inquiring about—His decrees! And as to Job’s manner of questioning, surely, under the first debate (however the writer seems to have changed his intention when he came to the second,) it *was* intended to be of the right sort. For where has there ever in the world been given forth an utterance of the deepest and truest spirit of perfect religious confidence that can go beyond the following, attributed to Job in that first debate:—“Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him!”—which expression, taken, observe, in connexion with the immediately succeeding one, that apparently forms the matter of accusation taken hold of in the second debate, surely proves that the writer did *not* intend the offensive comparison with the object of his trust that he subsequently bethinks himself of to charge Job with. When, in the latter part of the verse (xiii. 15,) Job adds, “but I will maintain mine own ways before Him”, I think it is evident he was only speaking, as in the other phrase I have cited, of his *general integrity as a human being* as the thing that neither God any more than man could justly find wanting in him;—and yet Elihu answers this as if Job had been placing himself upon a par with God. The very assumption of the writer in the first part was that Job *was* truly a man of perfect human integrity.—And, therefore, the inference that I make as to

the defectiveness of the writer's view settles itself into this:—his want of keeping in his argument, and his altogether external sort of religion testified by the appeal to *power* made by Elihu, are both of them the consequence, and necessarily so, of the want of right distinction as to how far the Providential inequality complained of, is indeed that which human inquisition may naturally tend to the remedying of, and how far it may not. This,—the power, I mean, of remedying,—is obviously that which in itself solely justifies human inquisition. And I am maintaining, that cultivated morality *has* shown its power of such remedy within certain limits: while those limits, when fixed, are accordingly the true determining of what it is that man has to deal with as “man amongst fellow-men”, and what he has to deal with in the contrary way of “man in the presence of God.”

How much, do we then ask ourselves, may we assume that we do indeed know, under our present power of estimation, as to those limits? Clearly only thus much, that there *are* such limits. Where the true limitation lies, is exactly what morality, in regulating human powers, has to find out. But that there is limitation, the very existence of the ever-pending enigma we are contemplating is itself the evidence. That there is Providential inequality in the lots of men,—distribution of human lot which has *not* respect to the sort of balance between condition and desert which we are more and more learning to understand as a *just* balance,—is a fact no one can doubt about. The only question is, how much of the inequality observable to us is Providential. What is such,—whatever, I should say, actually stands to us *as* such,—that, but that alone, is rightly matter to us of solely religious trust: of the implicit trust expressed by Job. For in truth it is of the very same nature with the fact of Death. *Death* and a *certain degree of inequality of condition* are the two things that human beings—and in common with universal beings known as living beings,—cannot be without:—nay, that we have only to point to the

universal effects of motion and rest, to the varied distribution of land and water, mountain and plain, and the capricious swell of winds and waves, to show that nothing whatever in nature is absolutely without. And hence do I find it now the very essence needful to my scheme to add this present recognition to my former one. As the knowledge of Death as an inevitable evil appears to me the ultimate cause of Religion, so, I allege, is the attained parting off of what is inevitable with regard to Circumstantial Inequality the ultimate cause of Morality.

But has it not struck you how entirely the criticism I have just been exercising upon what I call Job's want of Morality, is a close following out of the ordinary orthodox criticism, which shows it as want of Christianity? Christianity, you are aware, is what I am *asserting* as incipient Morality; and here is the apt check, confirming my assertion. What is the condition seen to be indispensable for the partaking of the theological benefit attributed to Christianity, but that the candidate for it admit that he, in common with the entire race of human beings, is included under just liability to the charge of offensiveness in the eyes of Deity, which we have seen that Job repudiated? Without acknowledgment of universal Sin, the idea of universal Grace is an absurdity without meaning. And the only difference that I have to make in my own version of the same idea is this, that what theologians call under the one name of Sin, without making discrimination as to ability or not to do otherwise, I, with regard to cases like that of Job, where ability was wanting, would call merely *short-coming*. The generalization respecting the entirety of human beings which Christianity realized for the world, not having in Job's time arrived into the world, I find gave a sufficing veniality to the degree of egotistic presumption put into his mouth, which would *not* be pardonable under the moral influence of the abstract estimation attained in our post-Christian times. The point of the rebuke attributed to Elihu in our day should be one which, instead of being directed, as it actually is, against

Job's impiety, should enlighten him in this way: it should show him that if he could, and would, take his own case no longer personally, but all-in-all blended up together with that of human beings in general, he would find, though not an absolute justice in the case, yet a justice so much nearer to perfection than what he at present saw, that he would feel his faith authorized in relying upon it:—which indeed does, it is true, amount to the same thing as saying that his piety would hence receive its needed augmentation; since the more it was discriminating, the more, certainly, would it be also the purer.

For this comes as the result of the comparison thus made of our own state of mind in relation to the subject, with that proper to the past,—that we are now by means of it enabled, as nothing else would enable us, to understand both the general difficulty of the case, and the peculiar beginning difficulty of it. The enigma of Providential inequality exists, as we have seen, permanently in the world, to be for ever the subject in waiting for man to exercise his moral powers upon; while on the other hand, upon the degree of adequacy to which he arrives in his solution of it, depends the degree of religious harmony in which he will rest with regard to the Ordainer of the inequality:—this is the general view (leaving out, let it not be forgotten, all that main division of considerations, pertaining to the fraternal conflict in its properly worldly light, which remains outside of our subject). And for the particular beginning state of the case we have found, that the false light resulting from the incompetence of the existing kind of intelligence to deal with the problem sufficiently, owes its falsity to the ground that has been arranged thus: first, the impression falsely taken as to the *outward manner* attributed to providential inflictions on account of natural short-comings; secondly, the impression which proceeded from the spirit of *egotistic resistance* to believe that there was actually an inward cause residing in Self, that might justly call for the infliction of *some* kind of natural punishment.—Now, in *our* view of Providence, contrasting

with this false primitive view, punishment, by general consent of enlightened moralists, is intrinsically nothing else whatever than the natural counteraction to human misdeeds, consequent upon human imperfection, which results in effecting a degree of growth out of those imperfections (—corresponding with the figurative rendering of the same idea, that it is just the kind and degree of punishment which under a Paternal Director serves for carrying on duly the education of the human race—): and being such, it is of necessity both *inward* and *inescapably personal*. For inward infliction of punishment, the instant that it is inward, cannot by possibility be mistaken, by the thought that recognizes it, as being that which can only be suffered by the identical being that incurs the liability to it. But it may very well happen,—nay, it *must* happen,—that the thought which has not made such recognition, but that remains so rude as that the idea of outwardly-inflicted punishment still satisfies it, must be at the same time incapable of seeing any intrinsic reason why it should not be transferrable. Outward punishment, being merely the matter of arbitrary resentment, while as such it deals only with committed *actions*, that we have no need to count as part of *ourselves*, does *not* approach to touch the individuality which the inward punishment of Conscience specially and properly does affect. And therefore to those early beings who knew only the former mode of punishment, no such necessity of intrinsic intransferrableness *could*, in the nature of it, be appreciable: *except*,—for this is the notable point in the case,—*except* just in so far as the experience forced upon them by nature in regard to Death drove them *towards* the appreciation. Death, by this time, we have seen, they had come to know positively as what was *not* transferrable;—and yet Death hitherto still remained known to them only in its primitive light of a punishment:—here, I say, is visible the means through which the better knowledge as to the nature of punishment was finally to be wrought out! At present, however, is it not evident how the existence of this

fundamental contradiction within their ideas, utterly uncomprehended as it was, must have been a perpetual matter of cogitative action to them?—and the more, because of the farther sort of confusion which was at the same time resulting from the uncertain boundary which I am now urging between the inevitableness belonging to Death as a manifestly sheer inevitableness, and that latent inevitableness, quite as yet undistinguishable, which belonged to the mass of minor human evils. The fact is, that it is only through our painting of minor evils *as a mass*, when we do so paint them, that their inevitableness *does* show itself in the similitude with that of Death that it ought to do: the particular sorting out of them, in the way that it is proper to moral science continuously more and more to sort them, is only a making out of the peculiar *degrees* of removableness that, altogether apart from the character of the general evil of Death, separates their character individually amongst themselves. Still, it is so clear that the secondary sorting is essentially of the same nature as the primary, that, remembering how the secondary sorting *is* moral science, it is surely thence evident how it may rightly be represented that this latter is the very operation towards which the stirred-up cogitative action was, even previously to moral science, already tending:—although it is true that, here again, the paradox as to which is really to be counted the primary or the secondary in the matter, does and must occur to baffle us for a moment by the temporary obscurity it raises. Since moral evils, in the natural course of things, could not but be considered severally, before they could come to be considered in mass, it would in a simple narration of such course be the true order to state the individual operation as prior to the general. But a simple narrative is a different thing from an explanation; and so also is individual consideration not the same as science. To turn individual consideration *into* science, a rational generalization is required; and hence with the obtaining of the latter, true science, *as science*, only first begins. For this reason, therefore,

was it, I urge, that pre-Christian morality was the thing that had the utter want of true requisite for morality that it had. The human mind, working its way onwards towards the power of taking the generalized view of the all-in-all blended condition of human beings, which without the Christian generalization, or one of similar purport, it could not take, had as yet no conscious interpretation to itself, to explain the meaning of the practical moral efforts that human *conduct* was nevertheless all the time instinctively carrying on. That is, men were *being* moral, long before they *knew* of it. At least, they only knew their own goodness in the way that Job did: they were able to assert it, without having proof to give of it.

Let me, however, take up the thread, that I have dropped as to the *manner* in which the cogitative action proceeded. The following is the inference that I draw out respecting it:—Since moral evils, considered severally, by pre-scientific men, had to them this aspect, that, while plainly removable for the most part, they could not help thence appearing, so far as there was absence of any hitherto showing of experience to the contrary, presumably *universally* such,—this, I say, could not but cause in the minds of the original speculators the idea that in Death itself, being the punishment that it was, there must be in the spiritual part of the punishment, notwithstanding the conviction wrought out as to its corporeal part, still by the nature of it an actual community with all that they had known respecting judicial suffering in their habitual worldly experience of it: and that is, as we have seen, that it was capable of being obviated through the ordinary and natural means of filial flattery and brotherly contention. Here then we come back to our proper ground. We see how there was thus engendered (—to paint the normal condition, as we may, most forcibly, by showing the abuses to which it was liable,—) the constant tendency, on the one hand, towards the *impiety* which would, if it dared, murmur against the Maker in language such as this:—I am a better man than my neighbours,

and yet I know that if I do not pay sufficient bribe I am likely to be treated now, in this matter of spiritual punishment, as of all other kinds of punishment, worse than they are treated:—and on the other hand, there was the greater urgency of *fraternal jealousy* made now to pervade the constant fraternal struggle, to which the depth of the motive gave its own virulence. (—For, if it be here thought of as an objection,—as it may naturally,—that this supposition of escaping suffering by throwing it upon others, implies the assumption that there was a certain amount of suffering that was fixed to be undergone: I answer that this assumption was one which, even previously to all philosophy, *must* have formed part of the character of the Divine Abstraction, whose abstracting had been gained through the sign of his implacable wrathfulness suspected as manifested in the fact of Death.—) These two modes of intrinsically wrong feeling then being in action, is it not however clear that in the nature of the case very much the greater stress,—nay, almost the *sole* stress,—must have been in the beginning laid upon the latter of them?—for this reason. However the individual might have set himself to the endeavour to gain his end by the placating of the Divine wrath in the matter, we know that he must have failed of obtaining result. Not any sign can have come to him to tell him that the Divine Being was so well-disposed to him on account of his homage, as that either ordinary human evils should manifestly be averted from him, or that he should obtain positive assurance that spiritual evil, such as he dreaded, should be in future averted from him. And therefore the result must have been to fall back where at least some degree of ostensible benefit was obtainable: namely, in the fighting of the matter out with fellow human beings.

This, then, let us take as the making out of the case that a little while ago, (at p. 326,) I said was the preparing of the matter for which the principle there set forth was in requisition: the principle, namely, as to the inherent mode of working pertaining to the fraternal struggle. Let us now, therefore, take

up that principle, and the task before us is the following:—we have now, that is, to go on to consider what will be the aspect of the struggle, under its now described spiritual phase, regarded as carried on in accordance with what I have called the peculiar root, or inherent source, of the fraternal conflict, which I have defined as “*the allurements of self-sacrifice.*”

With this principle for a basis, I urge there is no paradox at all, however paradoxical it may at first sight appear, in what I am now going to adduce as really affording a natural explanation that may suffice us, in regard to the great matter of Christianity at present our subject. Vicarious Suffering, we have seen, is a thing essentially demanded by Nature *somewhere*. It is a fact laid down in the very constitution of things that, out of the entire number of human beings, *some* there must be to whom there is no possibility of escaping the fate to encounter evil that is on behalf of *others*. And this being so, why should we find a difficulty in recognizing that the very same quality that in all inferior cases has grown out of the presence of similar emergency,—namely, that which induces the resolute facing of the difficulty that cannot be fled from,—must here of necessity both have sprung forth, and have tended to similar result? If Courage, which is the noblest of active qualities that we have, has manifestly in lower cases of physical danger developed itself out of the Cowardice which is the basest, so as to give that very character vaguely esteemed, as we have seen, as an even “disinterested” love of the encountering of the danger “for its own sake”,—why, I now ask, may we not feel it natural that Spiritual Courage, the noblest kind of that noblest quality, may have had corresponding derivation: provided—for here is the limitation that the frustrating character proper to all connected with Religion again enforces upon us,—provided we make the due allowance which the variation in the matter calls for? I do not say, observe, that I conceive it possible that the human feeling which in the

beginning was the desire to make others suffer for self, was that which could so perfectly reverse itself as to become the desire to suffer for them:—for this is a supposition which the egoism indispensable to the individuality of human beings puts out of the question. I merely assert that it must, in simple accordance with the general law of things, *tend towards* such reversal. And in both of these facts, that of the tendency, and that of the stoppage to the tendency, when they are combined, do I find,—as let me now show,—that which I consider accounts for the hitherto religious theory of the case.

To understand what Courage is, in whichever department it lie, physical or spiritual, we need to look at it in its very lowest appearance in the animal nature: that is, much below the existence of man. And here I think it must be owned,—in proof of my assertion that Courage properly springs out of the very extremity of Fear,—that, notwithstanding Courage's being the essentially masculine quality it is, the truest exhibition of its presence in the brutish nature, perhaps the *only* true exhibition, is the feminine case of the mother brute defending her young. And if this be so, we have exactly the manner of the production of the quality which I am theorizing for. The lion or wolf that, conscious of his own capability of successful contention, takes a pleasure in the "fighting for its own sake," which I have assigned as the indication of the purely fraternal element, cannot be thought of by us as therein properly showing Courage. To the raising of the former into this character, we all feel there is required to be present some motive of the uncontentious or affective sort,—which by my theory is a beginning crossing of the fraternal conflict by the parental,—necessary to give it its due development. And hence the estimation as to true bravery, in opposition to merely brutish bravery, which we accord to the behaviour of the brute mother. While actually engaged in nursing her young, there is indeed the necessity in the case, in the first instance, which, seeing that she *cannot* fly from attack made upon her, causes it to be

her *only* resource that she attack in turn; and therefore so far there is no proper Courage in question. But when the growth of the young has so far advanced, as that physically she might leave them if she would, though affectively she is still unable to do so, the degree of what we must count as voluntariness has commenced, which at once exalts the merely re-actionary movement of self-defence into the genuine character required. Here therefore is the indication that we have to follow throughout. The manner of the rising of Courage out of its lowest mode into its highest, is always dependent upon the nature of the inducing motive to its exercise: the elevation to which it in any case attains, being always such in proportion as that motive—never an absolutely selfish motive, since if it *be* so, the quality is *not* Courage,—becomes farther and farther removed from absolute selfishness, though also in the nature of things prevented from being ever absolutely removed from selfishness: this latter extreme being that which as much implies a super-human, or Divine character in its possession, as pure spirit of contention implies the sub-human. And this certain character in the extreme cases helps us towards the assortment which forms our present point in relation to the midway distinction: namely, the characteristic which really separates Courage of the Spiritual sort from the Physical. In the first place, it is evident that the increasing abstractness asserted for the needed affective element in the case, shows the requisite gradualness in the coming on of the spiritual character:—there is no unnaturalness in attributing even to the most savage of human beings a willingness to encounter even the agony of spiritual terror itself, when this should be called for on behalf of fellow-beings occupying the closest of domestic relations to self:—and so on, advancing perpetually in its quality, it is perfectly conceivable how the more generous nature constantly arriving to it would show itself in the being willing to die, and to suffer generally, more and more on behalf of beings less closely and personally associated with self. But still there occurs here, as

ever in similar cases, the need dwelt upon in the last section, of the coming on of a *crisis* in the accumulation of improvement. There inevitably comes on, as the proper necessity constant every where in human intelligence, the period where accumulative effects have brought on the preparation for receiving a character hitherto foreign to them, which the instant it is received, and of necessity with special suddenness of reception, converts the particularized improvement into that which is oppositely *general*. And here, accordingly, comes the mode of special alteration to Courage thus:—All at once, when the power of extending generosity to associated beings had gone as far as it could go, the conception as to the *totality* of human beings which otherwise was coming on in the intellectual department of human nature, (therein foreign to the emotive,) could not help darting into collision with it, and therein creating image as to the at-all-events-conceivability, of generosity of the extreme and utterly impersonal kind which would convey willingness to die on behalf of any and of every body;—while this image, being as it was in the nature of things prevented from being realized by human egoism, would thence of necessity be restricted to being a merely ideal or religious image.

When it happens, as I am not in the least denying that it does happen, that the most noble kind of men show that they *are* able to die, not only for fellow-beings, but even for the purely impersonal matter of abstract Truth,—observe that I consider even this to be a case where personally emotive feeling is still *not* wanting, so as to take it out of the range of what I am required by this theory to admit as possible. For such instances of self-sacrifice to the degree of martyrdom, are always found to be the effect of the high enthusiasm which I take to represent precisely the final character which the crisis now in question brings with it, or at all events is naturally preparatory to. By that crisis, the Courage which would only act under physical inducement towards *particular* beings, is suddenly converted into Courage that can act upon *general* inducement;—

which however, in consequence of the frustration naturally (or Divinely) imposed upon human nature, is at that point truncated, as to man's power of fulfilling it, into the Religious Ideal whose character is thence, observe, itself also restricted as such by the implication of the case thus:—it forms, namely, that which, in standing ever before him as a thing to be admired, *may* indeed, under occurrence of momentary exaltation such as actually possesses the religious character, be even partially realized by him; while still it remains none the less a thing that can never be *wholly* realized, and in the habitual temper of life not at all realized, but *only* held as an Ideal.—And is not this an effect, I would ask, as manifestly true in the case of us who have stripped our Ideal of its originally concrete embodiment, as it was true to those who could never think of Vicarious Satisfaction *otherwise* than as afforded by the theological representation of it?

The god-like, and not human, character represented by Christianity as residing within Christ, let us reflect, was this: that one individual man undertook in his own person to suffer the entire amount of spiritual evil, as such, that required to befall the entire number of men. Very well: then I would assert of this representation, that the only way in which it differed from the natural fulfilling of the actual demand of the case, was, as hitherto, the mode of miraculous exaggeration given to it, which by us may so innocuously be separated from it. It is the natural demand of the case, that each several man out of the number of men should have a brother-man willing to take upon his own shoulders the burden that each several man ought to carry; and *some* out of the number of men *do* occasionally, and in a measure, find such substitute; and therefore the miraculous satisfaction devised to meet the general need, is miraculous,—that is to say, naturally impossible,—*not* because the satisfaction is of a wrong kind, but solely because the quality and amount of it is exaggerated beyond the power of human fulfilment. (—"Scarcely for a

righteous man will one die!"—) So, the effect of culture which we have been contemplating as leading onward the savage disposition out of its primitive state of spiritual cowardice into a state of partial spiritual courage, if deprived of its minuteness of gradual attainment, would be in like manner miraculous: as, suppose that we should imagine the absurdity of a savage man saying, as the effect of sudden deliberation, "Because my brother will not suffer for me, therefore I will face the difficulty, and forthwith conquer the difficulty by suffering mortally for him." But the special fact of the case is, that the very imagining of miraculous effect, which religious imagery is, constitutes the realizing of un-miraculous, or natural effect! And the illustration—the demonstrative illustration,—of this lies in the constant efforts towards this sort of moral idealization, that history shows us *have* in fact proved themselves quite upon a par, in point of frequency and degree of success, with the beginning efforts at intellectually dogmatic idealization. The primitive Saviours which sprang up under names such as those of Hercules, Osiris, or Prometheus, are, I conceive, to be regarded as frustrated attempts of the very same sort, and frustrated for the very same reason, as those we have lately been considering as aimed towards the forming of a true theory of Deity:—these Grecian efforts for the obtaining of a sufficing Mediator being the proper counterpart to the Hebrew effort to obtain a sufficing Trinity. For, I argue, the exact cause of failure in the latter case, was in action to the Grecians in the present case. The Grecian heroes, namely, were as much too local in their sphere, and too concrete in their object of mediation, really to fulfil the work of Mediation, as the Hebrew Messiah was in like manner too limited to fulfil the character of the true Son of the Father, which should indeed have served to make the Son a Divine Son, and the Father a true Father;—and for source of the injurious localism and concreteness in the present moral ground, corresponding with the source of intellectual failure, there is still here the

identical matter of the spirit of exclusiveness, shown by the Grecians in *their* notorious ignoring of the barbarian world, outside the estimated bounds of mediatorial salvation, that corresponded with the *Hebrew* ignoring of the world counted as the Gentile world. A local Saviour was of necessity a chiefly worldly and political Saviour, wherever and whenever thought of. The object of his mediation must, as its rule, be restricted to the removal of temporal evils, and especially be in ordinary limited to the mere work of deliverance from human tyrannical oppression. The isolated cases when an Orpheus regained his Euridice from the clutches of Death, or an Admetus received back his heroic substitute from the shades, were instances of high poetical *exception* to the rule; and even as such lay still within the bounds of immediately personal motives as the acting ones. But a real generalization, abstract to the degree required, neither was ever suggested by Grecian thought, nor in the nature of things could be, while any restriction at all remained as to either the extent or the spiritual elevation of the idea. And therefore, here again we find ourselves, I urge, just as we did in the last section, at the point which shows us the significance of the great Providential union taking place between the nationalized conceptions in the case: accounting here, as there, for the serviceable imagining of miracle, notwithstanding its having really no existence. For let the Grecian feeling as to the moral demand of the case have gone on, as it must have done, gradually enlarging and improving itself in proportion as Grecian civilization extended, still, I repeat, there was nothing in the *ordinary* method of civilization that *can* be rested upon, as explaining the immediately-astounding change that notoriously did take place in the world when the notion of the perfectly Divine Mediator broke upon it;—and yet, the *extraordinary* method of such civilization, as displayed in the manner of crisis here asserted,—by the concurrence, namely, of ready-made notions prepared severally on the part of the distinct nations to fall in with one another,—

does, I conceive, sufficiently explain it:—though not, indeed, it is true, with full adequacy, until we farther take in the considerations which will have to be added into the account in the section which, by our plan, yet remains to complete our examination. Thus much we may at all events see distinctly, that the stride made suddenly from the restricted notion of the concrete Deliverer into that of the purely abstract Deliverer, was one that of a certainty was, naturally coincident with the change of attribute brought about in the Hebrew Messiah, when the idea of the latter became developed into that of Deity.

But this completing of our estimation as to the nature of the union, and the peculiar realization of principle thence afforded, has, let us well observe, a manifestness of effect as to the result of the union, that we must accordingly not fail to add to the merely one-sided estimation of that result, which was all that in the last section we could reach to. I mean, as to the "causative power in dogmatic forms of bringing about moral effects" (p. 293), which even in regard to the bare dogmatic outline of theorization as to the Divine Sonship of Christ, I said was already discernibly at work in creating for men the general sense of common nature amongst them, without which, it is plain, proper Morality, as I have since been urging, has no possibility of true foundation. But now that to the dogmatic outline we are adding the dogmatic filling up of the outline, which consists in making the Second Person of the Trinity also the Mediator in respect of human transgressions, the moral effect gained by the generalizing personification is such as has been all along too evident to have been ever missed by the minds, of whatever sort, that have contemplated it. For the Ideal Conception, here painted forth in concrete colouring, of the General Substitute who should actually be that fulfiller of *every* man's personal need, to be which in even *any* case the consciousness of man in general told him was possible to men only when under influence of an utterly exceptional

and momentary outburst of special enthusiasm, was that which, as it could not but be a welcome representation, so could not help also drawing forth the warm and loving admiration of men towards it;—and this is what all of us know as the indispensable means for the cultivation of the power of imitation in ourselves in regard to it. To set forth the efficacy to such and of the Ideal of the spirit of Self-Sacrifice, presented to Christians in their notion of the *model man* Christ Jesus, has been the object carried out so fully, and even so over-fully, by Christian expounders,* that nothing indeed remains necessary to be said about it;—except, as always, to insist upon the difference I am now making: which in this case is, you observe, that *I* am crediting the dogmatic symbol with having actually created the sense as to what Self-Sacrifice means, which *they* credit it with having only availed itself of. I am supposing, you perceive, all along, that men who possessed the human nature that *could* only exist previous to the forming of the Christian generalizations, were as such blindly and egotistically pursuing nothing but their own selfish benefit in spiritual matters; while the instant that they *had* begun thus to generalize, they learnt—I mean, they were set in the way of learning,—how spiritual benefit, in the very nature of it, could only be procured by pursuing it with *not* exclusive selfishness. And the bringing about of this could only be through the extension of brotherly feeling, such as it already existed, into what was of right deserving to be counted brotherly Love. *Brotherly* Love, remember, just as much as we have seen *Filial* Love to be, (p. 231,) is Love of *abstract* sort;—it is Love, therefore, which is wrought out, in express contrariety to Love of the instinctive sort, through incessant conflict with self-ism, of the truest *contentious* sort! Sore fighting with personal desire for easy immunity from evil must there be, before an individual with his unrootable inborn Love of Self within him, *can* come to love, in any true or direct sense, those whose very existence impels the working of that constant instinct! But from the

very first there was no difficulty in the abstract Love—hardly other than concretely-selfish Love,—that was directed towards the supposed Saviour of Self, who, in being a Saviour, was at the same time removed from all question of being in any way the *rival*, that a properly fellow-man would have been. And the beginning of the better sort of Love, the turning-point *being* thus effectually helped over, led on naturally to also its own effectual bettering. As men begin by loving, instinctively, any being whatever that serves them: so they cannot help ending by loving reflectively (—and a religious idealization, we remember, is an emotional *reflection*,—) the beings that they themselves are able to serve: the religious idealization carrying on the love experienced for itself, as in the case of the natural father, to the beings who, together with self, are supposed the object of that ideal being's love. Neither, after all, is even this abstractly-produced love any thing really inconsistent with the pursuit of the self-ism that solely constituted the instinctive sort; as we may see if we state the same fact thus:—The perception of having a common Saviour, and a common duty of imitating that Saviour, with those who were not brothers according to the mode of corporeal ties, enforced their becoming such in the finer mode of now innermost sympathy; since however, and wherever, sympathy is awakened, there of necessity, as long as rivalry continues to be prevented from interfering, love *must* follow.

Duty:—a word has been forced upon me here for which there has been no occasion in the course of this examination before! And why is it so now, except from the cause into the nature of which I am expressly inquiring? Duty is the idea which by inevitable association falls to be coincident in the mind with that of Sin: it is the correlative idea of Sin. And I conceive that the entrance into the mind of the sense of Sin,

not existing there before, was indeed brought about in the way just intimated: namely, as the consequence of this same recognition taking place, at once of there being such a thing in conceivable possibility as the Vicarious undertaking of the sufferings of others (shown in the ideal exemplar of the Saviour), and of there being an actual possibility of in some measure carrying personally out such undertaking (testified by the now fraternal sentiment entertained amongst the followers of that Saviour); which two possibilities combined produced the sense of the Duty of so undertaking.

Let us suppose—in order to feel the very depth of the matter,—that it had been within the nature of things that there should have been a condition laid out for men, in which every individual should receive from Providence the exact degree of well-being conformable to his functions for profiting by well-being:—could any moral sense in such case, I entreat you to consider, ever have come to arise within men?—No one, indeed, has ever attempted to show that it could; because hitherto it has always been supposed to have been miraculously imparted:—miraculously imparted, that is, if not (as supposed by the orthodox,) at the hour of conversion, yet at all events at the hour of birth.—But, *with* the existing fact of Providential inequality taken into the account, see with me if indeed the rise of the moral sense is not most plainly accountable for!

Consider what has uniformly been the character of the working of human endeavour of the moral sort, and what, I ask you, is it possible to see in it other than a persistent turning upon this one identical point: an effort to remove egotistic discomfort,—constantly kept alive by the inequality,—which, although attended by partial success in progressively alleviating the discomfort, is naturally incapable of reaching to remove the source of it? At first, as I have been pointing out, the human mind *could* only, in its infant helplessness, look to have the cause of its uneasiness outwardly and bodily taken away, by whoever it was that had placed it in the

position of torment. But having tried to get it thus removed by all the means of cries and bribes yet thought of as within its power, what else could it do than try what should presumably be more effective means:—that is, what else could it do than try to help itself in the matter? And this was the drawing out of its *inner* strength. Did it not amount, in fact, to what *must* have been felt of in this way:—That help of God, which it had been proved was not to be had for man's asking, and which therein had however these two possible causes for the denial, either that God *would* not, or that He *could* not grant it,—was it not the plainly advisable course to experiment upon as to whether it lay within man's own power? (—Observe, I entreat you, the painfulness of self-contradiction which the theological dilemma evidently contains: the shock to pious instinct as to what *ought* to be the attribute of All-Power and All-Goodness in God, that in no way can in *both* cases be avoided.—) But the very fact of man's thus arriving to conceive, that it was a work *properly* to be undertaken by *himself* to try and remove the effect of Providential inequality that weighed upon him, was, I repeat, equivalent to the finding that such undertaking was his *Duty*.

The difficulty that lies in the way of our present understanding of the subject—the difficulty, I would say, that must of necessity prevent this present explanation, even if it *be* the true one, from making itself immediately obvious as such,—is, as always, of the two kinds needing to be remembered as inevitable: first, namely, the difficulty of our entering into what could have been the first glimmering sense of Duty to those to whom it was a *new* sense, which I need not now, farther than I have done, dwell upon; and secondly, the difficulty of our now comprehending at once the change that has come about in our present sense, compared with that original sense, which I must and am anxious to say a few words more upon.—To many persons,—to *most* persons who have not already spent much thought upon the subject,—it *must* appear that I have, in my

present assortment of the respective bearings of the notions of Sin and Duty, been bringing together ideas so far out of obvious connexion with one another, that much rather they would need to be placed as essentially opposed to one another. I mean, in this way: that, as to the especial point of the matter, the stating, as I have done, the sense of Duty to be the natural fruit of what to the enlightened moral feeling of the present day appears so entirely opposite to the sense of Duty as that of possible Substitution of Merit does, has the necessary aspect of being a statement of self-condemned irrationality.—Now, to meet this difficulty, I will not offer the mere theoretical reply, supplied as ever by my principle, that the natural mode of all growth is that it is obtained by the working of influences that *are* contraries. It is the immediately personal sort of appeal that I would rather rest upon; and it is thus therefore that I desire to put the case. You say, as let me represent your objection,—for let me suppose myself now addressing one of those rationalistic moralists who, like myself, has abandoned all belief whatsoever as to any actual validity in the realistic doctrine of Atonement, held according to the mode of orthodox Christians;—you say that the idea of Substituted merit and Vicarious suffering is utterly alien to your own moral feeling; that your Conscience rejects it, and owns nothing which corresponds in any way to any sense of need for it. You say that, on the contrary, so far are you from feeling any need of extraneous Atonement for the short-comings in respect of Duty, of which nevertheless you are continually so deeply and regretfully conscious in yourself, that you have not actually the slightest impulse towards requiring that any portion of the suffering to result from such dereliction of Duty, should be lifted off from you in any such manner.—But let me make the following suggestion, and earnestly appeal to you whether it has not the force that really meets the whole of such case as this of objection. If you feel no need for Atonement on your own behalf, is it not indeed precisely because you are convinced

that, in the way that you are thinking of it, any retribution destined to fall upon you for your personal offences, will be of the remedial kind that if *not* endured personally would leave to you no means of overcoming the evil tendencies in yourself which you deplore, and that accordingly compels you, in your best judgment, even to *desire* the infliction of the just penalty? I ask you, however, if there is not, nevertheless, *another* way of thinking of Atonement, in which you yourself will be ready, beyond every other kind of thinker, to own abundantly the very need which here you disclaim! There is a sort of evil, and of moral evil too, in the world, which your personal correction has nothing to do with. You yourself groan under it; and do so much more than the mass of Christian believers,—just from your having this assured feeling, which has no part within *their* view of Atonement, of how neither effort nor suffering of your own, or of any other being whatever, is of any avail towards it. You, I say, much more than they, travail in your soul, and heart of hearts, over the weary problem of natural human life, which, ever existing as I have been insisting that it has done to the troubled thought of man as long as he has been man, is unfolding to *you* now only fresh difficulties the more you vex your spirit over it. *Here* is it then, I say, that even *you* yourself *do* indeed most deeply feel the need of Atonement. Tell me, if in the moments when blank Scepticism as to God's goodness falls upon you,—as fall it *must*, when the repeated frustration of your philanthropic exertions, inevitable to occur, cannot help but lead you to demur against the character of Him who was the Ordainer of such a plan:—tell me, I say, if at such moments you *do* not indeed own to such need: crying out from the depths of your generous despondency, with the intensest urgency of desire, for that which may set you in truth at one with God's Providence,—for the healing Word that may in very reality Reconcile you with His ways!—What then but a common need, after all, for the very same kind of obviating of difficulty, in

no other way to be obviated, that Christians felt as to their personal contentedness, is indeed this which you yourselves feel thus in regard to your un-personal contentedness?—while, if I am right, so even complete is the community of the experience, that neither, when we seek for it, is this un-personal obviation any more actually wanting to *us*, than their personal obviation was to *them*. Such healing Word as that which you require,—for this, as you perceive, is what I would now urge upon you,—*does* in fact, according to my belief, come with the system of principle that I am advocating. Listen to me, therefore, and judge, I entreat you, whether you cannot find it to do so.

According to my principle, the very fact of the mode of Providential dispensation which *will* and *must* convey to you such disheartening impression as to the reality of the Fatherliness of its Disposer, is that which causes you to be the beings you are, whose moral sense gives you the means of receiving such impression. Except for this dispensation, not only would there, manifestly, be no occasion for any exertion of philanthropic energy on your part, but also, by the clearest inference, no possibility of any existence of philanthropic energy within you. And this being so, is not immediately the *true* sense of Divine Fatherliness, in its *best* sense, restored?—Not the literal sense;—not the sense which involved us in the theological dilemma as to the “would” and the “could” of Divine prevention of evil, which left with us for ever the unanswered discontent belonging to our inevitable moral protest, “If God *could* have prevented all this suffering in the world, while He yet *did* not, nothing can make us count him as a real Father to us!”—but the symbolical sense: involved in the multitude of abstract considerations, a comprehensive regard to which, in proportion as we become able to carry it out, *does* bring back the general, though not the particular and personal feeling of Superintending Paternity:—and yet still a feeling that is so far personal as this, that we may perfectly so accommodate our

former theological notion to our present rational one, as to say to ourselves, with simplest concreteness of expression, "We see that what God would have in the matter, was that we should consciously set ourselves to try, as we *are* trying, to be ourselves the means of effecting as much as is at present possible and desirable to be effected, of the removing of this same problematical inequality."—The name of God, upon my scheme, you remember, means the very constitution of things itself:—the really unchangeable, though infinitely variously operating Order of things, to which, as soon as ever, under new emergencies, our own powers become harmoniously adapted, the sense of beneficence in it *must* return. And the *means* of the harmony in this present case,—the means which form the true Mediation of Reconciliation,—are simply this: that we ourselves learn to be the Vicarious Substitutes, who, whenever and wherever we see an undue share of human suffering undeservedly borne by the less-than-ourselves circumstantially-favoured of our fellow-beings, may therein know ourselves to be willed by God to take it voluntarily upon our own endurance:—one part of mankind thus becoming *active* Mediators to the rest, while, in order still to preserve the general balance, the latter have in the very same transaction the means of counter-privilege, in serving as they may, to their very relievers, in the character of *passive* Mediators.

But does not this strike you?—the work that hitherto has appeared the work of *beneficence* has, by this present attribution to it of the character of rationalized Vicarious Substitution, become altogether of the Providentially-imposed sort which really takes all the hitherto credited *voluntariness* in fact quite out of it. And this, accordingly, I ask you to observe carefully, is precisely the *mode* of moral cultivation which, I am urging, has been in force all along, as to human nature in general,—*creating*, namely, as I assert, the sense of Duty. But much still remains wanting, it is true, to enable us to draw out to

ourselves the actual nature of the moral change thus effected. Let us take in some farther considerations which may render our idea of it somewhat more definite.

The broad matter of improvement that I assert in this present mode of treating the natural inequality over the crudely-Christian mode, bear in mind, is always this, that the clearing away of supposed room for benefit through placation of a Tyrannical Autocrat, lays open the course for the proper action of the so-to-speak mental struggle of man with Providence in the case, which brings out the real strength of the power of Moral Contention in man:—seeing that, in accordance with the ruling paradoxicalness of the case, it is, in truth, only when all action of *will* seems to be excluded from the matter, that man does and can become a *willing* agent in the matter. But the excluding of the idea of a Tyrannical Governing Will, and the inducing of the consciousness, in the place of it, of a willing action in Self, was a work that I think we must see was brought about *only* through the progressive perception as to the nature of spiritual Punishment: in that, being also involved, remember, the growing notion of Sin. As long as men conceived the ills afflicting them to be mere signs of Autocratical displeasure, there was clearly no beginning whatever of consciousness of Sin within them;—nor even, as Paul so truly says, the *actuality* of Sin, which could not *be* Sin, previously to the arrival of a law of righteousness to *make* it Sin. All that was present to their thought was, as I have said, to seize upon the means first at hand to shake off the immediate sensation of the ills. And let us consider this:—if the means *not* first at hand, but on the contrary, the means *latest* of all at hand, however the only effectual means, were those that lay at the beginning as yet all undeveloped within the being of Self,—why, this is but according to the whole analogy of development. In the sphere of pure Intellect, is it not notorious that the power of Introspection is the last to be realized;—why should the case be different in the sphere of moral enlightenment!

Man's Thought,—developed first out of gross sensation by being drawn forth, out of the latter, through the means of affective passions,—requires to be drawn forth to an extent of the highest degree of abstractness, before he is enabled by it to look downwards into his own inner self;—and so also is it evident, must Moral Feeling be likewise drawn out and considerably elevated above the dread of immediate personal suffering, before it is enabled to see the moral cause of suffering, which on its part also, is latent within those self-recesses. And this attended to, we see, in fact, the very working of the sense of Sin. The power to look within, which makes the moral nature in us what it is, is that which, I say, nothing *but* the urgency of spiritual pain could ever have driven men to;—while that it *has* in fact driven them to it, is too manifest to be deniable.

Let us however notice specially to ourselves the peculiar obduracy of the outer crust of the matter, that had to be broken through, before this inner perception became accessible;—and let us note the *manner* of the breaking through.—This latter, consisting, namely, in the gradually-working effect of the Christian idealization, has thus far, observe, been the following:—Men having begun with the impression of all evil's being an outward and arbitrary infliction, it is plain, in the first place, how the conceiving of the Ideal Inflictor now in the new mode of a Vicarious Remover of the matter of infliction, could not help being that which infused into the impression the sense of *sympathy* regarding the undertaking of such office:—and of sympathy whose bearing, it is also plain, would be of the same two-fold character that is implied in the figure by the two-fold nature of Christ. That is, it must lead, as we have been seeing, primarily, to an abstract sort of love, (which however was *not* properly love, but merely the selfish beginning of love, which instinctively attaches beings to whatever other beings personally benefit them,) entertained towards the softened Autocrat of human lot;—and secondarily, to the philanthropic

love of fellow-partakers of the lot. But let us now bethink ourselves of this:—love that was thus directed outwardly of Self, could not but, in the nature of things, be attended by a corresponding diminution of the amount of love hitherto reserved inwardly *for* Self;—while, moreover, the nature of the express circumstance belonging to the setting-up of the new Ideal to be loved, was that it came *not* gradually, but in the way of super-eminent *crisis*. Take these two considerations together, I say, and reflect, I ask you, if it is not thus rendered at once intelligible how, under the naturally over-strained violence of the immediate consequence, there *must* have become engendered that temporary phase of consciousness, with which ecclesiastical history has made us so familiar as the characteristically Christian sense of Sin? It was the rousing in human feeling of what we must count as a momentary *enthusiasm of self-depression*;—and out of such enthusiasm the doctrinal fruit was the result that appears perfectly explicable. Nay, the very violence of the contrast thus effected, between the overwhelming force of egotistic confidence previously to the doctrinal birth of idea, and the eager self-humiliation after it, is itself the true indication of the real gradualness remaining in regard to the transition;—since the progress of the now exaggerated feeling into its hereafter-to-be obtained character, of the just sense of personal demerit implied in the fact of a developed Conscience, was manifestly *held back* as long as the utter dependence upon the ideally-conceived Divine help in the case maintained itself. As long as the mollification of Deity remained all that seemed to be required, *that* only of necessity would be attended to; and from this could not but follow the effort to look at Self in the way that God was supposed to look: which hence gave,—may I not say?—such *vulgarity* to the complimentary sympathy offered to Deity. God, it was imagined, was offended with men because they were not like Himself! It was because they had *bodies*, and attendant “lusts of the flesh”, that they were objects of wrath to Him!—this

being already so vividly drawn out as the material point of the case, let us remember, in the original myth upon the subject, where the human beings were condemned as under the symbolic cause of being unable to resist the temptation of eating an apple. Those who were so base in their want of self-control over sensual appetite, were yet presuming enough to aspire at being "like one of ourselves:"—it was thus that Deity was thought of as complaining;—while the individual worshipper who *did* so think of Deity, may in his turn be imagined by us as pouring forth his intended flattery to Deity (flattery in taking His part in the matter!) in some such sort of obsequious conference as this:—"Thou art absolutely in the right; man *was* utterly to be condemned; no wonder it was odious to thee to look upon conduct and upon beings so unbearably inferior to thine own perfection; the only surprise is that thou didst not at once crush them altogether out of existence;—the only part of man, at all events, that may be thought of as having deserved to survive, is that which had a capability, by whatever means, of being reduced into perfect self-subjection to thee: that is, his soul; his body—*that*, we acknowledge, is altogether worthy of destruction."—And, in accordance with such equally slavish and presumptuous tone of feeling, the practical worship resulting could only be likewise the corresponding aim: to second God's indignation, namely, by combining with Him in as far as possible casting off all that pertained to this condemned condition of present existence.

A soul, ashamed of the body that God has given to it!—Can there really be in any way imagined impiety that goes to a greater depth than this?—But, nevertheless, this outer crust of gross mistake, as I have called it, was that which *must*, in the first instance, intervene to be broken through. This obsequious self-surrender to God's supposed view of the matter, was in fact an actual beginning of the mode of abstract self-contemplation, which should have to be in the end the means of furnishing to man his rightful moral sense. The mountain heap of egoism, natural

to his pre-religious condition, although still preserved mainly entire, has by this received the new adjustment which forms at all events the preparation for its final reduction into desirable proportion. Man,—we may express it,—through this supposed entering into God's feeling respecting himself, *has come thus far* towards the power of making a *just* judgment respecting himself:—beginning by throwing all blame that was the fancied cause of God's displeasure upon *ancestors*, he has come to own, as a sort of compromise to his egoism,—“Very well, then we will all,—the entire brotherhood of us,—be acknowledged to blame!”—a very much easier matter to acknowledge, (I appeal to every one if it is not!) than to own specially *oneself* to blame! For that this is the purport beyond which the Christian doctrine of Sin has no power of carrying the moral effect, I think is sufficiently evident. The supposed discovery that it was the *bodies* of men, with their fleshly consequences, that were the matter of Divine offence, was one altogether and naturally consistent with the recognition of the entirety of mankind, *as* an entirety, being held displeasing to God; but so also, as long as this mere entirety of consideration seemed all that was needed,—as the fact of men being held in common under the representation of Christ, implied that it did,—no *farther* discrimination as to such source of displeasure was natural. Religious improvement, as thought of under this representation, *could* only be the getting rid, as much as might be, of the effect of living under the universal condition of having the encumbrance of the Divinely-hated bodies. — And yet exaggeration, as such, is the *only* fault, even here. If at first it seemed that the proper work of religion was to enable us to get rid altogether of the effect of having bodies, the true effect of the truest religion is always to enable us to *control* such effect. And the accompanying sign of this truth of its office, is accordingly the reduction of the Self-Hatred imagined to be imposed by Christian Love of God, in this way: the beginning enthusiasm of ascetism which made the gross division as to objects of moral liking and

disliking which consisted in their being bodily or not-bodily, had to end in the finding that actually the *least* deserving of moral hatred amongst human defects are those which *are* corporeal:—that moral hatred, as *really* hatred, needs to reserve itself for defects un-corporeal; while, for defects corporeal, the feeling required is simply the degree of religious care employed in directing bodily instincts, which in fact ecclesiastical (or strictest) Christianity has showed its inadequacy by always ignoring.

Thus, you perceive, my two-fold conclusion respecting the moral efficiency of Christianity is this: that while the notion of Vicarious Satisfaction, as a general one, was that without which true moral feeling could have no beginning; yet as long as the notion remained a *merely* general one, none of the particular or individual effect which proper morality requires the character of it to be, could in the nature of things take place,—although the general effect still was essentially working onwards *towards* the particular. Here, however, I find myself being led to the matter which would carry me beyond the subject I have allotted to the present section. The seeking out of the element which, although having its own root (altogether involved with that of the present matter,) within Christianity, nevertheless in bringing this notion of Vicarious Satisfaction to its requisite completeness, could only do so, manifestly, in destruction of Christianity,—that is, by the thorough abstraction from it of the whole body of Christian imagery,—has to be considered, as the finishing matter of our analysis, in the following section. Here, therefore, let us for the present arrest our thought; while we mark the important station of conception we have now arrived at. We have in fact just reached, and *only* just reached, the peculiar stage in the progress of human feeling, which is made such by the actual birth of the idea which is the one of real importance to us:—I mean, of the idea of Sin, as no longer held under its originally concrete investiture, but as the purely abstract idea, that the being taken as a properly personal

admission makes it.—The abstractness, remember, came with the intellectual power, only just attained to, of looking down into Self from an objective station; the personality of admission of Sin comes only with the moral disposition, just ripened to the sufficient degree, to confess to Self that Self really is a possibly just object of God's displeasure.—And as to this latter branch of the matter, let the following, moreover, be considered:—although the idea of "God's displeasure" is really, in a literal sense, as thoroughly inapplicable, in fact, now when applied to internal defect, as even it was when applied to bodily defect,—nay, is upon the present scheme even the very same thing, seeing that the latter stands as the actual cause of the former,—yet, as a figure, it points to a truth the keeping in sight of which is of a value not to be over estimated. To say that "God hates mental defect", and moreover, as we figuratively may, that "He hates mental defect so much *more* than bodily defect, that His hatred may be said to be exclusively confined to the former",—true as it is, that the phraseology remains but upon a par with the now scientifically discarded one, of "Nature's *abhorring* a vacuum",—nevertheless preserves in view to us the prime truth of all others, that lower condition is uniformly that which is rejected by Nature in favour of higher condition; and this, when applied to the department of moral progress, means in consequence the feeling of disgust,—attributed indeed to God, but still actually occurring in Self,—entertained towards moral condition found inadequate to moral content: aiding therefore aspiration towards condition that may be found less inadequate.—Does not this, then, bring before us the superlative import contained in the arriving of human nature at the capability of the personal admission of Sin in question! Aspiration towards higher condition, while present every where as acting in general mode, had, without the special disgust caused by this special admission, nothing whatever to guide it in a direction that *should* be a *moral direction*. Previously to the inner sense of Sin, human beings, it is evident, must have

wasted all onward energy in the manner that had no moral direction to it,—precisely being diffused hither and thither in directions which moral effort had nothing to do with. The merely incipient moral sense, in lying as it did under the unsurmounted oppression of its superincumbent egoism, oozed itself away, as we have seen, in nothing but the vaguely pitiful seeking of what there was that might be complained of;—nay, had its seeking, even of such sort, expressly withheld by its egoism from quarters where, if anything justly deserving of complaint was found, control over the matter of complaint might be exercised. But the personal admission in regard to Sin, came, I repeat, with this effect:—*it was the causing of human attention to be brought to bear upon the very spot where solely for moral purposes it was required to bear.* Conscience, let us define it, is the concentration of all the wandering expenditure of moral force, upon henceforth exactly the sphere which God has given to us to be of right under our own control.—But this definition, let us note, sufficiently also strikes the reason *why* the function of Christianity here came, as just asserted that it did, to its natural end. And that is, the following evident one:—as long as the improving influence upon human nature remained under the concrete embodiment of the individually-personified Christ, the attachment of loving gratitude towards such imagined being was that which of necessity prevented the concentration of attention taking place where it was required to take place. Attention was expressly concentrated upon the merely un-practical generalization of the matter; while, as yet, the only furtherance towards the obtaining of the requisite individualized effect, was in fact that same contradictory element (—not yet taken up into the matter so as to be itself a proper constituent portion of religion,—) which, as already pointed out, left the *appropriating* of the substituted merit proffered by Christ still a matter that was open to individual effort. The need of personal Faith in Christ, to secure a personal share to Self out of the universal benefit, thus regarded, does indeed manifestly

show itself as precisely the individualizing influence, which when duly carried out, could not help but lead onward human attention to that work of internal self-control, which once being properly set on foot, the concrete generalization could do no otherwise than lose its concreteness, and become the merely abstract guiding principle which we know all other moral generalizations to be rightly to us.

The death of personal faith in a personal Christ, I thus make out, is that which, in the natural estimation of the matter, is coincident with the birth of the first properly personal, and therefore first *true* sense of Sin;—the true sense of Sin being moreover to me, fully as much as to Christians—nay, I protest, very much more so,—the indispensable condition for a human Morality that shall have any right to call itself a *true* Morality! Within this view of the matter,—let me say,—there is an importance so great to me, that, anxious as I am to express it, I scarcely know how to do it with sufficient force. Certainly, in no other part of my own plan of thought, do I find so vividly portrayed to myself the parallelism of my actual feeling with that of the orthodox, as I do here:—in sharing, namely, as I do, with them the repugnance of deepest sort that I am capable of, towards that element of materialistic Positivism, which shows itself in the abolishing of this heretofore theological notion, as one which therefore has become no longer a necessary one to us. To me, the ripening of the recognition of Sin into a character that is not only a true, but a distinctive character, is the fruit of Christianity so precious, that it is in itself the perfect justification of the existence of Christianity! It is that which I can only describe as I have just described it: as forming upon this its arrival into human consciousness, *now* effected by Christianity, the actual rise into our mental constitution of a *new sense*:—a new sense, observe, which is to the Moral nature of man exactly what the sense of physical Pain was to his corporeal nature, and what the sense of spiritual Pain, or Fear, was to his general spiritual nature; and that is, *the essential*

condition of Life to such nature. As the doctrinal portion of Christianity gave for its result the generalized mode of human feeling, named Philanthropy, which I have already claimed in the same manner, as a *new sense* to those whose particular limitations of feeling were by it entirely swept away;—so I find that the deeper and more properly moral portion of Christianity now being considered, affords a moral generalization that *as such*, and *only as such*, entirely carries out and specially vivifies the first preparatory generalization. The capacity for loving *all* human beings, as *merely* of loving them, is, in a properly moral sense, nothing more than the preparation for the capacity of acting for, and suffering on behalf of, that same *all* of mankind; and—while the first of these Christianly-enforced duties will be, I believe, borne out as such by the matter of the next section: I mean the-duty of *acting for* men, and for *all* of them, who are other than ourselves,—the duty of *suffering for* them is the already obvious fruit, and obviously *main* contents, of moral sort, of Christianity. But has it not become proved to us how the power of *will* so to suffer, in the spiritual manner of which alone it is here the question, depends upon the suppression of egoism which, combined with other effects of refining constitution, is precisely the attaining of the sensitiveness which *does* amount to the fact of lying under perpetual liability to the undergoing of the pain of being conscious of Sin? This liability conveys to us first the possibility of the consciousness of due obligation, as general obligation, fulfilled, which we know ordinarily under the phrase of the possession—the general possession—of a Good Conscience:—of *a* good Conscience, as apart from the consciousness of well-doing in particular acts. Sense as to Sin, as a general sense, is, I say, the peculiar perception within us, which, if it could be extinguished, we should lose the *sentient generalization*, so to speak, without which the sense of Duty, even on the merely human side of it, would be deprived of all that gives to it its lawful authorization, and therein its proper strength and dignity.

I say, "on the merely human side of it"; for here is the cause of separation from Positivism, to this present scheme of what I have called *Comparativism*, which has now come to its capability of being expressed to its full depth as such:—the cause for such separation, namely, that occurs to me in the necessity which I find everywhere, of making distinctive recognition of two entire classes of conceptions upon every several matter capable of general thought. I began, in my Introduction, by setting apart from one another, as clearly as I could, the "contrary aspects" under which all such subjects of necessity present themselves to our Intellect, thence showing two distinctive *modes* to our Intellect, of which one, and the more habitual, (the subjective,) is that which lies much closer in alliance with Feeling than the mode of purer Intellect;—but now, in necessary connexion with the central matter of Christianity before me, I have been obliged, farther, to have recourse to the believed ultimate fact in human constitution, which appears to me capable of accounting, as its *final* result, for even that distinction in intellectual modes itself. I mean, the natural distribution of all human action whatever into what I have called the Parental and Fraternal compartments of the one General Struggle of life. Owing to the existence of these, I would say, is it that the Intellect itself, when it came to be first formed in then-developing human nature, fell into the two modes, of which, though both were every where present, the Abstract mode was the one that came to be the *prevailing* one in dispositions where the Fraternal conflict had the greater share; and the Personal or Subjective mode came to prevail where the Parental conflict was the most influential. But so also have I found, that Feeling itself, as distinguished from Intellect, was marked off by the very same means. And so, moreover, do I *now* find that Moral Feeling, even within its own special department, needs distinction to be made of perfectly identical character. *Nowhere*, I find, is there distinction, of the sort that rational intelligence requires, really capable of being made,

unless recognition is expressly admitted, in regard to it, of the contrary aspects whose effect alone gives us the wherewith to *make comparison*. And hence is it, accordingly, that the very sense of Duty itself, I repeat, is likewise that which, without having its generalized form borne perpetually in mind, to authorize its particular form, has no real right to the properly rational character.

Religion to me, I have shown, is nothing else than Generalized Feeling,—Feeling which, having crept upwards through all its merely instinctive stages, bursts forth at last into the crisis of ideally conceiving itself in a state of freedom from personally selfish restrictions; and as such, I say, it affords a sense as to the carrying on of human life, which needs permanently to afford a contrasting comparison with the sense which is afforded by what, for distinction's sake, I have called the *worldly* method of judging of the same. Positivism, however, denies the right of Religion to any such distinctive province of its own; such Religion as it *does* acknowledge is that which it expressly bases *upon* secular considerations; and by so doing, I would argue, it loses all true force belonging either to the one set of considerations or the other! Sin, as the *offence against God* which theology called it, and for which interpretation I maintain that I find in Present Religion a true meaning in succession, even after Past Christian Religion is entirely as to its form done away with,—Positivism casts aside as an idea henceforth unnecessary, merging *Sin* altogether under the ideas allotted severally to the terms either of *Vice* or of *Crime*;—but this, I protest, is cutting off the very source of all that has hitherto raised men's comprehension as to those latter terms. *Vice* and *Crime* are the terms which—to recur to my own expression just now,—represent the matter of wrong-doing with perfect aptness “upon the human side of the question:” that is, as it regards the particular ostensible actions of life, which in pertaining specially to the struggle of men amongst men in the mode of individualized contention, are, like all other

ostensible particulars, as such, properly subject to the mode of judgment which makes estimation of their *Utility*—of the quality, that is, which is known through attending to the *using* of them:—the general qualities employed in the emotive struggle being obviously those which in their nature are judged of, *not* as to their *use*, but as to their statical character of instinct; and which, by my rule, have therefore to be thought of as lying rather upon the “natural, or divinely-instituted side of the matter”, than upon the “human side”. But the very notions of Vice and Crime, according to the very utility which the principle of Utilitarianism itself draws out of them, I say, manifestly owe all that utility to the principle of separation from the Un-utilitarian principle which is the thing here contended for. For, just as I have been arguing that all improvement in matters relating to the Fraternal or worldly sphere of conflict, comes universally from inter-mixture with effect of the Parental or spiritual sphere, *as a separate sphere*, so, I say, the very character lying distinctively upon the face of these two secular terms proves the fact. Is not *Vice* an idea lying manifestly upon regard to higher—or rather deeper—considerations than *Crime*? And if so, *why* is it so, except just from the very inter-mixture I am speaking of?—and farther, from the very mode of the inter-mixture that I have been insisting upon? In the beginning state of things,—that is, while as yet theology *was* the same thing as politics, and politics as theology, which I accuse Positivism of wrongfully making them *now*,—there was nothing as yet imagined of what needed the term of Vice. The idea of Crime reigned alone; and in that solitude was accordingly correspondingly identical with the idea of Sin. To offend the Patriarch was at once both Crime *and* Sin. But the instant that, through influence of the inter-mingling conflict, the Patriarchal Deity was separated *from* the Patriarch, the distinction began which made *religious crime* one thing, and *secular crime* another thing. This arrangement was, however, merely thus far carried, too crude to suffice for long. Modification could

not but come into it, as soon as the idea of Divine Government began to be at all an inner conception; and then it was that the working out of the true nature of punishment furnished forth the necessity for the generalization, as it may be called, upon the nature of Crime, which on its secular side *Vice* is. The idea of *Vice*, it may be figured,—nay, I see no other way of figuring it,—is the offspring of the union between what comes to be parted off as the due sense of dereliction in the sphere of circumstantial, and self-interested conflict, under the exclusive name of Crime, and what, on the other hand, comes to be parted off as the properly religious sense of Sin,—which offspring, however, it must not be forgotten, retains of specialty to itself the masculine sex of its political parent, in contra-distinction to that of its religious parent.—Only allow this figure, and does it not, I ask, convey an intimation which explains the very need for the permanency of an idea of Sin, as a true equivalent for the by-gone theological one, which I am arguing for; so as not to leave the secular and utilitarian idea of *Vice* for the sole measure of human obligation? The very word of *obligation*, observe, has framed itself so as to form a standing sign of the association necessary to the thing it signifies *with* Religion.

In what, then,—is it asked,—does this permanent equivalent consist? Surely, it consists, as I have already said that it does, in no one single consideration, but in an entire *set of considerations*. The finding out of the true meaning of Sin, I repeat, is the finding out of the true meaning of the religious side of Duty; and this surely, in common with the human side, does indeed belong to every several portion out of our entire sum of life! To draw out the portraiture of the peculiar aspect of Duty, that *does* seem to me to be afforded by the view of Religion that I am taking, as specifically apart from the Utilitarian view, (which I consider, however,—do not, I entreat you, forget,—to be all the time of quite equal legitimacy with it upon its own ground,) forms in fact the chief object that I

propose for the Second Part of this work.—Still, the general meaning is not the less requisite here upon the spot;—and neither is it wanting. Sin, by its very etymology, directs us at once to the precise matter that if we have recognized, we have at all events, whatever farther may desirably be thought out respecting it, the one characteristic which is the necessary one. It is the *sundering* of the subject of it from that which is its legitimate connexion. To the theological mode of thinking such connexion was of necessity with *God*; but do I not,—as I assert I do,—preserve the whole of what is essentially of the same import, when I say, as I do say, that Sin means a voluntary separating of himself, on the part of any individual, from that conscious alliance with the whole remainder of existence, which he needs to recognize as the entire source of vitality to him *as* a conscious individual? Any mode or any degree of such sundering, it is surely sufficiently manifest in the stating, can be only, in accordance to such mode and degree, a very *death* to the moral nature!—And being so, likewise have we, on the other hand, the equally sufficing reverse idea of what is the general meaning of Duty, which forms the *life* of the moral nature. Moral life, as a principle, is, that the human individual, *as* an individual, feel that, in harmony with universal being, as universal being is in a state of growth, so he also is a *growing being*. *Not* to grow,—*not* to grow under whatever obstacles to growth Nature and Circumstance may have interposed,—is in any and every case an offence against the General Ordering of Nature, and therefore, I say, is undeniably Sin;—while also undeniably is thus exhibited the quasi-circular proof, as to the absence of moral pursuit of Duty being equivalent to the death of the Soul.

I say, the death of the *Soul*; for here is it that there comes into view, the natural and necessarily-acting cause for the rising up within the human mind of the spiritual entity known by us under this name:—forming the last and clenching consideration belonging to this division of our subject. Vague to the extreme

as the just considered notions of general Sin and general Duty are, yet I appeal to any one whatever who has attended to the working of them, to say whether they have not the power of conveying to the mind that entertains them, expressly a more stringent feeling of *individualism* than any other mental entertainment whatever can afford. *How* they work in producing this, is what we shall have presently to see; but taking the effect as yet only as a general one, this, I argue, is already apparent. The general sense as to human conduct, distributed thus *still* generally into the mutually-complimentary senses of Sin and Duty, gives to these latter of necessity an individuality of *their own*; and how can that, being produced, do otherwise than reflect itself upon *our own* sense of *ourselves*? The knowing definitely what it is that ideally *has* to be done by us, and what has *not*, must and does, I say, bring immediate limitation and immediate perception in regard to our own distinctive moral personality. We cannot set up before us the idea of a certain fixed disposition of General Nature, to be that with which, according to the terms of our just-stated definition, it is Duty to be in harmony, and Sin to be otherwise, without creating upon the spot the image that the natural mode of human thought requires, which figures to us an Universal Soul presiding over the outside-of-self existing world of things;—and the creating of this, again, is but the same thing as the creating of a personal Soul within ourselves, which shall be the thing whose part it is to correspond with the General Soul.

Let me then now sum up the contents of this section.

The whole of the general conflict carried on by man with general Nature, *being* thus the seeking to arrive at a state of harmony with Nature, what I would describe as the mode of such effort that we have now been finding, is this: namely, that the general conflict, in being naturally separated into two

particular sorts of general conflict, all the time that it is not only the root but moreover the maintainer of *them*, is nevertheless paradoxically brought to its issue, in so far as it in any case does come to an issue, *solely by means of them*;—while to complete the paradox, farther occurs this: namely, that they, while they *are* thus the sole means of bringing the harmony about, in so far as it *can* be brought about, are nevertheless in themselves the incessant occasion of impeding, or delaying, the harmony; and thereby of presenting to man the matter of the entire amount of perplexity and vexation that belongs to him.

For, in the passive and affective part of man, he is disposed for nothing but to *acquiesce* with the work of outwardly-effected creation, or growth, going on within him. His *Religion* is the feeling that to know God as his Father is the whole of what will suffice him. But, on the other hand, the active and combative part of him is compelled to break through the passivity, by the need providentially forced upon him through the unequal adjustment of men's powers and possession of enjoyment: requiring each man, as it does, to strive against the rival instincts of fellow-claimants of enjoyment—figured by the knowing of Self as the object of God's paternal love,—so as to prevent their concurring efforts from hindering him in his own personal attainment of the end.—And yet still the case is, that for all the existence of fellow-beings constituting this actual hindrance, it is really the only means of obtaining the end.—Thus, accordingly, arises the life-long need of making arrangement such as shall be *due arrangement* in regard to the separate demands of our nature: the religious demand, namely, which seeks peace with God; the worldly demand, which has to be met by peace with fellow-creatures.

Now, to meet the latter, we have at this present time become aware that the adequate correspondent to the at first fruitlessly desired *alteration* of the natural inequality of human condition, (in so far as any thing adequate is possible,) is the possession of a sense of Abstract Justice within man himself: which sense

has indeed, by experience, come to us; and, by reflection upon that experience, has so come as the result of the human sympathy gathered out of Religion. But the original problem before man was precisely *how* to work out the gaining of this sense of Abstract Justice: not only was it the direction of his own conduct that was in need for man to effect, but the very obtaining of the mental faculty that *should* direct it. And I say again, that this did come only through the *due arrangement* which man had to institute, between the matters as to which the co-operation of fellow-men was right and desirable, and those as to which it was simply obstructive:—such arrangement being afforded, and by my scheme alone capable of being afforded, by Religion; and in the following way.

When man first came to the consciousness of uncomprehended evil pressing upon him, we must remember, there was nothing present to him but a blind endeavour to avoid it, or to shake it off from him. Having no thought of its lying within himself, he gropingly inquired, “what is it?” and “who brought it upon me?”—in self-answer to which, having, in not daring to attribute it to God, laid it to the account of his ancestors, he thence, for his own special relief from the consequences of their misdeeds, devised the plan which was this: namely, that God should separate him from all connexion with them, as such connexion naturally existed, by henceforth a *new birth*, which should in fact be tantamount to a death of natural condition. But what was the consequence of the working of his thought upon the device?—Not the real severance of such connexion,—we may be very sure of that!—Nature would take good care of that!—But it was the bringing upon him of a religious experience of such peculiarly crucial sort, as such, that however desirable for the sake of its final result, it was in its actual state that which for permanent endurance was simply impossible. It was, in fact, the bringing of his own personal Ego to the pass of bearing upon itself the brunt of the full encounter with Deity which ought to have

been shared by the entire number of human beings! The original grasp of the idea of Deity, we have to recollect, had been obtained solely through the introduction of fellow-beings into the encounter (see p. 268); and now, the idea having been gained, the seeking to *exclude* them from it, was the means of bringing down upon Self the utterly humiliating consciousness of unsupported unworthiness in the presence of Deity, which accordingly made it seem impossible that God ever *could* be a loving Father to that Self.—Thus, however, came about the rectification that vindicates the process: the very humiliation (combined with helpful influences,) put him upon the striving to rise out of it,—brought him, at the last, to perceive that he required to *do* something, of his own self, to lift himself out of his actually despised lowness of condition. And this is what forms the notable reduction of his feeling into its true and rightful province of proper individualism. For thus comes out the state of the case regarding the latter that seems the true case:—While, in the matter of the instinctive pursuit of what forms the common object of desire to men, men *are* indeed not only naturally compelled, but morally required, to act in common with one another, this proves to be *not* the natural necessity, and *not* the moral requisition, when matter of opposite sort is in question,—that is, as soon as there has commenced a personally self-conscious action;—since this shows to be what in its nature enforces that they act *apart* from one another. Linked together, I would say, indissolubly as men are, and ought to be, in their *privileges*, yet as soon as the matter comes to be that of their *responsibilities*, they are, and ought to be, disjoined from one another, and each man of them made to stand singly by and for himself.

The effect of Christianity is thus, observe how exactly, reversed! It was the consequence of *its* mode of arrangement, that the *responsibility* of the case came to be that which was prevailingly felt as the peculiar matter of experience *in common*, while the *privilege* of it alone was the thing that was *special*.

SECTION V.—THE NOTION OF EVERLASTING RETRIBUTION.

THE task now alone remaining to me, in the completing of my analysis, is to draw forth the farther element in Christianity, beyond those already examined, which, according to the statement just made of the ground of the last section, is needed to be shown as actually concomitant with them in bringing about the end there described thus: namely, that which was the affording to human consciousness of the arrangement required in respect of its Privileges and its Responsibilities. This very same matter, however,—or, at least, that which I contend to be such,—I have already, as the reader may remember, so differently described, at the first allotment of the matter of these several sections, (p. 262,) as this: I have, namely, there stated it to consist in “the settling of the current of human attention predominantly in the direction which, with respect either to actions or sentient condition, regards Consequences preferably to Causes.” What I have first, therefore, here to do, is to show, as I hope it is evident may very easily be done, how the essential unison that I believe to exist between these so differently expressed statements, if apparently disguised, is only so in the way that is necessitated by the fact of the latter’s being a definition of the allotted purpose in the *abstract*, while the former defines the same according to its presentation in the manner of the natural working out of our *experience* in regard to it. Let the exhibition of this proof, then, be stated as follows:—

No one will doubt, at all events, this,—that the arriving at a sense of personal responsibility as to the remedying of existing evils, is in truth the proper means that I assert it to be, of the human will’s acquiring for itself the special mode and habit of determination, which is the *practical* determination

that I am now seeking out as the final benefit deducible from Christianity. That it is so, whatever may be the explanation of its being so, is the plainest of all the fruits of our habitual experience.—And let me add to it this farther, as what I believe is equally unquestionable, though it relates to the totally contrary and transcendental experience which, as such, I appealed to in my foregoing third chapter (p. 142):—*practical* determination, I say, is eminently that strong and straight-forward disposition of the mind, which I there attributed as the result demonstrative of sound healthiness, already in a vague way established by the general consent of Christian believers, as rightly indicative of a finished operation on the part of their religion. Very well:—to these two results of experience, then, add yet one more, and that of the commonest sort, and I conceive that the full bearing of the matter, taking in all its aspects, is sufficiently exposed. Let us suppose an occurrence of some unlooked-for calamity, suddenly intervening, such as should call forth an immediate expression of general mental disposition on the part of the subject of the calamity: would it not be the case, I appeal to any one, that the mode in which we should gain what we should count as a *characteristic* impression as to the actual soundness and healthiness of the mind in question, or the reverse, would be this?—if it be a strong one, it will show its strength precisely by the instantaneously bending of itself towards the seeking of remedy, which, lying as it does in the *future*, can by the mind's also bending itself *towards the future* alone be obtained;—while if it be a feeble one, supposing that it gets at all beyond the mere imbecility of expending itself in complaints against the calamity, it will testify to its feebleness by contenting itself with effort that is limited to this: just to the striving to find out "*how* it came to pass", and "*who* did it":—obviously, the mode of inquiring which does *not*, if it be there stopped, lead to any practical action to ensue upon it; and that does not *because* arrested upon contemplation of action lying in the *past*.

In this so perfectly ordinary experience, it thus seems to me that I find the entire *motive*—technically speaking,—of Christianity! The whole complicated apparatus of feelings, notions, and dogmas, as to the effect that it produced upon human nature, seems to me precisely accounted for, when we thus take that effect to have *been* this assigned one:—this heaving, as it were, of the substance of human thought all round from that its first practice, the unhealthy blame-scattering habit of a life-long hunting out of the Cause of suffering, now to the sound exercise of the endeavour to secure better Consequence from present suffering to accrue in future!—More and more clearly, unless I deceive myself, has this general tendency of what I at first theorized as representing “the peculiar strength of Christianity”, become confirmed by the particular examination of the working details; and may I not appeal to you as to the assistance that in regard to these details, the transcendental figuring *has* afforded? Christian doctrines themselves, you see, I hold to be the natural massing together of the speculative ideas that have successively sprung forth out of developing human nature; and we, in our analysing of them cannot, if we would, resist the natural chemistry by which they instantaneously mass themselves anew!

The section we have just finished, accordingly, it will here for the moment help us to describe as having been the tracing of the mode of this heaving round.—And so, correspondingly, what we have now to do is to examine into that which constituted the precise engine, by the means of which the revolution was brought to pass.

We have already arrived at the general principle, as such, that is required. We have seized, as I hope, firmly upon the understanding that the actual manner of the change's taking place consisted in the fact of man's acquiring the distinctly

personal sense of Responsibility lying within himself. But now there remains yet to see the again complicated matter of the mode in which this sense gradually realized itself to him:—un-twisting and twisting anew those fibres of old experience, pervading his entire mental nature, which were destined henceforth to fulfil such contrary to their former functions.

The task, however, is already in great measure worked out for us. As in the last section we found how much there was that we needed only just to avail ourselves of, in respect to the tracing of the effect of the idealized example of Christ,—so now, we have assistance at hand from the part of positive philosophers. They have abundantly demonstrated how the only meaning that *can* rationally be attached to the idea of Responsibility, as a practically-working feeling, is indeed that consciousness of *Amenability to Punishment*, for which, after them, I have been hitherto assuming it. Let me only therefore throw in, upon this point, the remark, how perfectly it is in accordance with the universal mode of limitation, in which all thought whatever consists to us, that moral ideas, as such, *should* be determined by a morally-controlling, and not by a morally-encouraging, influence,—by a “Thou shalt not”; and not by a “Do this for my sake”! Religion begins by the prime matter of giving a disposition towards well-doing; but Morality, as Morality, *can* build itself only upon restrictions. Is not here shown the necessity for their both being permanent?—though indeed is it not hence equally shown, how Christianity, in so far as it was not, characteristically, a moral religion, was not accordingly *the* religion that *could* endure in permanent association with Morality?—This matter of Responsibility, with which we are now to deal, is, we must bear in mind, that which has to carry us finally altogether beyond the *main* contents of Christianity.

But, accepting the philosophical definition, still remains to be considered this: what are we to determine as to the “how”, and the “to whom”, of Responsibility? Here, it seems to

me, has the practically-sufficing settlement been still left in the abeyance, which hence causes that it must perforce now occupy us for a short space.—I say, “a short space”: for I cannot but think, that *as* the “practically-sufficing settlement” that alone I aim at, the present development-view does, in fact, again afford the reconciling arrangement to the “contraries” of previous schemes, that effectually reduces the puzzle of them, once more, to a merely harmless one. That puzzle has been notoriously the following:—while, on the one hand, it is so manifestly the sole condition under which the theoretic conception of Responsibility can exist, that it have the companionship of that of Free-will, that such companionship stands as the logical necessity to our thinking in the case;—on the other hand, Free-will is, by the very terms of it, the idea which, by our philosophically-claimed recognition of universal Law and Order, seems proved at variance with the principle which of all others we are bound to pay homage to.—This, however, *being* the dilemma, judge whether the following representation does not actually meet the true point of difficulty; and, in explaining, soften it away.

In the first place, remember how it is the primary fact of all under the present scheme, (—and little as I desire to speak of it as in any exclusive manner belonging to myself, I *can* only do so, in regarding it *as* a scheme, in this instance:—it is, I say, the primary fact of this scheme) that nothing whatever is to be thought of by us in the question, other than *the mere matter of our own mental progress*, (see the first section of my Introduction,)—while the main source of the puzzle, as treated in general, has lain in the supposition that the human mind, by its speculations, was gaining a real knowledge of facts as they are (see p. 182). As here understood, the mind is engaged in simply realizing a constantly more and more developed mode of arranging its own conceptions: under, however, be it observed, thus much of outward fact which it is here considered that long experience *does* give us the legitimate sort of

(relative) right to count as such:—namely, the confirmed result of general experience, first, that there is a matter of general progress in nature; and secondly, that the mode of that progress is of the special character that is gained by the sole means of the incessant alternating of influences that are contrary to one another (see Introduction, Section II). Thus far, therefore, there is already the ground for *à priori* expectation—nay, even the *à priori* necessity,—that philosophical conception, when it came to investigate the nature of moral action in man, should have followed out its two opposite modes in progressing towards its own completion. For, it is evident, the thought which rests, with sufficingness to itself, upon the principle of Free-will, as a governing one in the case, is that which follows out the subjective mode of thought; while that which rests upon the abstract recognition of Law and Order, is itself a pursuing of the abstract mode of thought. This, accordingly, is the general outer view of the matter.—But, I urge, let us take up the inner and detailed view, and we may see immediately how the *à priori* necessity is conceivably that which has been carried out in the actual event of the case. According to this inner view, as I have set it forth, while there are actually in the nature of things two sets of circumstances, which hence necessitate the two-fold operation of our mind in regard to them,—one giving the condition of progress as a serial condition, appreciated by the mind in the manner of eventual succession, or of *history*; the other giving it under the condition estimated as what we may call a sectional view of progress, appropriate to the *scientific* order of mind, and of which it is the peculiarity to show things no longer according to their presentation as successive products, but according to their aspect when taken as in the *act* of producing such scientific results:—while, I say, there are two sets of circumstances in nature giving these several impressions, there is moreover the *third* set of circumstances additionally existing, which, always tacitly pending, nevertheless has *this* for its peculiarity, that,

having the function to blend the two other sets; it does so at marked intervals, or *stages*, (see pp. 36, 39,) discernible to us as such when we regard the operations of our mind in an abstractly serial mode, though not otherwise (p. 45); and which form to us the indication of some certain degree of fixed organization being at such epoch newly added to, and established within, the substance of the mind (p. 46). And let me remind you also of this, that, according to my conception, mental philosophy has of right no proper beginning, as such, until it has taken into its account this special effect of development:—having, without it, in fact, nothing but the piece-meal view, which does *not* give the means for an adequate philosophic generalization.—Very well, then: taking this much as to be granted, is not, however, the following yet to be seen as an immediately attending consequence?—*while* the philosophizing mind, in operating upon the matter of mental actions, must, by hypothesis, attend to each several phase of the three-fold operation belonging to all mental action, yet in being itself as much as ever subject to the universal law of mind, it must, accordingly, take *bias* as to the mode of its judging, from the tendency to favour one or the other of the aspects of the case that is individual to itself. Generally-viewing as philosophy by its nature is, yet in the oscillating consideration as to the different aspects, one philosopher will, and must, give greater weight than is accurately due to the one side of the matter; while another philosopher will, and must, give undue weight to the other: and the fact of this alone *gives* its truth to philosophy. Therefore, I say, while the matter of estimating these developmental stages is that which constitutes the truth of philosophy to be estimated, there is still permanently abiding in philosophy this division:—The philosophizing mind that is disposed to rest mainly upon mental phenomena such as are connected with the serial *realization* of the stages, will and must abidingly have for its prevailing and governing impression the sense of *fixtured organization*: such as brings the character of Mind

into correspondence with fixed organization in every other department of Nature, and consequently enforces upon us the conviction as to universal Law and Order, claiming every where obedience in the manner of *necessary* obedience;—while to the opposite mood of philosophy must occur the result that is also an opposite one. For when, on the other hand, the choice of subject to philosophize upon, is precisely *not* that which shows a fixed organization; but which on the contrary settles instinctively upon, rather, the mere section out of the serial course of progress, which shows nothing beyond the tumultuous details of mental operation which form the *working out* of some certain stage of progress: *then*, I say, *Freedom* is the condition whose recognition can alone be the ruling one. Things are now looked upon as in the act of growing; and whatever is growing, is it not of necessity free! Consider how it is habitually with ourselves, even without there being the smallest consciousness of philosophy in the case. Do we not inevitably associate with the idea of Necessity, precisely that sort of our actions which *are* distinguished from others by this very distinction of fixed organization: calling them, if their organization be of the corporeal kind, automatic; if it be spiritual, instinctive, or impulsive actions;—but in either case, attaching to them that idea of absence of *choice* in the matter, which, I argue, justly authorizes the philosopher, when he comes to philosophize upon them, in classing their manner of actual movement with that pertaining to the now astronomically-calculated motions of the heavenly bodies!—And so, of the contrary sort:—in respect of actions for the carrying on of which we have as yet *no* fixed organization, but where our determination lies still hovering in the balance, at the mercy of circumstantially-presented conflicting motives;—and where *this* is also true respecting inner condition, that although the force of previously-established habit would, as a mere matter of its own *vis inertiae*, seek to propagate itself into new instances of mere pursuance of that established habit, yet the controlling influences with which it

has to struggle make such mere repetition a thing that is an impossibility;—in respect, I say, to all actions thus hitherto *destitute* of determination, truly is the human mind to be known as actually Free from subjection to Law and Order, as indeed was the original Chaos itself!

In this manner, then, does not, I ask, the long-disputed basis of philosophic principle really set itself sufficiently at rest? If philosophy continues to oscillate between the antagonistic recognitions,—as I consider the above proves that it must continue,—this is exactly the vital movement which alone keeps philosophy alive; and therefore it is shown to be that which presents to our comprehension no real difficulty. But here we come to the point now in question with us, for the sake of which this arrangement has been sought for. If both recognitions be right and true in their own several spheres, there still remains the problem, to settle them into, and to keep them in, those distinctive spheres; and this is what, I would say, the existing state of the general idea of Responsibility, now under our consideration, is the express sign of *not* having been yet done in our world of thought—aiming towards it nevertheless, unconsciously, as I believe that Christianity and Philosophy alike have been doing. Seeing that, by my scheme, the subjective recognition of Free-will is by the rights of it appropriate, and solely appropriate, to the Religious mode of our thought; while the abstract recognition of necessary Law naturally fits itself alone to the Scientific:—the need of the question before us is simply that the idea of Responsibility, in being attached to the former recognition, be thence limited to the sphere which is of the appropriately free, or un-organized sort:—that is, as just stated, to precisely that portion of our human conduct in regard to which *instinctive* action, as such, does *not* as yet exist, in the particular individual concerned. However true it is that where we *have* instincts to guide us, we are *not* free agents: yet, I say, still it is manifest, that, *per contra*, where we have *not* instincts, we *are* free. But hitherto Christianity

and Philosophy have each of them been claiming to have the whole region of action, as of thought, under their severally sole dominion.

It is with the former alone, however, that we have here to do. Confining ourselves, accordingly, to the religious operation, let me offer the following suggestion, and ask you if it does not show, with self-consistency, the *manner* of Christianity's unconscious aiming, as I have called it, towards the present settlement?—In the first place, take its fundamental assertion of human nature's Responsibility in the mass:—now, grossly-aggregated as this idea is, it yet conveys, as we have seen, the intimation of positive truth within it, and of manifestly essential truth, that unless humanity in general so bear itself in regard to Consequences to accrue to it, as that it be a constantly-growing state, it will fall under the Punishment of being without the natural blessing attendant upon growth: thereby incurring the positive infliction of falling into decay.—But pass on beyond this,—as, you remember, the especially egotistic individuality of the first originators of Christianity made it especially necessary for *them* to pass on. There is required distinction to be made within this yet merely aggregate notion; and how *did* they make it? They made it, we very well know, by parting off the matter of Responsibility that seemed as if it *must* remain a thing in common to *men*, from that which farther consideration, made under egotistic influence, showed them need *not* remain so: and that is, they separated the common portion under the name of Original, or birth Sin, as that which individual effort had no effect whatever upon; while, as to the remainder, they dogmatically settled that the personal realizing of faith in Christ *could* succeed in shifting the Responsibility in regard to it away from personal shoulders. Let me, however, correct myself:—I should rather say this was the separation in the case needed to be made, while Christianity, as far as it went, was and could be only tending to it. For, although it did set forward a first attempt at such separation, the attempt

was of such rude sort as could be only unavailing. That mistake I have alleged of its making, as to the relative modes of Responsibility and of Privilege, lay upon its reasoning, I would say, as a fetter. The responsibility undertaken by Christ, in that it was common, being *universal*, forbade the sufficient working out of the distinction. If it *could*, however, have been made out by Christians, as such, that the imputed merit of Christ did indeed suffice to cover the whole of Original Sin in man, while it had, nevertheless, no influence whatever in impeding the course of Responsibility in the matter of Individual Sin *,—*then*, indeed, it seems to me, the Christian imagery would contain a perfectly faithful figuring of what is the real truth of the case!—That real truth, you see, I take to be this:—Inasmuch as there is to every individual man a certain sphere, greater or less, of undetermined action within his life, lying intermediate between the action of instincts natively or hereditarily possessed by him, and that of instincts which he himself has to pass on to his own posterity; and in which intermediate sphere he is therefore to all intents and purposes the veritable (delegated) Creator of himself: therefore, I say, just so far as within this sphere, though in no other, the individual being is strictly *responsible* for the employment that he makes of the *freedom* therein existing for him;—while for the whole sphere of his action that is instinctively determined for him, it is an entirely fitting representation to say that human nature in general, as it has come down to him, and as it is aptly figured under the idea of Christ, is the only proper holder of responsibility. And if this be the case, (—I see not how it can be questioned!—) the only matter left is to find where lies the actual boundary between the spheres. *Christianity*

* There may possibly be some sect of Christians, or some individual thinker amongst Christians, who has actually taken this peculiar view respecting Atonement, notwithstanding its logical inconsistency with Christianity; but no expression of such view has fallen within my own knowledge.

made out the difference by crudely marking off, for the domain of individual freedom, a certain portion of existence sharply severed from the rest, by lines that cut it out, drawn straight at either extremity through the hours of (rational) birth and (rational) decease. And I conceive that what *ought* to be done is this: that the line of determination be made out as, in fact, a meandering one, whose sinuosities pervade the whole extent of life's course!

Here, however, let me stop for a moment, to carry on somewhat farther a parenthetical observation, that already started itself, as such, in the foregoing section (p. 358):—I mean, as to the effect that inevitably produces itself upon us, when application of these notions of Free-Will and Necessity is made, as it enforces itself to be made, to our idea of Deity. It seems to me singularly observable, that in reality we obtain thence precisely the very same sort of demonstration as to the fact of that idea's being determinately the produce of our own minds, that in astronomical science, in regard to the fact of the earth's movement, is afforded to us by the circumstance of the aberration of light.—Consider, I appeal to you, if it is not so.—Genuine logical sequences, arrived at from the several mental stations appropriate to the opposite principles, (—and whether it be in the single mind of an individual thinker, debating with himself, or, as is more common, in the severally independent minds of antagonistic thinkers, is of no consequence:—) in meeting together in the one idea of Deity, strike against one another with absolute contradiction; and as the necessary consequence, by that means nullify the idea of God altogether,—leave it behind, therefore, absolutely excluded from the field of our mental vision! And this, I say, is what *could* not have been, if that which our idea of Deity conveys to us had been a substantial fact, and not the phenomenal result of our own variable impressions!—The Positivist, observe,—and perhaps I may say, the rationalizing theologian also,—looks upon the

scheme of things under the prevailing sense of Plan, and therefore under recognition of Necessity; and because they do so, it happens to them that when they proceed to carry on their impression to the Unknown Cause of things, God to the former becomes simply identical with Fate, while to the latter He is at all events rendered subject to Fate. On the other hand, however, the proper theologian, seeing nothing of Plan except as solely proceeding from the immediately-acting Will of Deity, in fact has the same kind of agreement with the atheistic worshippers of Chance: that is, an utter indeterminateness is itself the God of the latter; while to the former, their God is merely subject to utter indeterminateness. And these opposing views *are*, surely, all of them alike legitimate ones, when measured as from the shifting stations of our own veering conceptions;—nay, by their very opposition, are the sole means by which we come finally to make the comparison and adjustment of different classes of impressions, which alone give to us the clue that is a rightful clue, as to the always inaccessible Object we are dealing with. But, supposing the image of Deity to be really that actual Being which theology takes Him to be, it follows that, unless human reason be purely a delusion, God *in Himself* must exist under condition of either constant oscillation in His own nature, such as would altogether confute the “unchangeableness” attributed to Him;—or else, under the general conditions of Freedom and of Fate *at one and the same time*: which is impossible. It has surely been the intuition as to this result, necessarily latent within all philosophy, that has all along constituted the cause of common scepticism, so notoriously prevalent in philosophy!—Let me, however, now return to the “practical” sphere, which is the thing of present importance.

And yet, the more I consider it, the more do I feel how this parenthetical observation is *not*, in truth,—is *eminently not* an *un-practical* one!—The point which now rests with us, is

the "to whom" responsibility is due. And this image of *God* being thus reduced to the mere phenomenal impression that it is, what becomes, it will be asked, of the very *meaning* of Responsibility? What is there that shall stand henceforth as the definite object of thought, forming at once the originating cause of payment's being required from us, and the claimant, with capability of enforcing the claim of the payment's being made, without which definite object the idea becomes a nullity?

To this, I can immediately return, the answer that satisfies me is the following:—First, that which has been given to me is this: a possibility of sharing in the general well-being which is made out by the duly carried-on action of all component parts of general being;—secondly, this possibility has been allotted under penalty that if I, in my own individuality, do *not* duly carry on the action belonging to my own constitution, in that part of it which is open to my own action, by aiming to bring it into requisite harmony with the general *progressive* condition, not only shall I forfeit that constitution, but moreover become, as it were, *rotten* in regard to it;—and hence, thirdly, I may indeed say, that while the payment of my obligation is manifestly due, immediately, to my own constitution, which is *myself*, yet, ultimately it needs to be estimated as due to the general constitution of things, which rather ought to be called *the Power therein manifested*.—But I know how far from definite,—how, on the contrary, utterly vague, and therefore how destitute of any reality of moral force, a reference of this merely abstract sort *must* appear to all who have as yet found their standard and authorization of Duty only in the concrete recognition of a Divine *Being*.—"How", I know it will be farther urged, "are we to gain our apprehension as to what it is that this general harmony requires?"—And if I answer, as I have already answered in advance at the beginning, (see p. 21,) that the foundation upon which our present sense of Religion,—and thence, of course, our sense of Religious Duty,—rests, is the result gained out of Experience:—will not such objector,—I

feel sure that he *will*,—turn away from the reply with a Pilate expression of contempt, and say “What is Experience!”——Reader, if you will listen to me, I will tell you what it is in this case. It is the very same *really nothing*, but *effectually every thing*, which the centre of physical gravity is to us. This is the only image to express what it is; but this, I say, *does* precisely express it. What *but* such concentration,—such bringing into one single valid point, of the infinitely otherwise minute and diffused influences pervading the entire range of material things,—*is* it that enables us to hold our else uncontrollable bodies, all microscopic as they are, upright!—Nay, let this farther be noted: that we are able, in addition, not only to stand upright, but moreover to move and to walk, what is *this* but, again, precisely the possession of an individual control over the petty sphere of gravity immediate to us, that corresponds with the degree I have been laying out of man’s responsibility?—Think upon the analogy, I entreat you; and see if the definiteness—which, at all events, *is* definiteness,—that this figure brings, be not indeed that which, the instant that your meditation shall have realized it, will produce in you the conviction that, after all, there *is* a moral force in what I urge.—If, amidst the concrete press of daily life, it *will* seem incredible to you that so intangible a guide as this of merely concentrated experience should serve you, so that you cannot but be “of little faith” respecting it:—go out, when the time comes that the “lilies of the field” have gone to sleep, and “consider, I say unto you, the stars of heaven, how *they* direct themselves.”

The concentration, I conceive, has come about in the same way that I have described in regard to the Christian generalization (pp. 74, 75);—the fact being, indeed, evidently, that although the realization of the idea of God must be thought of as in a measure anterior to the beginning existence of Christianity, yet the latter was still but one and the same thing with the *ripening* of the idea of God. And thus we arrive to feel

what they were doing for us—all that multitude of our fellow-beings, that have held and moulded forth Experience, *before* it came to be now the time for *us* to take it up after them. Under imagery of the attributes of Deity, they embodied for us the entire fruits out of that experience, as to whatever it was that they had found to be richest, noblest, best, in regard to life. They painted forth in Him Power, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty, Love:—all these, observe, being qualities essentially in harmony with one another, and therefore both capable of being blent into one image, and requiring to be so blent. And this being so, how,—I ask once again,—can there be any real difference as to the effect, the moral effect, upon ourselves, when there is simply the change to the Ideal Embodiment, that its concreteness has fallen off from it? Surely it is, undeniably, the case that I have just figured. Exactly in the same way as this, did the old astronomical notion of the Individual Sun, as the source of attraction, give place to the finding such source now as, although still lying within the corporeal body of the Sun, yet owing its efficiency solely to its forming the focus of a general balancing of forces. And although the individuality of solar influence is gone, still, as ever, the earth stands, and turns;—and *we*, I repeat, may also stand and turn: stand *firmly*, and turn *securely*, still, as ever, solely in proportion as we maintain our base direct with regard to our earth's base, just as that maintains itself with regard to the whole planetary system's base.

And see, moreover, how perfectly this figure disposes finally of the master-difficulty in the whole matter, respecting the contradiction to our best instincts! That difficulty has consisted in our now missing, through want of the theological personification of Deity, the influence in front of us and above us, directly to be appreciated as such, which should,—coaxingly, as it were,—*draw* us onward in the path of duty, instead of, as now, *driving* us by this apparently derogatory method of sole instigation by punishment. But, I say, this appearance, so far as there is any real derogatoriness in it, now entirely *dis*-appears.

For, just as there is in fact the contrary to a necessity for our looking downwards towards the principle that gives us a firm physical basis,—just as the lowest depth of the nadir beneath our feet, though it affords us the direction for our upright standing, nevertheless does so only by its determining for us the zenith, towards which alone our *looking* being (capably) directed, we *can* stand upright,—so, I say, the ennobling object of aspiration remains to us, now, in the same forward position, and truly in the same forward position of proper *attraction*, as ever it did, notwithstanding that the actual immensity of distance to which the focus of solar influence is reduced, requires us to own that for ordinary matters, such as that of our daily walking to and fro upon earth, the more immediate influence that acts from below our feet is incomparably the *more* influential. Regarded under this figure, no one, I urge, can by any possibility any longer fear, that the tendency of the estimation of Punishment, when rightly unfolded, is that which must cause our moral nature to grovel!

But, always, the matter of this being or not “rightly unfolded”, is every thing. And therefore,—considering that the foregoing has been indeed a sufficing answer to the question of the “to whom” responsibility has to be paid,—let us recur to the companion question of its “how”.

The great point of *improvement* in our idea of Punishment is that we learn to know it as provided for, mainly, by an intrinsic principle within our own constitution: that principle being our power of Conscience. This is the station we have arrived at, that is in so far manifestly clear. But the qualification of the “mainly”, so necessary in the case, precisely indicates the somewhat farther to be examined, that at first sight is *not* perfectly clear. And this relates to the carrying out of the new sort of distinction as to the sphere now assigned to the exercise of “Freedom” and “Responsibility”, into the

quality of the "Punishment" acting on such sphere:—the varied estimation as to the latter being in fact the essential cause of there *being* any such distinction of separate spheres.

The matter of *perfectness* in our moral constitution, so far as it is ever attained, we see is that which is intrinsically in proportion to the degree in which our individual instinct as to right and wrong doing, corresponds with our general instinct: that is, in proportion as the impulse which drives us into practical action (—I have already, remember, laid down that individual action, *rightly estimated*, is therein signified as being practical action:—) harmonizes with the impulse that drives us meditatively to seek union with action that is general in nature. And this harmony, in whatever measure it *has* been obtained, is, by the preceding figure, tantamount to the realizing for ourselves of a moral focus of personal instinct, or "intuition",—called by us our general Conscience,—which, if our personal nature in other respects be so well balanced as to preserve the focus in sufficient steadiness, (—observe how essential is this condition to the matter!—) will indeed serve to us as the centre of our own peculiar sphere of moral gravity, that will afford us an available fulcrum for our daily living. But this is the same thing as saying that, as to this harmonized portion of our being, the need of the original sort of impulse of Punishment is entirely merged. Moral movement is herein fully provided for by a principle resident within our own constitution. Here, however, arises this confusing aspect: the department of our nature which possesses this resident principle is not, as first impression is apt to suggest, the one in which we are properly responsible, and in which therefore we acquire merit, but the reverse. It is the one in which obedience to rightful regulation, otherwise indeed meritorious, loses all such quality:—throwing it all upon general human nature, as, according to the orthodox image, represented by the "Christ". It is the one in which the matter of moral control takes rank purely with the whole mass of physical and affective instincts.

And doing so, observe how another point of confusion clears away, as to the apparent contradiction of that which is the "mainly" influencing motive being nevertheless not also the "most influential". The action of the moral instincts, in being thus ranked with the mass of inferior instincts, shows a sphere for them which, according to my adopted figure, is truly as much *larger* than the strictly responsible sphere, as the sphere of physical movement which includes our journeying together with our earth annually in space, is larger than that which limits our personal peregrinations! And yet who would say, for this, that the side which is favoured by the absolute disproportion, is the one that upon the individual aspect of the case is the most important? The part of moral being in which Responsibility has become latent in the mode of instinct, is that in which the imprisoned principle of life and happiness has to go out henceforth, not to the benefit of the individual holder of it, but to the practical work of benefiting others: and in the doing of such work—except for general compensation,—the true manner of doing it *well* is that the man sink into the mere machine—noble sort of machine that he is!—And therefore it is manifest that, in regard to his own life, the part of him alone that is as yet free, and growing, is that which incomparably the most influences his sense of individual well-being;—while the fact of this being the case, making the several measurements of individual enjoyment of life and of moral perfectness necessary to be judged of from such opposite points of view, proves, I argue, the enduringness of the need of recognition of the generalized motive of Religion, lying in its being that which not only requires to remain for ever behind the daily-impelling motive of Morality to give it requisite support, but also to persist in present ministry upon it in order to afford it substance. The absolutely small, but relatively all-important sphere of Morality, in which action is free and the individual is responsible, would have no existence as such if there were not an already-obtained amount of intuitive Conscience behind it to back its own actual

state of non-intuition; but seeing that the very life of the individual, as an individual, depends upon non-intuitive action, and that this, again, demands for itself, in its deficiency of the control of inner principle, that of the happily-always-existing means of control lying in external Punishment,—therefore, I say, Religion, which always *does* act by external Punishment, remains the general influence whose estimation cannot, in fact, be under any mode of considering moral circumstances dispensed with. The orthodox figure, that is to say, will for ever need, provided it be but restrained to its proper sphere, to stand side by side with the morally-astronomical one;—and not only as its companion, but as its perpetual progenitor. For it is evident that all whatever of intuitive moral principle, organically and hereditarily established, existing within any individual, and thereby enabling him to rise above the need of external Punishment, that *does* so exist, came to him, or rather to his ancestors, originally *by means of* external Punishment,—that is to say, has *grown out* of the need for the latter.—Let us, however, trace this event a little closer.

Let us call the intuitive mode of Punishment where Responsibility is latent, *fixed punishment*, and the contrary mode *floating punishment*;—and this, I think, will help us speedily to see how every degree of the former, after first there came to be any recognition of punishment at all, *must* have been derived out of the latter. The reason *why* external punishment is in its nature destitute of fixedness, is the universally-prevailing inequality of condition:—even the so-called *fixed* condition of punishment being only such, let it be always remembered, relatively to our human apprehension regarding it. *Here* is the Original Evil of the matter, if Evil it needed to be counted. Except for our human sense of Justice, (when that *is* arrived at,) there is nothing in nature to cause retribution to fall determinately upon the place to which we feel it to be due. It is, so-to-speak, *accident* whether it light justly or not. Let us, for example, take the case which truly *has* the right to stand as

the representative case of all others,—that of the man who sins in the manner of leading a life of habitual and gross self-indulgence. Such sort of sinner, take note, is, by the very fact of his being such, one whom the precise hypothesis of the case affirms to be destitute of the controlling inner principle, which has in it the organically fixed power of punishing him in the best possible way of punishing him, which consists in the torment proper to a morbid or wounded Conscience, known by us as *Remorse*. And wanting this, there is still, of determinate sort, no *other* punishment provided by Nature for him. In his greediness to clutch at and heap up for himself more of self-enjoyment than ought justly to belong to him, he leaves to fellow-beings in contact with him less than justly belongs to them;—and much more, eminently much more than this, he commits the heinous sin of repeating the same brutish usage of his own ability in regard to the fellow-beings *not* in present contact with him, who nevertheless still *are* in an abstract sort of contact with him, in respect of their being the destined inheritors of the circumstances he has to leave behind him: I mean, of course, as to what is of special concern in the case, when it occurs that these circumstances consist in the miserable inheritance of his diseased constitution;—but the direct suffering resulting from all of this falls, not upon him, but upon them. All that happens is that the result of Providential inequality, hitherto seen, repeats itself in exactly its hitherto manner. The sinner's lot is inevitably blended with that of the mass of his fellows; and in its being so, there is but one course that can follow. If, in his lack of generalized impulse to the contrary, this continuer of the wretched effort of primitive barbarians do actually succeed in accomplishing his purpose, that, by whatever means, he may make himself the one that draws all the effect of the inequality towards himself in his own favour,—why, Nature leaves him alone to do so. She has nothing at all to say to him that will *directly* manifest her displeasure, (—mind, I entreat you, this qualification,—) but only suffers the case to remain

open to mankind as a specimen of what it is *their* business to aim towards the amending.—And by so doing, is not this much, at all events, immediately evident?—she stirs up the *world's* Conscience vicariously to supply the want of that which the sinner has not! (Vicariously, I say: and observe the word, since it is this which points to the function of Religion in the matter, which it is my object to point out.) The world visits the sinner, vaguely, with its general scorn and indignation; and this, accordingly,—in conjunction with the enfeebled condition of his own constitution, bodily and mental, and his liability to an accelerated death,—makes up the *floating punishment* that, as such, *does* naturally attend this species of delinquency. But how this externally-inflicted disgrace has in it the power of bringing about the remedy actually required as an adequate one,—that is, how it has the power of producing in the sinner the generalized impulse towards fellow-beings, the lack of which was the cause of his sinning as he has done:—this, I say, is not immediately evident: and therefore, in my asserting of it, needs to be more fully explained.

It is the ordinary understanding of the matter that Shame acts as the *result* of an already existing inward recognition of delinquency; but such mode of understanding, I am again, according to the compulsive rule of my principle, paradoxically reversing. And this, surely, I may plainly allege on behalf of my doing so. *Must* not man, in every case, I ask, *feel* calamity, of whatever sort it be, before he can *think* about it? Very well: then, if so, the penalty awaiting him of the world's contempt and anger—this being the portion of the natural penalty that solely has relation to the point in question,—is 'just that which, by its very subtleness, *would*, I argue, in such case as that now imagined, have the power of acting upon the thick-skinned stolidity of his yet crass egoism, so as actually to begin to awaken the capacity for a Conscience hitherto wanting to him. It would act very gradually in so doing;—it would arouse, in the first place, nothing but the customary

effort of barbarian natures to remove the externally-arriving distress, by the proper barbarian remedy of either force or flattery;—but still, this remedy having failed, as in the end it must be known by him to fail, he would thereby be driven, and as effectually now by the power of Shame, as heretofore by the dread of the corporeal rod, to try for remedy within himself. For, helping him to this effort, the very reception of the iterated expression of dislike towards him on the part of his human environment, could not help infixing what would become at last a permanently-engraved reflection of itself: that is, a *generalized* impression respecting the matter of moral aversion. And this is, in fact, the bestowing upon him the very thing hitherto absent from him. It is the teaching to know the feeling of *self-contempt*, and *self-indignation*, which, without the means of the abstract point of view afforded by the generalized impression, his egoism would for ever have resisted;—and what is this but indeed the veritable induction of the crisis of transformation, through the result of which his heretofore exclusive regard to outer moral influence obtains to accompany the latter, and finally to predominate over it, the better sort of regard which respects inner influence? Shame directed towards the matter of *self-condemnation* surely may, in this way, well grow out of shame for the world's condemnation; and may do so, moreover, without at all ceasing to be intrinsically just the same motive of the fear-of-punishment kind that ever it was.

But generalized impression is, by hypothesis, religious impression. And so, accordingly, is it the express purpose of my demonstration, here, as in the preceding part of it, to show how Religion does fulfil its rightful end for man, if it do succeed in bestowing upon his spiritual nature more and more of this transformed constitution. By my scheme, if the obtaining of self-enjoyment (in the mode of self-realization, and of a constantly refining character,) be the proper acting motive for the individual, as an individual; so the simple fact of growth to his nature,—which this changing of regard to exterior or charac-

teristically physical inducement, into regard to interior, or characteristically mental inducement, must be admitted to be,—forms the motive which is the general one of his existence, and therefore the one that it suffices to attribute to God in the matter. Certainly, it seems to me that if this object *be* proved as attained, nothing whatever is there else remaining, as an ulterior object, that can in right reason be demanded of our natural constitution, and the Divine ordering of it.—Let this ground of mine, I entreat you, be well understood in the matter we are now entering upon.—You already perceive, doubtless, the mode of explanation which I am about to adopt with regard to the signal exaggeration in respect to Personal Retribution, by which Christianity afforded the needed counterpart to its opposite sort of exaggeration, considered in the last section, and thus made out the required sum of mental circumstances, whose conjunction formed the Providential crisis, preparing the means of individual crisis, of the sort just spoken of, to each of us. But before we can duly consider the production of such effect, we must have a degree of assurance as to the principle we take for our standard. And here, therefore, I would plainly state, lies what forms my own. If the Christian doctrine of Eternal Rewards and Punishments, notwithstanding the externalness of motive proffered by it,—inevitably, as I recognize, and in every case, proper to motive that is of religious sort,—really have ended by transmuting a portion of our psychical being in the manner described:—then, I aver, truly has it done its work, and fully, without any thing at all of farther consequence beyond this being necessary to be thought of in this case, any more than, and of any other sort than, in the case of all others of its doctrines. Only upon this understanding, I am aware, can there be found any force in the representation I am making; and only upon this, I ask, let it accordingly be judged.

I assign to Christianity in this present matter, just the agency which consists in the sorting out, by its dogmatic machinery, of the different sets of motives which, upon the

institution of the province of Morality, find each of them their proper place; but which, previously to that event, act in human nature largely towards unserviceable ends, and at cross purposes with one another. And what this in fact comprises, let us try to estimate by returning to our illustrative example.

What, I ask, can be thought of as the true remedy for, and cure of, the sinner's condition as we have taken it, other than this: namely, that the egotistic sensualist have grown to be actually capable of making a just account of the interests of fellow beings, and as the special point of the case, of those of his circumstantial successors? But to do this, is necessary the basis of instinctive principle which takes generations and generations of men innumerable to produce! Born as the sinner is without it, the utmost the sinner in his own short space of life can do, is to make a feeble beginning towards the work of its cultivation. Here therefore is the foundation of the need that finally there should be the two spheres of feeling and of duty within man: the Moral sphere, of free individual action, being indeed that which alone has the true sense of Responsibility and of Obligation within it; but the Religious sphere still having the pseudo-moral, or pre-moral sense of such Obligation which gives the constant character of Religious Obligation—akin, as we have seen, to that of Physical Obligation, or the pervading influence of the universal domain of the instincts (—our properly Moral Obligation in regard to our conscientious instincts, being just to provide requisite circumstances for their exercise, as we provide, for instance, fresh air, and cleanliness for our bodies—). The sinner supposed has *only* the sphere of rudest Religious Obligation; and observe, as a circumstance tending ever expressly to keep him under his restriction, the submission to his lot which Religion enforces upon him, is that which actually encourages him to avail himself of all the means of selfish indulgence within his power.—It is only the Moralist, whose development is so far beyond his, that is able to see where the true course of wisdom for him lies.—But let us come

to the state of that Moralist,—of him who *has* his two spheres set distinctly apart. He has by birth-possession the high privilege of a clear image, reflecting the entire sum of the world's moral experience hitherto, all stamped and verified, ready at once to serve him as the standard and guide of the whole of his conduct in life. But because it is such,—because, in consequence, the acts he performs by it are such as he cannot help performing, and such as are therefore performed only by the sole “grace of God”, and by “no virtue of his own”:—because, I say, his moral standard is such, the obligation it imposes upon him is only of Religious sort: it is that in regard to which the appropriate *Sin* is the general allowing his instincts to fall through inertness into rottenness and decay,—the appropriate *Duty* is simply to accept the exertions involved in its possession with thankfulness,—the appropriate *mode* of exercising faculty upon it, is that of owning that the exertions involved by it are due in the manner of *Vicariously*-undertaken labours for less favoured beings: that is, labours which are already paid for,—which pay themselves in the doing,—and which have no ulterior reward for themselves in view.——And let us note, that in whatever degree this inborn standard fails in the perfectness that is felt by any being to be desirable, just in so far is the Religious Duty of the case that of implicit submission, as to any other calamity that is absolutely inevitable. Some out of the number of human beings,—it is the crowning effect of the natural inequality,—must enter life upon lower ground than others, and be subject to its conditions all their life long;—and hence to them the share of Vicarious Duty that falls, is only that they learn willingly to suffer it, for the sake of general good.——But all this is reversed upon the ground of Morality. We are here within the matter of conflict which is true conflict. In relation to *instincts*, all that man can do is to carry on that pseudo-warfare with God, which means of necessity that he leave his lot implicitly in the hands of God: the carrying on of his own development, all rightful as it is, must be owned as

utterly subordinate to acquiescence with the limitation laid upon it. But Moral ground is that in which the individual, as an individual, is altogether free to fight the matter out with his fellows:—free, that is, except for the inner restrictions that are only felt as such in the case of his disobedience to them. It is the ground upon which his combative energies having their full play, he knows, in consequence, what is the enjoyment that results from the glow that comes with their exercise. And thus it is, I say, that the being who in this manner has his different sets of energies parted off into their proper allotments, does indeed realize the fact how the standing upon a basis of higher developmental level, does actually, together with a wider sphere of employment, bring its reward for the employment along with it.

But Christianity, I conceive, in not as yet presenting the full distinction, remained destitute of this effect. Let us however consider the instrumentation by which it prepared the way for it:—that is, in chief, as already pointed out, the dogma of Original Sin. If that dogma be carried out as, I repeat, it seems to me that by its own intrinsic logic it may, so as to make the line cutting off instinctive or birth-responsibility (answered for by general nature,) from proper responsibility (answered for by the individual,) a line, as I have suggested, that in fact meanders through every portion of our life-long duration of consciousness, and that thus saves the sphere of proper Morality from the enfeebling influence of reliance upon a Saviour to do that which every man needs to do for himself,—the dogma, I say, becomes simply the theoretic device which gives us the proper means of recognizing what otherwise we have no means of recognizing. For such distinction of psychical departments, however it exists within us, has no means of being subjectively felt, any more than the veins that wander within-side our bodies; or,—let me rather say,—than the separating membrane that divides heart from lungs, or any other part of the internal structure of our frame from any other part:—the

division being, in either case, conspicuous enough to the eye of whoever analytically dissects, but otherwise rightfully hidden. I say "rightfully", in the present case, for this reason: that all our knowledge of ourselves needs, by the fundamental law of the matter, to come solely to us through *practical* experience. By trying whether or not any mode of action belongs to our constitutionally-possible sphere, or to our only creatively-possible sphere, is it that we have to find out to which it belongs;—while, on the other hand, abundance of inducement is there to impel us to such trying. The farthest from a *merely* theoretical question is this:—who will deny the depth of cruelty that there is, when, in forming our judgment of fellow-creatures, we err by supposing that they have been capable of virtuous conduct of which they have not been capable?—who will deny the fatality of injury when, in judging of ourselves, we make the mistake of supposing that we are not capable of exertions of which we really are capable?—But the experimenting, if it be duly carried on, does, I say, bring at all events the degree of conscious accuracy that suffices us, and that suffices us the more fully just when it becomes more approaching to accurate. And it does this, obviously, through our sense of the kind of punishment, floating or fixed, that our actions bring to ensue upon them. The matters in which we are naturally at sea as to any internal regulation respecting them, are inevitably those in which we lie consciously at the mercy of the chance sort of retribution that comes with the right or wrong attribution of external disgrace and calamity to us.

The mixing up, however, of external disgrace *and* calamity, as if they were influences of one and the same kind, is a leading sign of the imperfection in Christian dogmatization, which I say consists in its want of the finished distinction between Morality and Religion. For, as we have seen, disgrace is capable of effecting the transmutation of floating punishment into fixed, which corporeal calamity is not; and accordingly, the gross nature of the retribution which Christianity held

forth as in proper conjunction with the subtle effectiveness really present in the influence of Shame, could only keep back the latter from the exercise of its effectiveness. It is, we all know, the inevitable effect of the holding forth of the corporeal rod, and much more of the infliction of it, that the attention compelled towards it, makes it an actual impossibility for the sinner to be, in any true sense of the word, ashamed of himself. The utmost that the rod can in any case do, is to break up an existing state of impenetrable obduracy; and if it at all go beyond this purpose, we know it only defeats all that is legitimate in its use. So great indeed is the danger of self-frustration in regard to it through over-due employment, that it may be said the only degree admitting of justification is just that which suffices to create a practical *fear* of it:—since the *fear* of the rod is that which gives its peculiar tone to the sense of Shame, and thus mainly helps to create the sense. But having done this, it needs to separate itself from the latter. And hence, I conclude, it is only when the matter of Physical Retribution has duly lapsed into its proper department,—which I take to be that which is constituted by simply the liability to bodily disease,—that the Christian doctrine has really arrived at the stage, where in fact it comes to have any effect that is not an impediment to true effect in the case.

But the point of due arrangement which is the one that most comprehensively confirms the distinction, and that brings, when settled, this part of the general subject at once into the harmony with the entire scheme elsewhere followed out that is requisite, is this (—corresponding with the summed-up inference of the last section, respecting the allotment of our privileges and responsibilities):—Christianity, I assert, erred in attributing the department of effort which is here adjudged as the properly combative one, to the province which I would restrict to Religion; and the reverse. It led men (by its prevailing tendency,) to fight out their salvation in the way of wrestling for it with *God*, while amongst men, where it should

have instilled contention (of right sort), it suffered them, comparatively, to be passive. And the contrary mode, upon my scheme, is of the degree of importance, beyond its immediate effect, that it alone shows,—while it *does* show us,—the actual rationale of the fact of progress as taking place in the case. For, as, in general, energies which are properly active energies are those which are mainly pleasure-bestowing, and therein desirable, to man in his individual capacity,—so, I argue, the attaining, as a final result, of a progressively-increasing sphere for such energies, beyond the mere possession of the primitive and comparatively passive sphere, is indeed that which accounts for the impulse resident within human nature towards it. The motive for growth,—that growth to be rewarded by simply the enjoyment of growth,—is explained by just the modification of the old Pursuit-of-Happiness principle that renders it in every point self-consistent. Let us say that the thing which to man's own consciousness is the thing rightly pursued, is this: *Content*, as the fruit of *Contention*. Very well; then I say that Religion, however it be the faculty within us that gives us the truest enjoyment of Content when we have it, is not that which best enables us to contend for it. This is the work best fulfilled by our individualistic faculties. And therefore, that man should really,—as it were in spite of that which he thinks himself to be pursuing,—have a still greater enjoyment in his individualistic enjoyment of the Contention that is the proper means of obtaining the Content, than in his enjoyment of whatever measure he actually possesses of such Content, is simply that which, in keeping his individualistic faculties alive, gives to his entire individualism the only means it has at all of growth. Those faculties, like all other organic functions whatever, are maintained solely by the play afforded to them; and play is afforded, here as elsewhere, solely by the instrumentation of circumstantial obstacles intervening to interfere with the passivity of existence, that, except in the mode of alternation, would be, not only cessation of growth, but destruction. Should we

be able, let physiologists tell us, even to open our lungs so as to breathe, if disturbing influence in the atmosphere did not stimulate them to the movement? And so, likewise, is it the condition of our moral life, that we live within an atmosphere of disturbance, that by turns arouses us to re-actionary struggle against it, and, upon its cessation, enables us to appreciate the Content broken into. And so moreover, I say, does our moral constitution first attain the degree of perfectness that matches with the physical, when the pursuit of individualistic purpose, which is that of *Self-maintenance* and increase, first of all necessities as it is to us, nevertheless becomes as little of a directly-conscious object of pursuit to us as, chiefly, the taking in of the universal sustenance of air; and secondarily,—as involving a degree more of direct attention, and only that,—the taking of the sustenance of food. Not that food and air may not, and ought not, to be enjoyed in themselves;—it is the express sign and condition of health in us that they *be* so enjoyed;—but that they *best* fulfil the true bearing that their functions require to have, in regard to general well-being and progress, in proportion as their *chief* character is an automatic character. For thus, in regard to the moral case, do the opposite aspects that belong to it, become, as I consider, sufficiently adjusted:—Seeing that the abstract, or relatively-absolute state of the case, which, standing for God's object, is therefore intrinsically the truest and most important of the contradictory objects in question, requires that man's predominant mode of the Pursuit of Happiness should be that which consists in the fighting with, in order to remove, existing obstacles to Content: it is, accordingly, the most advantageous condition of man's nature, that he *be* predominantly disposed to such Contention;—but still the fact remains, that this most advantageous condition will alone be fulfilled to highest advantage, when to his own consciousness the Divine object is hidden and partially disguised, as it were by a semi-transparent covering, under his own immediately personal object. That is:—while it must be figured that

God's will is, predominantly, that man live, in order that he may grow and make growth; and only subordinately, that he enjoy the fruit of such growth;—it is needful that man himself should predominantly desire that he may grow and make growth in order that he may live thereby, and only subordinately the reverse,—just that he *may* best fulfil God's will:—while also, it is well that the semi-transparent disguise become more and more transparent, and less and less of a disguise.

Here, therefore, I would say, is rendered completely apparent the inherent undesirableness of the Christian notion as to Retribution. For, the degree of corporeality, and express personalism, of it, make it impossible that under it the regard to personal welfare should become automatic to the extent that a properly moral condition requires it to be. The balance to the opposing principles in our constitution afforded by it, is, I conceive, one which, if it could have been rested in, would have thrown our nature altogether out of the line of direction which is the true one for progress. But expressly the Divine state of circumstances is that it could *not* be rested in.

Let us accordingly, taking the foregoing as the standard principle now prepared to be our guide, turn back to see what *were* the circumstances, historically traceable, whose existence in their proper place gave to us present beings the means of this more advantageous condition. Let us see what did actually constitute the great event of the religious crisis, whose dogmatic results, in regard to the at-present-considered part of it, we are now taking in the light of having formed the means, Providentially laid out, by which alone could have been developed within us this specially individualistic portion of our being, upon whose relative increase we now see how our sum of general Happiness mainly depends. Remember that, by the very necessity contained in Progress, if we try to enter into the state of human feeling at that epoch,—as we must, if we would understand it,—we must find it, as an average state, upon a

lower level than our own:—so that the gentle sort of influence, which I have just compared to that of the natural means of physical life, (and I might add, of ordinary exercise of life of all sorts,) and which, in being gentle, gives us the truest capability of enjoyment of life, is precisely *not* to be expected as the thing in requisition then. The one great obstacle to our fulfilling alike of God's will, and of our own Happiness, all along,—let us never forget,—is the undue preponderance of our own Egoism. And in so far as it has been actually subdued at the present day, it is so, I conceive, precisely because its mountain-heap of substance, possessing all the obduracy that does in truth require even the physically-threatening rod to be employed, for the purpose of breaking into it, *was* in such manner broken into, at that special epoch. The dogmatic portion of Christianity already considered, would have been fatal in its effect, as to human progress, if it had stood alone. The institution of the ennobling sense respecting Human Brotherhood, if there had been nothing to counteract it by raising into a special newness of signification the sense respecting strict Human Individualism, would have altogether failed in its office. For Egoism, left in all the rudeness of its obduracy,—or, let us say, only just begun to be cloven into disintegration,—as soon as it realized that the means of Vicarious Alleviation of Evil was being propounded, would, of a certainty, have limited itself to the seizing upon it solely for the proving of what it could *get* out of it. To use the privilege of its possession, so as to find what could be *done* with it, is the farther employment of it, which nothing but a continued stringency of compulsion could bring it to. The first I have called the drawing forth of *passive energy*; the latter alone is the true sort of energy which is *active*: and for the awakening within man of the latter, there needed the specially heightened degree of the working of the Amenability-to-Punishment principle, that should correspond with the movement in excess, which the passing into function of new species of energy of

any sort,—whatever be the department of natural creation in which the new embodiment of vital force be supposed to occur,—ever entails along with it.

The one sovereign difficulty to egoism in the matter,—to us now, to the first Christians, and all along,—is that of the yielding to the Divine disposition of things which causes that the course of development is truncated to the individual:—this is the constant first condition of the case never to be lost sight of as involved in all the minor difficulties attending it. Easily indeed should we bring ourselves to own, that the simple fact of growth was sufficient reward to our virtue, and the simple fact of decay was sufficient penalty to our transgression of virtue, if we had permission continuously to battle out for ourselves the possession of the one, and immunity from the other! But, wanting such permission,—as, by my scheme, there needs to be no disguising from ourselves that it *is* wanting,—all that my scheme does proffer is that we should see how lightly, in actual circumstances, the difficulty bears upon us, compared with the weight with which it necessarily bore upon the conscious part of men, at the first rise of the conscious part of men. The dilemma to Christian consciousness, indeed, still bears upon all believers in Christianity, as long as they remain such. The kind and degree of the fear of Death which, by the very constitution of Christianity, is involved, under Christianity, together with the fear of Hell as the sequel to Death, and which thus I take to constitute the exaggeration of one and the intrinsically higher sort, that counter-balances (—nay, that just *more* than counter-balances, since otherwise there would be no effect of progress,—) the companion exaggeration as to the effect of Vicarious Atonement:—this kind and degree of the fear of Death, I say, is more or less necessarily present to all believers whatever in the terms of Christianity. Each individual out of all of them, who knows, as all of them do know, that notwithstanding the indemnification from the sentence of Eternal Woe, entailed upon mankind by the Sin of Adam,—obtained through its liability having been paid,

nominally on account of all, by the Sacrifice of Christ,—there is still within the drawing out of the indemnification the demur which in fact causes the sentence to remain yet *not* obsolete, but standing persistently in its full force as destined to fall upon some certain number of the children of Adam,—nay, upon incalculably the greater number:—each individual, I say, who knows this, cannot but be personally acted upon more strongly by the contingency, so special in its individual import, than by the matter of congratulation which he cannot yet assure himself is matter of self-gratulation. As long as the possibility of the case—I should rather say, as long as the fearful odds of the probability of the case,—remain undetermined, what is it to *him*, he cannot help feeling,—to *him*, the individual man shrinking under his own peculiar liability,—though he be assured that those who are the elect ones in Christ are thereby safe from the torments of Hell;—when still this gives him no real security that the burning flames are not in fact still kept alive in store for his own endurance! And this, accordingly, I repeat, is the corporeal rod still held in contemplation, with a certain degree of vividness, more or less, even by those Christians of present times for whom has arrived a mental state in which it might much better be dispensed with altogether. To the first Christians, however, there is this of difference in the case:—on the one hand, the circumstances were such as caused the potency of the fearful impression to be to an extraordinary extent heightened beyond that which the dogma *can* convey at the present day;—on the other hand, the exaggeration was *then* justified by forming only the proper filling up of the character that was due to the general event of the crisis.

Let us then now open our New Testaments, and see what the record there shows us as to the actual original entertainment of the Christian idea of Retribution;—not however forgetting,—as it is of the highest importance that we should not forget,—how the nature of the case causes this part of Christianity to be, even eminently above every other part, presented to us

under a disguise: that is, how the manner that could not help being that of the recording, shows the subject under an inevitable species of misrepresentation, which, for any true understanding of the matter, needs, as far as may be, to be cleared away.

“Thinkest thou this, O man, . . . that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? . . . but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, . . . but glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good.” (Romans ii. 8—10.)—These are noble words,—are they not, reader?—that speak with a genuine power to our moral nature! (—You will observe that I have omitted a certain reference associated with them in the text; but to this I shall presently recur.—) And yet, for all that, scarcely are they those which can be considered as exhibiting with anything of pointed peculiarity the specially Christian view of retribution, which it is my object to see depicted:—do you not also feel this?—Why then do I select them to quote?—Precisely for this, that the beginning necessity of my demonstration is to show the variation in tone upon the subject amongst the writers of the New Testament; and to show moreover that it is just the sort of variation that bears out the character in the general Christian crisis which I have already assigned to it. It may be remembered that I said in a preceding section, (pp. 299—302,) how the event of the crisis was this: that, having its true point of internal culmination, and thence of self-revelation, within eminently the

mind of Paul, as the true representative starter of Christianity; this was however only just the initiating of the work of external dogmatization, the ostensible perfecting of which could not be accomplished till after a gradually-ripening process, occupying one or two or more centuries;—though still there was that in Paul's own utterance of the matter of revelation, which, notwithstanding its lack of deliberate organization, had within it the ordinary power of inspired utterances, of going incomparably beyond all subsequently laboured-out utterances, in respect of its effectiveness. Such then do I wish expressly to show to be the case here;—and I need scarcely remind you that, in regard to this exhibition, I am in fact borne out by what I consider faithful criticism, in assuming that the various books of the New Testament *do* set forth chronological phases of progressing dogmatization, extending at least as far as to the middle of the second century after Christ. And therefore, this is my design:—just because Paul's description of the “day of wrath” is, I am aware, *not* the one that, for all its moral force, stands fairly as the expression that average Christian instinct tells to be the truest expression, I call upon you to *compare* it with the companion descriptions, and as critics tell us, later descriptions, that such instinct will assuredly not deny me to be the expression of right required. Even in this of Paul, however, let me first remark, the day of retribution is designated with that significant indication of the predominance of the bearing of terror in the matter, which causes the day to be of specialty that of *wrath*;—but then, on the other hand, the effect of this is qualified by the degree of merciful reticence which shows itself in the apportionment of the judgment destined to the several classes of the righteous and the wicked, equally as it seems at first to be made out: in the omitting, namely, of the idea of *eternity* as attached to the punishment of the latter, which is determinately attributed to the reward of the former. Such merciful reticence,—Unitarians, in holding fast by it, have all along had the assertion raised against them as a confutation:—

such merciful reticence no longer appears in the threats respecting "judgment to come," of the sort which the timid consciences of believers, who are thorough-going believers, tell them, are those which infix themselves with the keenest compulsoriness upon their attention and memory.

Turn, for instance, in order to compare with Paul's, to the vivid description of 2nd Thessalonians*, (i. 6—10): "It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you who are troubled rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power; when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe."—Or take, as perhaps still more likely to haunt, the oppressive warning in Hebrews (x. 26—31), of the "certain looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries", held out over those for whom, having sinned "wilfully, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins:"—those for whom so "much sorer punishment" than any which Moses' law inflicted was adjudged, that the exclamation was enforced to arise to the assertor of it, how indeed "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God!"—Or rest, as in fact the passage of right the strongest of all, upon this which comes with the judicial solemnity of being put into the mouth of Christ himself, in Matthew xxv. 41—46: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels";—or on the following from Luke xix. 27: "Those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before me."

* The reader may be reminded that the only Epistles admitted universally by critics to be genuine ones of Paul, are those of Romans, Galatians, and the two to the Corinthians; against all of the others there is found more or less of ground for their being considered otherwise.

Now in saying that these passages are more effective than the one of Paul first quoted, upon the timid consciences of thorough-going believers, observe that I expressly mean *only* upon such. I entirely recognize that their effectiveness is fast fading away at the present time: taking its so doing as in truth a leading sign of the thorough-going sort of belief in Christianity's itself fading away, and the form of Christianity with it. But still I think that, as I have stated it, the case is unquestionable;—and therefore let me be allowed to argue upon it as such. The reason of such greater effectiveness, acting precisely upon timid consciences, which are therein feeble consciences, and not strong and enlightened ones, when we *do* compare it with the moral effectiveness of Paul's words, is evidently this, that while the latter convey their warning in a somewhat abstract manner, the former are replete with concrete personal exultation on the one hand, and on the other, to a still greater extent, with directly personal threat.—But, I ask you to consider, is not this sort of effect the inevitable accompaniment of the circumstances, as they have been here depicted, attending the crisis? It was the turning-point in the life of human egoism; and all faculties and feelings pertaining to egoism could not but be altogether alive and rampant! Remember how it was at the moment undergoing the crushing weight of the newly-introduced sense of Sin (—and I cannot help, in using these words, parenthetically hoping that you do not omit to feel the force I would convey by them: namely, in showing how the very language applied in ordinary to the suffering of Christ, *does* indeed apply to that which I hold to be represented by the latter—). Human nature felt itself in mortal struggle with the Power above it, the only sort of gainful result out of which was a more advantageous position to be obtained relatively amongst its own members;—and the consequence was that each member fought desperately as to the obtaining of its own special relief!—Remember, too, the local circumstances

and colouring of the case ;—how the egoism specially concerned was specially *Hebrew* egoism.

According to my scheme, the junction of oppositely-moulded ideas necessary to constitute the crisis, could only have occurred, as it did occur, through the sort of union which actually that of Hebrew thought with Grecian thought was. But this, again, invlved the retaining, for a certain period, of Hebrew characteristics not finally essential to the union, in combination with those that were ;—that is, whose presence as a permissibly rightfl presence, was limited to a period of duration incomparably shorter than that which was legitimate to the latter. And of such extremely local kind, I would say, was the temper betrayed by these over-heated denunciations. The savage vehemence of them, altogether natural to Hebrews as Hebrews,—who were, moreover, at the time lashed into national fury through being driven to bay by their Roman oppressors,—had even under Christian circumstances yet more special cause of immediate bitterness. At the time when the later writings of the New Testament were penned, remember, the first grand moral impulse which had started Christianity had subsided, and the matter of struggle closest to the interests of Christians as Christians was, by the human necessity of the case, the comparatively worldly one of establishing their religion, as a worldly Form of religion, in the world. And this, we know, could only be done by means of the antagonism of men, carried on as properly that of men amongst men :—so that here had the spirit of Hebrew exclusiveness the sphere of exercise so abundant, as nearly to have the claim of a satiety, and means for being the occasion of its burning itself out!—so evident was it that the Christian aspect of the case formed only a development upon the purely Hebrew. The circumstance that gave aggravation to their political sufferings was this, that whereas they had counted the Gentiles those who, by the very fact of their being such, were the aliens from God's favour upon whose necks

they, the Israelites, had the birth-right privilege to tread, they found them actually those who were trampling upon themselves instead;—but now, under Christian circumstances, they were in fact merely making the prosecution of their first frustrated attempt, which therefore that frustration could only more than ever embitter: since, in the being compelled, as they were, in spite of themselves, to accept the Gentiles as religious brethren, there was still the matter of national triumph open to them to maintain, that at all events they would not have it denied, that the privilege of representing the Son-ship, which was the means of the Brotherhood, through their own special Messiah, was indeed that to which they, the Israelites, had been elected by Divine decree before ever the world began:—so that, indeed, the conversion of the political ferocity of the case into religious ferocity, was only just the deepening of animosity that universally attends same warfare, when the foes concerned come to be as those of the household. And necessarily much greater still was this sort of effect, when the enemies against whom the threat of damnation was levelled in the Epistles, were those not open unbelievers in Christ which the originally-intended "Gentiles" were, but only those dogmatically-acclaimed unbelievers within the pale of professed belief, shown by ecclesiastical history to have been indeed so numerous, and so potent a matter of internal distraction, even in the very times of the Apostles.

Taking this, however, to be the true circumstance of the matter, are we not immediately caused by it to feel the importance of our being now enabled duly to enter into it;—and hence the enormousness of the boon to us that a just criticism in regard to it becomes? Granting that it *may* have been temporarily-permissible, in the light of a circumstantial provision for the means of bringing about an external establishment to Christianity, that the exalted passion of the period should actually stir up this internecine fury in relation to the very contemplation of the rightfully tranquil region of Spiritual Destination,—how desirable is it for us that the perturbing confusedness

hence given rise to should be dispersed! Is it not manifest how great must be the injury of mixing up together as of equal authority,—as the old orthodox assumption of the New Testament's forming one mass of writing of uniform canonical stamp did compel us to mix up,—utterances really of this distracted and *merely* Hebrew sort, with the higher sort that came from the so much *more* than merely Hebrew mind and temper of Paul! By our so doing, observe, the genuine moral weight that by its own nature rests with the truly human earnestness of the latter, is made, by the superior effectiveness, of superficial sort, of the later writings, to go altogether to the account of these, and so to enforce what was in fact directly adverse to Paul's own spirit; at the same time that it also altogether confounds our own instincts of moral perception. I do not mean to say, indeed, that Paul's writings had not also a controversial purpose; in, at all events, the immediate object of their composition. So far from this, I have desired to point out, with particular intension, how the very passage I have selected from them is a notable instance of such local purpose in the writer's mind; and let it stand, as it well may, for a specimen of the prevailing purpose of his writings in general. Do you not notice how the passage, when taken under the omissions that I have allowed myself, in order to my own object, loses the whole of what was evidently Paul's direct object in the writing of it? Read the entire passage in its connexion, and it is sufficiently clear that it was by no means the Apostle's immediate purpose to propound the law of general retribution;—true as it is that the incidental occurrence of it forms the only part of his statement that has any interest for us. What Paul had it in his mind to set forth, was the fact, argued for by himself, that the law had no variance, such as was maintained by his antagonists, in the respective cases of the Jew and of the Greek. But still,—for *here*, I say, is the sign of his superiority over the writers with whom I am comparing him,—it is a matter of instinctive perception conveyed by his words, in spite of them—

selves, to his readers, that the incidentally-inserted fact is, after all, the matter incomparably of greater importance to himself than that which he makes ostensible. If, on account of the special argument with opponents which gave the stimulus for his taking up the pen, he uses the great principles working in himself temporarily in the low character of an instrument to gain some definite end, it is impossible to mistake that assuredly the principle *is* all the time *first* with him,—as the rightful state of the case requires that it should be. And hence the assurance as to Paul's earnestness, which makes every judicious student of the New Testament feel only more and more, the deeper he enters into the matter of the Epistles, how certain it is that the true vitality of the Christian records rests altogether substantially with him. Notwithstanding all his zeal of propagandism, and sensitive claim for the position of authority with his converts that he felt due to himself, which make him so genuine a *living man* to us, as he forces our attention into the affairs of those small churches of his,—we feel sure that there was in him that something *deeper* than his zeal on behalf of those churches, that has truly the universal kind of claim directly upon ourselves also. Anxious as he was to convert men to Christ, and plainly therefore as his writings had this in immediate view, yet it is still more plain that they were all the time written in chief for himself;—and is not this the universal sign of an author's having that to say which is deserving the promulgation! Paul evidently believed that he had within him conceptions whose amazing largeness and utter novelty demanded the divulging. It would, quite intelligibly to us, have been indeed "woe to him if he preached not the Gospel!" And it is, consequently, this pre-eminent personal interest of his in what he is saying, that seizes in like manner upon *our* personal interest, and drags, as it were, our conviction in unresisting companionship along with his own. With what *naïveté* does he tell us of his art!—and yet his true art is that he is above caring for the effect of making confession of it!—He owns to his actual duplicity:—this being, as *I* would

say, precisely capable of being accounted for,—though *he* has no care to account for it—by that two-fold nature in himself of which indeed, upon its own grounds, he does tell us that he was aware. He was perfectly conscious of being in his own personality a combination of two opposite elements, the one of which he knew to be alone worthy of boasting of, while the other he knew to be deserving of the utmost condemnation:—and *I* would say, the undeserving element, so far as it concerns us here to attend to it, was represented in his being that peculiar Hebrew of the Hebrews, which the egotistic craving for mastership just alluded to showed him to be; while the really honour-worthy element in him was the distinctness from mere Hebrewism, which expressly his consciousness of the distinction alone brought out to light. He, then, possessing this general and superior nature, controlling his personal nature, which gave him altogether higher and deeper ground than later promulgators of his doctrine, and therefore just reason for influence over *us* which *they* are without,—how evident is the injury to him and to us in our confounding together the validity of “*inspiration*,” thus testified, with that testified by them in such altogether lower fashion!—What propounder of original thought in our own day would like to have his own utterance of it bound up together with the explanations of it, and arguments on behalf of it, made by successors!—While Paul wrote mainly under the need of saying what was *true for himself*, they, I urge, took the altogether lower stand-point, of seeking to say of speciality what they thought would be effective *with their readers*. And that was, in this particular case, what would most powerfully strike them with *terror*.

The great advantage, then, which we gain from criticism in the matter is, in the first place, and eminently, this: that we are enabled to set aside all the properly *threatening* portion of Scripture denunciations, which belonged to the feverish opening chapter of Christian history, between the date of the Synoptical Gospels and the second-century Epistles of the

"Hebrews", of 2nd "Peter", and of "Jude", as rightfully of an entirely different and inferior sort of account to us from the representation of the notion of Retribution, essentially present in Christianity from its very birth, and which consequently has persistingly maintained its legitimate sway over the human conscience down to this actual time, when it has become, as I believe, the allotted task of existing mankind to gather up the fruits remaining at Christianity's dissolution. But in doing us this great service, criticism does us moreover the following: that it does not therefore cast those less valuable representations away, as if they were entirely nothing worth to us, in regard to our estimation of the case. By my view, the express need in order to a right judgment, is that the notion be seen as a growing notion: one that in keeping a certain definite character, yet keeps it under vitally-changing aspects;—since the fact is, that it is the estimating of these changing aspects that alone affords us the definite character. All this benefit we should lose if we made up our minds, as at first we are tempted to do, that because the damnatory threats appropriate to ecclesiastical warfare have no real influence now, we must forget the influence they have had. And the import that I do wish directly to gain from them is this, of so great general significance: namely, that they make undoubtedly apparent to us the instrumentation, not to be denied, through which Christianity has all along held its authority over men; and equally so, the instrumentation as to the variations in the mode of that authority. Caught by such denunciatory texts, I have noted how the feeble conscience, even of to-day, bears its immediate witness, that the thing in New Testament religion which sovereignly impresses it, is truly more than any thing else its urgent insistency—seeming, from its urgency, to pervade its every page,—upon the need of maintaining the watchful "looking for of judgment." And equally from the fact that feeble consciences are so caught, and from the fact that the consciences so caught are feeble ones, do I collect the inference

I am seeking. On the one hand, I argue:—because Christianity had the power so to seize upon the principle of moral fear within men,—to seize upon it, and not to let it go,—it realized for itself a stamp of genuine authenticity, valid beyond any other that any possible kind of external evidence whatever could have bestowed upon it. It is utterly out of the nature of things, I maintain, that a terror such as was utterly baseless in natural fact, *could* for so many centuries of generations have continued to possess authority. But so also, on the other hand, is this become matter of proof:—the grosser the degree of terror enforced, the grosser have also been both the kind of mind affected by it, and the kind of form of religion concerned in it; the *mind affected* has been of the sort least of all in these happily-circumstanced days of ours needing to be specially regarded; the *form of religion concerned* has been of the sort most of all a now happily-recognized worldly and *merely* formal sort;—so that farther I argue: stringent and in every way stringent, upon us is the occasion for our now bringing to the instrumental terror the utmost of refinement that we have the power to bestow upon it, without even the very destruction of the form being that which should withhold us, out of respect to the effect likely to ensue upon conscience,—finding the latter, as we now do, so able, as to its raised average, to stand apart from the form.

To cause the present necessity for that dissolution, you remember how I have asserted the fundamental error that Christianity has no means of getting rid of;—and now we are come to the final department for the exhibition of the effect of that error. Even in Paul's mind,—true founder of Christianity as he is here taken to be,—there was, as we have begun to consider, the degree of localization in his views, that made it impossible for them to serve for our avail, except by the abstracting of the circumstantial accompaniment of them, which gave their only point to contemporaries of the Apostle. But we have now to see how the localization of effect, was so much

deeper than the mere matter of temporary controversy between Jew and Gentile, as to their relative positions in the church, that it lay in truth upon the very core of the matter within Paul's heart as a *man*. That is to say, Paul's own view of Retribution, fraught with genuine moral instinct as it was, was nevertheless conceived under condition of the Religious Crisis,—that condition being this: first, of egregious exaggeration, destined to subside into the character of ordinary impulse; secondly, of being the turning-point of a course of thought, destined henceforth to reverse its hitherto course. Let us therefore now seek to image what was his actual mental position upon this subject.

In order to understand this, the main necessity is that we bear in mind, how opposite it was to the real state of the case, that the notion of Retribution, as Retribution afforded in a Future Life, came into the world under its Christian phase as being, in respect to this its general definition, an absolutely *new* notion. No one, scarcely, will controvert this assertion;—any one, that should take his impression fairly from an average estimate as to the prominent bearing of the original announcement of Christianity, and especially from the writings of Paul, would hardly be capable of hesitating to pronounce that *the* leading matter of revelation proposed in it, as such, is that of the atoning efficacy of Christ's mediation. And yet it is at the same time patent, as matter of history, that the course of enlightened consideration as to the part of Christianity most actually maintainable in reason, as well as most precious to natural feeling, has been to lean progressively *less* upon that originally predominant topic, and *more* upon the companion topic, subordinate to the former with Paul, of the revelation respecting the world to come. That is, Christians who are rationalists incline more and more to set Paul aside as the proper exponent of Christianity, and to fall back upon the delineation of it which is specially Hebrew. With such, in

consequence, the representation of the good news of the Gospel which instinctively they select, and instinctively they will cling to as long as rational foundation for their belief seems possible to them, is that of its "bringing of Life and Immortality to light";—while this, again, brings them into collision with the generally-admitted statement, so little easy of reconciliation with it, just referred to. All this internal inconsistency, however,—let me now show,—is that which, on both sides, expressly tends to confirm the peculiar explanation of the case that I am contending for.

According to my view, while Religion is a thing belonging in common to men of all ages, and all the world over, it has consisted, as the very cause of its community, in *that* of which the dread of Death, and, thence seeking for Life, is the natural and incessant producer. For this reason, Christianity, as only the most perfect of known religions, *could* not differ from the rest in having the pursuit of Immortality really for its intrinsic, and consequently to the last its perdurable aim; though it *may* and *must* have differed from them in the means it proffered for the obtaining of the object of its pursuit;—while, hence, the means, in being that which of necessity was most prominent to the minds of the original accepters of the religion, *must* have been upheld by them in a manner requiring to be subsequently reversed: especially since, by hypothesis, every form is that which has no final purpose except in coming to its own end. That end, regarding this present point, was, that although the belief in Christianity should prove to leave the natural quest for Immortality precisely in its former condition as to its intrinsic nature, it should yet leave it essentially heightened as to its mode. Now, all along, (—it is the great and standing proof of Good ruling in the world!—) this instinctive desire of man has been associated with a conscious necessity as to the matter of moral improvement within himself. Primitive man did not, could not, say to himself, as we may now conceive man saying:—"I know that, by becoming a higher moral being, I

shall be intrinsically better fitted for, and therefore more likely to obtain, prolonged existence";—but I have argued that he *may* have conjectured the mortality which afflicted him to have been the standing sign of moral displeasure towards him on the part of Deity. And from this nature of his instinctive belief, it hence could only occur, that all degree of "Life and Immortality brought to light" by any form of religion, must have owed such degree of light to the degree of truth and purity afforded by it respecting the notion of Retribution.—By the Christian scheme, such addition of this kind as it conferred, was conveyed, we know, through obviation of the dogmatic Sentence of Death pronounced upon the world on account of the sin of Adam: that is, by a partial *reversal* of the Sentence (—a partial reversal of that which needed to be known under *total reversal*). *Here* therefore, and in no other point, is the true ground of comparison which, if we lose sight of, cannot but cause us to fail in at all estimating the position of Christianity, even upon this central matter, with regard to other religions:—the dogma of Retribution, least of all in the Christian scheme, being that which has any true power of being judged of when severed from its dogmatic connexion.

We know that not-Christian nations have—we know, at all events, that not-Christian nations in ancient times *had*—their notions of Future Retribution, which were far from being, upon the whole, unworthy notions. Nay, their notions of such sort, it may be granted, were, as to the best of them, even, *if* isolated, superior to the Christian. This appears to be the case, at all events, in regard to the belief upon the subject reported to have been that of the disciples of Zoroaster, when we compare it with that which has been entertained by the disciples of Christ, as an average belief. But however this be fully admitted, as I am fully prepared to admit it, what I contend for is, that all the loftiness of conception in the idea of Retribution presented either in the Zend-Avesta, and much more any where else in the records of ancient religions, does not and cannot show in

it the *capability* that has belonged alone to the Christian idea. The generalization respecting Humanity wanting, which Christianity alone has adequately afforded, the idea of Retribution, I conceive, *could* only fall as barren of true development for itself, as we know in fact that the doctrine of Zoroaster, and still more all other similarly conditioned doctrines, *have* fallen. And hence still rests the matter of developmental "election", here as ever, with that people who were however naturally special in nothing but their backwardness of instinct upon the subject, the Providentially un-precocious Hebrews:—the people, therefore, whose comparative innocence of conjecture upon the subject, had kept them healthily sound to endure the crisis which was all at once to arouse the capability of it within them.

The general idea of Immortal life, you remember, I have taken as constituting, in its primitive stage, the vague assumption, altogether wanting in definite images respecting it such as should convey thoughtful limitation to it, which must be considered as merely the natural and universal fruit of man's attaining at all to the consciousness of there being such a thing as Life, abstractly regarded. Is it not then obvious, under this view, how the association of the unknown portion of Life, forming the Future Life, with the idea of Retribution, must have been inevitably induced, just upon account of its affording of such required limiting images. See, eminently, how to the active-thoughted Grecians the degree of tangible reality, demanded by their temperament, obtained actually for their conception of the otherwise necessarily shadowy Hades, lay entirely in the vividly personal examples of, especially, undergone *punishment* for offences against the Gods:—Tartarus being the domain so evidently conspicuous to attention to a degree far beyond what could be the case under the tame unimaginableness of their Elysium! But still is it not manifest that the instances of Retribution thus furnished were not of the sort that engaged interest in them of the practical and individual sort? They were heroic and ideal instances; *merely* of

the imaginative class. And hence Grecian thought, with all its activity, did little or nothing in itself, for the advancing of a permanent conception.—But, on the other hand, imagination was amongst the Hebrews all but inert upon the subject. Scheol was an Hades as dim as dim it could *only* be, when retributive images were by the very condition of the national thought cut off from it. To the Hebrews the idea of Retribution was fully satisfied when shut up within the bounds of the concrete punishments and rewards that were merely of the sort of *this* world's recompense—that is, the sort that could be experienced by men as pertaining to their actual bodily presence upon earth. An altogether narrow, and childish idea!—yet for all that, is it not clearly a *solid* idea, and one which it was therefore well not to have broken up, until it could be done so in the mode that should be a finally sufficing mode?

If, in order to judge of the true spirit of Hebrew religion, we seek the part of the Old Testament which shall show the proper vitality of it, corresponding with that which the writings of Paul show in the New, certainly we should turn either to the Psalms, or to one of the greater of the Prophets:—to *those* if our object be of the mode of personal feeling; to *these*, if it be of the more abstract sort. This latter, then, being our present case, open, I invite you, to the following from Ezekiel,—the one amongst the prophets whose intense urgency of practical moral exhortation immediately suggests him as the representative of the rest most suitable for our purpose:—"Then . . I heard behind me a voice of great rushing, . . also the noise of the wings of the living creatures, and of wheels over against them. So the spirit lifted me up, and took me away, and I went in bitterness, in the heat of my spirit; but the hand of the Lord was strong upon me. Then I came to them of the captivity at Tel-abib, that dwelt by the river of Chebar, and I sat where they sat, and remained there astonished among them seven days. And it came to pass at the end of seven days, that the word of the Lord came unto me, saying, Son of man,

I have made thee a watchman unto the house of Israel: therefore hear the word at my mouth, and give them warning from me. When I say unto the wicked, Thou shalt surely die; and thou givest him not warning . . . to save his life: the same wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at thine hand." (iii. 14—18.)—Now, in this passage, is it not keenly notable, in the first place, how there was brought to life in the prophet's mind, the sense of moral connexion between the individual responsibilities of men and men, whose recognition, when it comes to be perfected, is truly the very essence of a ripe morality?—But it was not for this reason, as the *chief* one, that I have now quoted the passage. This is, reader, that I may specially call upon you to mark, here again, the dramatic *setting* of the ideas, which I wish to show as indicating, just as in Paul's case, the real historical bearing of the matter. I wish, namely, to point out, how the peculiar moral urgency of Ezekiel—and so, of the prophets in general,—was altogether the fruit of the external circumstance of the captivity so strikingly called up by the images employed:—the sort of images, altogether individualistic to their own egotistic need, which *was* the sort in which Hebrew imagination *did* delight itself. It was from their Captivity that the people derived their beginning of a true moral sense, just as much as their true religious sense. Just as it was the comparison of themselves with alien nations that first gave them the sense of national limitation which made them truly know themselves as a nation, so the attention thus forced back upon themselves was the first genuine awakening of any thing like the just consciousness in regard to actual merit and demerit, without which no proper morality can have any beginning. For in their yet undisturbed assumption of enjoying the sole favour of Jehovah, they took for granted, as it is the way of all petted children to do, without the least of reference as to the circumstance of their deserving or not deserving it, that they must continue to possess it for ever. But the shock of their unlooked-for humiliation, in conjunction with the

inoculation of the more abstract retributory notions of the nations amongst whom they were captives,—the shock precisely giving effect to the inoculation,—compelled the re-actionary quest which was needed into the causes existing within their own behaviour, which could have induced their Divine Patron so severely to treat them. And thus accordingly began for them what I have called (at p. 844,) the “secondary sorting” of human psychical conditions, which all moral science is, as distinguished from the “primary”, which cuts off these in a mass from that involved in the general necessity of Death. In respect to the latter, the Hebrews received, and eminently as their *chief* acquisition, from Oriental thought, the leading conception that as Death came into the world by Sin, so does Death form in its nature the constant mode of Punishment for ever to be thought of as destined to be inflicted on sinners. And the now experienced symptom of abrogation of Divine favouritism towards them, was the letting in of the possibility of their own actual encountering of this unqualified and unqualifiable Punishment, that drove them, as I assert it ever must, to try their own internal resources to divert it:—calling forth their watchmen's guarding cry of “*Why will ye die, O house of Israel!*” (xviii. 81.)

This irruption into their self-confidence was, you remember, by my scheme, the only way of turning them from their hitherto sole pursuit of enjoyment of Privilege, into that which should end by an admitted accompaniment in the higher sort of pursuit, of exercise of Responsibility. The watchman prophet, upon his own part, observe, *did* already entertain the latter,—in being, as he was, indeed, one of the fore-stationed Saviours of the world. But *here* is his exhibited limitation: he sought to save no other than the *house of Israel*;—and do you not see,—mark the equation!—that this is in fact the same thing as saying that he sought to save Israel only *as a house*?—Turn over the problem to yourself, and consider if the “exact science” of the matter is not, in truth, to this effect.—For

the whole case of the subject depends upon it. Just as the Christian formulary of doctrine says that no Saviour but Christ alone,—he who is actually *God* as well as man,—can avail to save any individual soul of humblest men: so do I recognize that no standard idea of human duty, impeded by any limitation whatever from being one common to the entire number of men, can suffice to impart the mental condition upon which alone any single man whatever can rightly interpret what constitutes his own particular individual duty.

In respect to the *house of Israel*, as a *house*, the prophets and other leaders of Israel were indeed responsible, in the true and *active* sense of the word. But the private men of Israel had, as the rule, no obligation in the matter, except *passively* to glory in their supposed condition of honour. Hence was it, therefore, I would say, that their moral developmental condition remained essentially truncated as to its due fulfilment. The *passive* side of moral virtue,—that which I class as pertaining characteristically to the sphere of the Parental conflict,—the Hebrews of this later time did, as to the best and select portion of them, exhibit even to a degree of perfection that it is a special point with me to uphold; but the *active* and worldly side of virtue was that which their limited religion did not lift them up to the capacity for. Their patriotism was indeed of the highly enthusiastic sort which made it religion; it was so far beyond what is known by us under the name, that it seems as if the Hebrew man actually was, in a manner, indifferent as to whether he himself were destined or not to live an immortal life, provided that his Nation might be assured so to live. His national consciousness seems to have been a far more real part of him than his individual consciousness:—whence came that pathetic utterance of unaffectedly-bursting grief, when it seemed to be the case that his Nation was adjudged to die, already here considered, as expressed in Isaiah's painting of the "Man of Sorrows." But this abstract treatment of human emotion, just because it *was* abstract, *though* abstract only to this limited

extent, had the purifying effect upon the national temper of egoism, that I assert as naturally the conversion every where of the spirit of self-indulgence into that of moral struggle with self. And of this effect the special example,—never to be lost to the world,—is the rise amongst the Jews at this epoch of the class of contemplative moralists at its height in the days of John the Baptist, and of Jesus, as the school of the Essenes. The outward form of religion maintained by these embryonic Christians was the need of preparation for the coming Kingdom of Heaven—that definite object of now culminating Israelitish hope, which gives so precise a motive to the final Israelitish struggle;—and the mode of preparation required for such an object, could only be the limited spiritual mode actually resulting. Just as, in outward sign,—after the imaginative fashion of all the prophetic precedents,—the temple of Jehovah needed to be cleansed from the worldly presence which polluted it, in order that the Presence of Jehovah Himself might be induced to return and fill it; so must the hearts of Jehovah's worshippers be purified, in order that the vision of God's purity might descend upon *them*, the rightful innermost sanctuary for that presence. And with *this* effect, accordingly,—leaving, observe, the waiters upon the Coming still pending in their waiting!—with *this* effect, I say, ended all that was the mere Hebrewism of the matter. What came after it, was what the matter became when it was taken up by the follower of Jesus, of whom it was the boast that, though in no whit behind the chiefest of the Apostles, he was nevertheless the one who had never known Jesus after the flesh:—by him who received his revelation not even from those amongst the friends of Jesus who seemed to be the rightful pillars in the church of Christ, but who received it from Heaven alone.

When Paul, in those entranced meditations of his,—carried on perhaps in the depths of Arabia,—but how knew he, or cared he, where or when, while whether he were, during them, in the body or out of it, he could not tell?—when Paul, I say, first

set open to his own Hebrew mind the flood-gate of ideas, that let in the at first overwhelming conception of a "house of God" destined to be "eternal in the heavens",—so altogether new in its character compared with the "house of Israel", that totally new conditions in every way belonged to it,—this beautiful blossoming of Essene Morality, unsurpassable of its kind*, was swept down and away from human attention, for the instant, as the thing truly born into the world before the time had come for the world's being fit to appreciate it. Under the new generalization respecting Humanity, Morality needed to have its whole beginning over again, upon an altogether larger foundation; and especially upon the basis that, as I am now specially insisting, made the *general* view of Duty one thing, and the *individualistic* view another thing. For immediately that the House of the true "Israel" was extended to include (by possibility) every living man of the "sons of Adam", the responsible ruler of which "Israel" was the Being whose sort of duty in no way conflicted with man's individual sort, the latter obtained of necessity the distinctness for itself that it *could* not have before. Each several man was necessitated to strive for himself, so far as the sphere was concerned in which it was open to him to strive. And thus came about the separate feelings as to his "new man", and his "former man", battling within the just-escaped bondman of the "Law" into the free, because *un-certified*, condition of the "Gospel". The Israelite after the flesh was altogether assured as to the "election" of the sort that *he* believed his own, as an Israelite;—provided, that is, that he kept himself in the religious purity that he had come to admit

* The spirit of asceticism which is so delicately painted in Essene morality, (—at all events in Gospel morality: say, that of Luke,—) when adopted and carried out by proper Christianity, was deepened into the coarseness that can only be revolting to ordinary human sense. Christianity being an altogether deeper thing than Hebrewism, its asceticism could not *but* be thus deepened; but under Christianity we feel that asceticism was a thing naturally out of place.

as needful. But the Israelite of the sort that Paul now claimed to be, was still consciously liable to be found after all a "cast-away." And this was the sign of a true and living sense of his own peculiar Responsibility being called forth:—the sort of Responsibility that compelled him *partly* to submit to the birth-condition of his spiritual nature,—that which, as I class it, was organically established within him, but which *he* dogmatically represented as forming the result of Predestination* in regard to him;—but that *partly* also compelled him to exercise the Freedom he was conscious of being allotted to him, and so to strive against that birth-condition.——You will say, I am utterly perverting his actual thought!—Yes; I admit it. I admit, that is, that I *am* endeavouring to stretch forward Paul's reasoning, so as to reach an object that I am aware lay quite beyond his own intention. *His* object went no farther than, the subjective attempt of seeking satisfaction for personal consciousness in the matter;—*mine* is that of gaining the abstract consciousness, which by my hypothesis *could* not arrive, till the doctrine that *he* promulgated should have fully done its work, and borne its mental fruit: the consciousness, namely, in regard to Providential "intention", which has to see such fruit to consist in the matter of organic growth, as to which it is the necessity of the case that Paul himself could have not the least of intention. To express the difference in other words: Paul, as the fact appears from our present point of view, was indeed all along, through the moral struggle which he paints with such evidence of experience of it, aiming in chief, not at Self-improvement, but at improvement of the Destiny awaiting Self. Neither do I say this, observe, as in itself a sign of defect in his aim: for it is expressly my principle, that all attention directly given to Self, precisely thwarts the matter of improvement of Self. But

* I know that Paul's idea of Predestination had regard to circumstance of outer sort, rather than inner; but I must be allowed the shifting of meaning which so obviously had in it the natural necessity of shifting.

this seems to me the defect that is manifest as such: the degree of anxiety exhibited by Paul about Future Destiny, was that which a religion better than his can by no possibility permit to be entertained. It was that which shows egregiously too much of the spirit of Fear, then only just begun to be supplanted, as it was finally, through Paul's dogmatization, to be very much farther supplanted, by the newly-rising power of sound inner trust in man,—trust both in himself *and* in his destiny.

Consider what was the actual fact, as to the way in which this matter of self-improvement really must have painted itself to his conscience, distorted as it was by false lights, and those of the most terrible sort! One of these was the merely dazzling effect of exaggeration (to be presently considered); but there were two others springing from now to-be-counted positive contradictions to truth. The one is the supposition, actually held by Paul, that there was a *just* responsibility, of full and proper sort, chargeable upon him for *all* the sin, of whatever sort, committed by him, falling short of an absolute fulfilment of a perfect law;—the other was the supposition, that the means adopted by God from the beginning for the punishing of sin, was that afforded by what we now know as the natural institution of Death!—*Is it not*, I appeal to you, plain to us now, that both of these suppositions *are* false lights?—Very well: then, I say, only by our fairly acknowledging to ourselves, both the fact of this falsity, and also that of their being nevertheless entertained by Paul, can we be enabled really to enter into the frame of feeling which dictated those burning chapters of this epistle to the Romans, of which every student must admit to himself that they contain, above all other parts of the New Testament, what needs to be counted the special essence of Christian feeling.—The eighth chapter of Romans is the very pith of Christianity.—Turn to it, reader, and make it the test by which you judge of all that I am propounding:—could I offer you one that you would own, in the interest of Christianity, more fit to serve with full weight as such?—It is the passage in which Paul

expresses the full glow of his exultation in the *triumph over* former Fear, obtained by him through Christ.—Read it, nevertheless, under view of the interpretation I am now offering as to his case,—namely, that the degree of conquest obtained by him needed to be so far surpassed, *in its own very kind*, by the means of to-day, as thence to become small in comparison ;—and see if you do not find his meaning growing altogether for you into at once a new intelligibility, and into that which has at the same time a most new and enduring interest for you.

The very manner of his labouring expression is an evidence to be adduced for this interpretation ;—for exactly, I urge, does it tell, with the plainness that *manner* only can tell, how the thing aimed at by the writer was that so hitherto un-organically recognized thing, that ordinary expression was altogether wanting for it. His so often accused illogicalness,—his perplexing parentheses,—his eager iteration,—testify of themselves to the leading fact I am arguing for, that the main thing Paul was really doing, by his dogmatization, though his own consciously direct object was so different, was the establishing of an organic distinction, in no way yet allowed for, but still to be finally one of sovereign moral importance. For this, I conceive, was the true purport of the separation he strives for, between the life of the spirit and the life of the body, and between the character of works done under grace, and that of works done under the law :—this, namely, which here I have been arguing for as the division between the spheres of proper and of latent Responsibility. When this division is fully and organically made out, I have sought to prove, man is alone adapted for living the life that is a truly moral life. But then I admit, as fully as the strictest orthodox interpreters can do, that the moral life, which I consider to be the Divine object in the case, was only with Paul the means to an end of quite different sort, that was the really direct end with him. He does not indeed set forth, in true argumentative style, the train of thought that is essential to his doctrine. He does not expressly, and

sylogistically, remind his reader of the fundamental assertion—fundamental falsehood as I call it,—of Christianity, that the thing pertaining to Sin, which gave its real hatefulness to Sin, was the assumed fact of Death's having come into the world in consequence of it (Death, I mean; in general, bodily as well as spiritual). There is but one hint in the chapter towards it: that of the twentieth verse;—but in that hint do you not feel, reader, the betrayal of the depth and constancy of the impression respecting the matter suggested, that, it may well be understood, made it seem to Paul unnecessary to speak of it more directly! Have not the allusive terms of that verse clung to your memory, I would ask, just as they have to mine, perhaps from their very obscurity, in addition to their depth of significance?—“Not *willingly*”:—“The creature was made subject to vanity, *not willingly*”!—What does it mean? we ask ourselves. Does it mean that the un-created creature was not willing to be created, under condition of having to die?—or does it mean that God, who so created him, did it against His own will?—Neither, I should say; and yet both.—It means that Paul's thought thought the one; and that his feeling felt the other! *—At all events, it means, as to the effect of the whole verse, this:—“When God laid this burden of perpetually-fearing Death upon us, and of fearing it as the sign of His wrath, He did not, even at the beginning, leave men without hope respecting it: that hope which I, Paul, say is now fulfilled.”—And then, in explaining *how* it was fulfilled, the rendering that he gives of his notion, requires, I consider, to be read thus:—“What God wills is to take away from us at once Death and His anger,—that is, to give us Immortal Life and Happiness,—in and by giving to us the power of obedience

* The best paraphrase of the verse seems to me this:—“For the creature was made subject to vanity, *not because God expected that he would like it*, but that he might be taught to subordinate his own liking to that of the Creator; who, after all, did not so subject him without imparting to him a hope of escaping from the condition.”

to Him of sufficing sort, which indeed we *do* now feel within us, in respect of the former clog upon conscience being now lightened to us:—*obedience* now meaning only a rightly-directed intention to serve him to the utmost of our actual capacity; the *power* of obedience meaning a willingness to take to ourselves the means of obedience which the hope inspired by Christ's resurrection does empower us to take up:—for this reason:—if we do show ourselves in the frame befitting children of God, it follows to a certainty that we have thereby escaped the bondage to fear which was the penalty of disobedience;—Jesus Christ was the pattern Son of God, and see what the Father did with *his* mortal body!—the same quickening of *our* mortal bodies *must* follow from our obedience!—Death (except for some uncertainty resting upon the equivocal question of whether we, as followers of Christ, are entitled therefore to look for precisely the immediate manifestation of corporeal immortality that was actually vouchsafed to Christ:—what may be *hoped* is that we, in fact, like Moses and Elijah, shall never need to die at all, but only have our present mortal investment “clothed upon” with new investment of immortal sort*:—in any case, however, Death) is vanquished as to any reality of right to terrify us any longer. The instant we became Sons of God upon the footing so incomparably beyond that which we possessed as members of the fleshly Israel as this is, we were born into a glorious liberty in regard to it, such as raises us truly, through Christ, to be even more than conquerors over it!”

This, it seems to me, was the simple and always-pressing matter of interest which occupied the great Apostle, no less

* The reader will perceive that I am interpolating this parenthesis from 2 Cor. v. 4, and other passages. In the Epistle to the Philippians, (iii. 11,) there is a phrase upon this subject, that *if* it might be considered as Paul's own, it seems to me, would strongly indicate a hope on the Apostle's part of a resurrection that should indeed be in “like manner” with that of his master. In any case, however, it stands as the representation of the state of feeling attributed to Paul.

than all of us,—occupied him as simply a man amongst men. Neither the direct seeking of Virtue for its own sake, nor the direct seeking of a Future Reward for Virtue, seems in any way rightly to be attributed to him as proposed by himself:—the one, I should say, forms an anachronism, as much *beyond* what lay within the possibility of his position, as the other is evidently *beneath* it:—but he was simply rejoicing in what *we* now know to have been the throwing open to him of a fair field for the exercise of Virtue, consisting in the removing of Death as an obstacle to it: the *removing of Death* being itself the object immediately in his own contemplation, and as such inevitably misinterpreted by him. The matter of *needing to die*, and so of apparently frustrating all results seeming to be naturally and Providentially assured to attend sooner or later upon Virtue, is still as much as ever to *us* a stumbling-block in the way of believing in the beneficence of Providence, as ever it was to the Jews! Nay, upon the lower ground of mere capability of personal enjoyment, *here*, I say, both is there, and must there ever be, that which awakens a response in every human bosom to the feeling that I assert as the key-note of this chapter, struck by Paul. I believe him to have been engaged purely and solely with the one great fact that constitutes the universal mystery of our creature-destiny: the destiny that makes us creatures of mortal limitation. Is it not still, as ever, the case, that the constant temptation present to all of us whose state of mind is not elevated by religion, is the one suggested of old by Job's wife: namely, that in dying, as all of us need to die, we should die in "cursing God"? But the very best of us, when it comes for us to enter into the actuality of the enigmatical pain,—when it comes to us to feel ourselves born, as it were, for nothing else but only in order to die, and to see death, with all its attendant ills,—the very best of us, I say, cannot escape a measure of the same temptation. The best, indeed, it would appear, more than others of us, find it still the hardest of religious trials to them, not thence to

accuse Providence, that the boon of life at all, under such condition, is that which it seems to have been a cruelty and a mockery to have bestowed upon men.—Paul, then, as I understand him, was only occupying himself, after all, with *this* general difficulty. He was arguing over the problem, as it concerned himself, and indeed strictly *for himself*;—though, in two notable respects,—first, the spirit of utter faith in God, the only possibly successful spirit, in which he argued out the matter;—and secondly, the peculiarity of circumstantial severity to the conflict with the course of the developing conception, in his case;—he was indeed the special “spectacle” to us in the matter that he asserts himself to be, as well as our still eminent guide.

The exaggeration accompanying the religious crisis—additional, remember, to the effect of the two false lights whose distorting play received the effect of the exaggeration,—consisted, as to its minor department, in the supposition of the excess of moral purity requisite in order to acceptableness with Deity, which was indeed, perhaps, scarcely harmful in itself; but still which contributed, by means of the moral sensitiveness it occasioned, altogether to enhance the principal result: and this was, the one which affected the character of Deity. In any case, it is manifest how much of false conception must attend the sudden application of an idea, previously held under confessedly human limitations, to a condition rightly requiring the distinct acknowledgment of absence of the latter: that is, the confounding of circumstances rightly proper to a particular idea, with those proper to a general idea;—but in this instance, the terrific untruth involved in so doing was that of transferring to *God* the same feeling in regard to *His* enemies, now known to be in general whatever men were sinners, which Hebrews had all along attributed to their concretely-conceived Jehovah, in respect of those nationally-determined aliens from his favouritism, who had of late even specially stirred up wrath against themselves, as due not only from Hebrews, but from the God

of Hebrews. At the very same moment that Paul's mind was enlarged to embrace the conception of a Religious Ruler of men, who regarded men no longer under national distinctions, but purely in regard to their moral worth, his conscience was smitten with the suggestion that the moral defects, hitherto comparatively lightly thought of, in himself, did indeed constitute the express ground of internal and real alienation from God, which had rightly to bring upon himself the demonstration of Divine Vengeance, only immeasurably increased beyond that very sort of Vengeance whose anticipation in regard to others he had hitherto, as a Hebrew, been accustomed, in his own fancied security, to gloat over!—and thus the political feeling of maddened disgrace that so soon after Paul's time was to ensue to Hebrews generally through their total secular overthrow, was to him converted, by perfect revolution, into at once the feeling of the moral sort of apprehension, which had for its object so incomparably more tremendous a kind of subversion. If Paul had not possessed the "inspiration" to see how the Mediating and Atoning influence of the generalized sense of Divine Government he was introducing, really was capable of surmounting that of its involved Threat, surely the world would never have known any thing of it from him! But as it was, apparently the very hazard of the balance in which the relative weights of the considerations must have presented themselves to him, may well in itself have given cause for the enthusiasm of his reception of the doctrinal alternative, when once he *had* determined upon its reception. It seems to me, that here we find indeed an actual impetus, such as, without any thing else, suffices to account for the entire existence and propagation of Christianity in the world.

See how the two parts of Hebrewism, the gross and the capable-of-rising, fell asunder! The former showed itself in the only heightened egoism which, to the very last of their existence as a nation, caused its members to protest in the face of mankind, that if perish they must, it was only through their

own sins, and by the hand of Jehovah, that they really were brought to such pass. Their exclusiveness of claim was maintained to the last unbroken, even while in the act of being crushed!—But what Paul did was to let in the spirit that would finally dissolve it into nothing: the spirit, namely, of universal Brotherhood, towards which the very force of Hebrew egoism, as such, had the power, as soon as it was brought to bear in the true moral direction that now it was, of giving a motive impulse such as it seems nothing else could have afforded. Death—that is, Death with Damnation,—being the thing dreaded;—the *sting* of Death being known to be Sin;—it came as a true light from heaven into the mind of Paul, that the admitting of a means of Salvation from which none but voluntary recusants should be excluded, would be the real means of victory over the anguish of Death. And, as far as the peculiar anguish, the peculiar intolerableness of the sting that was present to the thought of Paul, was concerned, it seems to me the following shows how this idea was indeed a *true* light from heaven.

When Paul received into co-existence with his Hebrew state of moral feeling—that is, his heightened sensitiveness as to the degree of purity required by God, and his heightened imagination of God's relentless cruelty to be displayed towards those who should be found wanting in it,—the Alexandrian enlargement of the idea of Deity*, the theoretic statement that I say represents his case—and, in so doing, exhibits a state of experience that it was altogether natural, and in accordance with the reversing law of all subjective thought, that he should body forth, under his actual un-self-consciousness as to the fact, in the concrete terms which render it as the sacrificial work

* I do not, of course, by this intend that Paul on the spot originated, consciously to himself, the doctrine of the Christian Trinity, which has, notoriously, at all events no direct exhibition in his writings; but only that he set on foot the ideas that by necessity must ripen into such doctrine.

of Redemption effected by Christ,—is this: he was exposing his own Ego, of moral sort, to bear “the full brunt of the encounter” with the Divine indignation against human frailty, which here, precisely as with regard to the encounter with Deity in general, already otherwise insisted upon, needed of right “to be shared with the entire number of human beings:”—so that, unendurable as in any case this encounter must, for any permanence, be, yet, in the peculiar knot of circumstantial difficulty present with Paul, it gained a terribleness in especial. Suppose admitted into the encounter of this sort with Deity the due recognition of fellow-beings, (—remembering, as ever, that the fellow-beings properly in question under Religion are those separated from us by Time, in the manner of successive generations of beings:—) and the Divine indignation against whatever is sinful is diffused, as to its requisite application, over a surface of object to receive it, which renders the share liable to any individual truly altogether unworthy of special “terror”, and on the contrary quite capable of being welcomed, when known as the rightful means of improvement! And to Paul, I say, the idea of “Christ”, as he entertained it, did, “under a figure”, contain this welcome innovation of conception. Our present way of stating the view of circumstance revealed by it,—I mean, the way that comes to us, though solely, under development-principle, carried out in fulness,—is this: we can say for Paul, as we can say for ourselves, that incomparably the larger part of his moral life, causing unnecessary uneasiness to his conscience, was, in fact, in conjunction with his physical life, the produce solely derived by him from the conduct of the course of ancestral generations regarded backwards to the time when human development lay at its very foundation; and being so, it was certainly that for which, morally, the Governing Principle of nature had nothing at all to charge him with. The very bearing of it, if he bore it well, was that which even entitled him to reward. But since the method of that Governing Principle is *not* to

bestow recompense upon the individual principle, (leaving individualistic Justice, as the more perfect kind of Justice, to be worked out by individuals for themselves,) so the average-compensating rule is, that where Paul's conduct was truly open to recompense,—where he was indeed made free and responsible,—that too would become blended in its effect with what had gone before, and would hence be handed down to have its natural result distributed amongst Paul's posterity. This, I say, is the meaning which Development-principle gives to the all-in-all blending together of Merit and Consequences, signified under the representation of general human nature by "Christ". But this little terrible—though, I would say therefore, more really morally effective,—version of Paul's thought, is so, in chief, through precisely the dropping of the adventitious presumption which *he* found it necessary to rest upon as his very basis,—nay, which *he* first made the special basis that it thenceforth became. The ideas of Death and Damnation *could* not be parted all at once, though he *had* struck out the path that was to lead to their being so! And thus came the classification which so significantly notified "sinners" as those who were yet "in Adam", cutting them off in that manner of tacit reference to supposed sin in "Adam":—which reference being absent, and, as I argue, *well* absent, in our case, needs the alteration of classification that I would make thus:—Since the being "in Christ", is a lot that, when taken in contrast with being "in Adam", is a mere Providential circumstance of position in point of Time respecting the general course of human life, I would state it as simply the privilege, common to the average of men, possessed by all of us who have lived since the time when the doctrine of "Christ" was first promulgated. And thus taken, it is no harsh figure—no *untrue* figure—to me, to say still, that in being born "under Christ", instead of "under Adam", I do indeed feel that I have inherited both that sense of, and that condition for, virtuous living, which are to me as a coming to a law of true life, out

of subjection to a law of virtually ever-present death. Under development-principle, for Virtue to feel itself alive and growing, is abundant reward for Virtue!

To attribute such feeling as actually entertained by Paul, is, however, as I have said, an anachronism; or else, a supposition of miracle. If the feeling is possible to us now, as I consider that it is, it is so precisely because the dogmatization of Paul has by this time wrought out the due condition for it; and to suppose Paul himself capable of it, is to suppose that for him was done in a moment, what naturally requires ages of human experience to effect. And therefore it seems to me altogether *un-natural* to imagine,—in the mode that rationalizing commentators generally incline to do,—that Paul's finding himself the "wretched man" that he did, owing to his birth-condition of "captivity to a law (of established instinct) ruling in his members," warring against the better condition which his "inward man" saw that it was needful to super-induce, was purely the effect of his longing for such better condition: even including under his idea of the latter the proper accompaniment of its bestowing the sole means for the enjoyment of spiritual communion with God, which in fact to a duly ripened spiritual condition *does* become the inherently-rightful reward of Virtue. For the power of accepting the sense of communion with God as an absolute happiness in itself, depends upon the perfect tranquility of egotistic feeling which implies the casting out of all fear:—a state of mind attached indeed to the temper exhibited by "John"*, but certainly not that which could have

* Under Hebraistic limitation, however, that will presently be referred to.—And in saying this, let me explain, I am the contrary from forgetting that the Author of the Fourth Gospel is, upon ordinary ground of estimation, the one amongst all the writers of the New Testament, who is notoriously the *not-Hebraistic* one. My own ground, however, is thus far different from the ordinary:—the point which I find it necessary to maintain with regard to the so-called Hebrew Apostle is, that, notwithstanding the doctrinal un-Hebrewism which confutes his being so really

been in the least claimed by Paul, the force of whose preaching lay, as he was well aware, in his power "to persuade men" by means of that "terror of the Lord" which he in his own experience knew so thoroughly (2nd Cor. v. 11). The legitimate, although local, cause for this "terror", I consider, is fully recognizable when we suppose that the "body of death" hanging about him, hateful as it indeed was even under its actual presentation of *Sin*, was yet overwhelmingly more dreadful in its being the believed indigenous indication borne within him of the fate of damnation, over and above death, naturally awaiting him, and if not super-naturally averted, certain to befall him. Under such idea, I maintain, equally impossible is it that *Sin* could be in any true sense hateful to him for its own sake, and that *Virtue* could be in the same way desirable:—besides that it has to be remembered that the false light as to the yet insufficiently sorted domains of the different kinds of Responsibility, caused that the immensely greater part of his actual well-doing, and ill-doing, *was* truly the matter of only the "imputation" and "grace" for which he assigned it: just as truly a part of the birth-condition allotted to him as that of his being born a Hebrew. The ideas of *Virtue*, and of *Sin*, and of *Recompense*, duly arrived at now, were assuredly *not* within the birth-conditioned possibility either of him, or of any man, Hebrew or not, born within that period of human development.—But quite other is the case with regard to that common anxiety as to *Destiny*, which being the matter of such special experience of the anxious sort to him, may thence, observe, so naturally have caused him to grasp, as he did, at the suggestion of the bodily resurrection of *Jesus*,—ill supported as we see it to have been by the ordinary sort of evidence,—

adjudged, he does in fact still exhibit the temper of feeling which here I take to be the Hebrew characteristic alone of leading importance to be counted as such: namely, that which is still marked by the special quality, to be counted a moral one, of egotistic exclusiveness.

which seemed to afford him an in every way perfected theory to promise the obviation of the anxiety.

With Paul, I conceive, the idea of Retribution was held back from its true idea on the very account of this then necessity of its association with the matter of universal instinctive seeking: namely, the desire for eternal prolongation of personal existence, accompanied by the security of unlimited personal enjoyment (—the latter being to him the necessary consequence of gaining the approbation of God, while to us it stands simply as an express contradiction in terms!—). While under this association, Retribution *could* be a thing of value to him *only* on account of its giving the reality to the image of Immortality, which thence did indeed seem to bring the latter “to light”:—that is, the latter was the true *end* in the matter to him, while the former was only the *means* towards it. And this being the case, it is obvious why neither could he hold the true meaning either of Virtue, or of Sin. Whatever exception may justly *now* be taken to Paley’s much discussed definition of the former, it can scarcely be thought by any careful examiner of the nature of properly Christian motives for Virtue, that Paul would himself have made any objection to it, if it had been offered to him:—that is, if a definition could have been offered to him of that which under his actual ideas could have no existence! For,—I would say,—while the terms that describe Virtue as “that which was done in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of eternal reward,” would have had nothing in them but what Paul would have found entirely worthy of approbation, they do not, nevertheless, paint that which needs to be known as Virtue.*

* The meaning of this manifestly un-Hebrew, and thoroughly heathen or secular word, I should like to define as the quality of Virile Courage, which enables mankind duly—that is, actively,—to carry on the struggle of life in which consists the Duty of life:—the feminine department of such Courage and Duty being, naturally, as a characteristic class, the passive side of it.

But let me forbear to dilate any longer upon what *ought* to lead so much farther than I can pursue it, that it may well be thought an unpardonable rashness to have meddled with it at all:—if it were not that I *must* make it out as *our* capability of boast, like that of Paul himself, that *ours* is “this advantage every way,” that to us pertaineth still the whole doctrine of the covenants, old and new, carried on whether by the fathers, or the apostles. One more remark let me throw in, upon the effect of Paul’s scheme of theory, and then I will hasten to show the conclusions as to my own that I would gather from it.

I mean, in relation to the figuring of the apostolic writings, as to the great work of Retribution being that appropriated to a certain *Day* of Judgment, which has naturally come to appear to us so puerile: considering, as we must, how that Judgment implies the allotting of the retributive condition destined to befall the entire number of the future occupants of existence. With us, the latter mean,—if to Christians they meant only a repetition of present occupants,—an entirely fresh presentation of occupants. But does not this very opening to our conception of the mass of circumstances actually inconceivable to us in the matter, show how such conception could in fact only be entertained through this concreteness of imagery, called for to make incalculable periods of Time stand represented by precise symbols,—and by *days*, perhaps, better than by any other? The poetical covering of the thought, in this case, as in general, indicates the very extent of abstractness as to the idea attained. In the Grecian mythology of retribution, there was a prolific gathering of particular instances of it, which, as long as they maintained their hold upon human attention, went continuously to the building up of the needed generalization upon the subject. But the instant this was started, all that particular imagery was of necessity clean and for ever swept away from attention. The generalization must have terms which need in themselves, and with a special vividness, to fill the entire field of attention. And hence, I would say, the rise of the whole paraphernalia of

"signs", which the so aptly and densely concrete imagination of the Jews could not help seeing as "Revelations" regarding the circumstances attending the Day!

The great point of difference with the Christian scheme that only more and more clearly seems to force itself upon us under the present mode of view, is this of the Divine object of our living, not agreeing with, but precisely contradicting, our own natural object in the same. If the Christian dogmatization has furthered our mental growth, and fixed mental organization, in regard to the sense of Retribution, we still need, I urge, without looking for any thing farther from it, to own that this Christian doctrine, like all other parts of its doctrine, has formed a point of actual success in our mental history. But then the difficulty is how to estimate success of this extremely indefinite sort! Whatever result in human history we take to represent it, can, in fact, only be so taken in the mode of mere theory. All that we can gain with certainty is, that it shall appear demonstrable to us how, upon its own express terms, the success we think of could actually have been obtained in no other way, than through such new instance of the self-frustration involved in all gain, of really religious sort. This much, however, I think, is positively demonstrable.

Have I shown sufficiently how this Christian doctrine of Death-with-Damnation *has* been the Providential engine which has performed the desirable work of the "heaving round" of human regard towards the course of things lying in the Future?—I have shown previously, remember, how the original sting found in Death, through producing the sense of the crude kind of Punishment attributed to an Arbitrary Favourizer, brought forth at last the deepened consciousness of liability, all of which pertains to the no-more-than-basis upon which Christianity rested. But now to this I have added, how the thus intolerably-increased anguish of the original sting—in

enforcing a welcome to the revelation of escape from it, through admitting the Divine Principle of participation of this, as of all other of our human lot that is rightly a common lot, with the mass of our human brethren, past occupants of life *and* future,—thence causing in us a recognition as to Punishment, which correspondingly divides itself into *two modes of recognition*,—does indeed throw a weight of newly-preponderating importance upon the one of the two classes of fellow-beings, which specially the principle of Progress, as a general principle, requires to possess it:—thus clenching the compulsion of our prevailing attention to be religiously given to the Future of events, over their Past, by that satisfactoriness in the case, which as soon as we become self-sacrificing enough for it, cannot *but* be satisfactoriness to us. This adjustment, therefore,—I mean, of the relative importance of the two classes of beings,—forms the leading circumstance of the case with me; and let me adduce the considerations which, as I conceive, make the assertion of it both fully apparent and incontrovertible.

Take the subject, in theological fashion, under an individualistic generalization, and see how at once plainly and strangely it reads!—Paul's ancestors committed certain actions; but God, instead of recompensing themselves for them, laid the recompense for those actions, mainly, upon Paul's descendants!—The vindication, however, that, as I allege, makes the strangeness at once depart, while the plainness remains, is this: that in this way of God's, paradoxically contrary as it is to what the way of man, in all right reason, would have been, *could* man have been in God's place, which however, it is the last degree of suicidal unlogicalness to suppose that he *could*:—in this way of God's, I say, comes out the character of *progress* in regard to recompense, that *alone* is thus possible. That is, the general fact as to recompense is, that the more man's entire moral nature grows, as the very circumstance of his continually taking up an enhanced and enhancing measure of responsibility implies that it does grow, the more does the side of recompense

which is the side advantageous to man,—and to man in his properly individualistic character,—increase in comparison with the side which is disadvantageous to him: the more, namely, does Reward come to be the predominant part of Retribution over Punishment.—This is what the idea of Progress, in itself, necessitates; and what, I urge, may moreover be distinctly seen as the final consequence of the Christian dogmatizing, so soon as we fairly take, as I say we may now take, the balance of its working upon the whole.

The two opposite sides of the moral part of Christianity, the passive and the active, working of necessity in contrary directions, have ended in securing desirable predominance for the latter:—this is one consideration:—and they have *so* ended, and the end *has* been thus desirable, because the passive or religious side, in being the source of exaltation to the active or secular side, has in due proportion at the same time exalted itself; while, true Content lying alone with Religion, this preservation of due proportion is the only thing that *could* contain within itself the ground-work of increasing human well-being:—this is the complicated filling up of the abstract design of the progress I am speaking of!—But the historical working of the opposite elements has been altogether simple. The passive side of Christian “Virtue” was an affective reliance upon—what Christians call the efficacious suffering of the Saviour; but what I interpret as—the substitution of fellow-creatures to endure for us such part of human suffering as was indeed free to fall upon any-body.* Now such substitution may be voluntary on their part, or not; but at all events the obtaining of it comes as a *Providential* benefit to those who do obtain it; and hence the religious effect in general attending it: religious effect, upon my scheme, meaning the crowning effect of the influence that belongs to the affective department of human nature from its lowest foundation. Thus, while, on the active side of Christian

* Free, of course I mean, so far as concerns contemporaries.

"Virtue", the matter in question was the proper matter of human contention, which consists in each individual striving to fight out for himself an immunity from (no longer, indeed, natural Death, as at first; but still, with only increased anxiety, from adventitious) Damnation: as that which truly, by the natural uncertainty and inequality resident in the state of things, *does* and *must* remain open to some sort of struggle:—while, I say, the active side of Christian "Virtue" consists specially in carrying on this "fight" for personal salvation, the companion presence of the passive side alone can make it a "good fight". But so, I say farther, most essentially it *does* make it, when the whole working of the compound influence, for a sufficiently extended period, is taken into account:—that is, when we look at the entire course of Christian principle. And this is the evidence for its so doing that I would allege. Has not this course, I appeal to you, most incontestably proved, that just in proportion as the charity-enlarging belief in a general Saviour has gained in its effect over its primitive effect, the idea of the sort of salvation demanded for personal content has grown to be that which the primitive notion of Retributive Immortality, with its then-adopted Heaven and Hell, is in no way compatible with? Just in proportion as Christ has been faithfully adhered to, has the belief in the original notion of Damnation, that at first formed the only impulse towards the former, actually retreated from men's minds! To Paul, who first took estimate of the balance, there was, as I have said, just the turning of the scale which made him feel that though, through the Gospel, sin became to such terrifying extent "exceedingly sinful", yet still to an even greater extent, of contrary sort, did the newly-discovered "grace abound";—but the scale on the same side has gone on sinking with increasing weight, till, as I believe, the time for needed balancing is over, and an organic settlement may be considered as obtained. The original state of the balance was that which showed the working of the "love of Christ" to be such as left the followers of Christ entirely undisturbed, in

their exultation for the lot of the redeemed, by that awaiting the un-redeemed. The Gospel seemed to them not at all less a Gospel because the narrowly-estimated "brethren in Christ" alone were to be partakers of its mercies, while the un-included were left hedged all round with flaming Vengeance reserved for adversaries:—at least, if this was not, as indeed it cannot justly be said to have been, the case with Paul, the sign of it is prominent in the passages I have quoted from his successors. Even in the case of "John", the perfect love, casting out fear, through which he felt himself certified of the right to have "boldness in the day of judgment" (1st John iv. 17), was that which caused him no demur as to his entire love of God, on account of that whole external world which he asserted to be as yet "lying in wickedness" (v. 19). Could this however be the case—is it the case—now that the realization of the true general sense of Humanity (gained, as I say, through the apprehension of a general Saviour,) has made it impossible, as surely it *has* made it, for that Hebraistic idea of condition to be rejoiced in, to be actually any longer endurable to us?—But again, I urge, just as this generalized affective influence *has* thus banished Hell, in its pristine grossness of conception, from having any effective influence upon men's minds,—just as that conception has thus sunk to be recognized, as with such historical propriety it may, as the mere lurid reflection now lying upon the skirt of our horizon, over what was once the Jewish valley of Tophet,—the farthest is it from the fact that our active moral energy really suffers from the banishment. Instead of those Jewishly-imaged flames, the retribution of bodily sort, which transgression of also bodily sort is naturally needed to look for, is transmuted into the physical pain of bodily disease,—surely, no less effectual, but eminently more effectual, in the certainty of its occurrence, as a stay upon such sort of transgression. And the setting of the properly moral kind of retribution totally apart from this physical sort, is already thus far in itself an obviously necessary heightening of the former.

Let me not, however, pass too lightly over the point which is here the crucial one pressing upon the attention of all earnest thinkers;—and which Paul, in especial, showed his depth of earnestness by fully and fairly encountering, even with his actually-limited resources for encountering. Do you not inevitably call to mind his—"Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?"—That "man" was his own conscious thought and conscious feeling, that, as I have just been reminding myself, made it indeed the case with Paul that he shared our present powerlessness of unrestrainedly rejoicing, as in this respect Hebraistic "John" *could* rejoice, in the knowledge of a God whose love has manifestly such lack of the character that we must humanly estimate to be true love, as the Being in question with him and with us has. I say, with him *and* with us, because I wish by no means to consider the question here as one that lies merely between the character of the God worshipped by Christians, and of the God implied in the worship of Natural Religion. If the character of the former appear to *us* now so clearly un-loving and un-loveable, that there seems no possibility of such affective sentiment being entertained towards Him, still it seems to me that there is no essential difference in the case,—none but what arises from a difference of *amount* of difficulty,—when it is in fact nothing even but the most entirely abstract Governing Principle in Nature which we are really thinking of, under the name of Deity. Here, I would fully admit, lies the actual difficulty still as ever,—just as Paul admitted it;—and therefore, like him, and like every thinker really true to himself, I would gladly go, as far as my thought permits, to the true natural depth of the difficulty. Paul answered the matter to himself, we all remember, by the assertion of God's *Power*,—following up the argument previously that of Elihu:—by the assertion, namely, of God's right to have mercy upon those upon whom He willed to have mercy, and to reject those upon whom, having hardened them, He willed to show His wrath. And surely, taking in the

circumstances of his case, this moral logic was the *only* logic then open to him! *Submission to the inevitable* is the religious ultimatum that we must all, and ever, come to fall back upon, when our human ability of comprehension, having done its utmost, has indeed encountered its limit. But still it seems to me that the advantage I am now asserting to be gained over the position of Paul, is that which in truth *does* form a most substantial one: namely, in this, that it takes out the *moral* incongruity of the submission, which thence leaves our human consciousness free from all self-suspecting taint of servility as contained in it. For by this view, it is the fundamental part of our Destiny, underlying all others, that the bearing of the circumstances of Destiny which is the General bearing, *must* be directly opposed to the Individual bearing; and moral circumstances, including the matter of apprehension of what is *good*, and *right*, and *just*, can only follow the universal rule. But then, if they do so, still they do so with this of most essential variation:—when the circumstances *are* moral circumstances, the very fact involves this as part of their circumstance, that the judgment of *man* has become that which has eminently more of actual moral Divinity residing within it than the whole mass of General Nature besides. For thus does the natural Centre of Gravity shift itself, according to the nature of the subject-matter of our thought that comes into question! The crude personality of the Christian conception of Deity holds, or tries to hold, that Centre fixed down within the domain of physical superiority; and inevitably this effort causes man's moral nature to feel itself in a state of self-warring subversion. Let it, however, regulate itself freely, as our thought veers to its different stations of thinking, and all occasion for suicidal unlogicalness, and suicidal untruth,—so, at least, it seems to me,—is at once done away with! What but contrariety of aspect *could* be the result of such shifting? It is evident that the very owning of our own Providentially-appointed position—as it must now be owned by us,—to be that of having the

fulfilment of *goodness, right, justice*, laid determinately upon our own responsibility, even makes it precisely the thing to be rightfully *expected*, that the contrary to such fulfilment should be found otherwise than with ourselves. And then, by means of this recognition, when it is made, does it not also become evident how the argument by appeal to Power, naturally enforced upon us, does, indeed, gain the newness of character, which so mainly changes it as to render it henceforth instinct with even the express specialty of moral nobleness! For, God's power of bestowing improved lot upon men, is felt as committed, in regard to the need of the moment, and in proportion to our access of influence, into our own hands;—although with such indefiniteness so felt, that here again the natural operation appears, that our inevitable requirement to find out what share of such commission rests with each one's individuality,—what, therefore, each one has to submit to, and what to fight against,—forms our impulse to the exercise of it. But in the struggle with Circumstance thus entered upon,—or, at all events, in regard to the department of it which is personal,—arises to consciousness the distinction between the *two sorts* of power, resident in the different parts of the whole of things, that gives an altogether new phase to the contest, and to the matter of the contest. The General bearing of Circumstance, it is found, makes it inevitable that the Individual bearing should fall foul continually upon a principle of Individual frustration;—very well: such, then, is the kind of power that, it must be acknowledged, God has imparted to reside with Circumstances. But, to meet it, is this also found: constantly more and more, in the course of the struggle, does the Individual nature grow up into the sense of having that within itself which enables it, divinely, to make matter of conquest out of the very frustration:—into the sense, that is, of the Spiritual power that is by the nature of it centred, out of the whole of creation, solely in man. And here surely is the result that suffices:—I mean, that suffices to vindicate man's homage to the Power that, as

Divine Power, he has alone to rely on, as a truthful aid in no way degrading homage:—finding now, as man does, how the General rule of things, which is to him the testimony of such Divine Power, has caused that the sort of delegated Power which is Spiritual Power, tends ever to gain an increasing measure of Victory over Material Power. This once having been recognized, the stumbling-block that lay in Paul's way is surely effectually abolished. No longer, it seems to me, is there left any ground upon which man *can*, with any reason, complain of the seeming Providential wilfulness that necessarily presented itself under the Christian mode of belief.

Paul himself, however, I say, prepared the necessity for this recognizing of the two mental stations—of Self and of Circumstance,—thus severally extant for us to judge from, by his own distinction of the “natural” and the “spiritual” man; different as I know the meaning that he applied to those terms was to what I would apply to them. The “natural man” to me, regarded under practical consideration, is one who has not hitherto learned to make allowance for an object in nature external to his own egotistic object; the “spiritual man” is he who, aware of his own selfishness, and the necessity for it, yet has acquired in some measure the capability of entering into a general object in nature.—And now let me return to finish showing how the gaining of such capability, in the moral aspect of it, is precisely due to the ripening of our sense of retribution.

Closely, in fact, is the sign of Progress which lies in the matter just expressed,—namely, of spiritual power gaining sovereignty over circumstance,—in junction with the one a little before alleged, consisting in the actual (asserted) event that at the present period of moral development, Retribution has come to be generally estimated, much more than previously,—say, than at the commencement of Christianity,—in the prevailing light rather of Reward than of Punishment. For is not this, if it be true, the very proof of the nature of Fear,

as the motive principle of moral growth to us, having passed onwards, as Progress requires it to do, towards more and more of the nature of hoping Aspiration?—while, on the other hand, is there not this of confirmation in it to our general sense of Progress: namely, that this proved tendency in man's growing sense of Retribution to convert itself from Fear of Punishment into, or towards, Hope of Reward, indicates, with the best kind of indication, the scheme respecting it, which depends upon the lower state's being that which was the beginning state, and remains the constantly-impelling one? For, as to the fact of the Fear of Punishment, in association with the humanly-recognized *In-justice* in the outward state of things, being the real *cause* of our own moral progress, take the following most ordinary experience into consideration. Suppose for a moment that there could have been a state of things in which there should have been only Rewards, and no Punishments:—is it not obvious that, from all we know of it now, the human mind would have made no account of the Rewards whatever! It would have gone on, taking possession of them as they came in, just as if they were simply its own natural and rightful due; and without so much as even thinking it necessary to give a “thank-you” to Providence for them!—Imagine how the Jews (—since it is they who form our present special specimen of humanity,—) would thus have gone on, accepting the boon of everlasting life, and everlasting triumph over the Gentiles, as just that which was nothing more than the natural consequence of God's having been so “good” as to choose them in preference to the Gentiles!—while their gratitude, even for that original preference, would, such as it was, have *been* such evidently only in proportion to the possibility which they admitted to themselves as to God's even yet changing His mind with regard to them.—Surely it is manifest that it is and must be, only what is *un-certain* that we ever feel ourselves called upon, in moral fashion, to attend to! And of rights:—if Nature intended to educate man for serving as the appointed

dispenser of God's principle of Moral Justice in the world, what *other* means could she have taken for it, than that of thus making him, as by her actual mode of education she does make him, learn to *feel* what it is to live without an existing agency of Justice in the world?

Yes: it seems to me more and more the necessity of the case, that in becoming such agent,—that is, in attaining the organically-established moral constitution requisite for the being such,—man needs so to work out his individualistic principle as, in fact, to set himself therein, phenomenally, in direct opposition to what, equivocally, stands to him at the moment as "God".—I come to the old theological opposition-in-apposition of the relative terms of Religion and Morality:—for again I say, *this* is the mode of the superiority that I claim over theology, that while I own their essential contradiction, it is to me only the sort of contradiction that there is no other means of expressing than by saying that it is a sexual contradiction. I conceive at once that Religion is the natural mother of Morality, and that Morality, owing to its masculine nature, cannot live its life, and be itself, unless God—that is, in this case, general Circumstance,—create a new phase of Religion to be in harmony with it.

But, still, notably is neither Religion the only parent of Morality, any more than parentage is any where else in nature a thing of single operation:—it is *one* true parent, only in conjunction with the *other* true parent, which we know as the principle of Worldly Utility: that masculine parent which gives its own sex to Morality. I have already, you remember, insisted upon the importance, for all moral considerations, of keeping the principles fundamental to Morality apart from one another in their true individualized distinctions: far as I am, all the time, from meaning either that Religion is, *except* for distinction's sake, not useful, or that Worldly Utility is, with the same exception, not religious. Morality, as the offspring of the two, may be estimated in the light either of utilized Religion, or of

individualistic regard to secular benefit duly elevated by the general motives bestowed by Religion;—but still, I urge, it remains, under either description, that which *does* assume the individualistic stand-point for itself, as its own intrinsically appropriate ground, in opposition to Religion. And hence is it that, for any fundamental judgment respecting it, Morality requires to be referred much more nearly to the *secular* mode of thought, than to the mode at present followed.—Let me, however, waiving that, complete now this part of my subject, by including into the hitherto consideration the express agency towards helping out this requisite distinction, identical with the producing of a true Morality, which I am mainly insisting upon. Let me finish showing, namely, how the ripening of the human conception of Retribution, which is the indispensable preparation for a true Morality, and which, I urge, has now been demonstrated to have been the result of Religion, has of right the essentially important identity that I have claimed for it with the ripening of the human apprehension in respect of Time:—that ripening of apprehension, remember, consisting, again, in the making out of its own species of distinctions.

The true sphere for Morality, individualistic in its nature as it is, is manifestly Present Time: the portion of General Time, occupying which, the individual who does occupy it, amidst the multitude of fellow-individuals whose cotemporaneous existence fills up the field of moral Space, has to carry on with them the Fraternal struggle for the means of living, in the ameliorated mode which makes the struggle one of mutually-helpful emulation: calling forth, as we have seen, mainly his contentious, and also his abstractly intellectual faculties. But the *Religious* sense now rightly infused into Morality, as a moment ago suggested, is, that man, in carrying out the law of Morality towards his fellow-beings, has to feel himself, specially, the agent of *God* in so doing. *This*, I say then, is the Religious meaning of man's gaining within himself the organic disposition for an *active* fulfilment of duty towards

fellow-beings, in place of a passive acceptance of fulfilment of duty from them: which acquisition I am assigning as the finished fruit of Christianity. And the mode in which this fresh consciousness acts, or needs to act, within man, is very obviously to be seen as the following.

The affective mode of conflict in our nature,—the action of the “Parental” kind of struggle, which, while we are instinctively forbidden to class it distinctively as *useful*, is so undeniably *not useless*,—has, in its very closest and lowest kind of operation, this for its effect, that the individual in whom the instinct of Parental Love is in any way effectively born, does indeed thereby and thenceforth live, in a certain real sense, in the anticipated life of the child that makes the individual a parent. Here accordingly is the settling of individual attention in a fixed current towards the Future, performed with the utter imperceptibility of all Nature’s *own* special operations, which nevertheless corresponds to, and lays foundation for, that extensive and painfully-laborious conscious work of *man’s* carrying out, which constitutes the general “heaving round” of human attention now in question;—and which is, with perfectly felicitous fitness, painted in theological imagery as the finding of Parental Love truly resident within Deity. God’s Fatherly sentiment towards general mankind, I say, is the symbol that unobjectionably represents the intention of General Nature, that the Future of Humanity, which is, as it were, the Child of Past Humanity, should take up all the Consequences of improved condition which each particular man’s particular selfishness would wish to profit by in his own person. And, it being the effect of Religion to *give* the sympathy with general purpose which the individual being naturally wants, plainly hence does it therefore follow, that the merely instinctive desire for the natural child’s welfare comes in this manner to be capable of the abstract generalization, which the morally taking up the character of God’s agent for Justice in the world requires. *Could* man—we need to consider,—in any way become this

agent *without* the power of habitual pre-vision, more or less, into the moral Consequences abstractly-inevitable to ensue upon present conduct ?

Here, therefore, we touch again the point which is the vital one. If it is the office of Religion to fulfil the object of affording this pre-vision, Religion cannot fulfil this object rightly,—that is, cannot afford the pre-vision which is of the true Moral sort,—unless itself be the true sort of Religion. And hence, accordingly, I conceive, comes to pass the frustration that is now being sought to be proved as the rightful condition of the case :—frustration necessitated alike to Christianity and to our own principle of Self-ism. Surely, it is self-evident, that what I would call the merely tentative, and partially abortive, religious effort of regard to Future Consequences, which impresses them upon attention only as affecting the contemplator's personal Self, does *not* tend to produce pre-vision of the abstract sort! Surely, it is self-evident, on the contrary, that it expressly limits pre-vision to the sort that is solely and entirely personal, and therefore *un-moral*! But, moreover, on the other hand, the present principle, it appears to me, avoids also the opposite kind of difficulty, which, if not avoided, would be equally fatal to the required effect:—I mean, if it were the case that the abstract cultivation demanded were that which actually had the tendency, that at first it seems to have, totally to extinguish personal regard. For this consequence, intrinsically destructive as it would manifestly be to any theory that entailed it, is I consider, fully obviated—even as to this point of hardest contradiction to self-ism of all that self-ism can ever possibly have to deal with,—by the distinction here contended for which legitimates, upon equal grounds, the personal view of things, in conjunction with the general view. I do not say, indeed, that personal regard is hence permitted to remain as immediate, or corporeal personal regard:—by the very hypothesis of development it has within it the *necessity* of growing into a sort of regard that though still personal, shall be abstractly-personal.

But this allowed,—admission being made, as by present theory, that the only thing rightly demandable by personalism is, that it shall compass the gain of Self-Growth which shall bring it into reasonable acquiescence with its own condition,—and, I appeal to you, the consequence that *does* result from the actual frustration of self-ism, when we *have* made acknowledgment of the just-referred-to distinction, turns out to be indeed no other than just the rectification to our previous sense of the involved Religious Duty of the case, that forms precisely the practical impulse that we see to be in requisition. For, consider the following:—Have we not, all of us, just in proportion as this at-first confounding phenomenon, of contradiction between our own moral sense of just regulation, and our experience of what hitherto we have classed as “God’s” regulation, has shown itself the actual state of things in the world, come to feel, more or less, according to the measure of true moral courage within us, an indignation against such previous classification, and rebellion against holding to it any longer? What once seemed “God”, seems now changed into a Fetish-Devil;—nay, being the Deity presiding solely over the material world, it *is*, and ought to be *figured* as, according to my scheme, of necessity such. Nature, *minus* matter of moral recognition, *can* be only that primitive aspect of things, before moral nature was created, which primitive men, as we have seen, were compelled to image forth as a Fetish-Devil; though, as I say, the centre of ideal gravity being altogether shifted since moral nature *was* created, the meaning that once did belong to “God”, belongs to that designation manifestly no longer. But this shifting of meaning as to what God needs to be considered *being* effected, how does the matter stand as to the agency to be undertaken by us on God’s part? We now, observe, *by* our taking up this agency, become morally—in extremely small proportion, it is true, but still in actual fact as to that proportion,—absolute creators, ourselves, of the future race of beings. By our obtaining the conscious allotment of

this highest of all departments of Divine office, we have become, in fact, liable to the very responsibility of creatorship, which in our hearts we have been charging the "God" we counted such, with having exercised unworthily,—the "God", namely, so-accepted, whom we have been accustomed to consider as destining the majority of the beings who are His workmanship to Hell-fire!—*Here*, then, I urge, is the circumstance that eminently renders our connexion with future existence a most strictly personal connexion, rooted in our very deepest part of self! Who is there, I appeal to you, that, entering into this acknowledgment of allotted duty, will for a moment think that it is nothing to us—nothing, as to our immediate inner feeling of actually present complacency,—whether we be to those unborn creatures, thus to a certain extent dependent upon us, as the one sort of Creator or the other sort: the Creator of the theology devised by barbarous ages long over-passed, or the Creator such as we now esteem a true Creator?—If we, within our fractional sphere of creatorship, *so* fulfil our share of creative responsibility, as that we prepare for the subjects of our influence the sort of moral environment, and especially the sort of mental and bodily constitution, that shall compel them into the necessity to rue their birth into the world,—*then*, I say, manifestly, must we be self-condemned of being to them, instead of imitators of true Deity, the copiers in reality of the very Fetish-Devil, whose asserted existence has been hitherto so justly stirring up our own abhorrence.

This, then, I find to be the meaning of moral growth that alone forms any thing like a consistent meaning. The limiting of the effect of Retribution, as Christianity limited it, to the single individual being who gives occasion for the effect, I find to be so contrary to the promotion of moral growth, that it seems to me expressly the cultivation of a principle of unchecked selfishness. And, in fact, that Christianity should have done even that which it has,—I mean, that it should have prepared the way for the present more unselfish principle,—I find, as

already observed, is precisely owing to what, upon its own ground, has the equivocal appearance of defect. Suppose that Christianity had been able really to afford to its believers, the positive undoubted *assurance* of eternal salvation to any individual man, which, upon its own terms, it holds forth,—but which, in fact, if it *have* afforded to any, it has done so only in the cases of extreme fanaticism, from which, on that very account, I should say, the spirit of true Religion is proved to have been utterly absent,—the belief in Christianity would, on the ground of this assurance, have cut the partakers of it off from the main source, if not the only future source, of common feeling at all with their fellow-men. It is the degree of inevitable *un-certainty*—harmonizing with the Providential uncertainty every where else found in the world,—that remains incident, more or less, to even the profoundest believer in Christianity who is *not* fanatical, as to whether any one of them is indeed destined to be found at last amongst the number of the Redeemed, or that of the Lost:—it is this, I would say, that *alone* has all along been the really effective enforcer of religious sympathy to them.——But, under the consideration just stated, do you not feel that we have now, upon our newly-taken ground, the very same benefit upon an altogether surer foundation? For the anxiety to excess, thus stirred up occasionally amongst Christians, when circumstance seems to compel them to it, is more than counterpoised by the careless security, to a still greater excess, with which they, in ordinary,—as the general rule of the case,—assume, each one of them for himself, that the state of Hell-torment asserted is to be only for a spectacle, and not an experience: thus nullifying, in proportion to the excess of *this* excess over the *other* excess, the actual benefit of the Christian scheme of retribution. By the present scheme, however, while a small degree of just recompense is all but absolutely certified to each individual, even in the mode of proper personal recompense, there is in the abstract kind of dread of a tormented Conscience—as to Duty required to be

fulfilled for beings apart from Self, and especially for beings apart from us who are to come as inheritors of fate after us,—that which, I urge, very much more than the Christian liability causes us to be in conscious union with the general brotherhood of men. If Sorrow in ordinary makes, as has been said, all the world akin, most of all has such effect the Sorrow which is the intense Sorrow for recognized Sin! Of all retributory influences be for ever most revered for its profound salutariness, the Anguish which is that of Repentance!—since, over and above the salutariness through which it causes us to turn back and amend our ways for our own sakes, it has yet this incomparably more precious value, that its influence is capable of acting in leading us to mend them even when it is only for the sake of others,—for the sake of others who may never know or think of us!—Yes: if it were possible that through Repentance and Amendment the only event to ensue *should* be that we should merely save our own souls, surely would the very principle—the *Christian* principle,—that called the Repentance and Amendment originally forth, have proved to have denied itself. It is universal love that must save us; and by making self-salvation our end, we are false to that love. Christians, I admit, were therefore right when they said that all our good deeds need to be done “*for Christ*”, just as they have been done, and can only be done, “*through Christ*”,—leaving to us the sole proper reward that we are, and may remain, “*in Christ*”.—And if it seems, indeed, too hard for men to accept this fact of involved union with the common lot, as a really sufficing reward for working out the terms of that union, then I answer with these two statements, which together make up *my* retributive system of threat and encouragement:—If they do *not* obey the salutary spur to Amendment which, passing by self-salvation, urges each to work for general advancement, their lot is henceforth assured, by the very sense of Duty as an inner one now become a part of the inherited birth-destiny of men, to be that of the wretched consciousness of

isolation by which Sinners are, by the law involved in their being such, *sundered* from their part of the general harmony of things;—And, on the other hand, to lessen the seeming sternness of this condition, there is the reflection, that in all human effort that *does* lead towards Amendment, the whole force of natural tendency is shown to be with them to back them; and what *might* be too hard for men to do, is *not* too hard for God.

Thus, therefore, we come to the winding-up effect of all that Christianity in general has done for us:—the effect, namely, of this gaining, within our permanent constitution of an ability of genuine moral strength: strength which, to be known as such, in its true value, needs only to be compared with the moral, or rather pre-moral, condition possessed by man previously to Christianity. This form of religion, now, as I consider, a lapsed, or lapsing one, has, I also consider, proved itself to have by no means done for us what our own individualistic feeling would have called upon it to do, and what in fact, its actual originators *did* expect of it to do. There has all along, I conceive, been going on within it that same working out of the inevitably contradictory aspects in the case, which, because they are such, involve the event to occur out of the case, on the one hand, that individualistic feeling *must* find itself to be thwarted; and, on the other, that the form embracing the contradictions, must, after a certain period, determined by the ripening, and thence mutually-cancelling, of the antagonistic conceptions, arrive at its own catastrophe. The intrinsic dilemma of such sort which must be counted the fundamental one, is evidently that which has been just now under consideration, relating to the “would not” and “could not” pertaining to the Ordainer of human suffering, needing to be thought of as a *good* Being;—this contradiction,

however, being one in no way singular to Christianity, but possessed by it in common with the universal mode of religion hitherto (except in isolated cases) entertained amongst men. But the two following are similar dilemmas that *are* peculiarly those of Christianity:—first, that with regard to the All of men, and the not-All, destined to be saved by Christ;—secondly, this of the Life and Immortality brought to light by the Gospel, which, after all, proves, as it appears, to be yet *not* brought to light. On all these three points, the Christian Religion seems to have now split itself, as upon a three-fold rock of latent self-inconsistency, underlying its ostensible compactness, which thence has rendered manifest to all present logical perception its effectual self-confutation. And yet,—so far from this being a sign of failure to it,—let me now try to demonstrate how, if we trace what it is that Christianity *has* actually accomplished (including the effect of its lapse,) in regard to this latter portion of the general dilemma,—this being the portion which, according to my scheme, forms indeed the portion, not only of by far the closest individualistic interest, but for that very reason, the one that effectively governs all the rest,—we shall gain evidence that must abstractly satisfy us, that the contradiction to our self-ism has been the means, and, it would seem, the only possible means, of enabling our nature truly to realize the improvement originally promised in Christianity: namely, the acquisition of the spirit of self-sustaining Power, which is such through the surmounting of Fear that is selfish Fear, by means of Love that is not merely egotistic Love, but extended beyond self.

Pre-religious man, as soon as ever he began to reflect at all upon his own condition, found Death in front of him, as the barrier that shut out from him the whole of Future Time, except precisely the term of existence that seemed allotted to his individual self; and together with such state of spiritual limitation, co-existed, as of necessity must, the state of moral feebleness which, as our own experience tells us, bears with it

as its universal indication this, that to the mind afflicted by it the existing evil in the world is more terrifying than the existing good is exhilarating: whence the primitive excess of Fear in the impulse that drove him to religious idealization. The entire object of the latter, as a self-proposed object, has been the breaking down of that barrier: egotistic man thinking it the right state of things that the whole course of Past ages should have gone to prepare a condition for him, of which he, through the whole course of Future ages, has only to avail himself.—Religious idealization, however, was tantamount to the casting in a *general* mould of just what otherwise was thought of as individual. In its very nature, therefore, it could not but, as it did, actually burst open the barrier, and let in to man the pre-vision of a Future Eternity, which thence, till he was expressly contradicted, egotistic man could not help assuming to be the boon of the very nature that he desired. That is, he would willingly have appropriated to himself, what needed to be shared amongst the entire number of the members of “Christ”.—Happiness being, upon theological assumption, unlimited in its possibility of amount, why should not, he argued, each fraction of it be equal to the whole?—At all events, his calculation was of the kind which caused that no incongruity, moral or intellectual, amounting to any obstruction in the case, was found by him in the arrangement now come to, which seemed for its end to have this: namely, to secure an Eternal Luxury of Self-Enjoyment as the Hereafter reserved in Heaven for self, together with a special few out of the number of fellows to self in the human race, while for the remaining mass of mankind was destined, to swallow them up, the sort of Hereafter that formed an Hell of unending Torment. This accordingly, I say, was the mode in which the naturally-produced and naturally-developed argumentation of human thought, so long as that thought remained grossly weighted towards the egotistic side, did the best that it could do towards settling the matter for man’s satisfaction. Christianity, as the world’s religion, has, I conceive, thoroughly

tested what of result *can* be gained, upon this principle of estimating satisfaction.——But then, to counteract this principle, Christianity had another side to its own generalization, latest to develop itself,—and so doing, when it did, only in consequence of the salutary uncertainty left inevitably within the asserted Christian assurance:—I mean, the properly moral element which teaches that the truly “elect” members of Christ are *not* in fact those who are destined specially to have most allotted to them to *enjoy* in life, but those to whom it is allotted to have most to *do* in life. And this moral element, faithfully cogitated, changes, it seems to me, the entire bearing of the general result. Though the barrier of Death *be* still left standing where it was, (as to the essential fact of Circumstance, determining the various modes of our thinking respecting it,)—and though, indeed, the very failure of this large human endeavour to prove its removableness, goes altogether to certify its irremovableness,—yet still, the individual man whose mode of anticipation regarding what lies beyond his personal sphere of life is become that now made known as the right mode, does not thence find himself, as to the really best part of himself, excluded from true Interest in it. Feeling, as he now does, that the prerogative rightly to be desired by him in the gift of Providence, is that he may be entitled to act in producing good, instead of that of being permitted passively to receive good, his own living concern in the Future, and to an indefinitely farther and farther extent, is ensured to him, in all that lies outside of his immediate personality:—so that, at all events, as to the thought, and the more generous feelings of men, the gates of the Grave have indeed been thrown open to them, and have been so by the Christian Religion!——Compare then the scheme of Futurity which I have just pointed to as the Christian scheme, (—an end in its own view, though I take it as only a means:—) with the one which I propose to substitute for it: namely, that which consists in a gradually-progressing state of things, whose fruit of progress, as it falls constantly in, shall be in reach of all and

every one of the hence-coming children of men:—and judge (—*not* by your selfishness, for I am not appealing to that,—) if the latter does not manifestly conduce to the moral strength in man, which in opposition to the influence of moral feebleness, shall really afford him the truest kind of ground for actual trust in his destiny. I mean, the strength which shall afford him the sense—the *general* sense,—of an Ordering of all things *generally* for Good.

CHAPTER V.

COMBINED RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS, SHOWING THE PERMANENT FRUIT NOW REMAINING WITH US OUT OF CHRISTIANITY.

OUR detailed examination of the contents of Christianity is now completed; and, I hope, not so inadequately as that any reader should find it difficult to gather together from it, at once, the general representation of the nature of Christianity, which shall answer the immediate demand of the plan of examination here laid out to be followed: namely, a representation that shall in so far satisfy that demand, as unevasively to express what is here accepted as the actual purport of the humanly-wrought-out Generalization that Christianity is taken to be. The entire meaning of the whole widely-compounded idea embraced by that Generalization, reduced into terms which bring together, in close verbal connexion, the several results of the five branches of conception into which I have arranged to divide its naturally-mingled subject-matter, seems to me to state itself, with a full general sufficiency, thus:—

What the Generalization strictly asserts, as such, is simply this, that the primitive notion of Religion which existed previously to itself,—namely, that Past Ages were better than, and yet the source of degeneration to, Present and Future Ages,—is an entirely false notion (Section I.). This assertion, however, it makes in such manner, as at the same time integrally

to support itself, as to its own truth, upon the following grounds, which have, ever since the beginning of Christianity, been evolving themselves into greater and greater clearness:—namely, that while, on the one hand, the Governing Principle in Nature proves itself to be that which in fact more and more expressly, as the course of human history lengthens, makes manifestation to human beings of its own Paternal character, in proportion as the bearing of it upon the whole mass of them is comprehensively taken into account (Sections II. and III.); they, on the other hand, in proportion as they only act upon the recognition of this universally-shared manifestation, prove that they are, in the very circumstance of their doing so, effecting an advance in their own constitution, which, being made, specially enables them henceforth more and more effectually to carry on the course of advance (Sections IV. and V.).

Thus much to state, as the result respecting “revealed truth” seeming to be afforded by Christianity,—keeping present terms within the restriction of a compelled reference to the actual form of thought maintained by Christianity,—is, I say, an easy manner of knotting together the conclusions arrived at. And if to any reader this appears all that requires to be done, in the way of winding up this examination, here let him accordingly stop. My analysis of the formal intention of Christianity is at an end; and if this alone is of concern to him, he will do well to go with me no farther. But my own purpose, you remember, is not so much to show what the Past Form of Religion has in itself done for me, in the affording me of ancestrally-stored-up thought, as to show what elements the relational consideration of it affords towards the moulding of a New Form,—is indeed to show the former only with a view to the latter. And therefore my mode of gathering up results has required, on my own account, to be especially regulated by this design. I have felt the need to see, and solely, what there has been brought to light that shall serve me in the laying of a stable foundation for fresh Religion: by which I mean,—is it

necessary to explain?—what there is that has now been rendered believably evident in the very Actuality of things, that gives true cause of Religion. Let then only whoever feels the same need, and let none others, proceed to take from me, as I now offer it with most earnest appeal to their judgment, the following outline,—attempting to body forth with somewhat of the definite requisites of a scheme, the dim notion of such scheme which has by this time shaped itself to this degree for me.

The conditions that I find myself obliged to postulate, as requisite to the peculiarity of my subject, it is necessary for me to begin by stating, are solely these:—

1. On the one hand, regarding the human mind, I assume:—first, *metaphysically*, that what was required for it was, that it should extend itself in regard to its knowledge of Space and Time;—and secondly, *actually*, that this extension should be of the mode which should exhibit the human mind in its due correspondence with the rest of general nature: namely, the mode of a regulated growth, effected by means of the mind's assimilation of external influences: the growth being that which is habitually estimated by us, as the fact of the mind's becoming constantly more and more abstract in its capacity.

2. And, on the other hand, as regards the state of things external to the human mind, I assume the following:—namely, that it is the necessary character of the movement, which, although its original cause is inexplicable, must nevertheless be attributed as essential to the being of general nature, that such general movement should have resulted, as we see that it did result, at the period which appears to us as the Beginning

of things, in the separation of the entire Life of nature into individual Lives; all of them subject to progressive increase, as their lot in common, but all of them subject also to a certain inequality in the distribution of the means of increase, which must tend continually more and more to sever the lot of each one from that of every other:—the prime matter of the inequality being the circumstance, that two generations of lives uniformly co-exist with one another to such extent, and in such manner, that the earlier-existing generation of the two has the full command of all that is needed for life, at the time when the other has every thing against it in the struggle for command, except solely what it owes to the fostering guardianship of the other. That is to say:—when the Universal Ocean of Being broke up into Individual Waves of Being, there was a relation established, which necessitated that all consciousness which could ever come to the individual beings as to that relation, could only be that which manifested itself under the image of their being children of an Universal Parent; while also it necessitated, that the sole means of gaining such consciousness was, that each individual being should severally take account of the existence of its fellow-individual beings.

8. For, as, without that breaking up of the Ocean into Waves, the Universal Life would for ever have been uniform, and there would have been no existence of individuals at all: so do I suppose that the fact of the Waves being Waves—that is, of their over-lapping one another,—has made it a necessary condition of development that human nature should be a Religious nature. If the individual portions of Ocean had stood each upright and self-dependent in its separate little heap, men could never, by any means conceivable to us, have realized any degree of consciousness beyond that which pertains to the several little heap of each. Being, however,

as they *are*, these over-lapping Waves, there has been to them from the beginning an innate cause at work, which could not but end by their having, under the effect of growth, more or less—first less, and then more,—of consciousness as to their being each one bound up, in the sort of union that is a dependent union, together with the whole Ocean of Waves.

4. But the immediate result of this fundamental Inequality—this, as it instinctively paints itself, equatorial obliquity of our spiritual world,—is, that the human mind has within itself two modes of action, two totally different sets of functions. That is, the human mind has such *now*: in its existing state of comparatively high development. The one mode is appropriately used when the mind thinks *as an individual*; the other, when it thinks *as a part of the whole of general being*.

5. Now, the first mode (—first, as it is natural for us logically to estimate it, but really the latest in order of development:—) is that which of distinctive right belongs to Science (Science, that is, of all sorts that regard objects external to the mind: or, of all sorts except Psychology). And, here again, Astronomy gives me the analogy that better than any thing else will supply my explanation. As long as men limit themselves to gaining knowledge of the earth we live upon, plain straight-forward observation is that which suffices them. Positive methods of induction, in the way of logic,—the surveyor's rod and chain, in the way of manual assistance,—require only, as their finishing accompaniment, so much of mathematical acquaintance with the surface of the heavens presented to us, as enables them to perfect their map by adding to its delineations of the contour of land and water, and of variations of level, &c., the clearness, for practical guidance, of arbitrary lines of latitude and longitude. But let the students desire to go beyond their geography, and make the heavens themselves their subject, and what sort of clearness by latitude and

longitude, let them consider, will be that which is to be aimed at by them now? Is their rule of measurement to be still the geo-centric, which in the other case was the sole kind needed; or is it to be of the kind now become possible, though before it was not, which is the helio-centric?—and, if helio-centric, is it to have regard to the sun of our system, which, steadfast as it is compared with our now obviously-shifting earth, is indeed in so far comparatively better for a standard; or is it to have regard to a sun, or supposition of a sun, that shall have, if such a thing be actually admissible by the law of things, a perfect steadfastness as the centre of the system of all systems? Is it not evident that there has now come to be a vagueness, and liability to confusion, between the two ways become possible of regarding the position of any object amongst other objects,—any star amongst the stars,—which immediately makes the mapping out of the stars a thing to be done upon totally different principles from the mapping out of the earth?—So, then, I conceive, is it the case with the generalizing habit of mind which belongs of right to the relational character of Religion, as contrasted with the habit proper to Science.* *One* sort of latitude and longitude, and that an immediately intelligible sort, serves for Geography;—*one* mode of thinking,

* See *Thoughts in aid of Faith*, p. 302. I have thought it best, in general, throughout the present work, to refrain from confusing its delineation of principle by reference to the altogether different presentation of principle offered in my former volume; but I cannot help desiring to remind my readers that the greater part of the material which I am now endeavouring to work up consistently, was, at least rudimentally, set forth there; and, especially, that this fundamental distinction as to our modes of thinking, was already there taken as the matter of leading significance which I am now only more strongly urging its being.

And to illustrate the need of attending to the distinction, let me be allowed to point to what is occurring, with a peculiar degree of prominence, in the controversial experience of this very present time, in respect of the meaning of the word, that forms, indeed, the typical representative of the whole controvertible matter upon which philosophical

and that a simply observant mode, suffices for Science. And this, accordingly, I would consider as forming the fundamental

disputation of necessity turns:—I mean, the word "*cause*". Analytical Science, acting in its own proper "geographical" mode of simple experimentation, or surface observation, of things, and in its own characteristic attitude of purely positive and inductive thought, gives as the clearly sufficing definition of the word, that it is that which implies between any two circumstances or things that may be in question, a relation of "invariable sequence" on the part of one of them towards the other. And, surely, as to the characteristic working of Science,—namely, upon objects external to our Selfism,—such definition does imply all that Scientific observation ever needs, or can need, to be present to apprehension in the matter. But surely, also, it is clear that the nature of the idea involved in the word is that which inevitably carries thought away from the Scientific mode: just because, the instant we dwell upon the word to gain its meaning, our attention abandons the circumstances and things which under Science were our object, and rests instead upon the relation between them, which thence demands that our mode of thought should be a *relational* mode,—that is to say, the characteristically generalistic mode, which, though I am here designating it the "Religious" mode, from the nature of my subject, is on secular topics ordinarily called the "Philosophic".—Being, however, regarded in the generalistic mode,—that is, being so regarded with self-admission that it is so regarded,—immediately, it seems to me, arises the need for the duplicity of mental stand-point that I am asserting,—for this reason: namely, that in relational observation the mind requires still to retain its hold over all the experimental and detailed results that have been gained, though it must do so only in the entirely subordinate manner which belongs to its own "astronomical" mode of dealing with results, as from the heliocentric focus which can treat such results, like worlds and stars, only in masses. Very faintly and confusedly, and often very self-contradictorily, it seems to me, *must* the thought which occupies this equivocal position be compelled to render forth its image as to the truth of things, when it ventures into collision with the safely stationed thought of the scientific mind!—while yet, for all that, having a specialty of merit of its own, in its aim going, as it does, beyond that of the latter!—"Astronomical" thought *can* only treat its massed objects as to their *motion*; and, so thought of, is it not evident that their fulcrums of motion become the only thing of importance? But this is a carrying of consideration

indication respecting Science. But the instant Religious Generalization is made to take the place of Science, at once the equivocation in question falls liable.—Do you not observe, that when I just now called the essential circumstance of human

away from their surface, and into their interior;—and knowledge of interior *can* only be gained through subjective self-reflection:—whence, I argue, it happens that anthropomorphic conception inevitably supervenes; and with an advantage of most eminent sort. For now, as to this word *cause*, comes there to be felt the necessity of in some mode retaining in its definition, the acknowledgment of that creative potentiality which by subjective comparison is now first, but is inevitably, suggested. A *cause*, heliocentrically defined, *must* be regarded as a massed consideration: as that which, in being such, means something that cannot but be dispersed into utter nothingness when analysed, though, when massed, meaning something of the most essential reality. For, according to heliocentric thought, there are ever to be taken into account these two essential circumstances:—on the one hand, every separate antecedent needs to be counted as the express creator of its consequent: thus backing each individual instance of causation, and surely rightly, by the whole force of general creation;—and on the other, has to be allowed for the phenomenal circumstance, to our human apprehension necessarily the determinative one in the case, which is this: namely, that such creative force, requisite though it be to exist, and to be assumed as existing, resident within each minutest atom (so to speak) of eventual transaction, yet is that which acquires its *minimum visibile* of actual recognizableness under nothing less than the amount of conglomeration, which, on the very account of this implication of recognition involved in it, enforces upon the mind that contemplates it, the application to it of the figure of living individualization.—And as to the mode of such personification,—that is, as to the mode in which the individualistic Ego, thus figured, is to be imaged as exercising the “control over volition”, which constitutes it an Ego,—the interpretation falls as follows: namely, that the *sum* of the atomic capabilities, corresponding to the accumulation of habitual human inclinations, estimated upon the average, or as from the focal centre which the conscious human Ego *is*, has, in the mere fact of being such *sum*, the same obvious determinative potentiality over any freshly-occurring atomic circumstance, that the human Ego has over any newly-springing human inclination.

condition an "*equatorial obliquity*", I was only describing, as from the astronomical point of view, that which from the geographical, I should have needed to call, as we do, notoriously, in familiar practice call it, obliquity of the *ecliptic*?

6. But the relational view of things proper to Religion has for its fundamental indication, not only this of its thus affording two modes of viewing open to the choice of the mind, but also that of its requiring the mind, in the course of its development, to acquire distinct *consciousness*, both as to the need of choice and its own power of choice. That is to say, Religion cannot truly fulfil its character, without Self-consciousness in the mind as to what it is about. And this internalness of object is hence, I infer, the cause that Religion by necessity stands for ever upon higher ground of abstractness than outwardly dealing Science; though still a balancing equality is nevertheless preserved between the two, by the fact that Religion, by corresponding necessity, always does the work it aspires to less perfectly than Science can and does accomplish its own lower aim.—Nor is this inferiority without its immediate explanation, when we remember how the very fact of Religion's work being inward work, causes that the mind, in doing it entirely by Reflection, does it under the disadvantage of seeing every thing, phenomenally, upside down; and that, till it has reached the point of development when consciousness of the circumstance arrives to it, it is altogether without idea of the necessity of making allowance for it. For the mind, as to its own intention, has just as much an external object under Religion as under Science; it aims still to preserve a geocentric rule of thought, just as much in considering the fields of astronomical Infinitude, as it legitimately did in considering matters really accessible to measurement. And hence, *before* the distinction as to the opposite rules is realized by it,—and remember that in every instance of beginning conception the puzzle occurs afresh,—the mind lies under the influence of conflicting considerations, which, while at first they necessarily

tend of preference to settle into an image of entirely deceptive position, will and must, even to the last, cause to even the steadiest possible gaze of would-be positive and inductive contemplation, an occurrence of impression which is that of a flitting falsity.

7. Thus far as regards the mind's external pose. Let us now, however, turn to connect this abstract division of the two sets of its functions,—scientific individualism, and religious relationalism,—with the subjective side of the same fact. That is, let us see how the original creation of over-lapping individual lives resulted in regard to the requirement stated in paragraph 1.

8. And first, as to the mind's extension in knowledge of Space and Time:—surely, such extension is manifestly to be seen as provided for, in the very nature of the wave-like distribution in itself!—the distribution, remember, which causes that the general Struggle of Life of necessity divides itself into the two kinds of struggle, which have to be carried on severally by men as Parents and Children, and by men as Brothers;—since what can be more evident to instant perception, than that the former, the Parental kind of conflict, is that which has, and must have, a special concern with Time, while the Fraternal conflict applies in peculiarity to Space? And if so, what else can the natural action of the several conflicts tend to, than thus to bring about the several kinds of knowledge required?

9. But, all plain as this is upon the spot in theory, the import of the merely metaphysical consideration is too much really involved with the actual consideration of the case, bound up with the metaphysical, to be at all sufficingly judged of alone. Let us therefore carry the former with us while we view, secondly, the *mode* of the mind's growth: by means, namely, of the assimilation of external influences. And it is to be observed, how greatly the distinction here insisted upon, as to the essentially varying two classes of these influences,—by no means, it appears to me, hitherto taken the positive theoretic

account of, in our general mental philosophy, that it needs to be,—complicates the estimation of their operation. Let me, however, in the first place, prepare for the consideration, by sketching the general plan as to their assimilation, without regard to the distinction.—The main point is this: namely, that a quite new set of influences began to be at work upon the mind, when, in course of its development, it first came to be acted upon by external *beings*, in their entire nature as such; after having been previously acted upon only by particular impressions affecting special senses. For these two peculiarities accompany the change: on the one hand, *beings*, as such, affect us only in a general manner; on the other hand, we appreciate them only by means of what we consider an *inner* sensation. And thus it happens that all this new set of relational impressions are classed under the broad name of Feeling (that is, of mental Feeling); while the other set of impressions, received directly through the special senses, are classed as Intellect, the mode of mind proper to us when we are considered simply as individuals. But, on the other hand, because Feeling is this *inner* impression of things, it forms that, except for conjunction with which, Intellect could never have gained the quality which alone conveys its true character of elevation to it: namely, the quality of Consciousness. The detail impressions that were received by the inferior creatures that had none at all of the concentrated recognition which gives intimation of the “I”, possessed only an utterly *un-conscious* Intellect; and so also, at the other extreme of the scale, is the highest kind of scientific intelligence only that whose cognizance of external things has been duly raised, and sharpened, to the degree of being an individualistic cognizance, through possession of the perfectly generalized impression as to individual Self-consciousness, which is the proper fruit of Feeling in its most abstract state of Religious Feeling. And thus it appears as if, all along through the course of human development, the matter of progress, or of an increased assimilation of external influences, might be con-

sidered as sufficiently indicated without any thing beyond this being attended to: that is, simply by the one event of the gaining of a deepening sense of Individualism.

10. But the fact is, immediately that we seek to bring this general rule under its requisite modification, this one-sided aspect gives place to the dualism that, as I have just asserted, belongs universally to whatever is contemplated in the mode of general contemplation. That is to say,—while we are regarding the law of external influences thus to be, that in proportion as they impress themselves constantly deeper within the mental constitution, so do they produce, or rather deposit, a growing Self-consciousness within the individual: we need farther to remember, that the very circumstance of those influences acting in the two-fold manner just described, must itself be painted upon the result. That is, there must come to be, as soon as the work is at all consolidated, not an uniform Self-consciousness, but one that has also its own *inner* and *outer* sides: causing, therefore, that the sense of Individualism, which can only be a purely intellectual or objective sense, shall be accompanied by the still deeper, and therefore still more central sense, which is the subjective one of Emotive Relationalism. And so important, indeed, is this division, being of this sort,—that is, a division where matter of composite nature is *so* parted, as that though the varied ingredients which are possessed by the two sides are in common, yet they are possessed in relatively opposite proportions,—that it is thence, as I imagine, that is given occasion for the mutual interplay of the two sets of functions associated with the two sides, that constitutes the entire action of the mind: their alternate exercise constantly maintaining an alternate appetite for the relatively opposite modes of culture (see p. 87). And for the affording of this composite nature, we have now to take into account, exists, in addition to the prime difference lying in the influence of external beings, from that of external parts of beings, the farther difference that lies between the influence of different classes of beings. Essentially an

opposite sort of limitation, I urge, is afforded to our Self-knowledge, when it is conveyed by the relations with fellow-beings that are of the Parental-Filial class, from that which is conveyed by our relations with our Brothers of the human race. Being so, however, what I farther urge is, that the whole of this new sort of difference goes nevertheless entirely to heighten the one already seen in process: since, just as the Parental conflict has been said to consort with the idea of Time, and the Fraternal with Space, so, on the other hand, has the Parental conflict the peculiarity of dealing with its objects as beings in the mass, while the Fraternal takes them rather in detail; which altogether promotes the ultimate separation in respect of Relationalism and Individualism. And hence, accordingly, seem to be intelligibly necessitated the antagonistic characteristics residing in the two sets of resulting functions, as to which let the following hints suffice:—

11. Firstly, Intellect, or that which is fed mainly by details, is essentially *active* action of the mind: that is, it does not wait till external influences come to it, but it seeks them out, and when it has found them, controls them; and is, accordingly, combative, courageous, self-reliant. Having a definite object, it is led to pursue it soberly and steadily. Aiming always to abstract itself from connexion with its object, it can only come to be, so to speak, corporeally repulsive. But Feeling, vaguely maintained by only general impressions, is thence itself altogether vague, and mentally feeble. Its mental action, if action, is only *passive* action, or *passion*. It receives the influences which alone can influence it,—that is, of beings,—and does *not* seek them out. It is controlled by them. It clings to the beings affording them, and recognizes corporeal attraction in them; is submissive to them; is content with enjoying them, and desires no change in them; resists, as the only thing that it does resist, the idea of being ever compelled to part with them; and yet accommodates itself, nevertheless, to the change that Nature puts upon it, in regard to the

successive objects that gain sway over it. In its lowest mood, the beings who are domestically related are those that alone take possession of it; but in its highest mood, it is capable of imbibing the influence of the whole of General Nature, so long as the latter has the needed condition of being embodied in a sufficiently concrete personification.——But, secondly, is this of apparent self-contradiction in the characters of each, that while Feeling, notwithstanding its forming the link of connexion to the individual with fellow-beings, is, however, owing to its feebleness, so limited in its regard to them, that it concerns itself appreciably only with those that are in immediate contact with Self,—and with the Personification of the whole, only in the same manner,—and is therefore eminently Selfish: Intellect; notwithstanding its pure individualism, spreads its abstract regard abroad amongst the whole number of fellow-beings that at all fall under that regard. And here, in fact, observe, seems justified the pertinency of the mode in which we find ourselves compelled to think of the two prime ideas of Space and Time involved: Space, namely, as in chief concern with Intellect; Time, with Feeling. For the extreme narrowness of the occupied Space lying around Self, and the unbounded continuance of the desired existence of Self, which are the conditions present to the mind under Feeling, cannot but make Time appear to us, as it notoriously does appear, a thread or line of produced attenuated Space. And so also, the comparative shallowness of the Time taken account of by Intellect, in its habitual operation, can only cause that Space should appear to us, as it does, the plane of scarcely other than presently-occupied Time. And, surely, thus again shows itself the need of the oscillation that makes thought a thing of vitality to us! To suppose that the mind could act without oscillation, would be to suppose that it could hold the conception of the line of Time in actual conjunction with that of the plane of Space: that is, hold each of them magnified to such a degree as that it should coincide with the other:—manifestly a feat that can only utterly transcend

human ability!—But, thirdly, comes this closer distinction, that in what Intellect does have to do with Time, it is enforced to affect chiefly Time that is Past: the sort of Time into which it needs to plunge downwards, just so far as, though no farther than, is necessary to procure for it a sufficiently solid basis of Experience;—while that which Feeling does and must characteristically affect, is the Future. When Feeling does go back to the Past, it does it with an evident unfitness: since it can do it only with the rash indefiniteness that is natural to it. And accordingly has it proved the case, that nothing less than the Absolute Beginning of things has at all seemed to suffice for its comprehension, as the sphere for the Being that it knows as “*my God*”. But then, again, only is this extreme retraction the occasion to it of bounding forward into still more daring flights upward, dilating in the existence To Come:—these being only checked finally by the due cautiousness, as to basis, which it gains as it ripens under its inter-play with Intellect. And so also, on the other hand, is the perfection of Intellect only exhibited, when to inductive Science is realized the capability of a certain measure of Pre-vision.—Lastly, the arrangement of conceptions that comes to be proper to Abstract Feeling (that is, Religion,) is such as forms itself in a mode analogous to the entire manner of acquisition otherwise of all that pertains to the special conception of Self: namely, in the mode of continuous development of a principle counted as a solitary principle: this being the mode known to us as that of History;—while the arrangement proper to Intellect is the mode that is contrariwise adapted to contemporaneous observation of a multitude of developments: namely, the mode known by us as Science.

12. And yet, while we take this for what appears to be the state of the two mental spheres when their difference is fully made out, we must bear in mind that it is still natural—nay, inevitable, and moreover what experience has shown to be the case,—that, so long as their rightful separation is as yet *not*

made out, the characteristics are all mixed up together; and in an early stage of development, appear even precisely in their wrong place. For, as we know, and as, I say, circumstance compelled it, Religion began by clinging to the idea of Time Past; by no means in order to seek, as Science now instructs it to do, a solid basis in the world of accomplished Fact, whose secure station should support it for those its upward flights into the regions of as-yet-Unreality; but only through a coward shrinking from such flight. And so did Science also, upon its part, begin, not by making the prudent generalizations which are the true guidance for scientific observation, but by revelling altogether in supposed Pre-vision. That is to say, Science, instead of being securely based, was fanciful and theoretical; Religion, instead of being submissive, was self-asserting and self-sufficient.

18. Let us then now, keeping the actually-attained distinction as to these modes of mind in view, recur to the principle respecting the action of external influences stated in paragraph 9, in order to trace how *this* distinction can have proceeded from *that* action. Let us, in accordance with the mode proper to our subject of Religious Development,—treating that Development, namely, as if it were through its whole course pertinent solely to one single mind,—travel back along the line of Time, till once more we seem to take up the matter at its beginning point:—the point when man, conditioned as we have noted, was in fact not yet a man, but only the brute about to become a man;—when, as yet, though it was already in him that he *had* to arrange mental powers into these distinct compartments, of outwardly-adapted scientific quest of knowledge, and inwardly-adapted religious quest of knowledge, he was only just beginning to acquire the materials that were hereafter to be the means of creating those mental powers;—when, as yet, though it was his destiny that he *should* hereafter gain the two-parted sense of Space and Time, he had nothing but the dimmest acquaintance with merely the excessively-limited

environment of either kind which was closest bordering upon Self. (— But here, as to this last phraseology, which I would ask the reader to observe, let me be permitted this remark:—How easily would it have slipped from the tongue, or run off from the pen, to have said that the knowledge of the mere brute is such as limits itself to the knowledge of mere Self in point of Space, and of mere Present existence in point of Time! I confess that in fact such was the phrase that, in utter defiance of my principle, *did*, under the impulse of the moment, at first flow from my pen;—and, reader, if you wonder why I relate the fact, it is for this: just that I may instance it to you as an illustration of that “fitting falsity” that I spoke of a sentence or two ago, as tending ever to be a source of delusion till we have learned to make a fixed allowance for it. For the principle that my scheme is expressly directed to assert, is this:—) Although subjective thought, it is indeed true, must, in the nature of it, start *from* Self and the Present as its rightful basis, yet the knowledge of Self and the Present can, in actual fact, alone develop itself as the result of previous acquaintance with environment of either kind: that of Self, through acquaintance with external occupants of Space; that of Present Time, through acquaintance with the Past and the Future of Time. And hence, looking at the pre-human soul now before us, the entire problem of its religious development, including all that belongs both to the outer and inner sides of realization, may be summed up thus:—It is required that, by means of nothing more than instinctive strivings to adapt itself to its environment, it shall succeed in gaining for itself a clear and adequate consciousness as to its own Present Individuality.—Nor let it be imagined that, in saying this, I suppose that the average human mind even of to-day has actually attained this consciousness. I suppose, on the contrary, that in fact we have but just come to the point where we may perceive what we have need to acquire. For while the whole history of the mind has, of necessity,

consisted in its learning of its own true limitations, the whole matter of, at all events, the species of limitation which has regard to its relation to Time, remains still a kind of knowledge which the emotive principle within us utterly resists.

14. The limitation which accrues through acquaintance with Space, I conceive indeed to be all along in advance of that which arrives through acquaintance with Time. This allowed, it is evident that it may have well happened that the brute mind may have been concerned with the former, without entering upon the latter; and this I suppose to have been actually the case. The question then is, how near an approach can this condition have permitted it towards the recognition of its own Individuality? Spatial limitation, even alone, does certainly suffice to give knowledge of external beings, as such: which is the preparatory step towards knowing Self as a being;—but it is scarcely to be thought that the brute nature fully realizes any thing beyond the preparatory step. The more intelligent animals no doubt go so far as to know external beings in the vague entirety which gives them the character; but with regard to Self, even a dog is occasionally observed to mistake a part of himself—his wagging tail, for instance,—for a being that is *not* himself. Perhaps the only effectual evidence of the sense of Individualism's having acquired a definite beginning,—the mere outline, henceforth to be filled up,—is that of a verbal expression being needed to represent it:—and not merely the appellation which is a proper name, but the abstract designation of the “I”. So far forward in properly *human* life must the being have advanced! The *brute*, indeed, has probably a dawning apprehension as to his own selfism, when he distinguishes that himself is intended under the proper name that his master gives him; but how long a period must elapse even after he has become a *man*, before he bethinks himself to seek a self-designation in the personal pronoun!

15. Let us pass on, then, to take up the being at this point. But does not the fact of arriving at this point imply that *now*

Time-conditions have been mingled into the account? What entirety—such as is needed to round off the sense of the pronoun,—can belong to the conception of an individual, except as it comprises attention to the circumstances of birth and death?—And this is what brings us to the recognition of the real agency of the here opening sense of Relationalism. Birth and death are taken cognizance of, primarily, in consequence solely of the affective relations of *the sort* which connect individuals with parents or children.—And yet, for this forms the natural paradox in the case:—affections of this sort, connected thus with Time-conditions, must have come into operation *prior* to the fraternal affections, connected with Space-conditions.—But the following is the solution to the paradox wrought out in the foregoing analysis:—Until Consciousness arrives, whatever in the process has been accomplished, counts in fact for nothing; so that the whole influence received out of the Parental conflict, as long as it remained the only one, must in our estimation of *mental* growth, be passed over as only preparatory to a mental beginning. This, I have argued, could only occur when the dawning *appreciation* of the Fraternal Conflict, in its conflicting with the Parental, communicated likewise appreciation to the latter:—for, in fact, as an *un-appreciated* conflict,—as one therefore that was *not* of an affective character, but altogether lower, and more utterly animal,—the Fraternal must, as is implied by the very fact of its dependance upon Space-conditions, have had the absolute priority of the two. And thence indeed follows, that it is only the habitually *relative* position of our thought which causes us to fix, as we do, the starting-point of mind in the Time-recognition. But this, at all events, stands as a fact to be counted absolute: as soon as *both* sorts of recognition had been realized, and not before, there was gained the true appreciation of Self, first in any thing like the generalized sense of its forming an individual being. The *mode* of the obtaining this is, however, the thing that we must now more particularly betake ourselves to consider.

16. The knot of difficulty, both as to our present understanding of the occurrence, and as to the occurrence having taken place, lies, we must well observe, altogether with the import that this term of "generalization" carries. The "generalized sense" just spoken of, was an intellectual sense, as requisite to supersede a merely impressional sense. For suppose, as in the beginning state of things must be supposed, only thus much, that the individual shall have come to distinguish that amongst the beings around him, there are those who are distinctively Fathers, Brothers, Children, to him:—this is altogether a different thing from his perceiving that he is a Father, Brother, or Child, to them. And between the two capabilities lies, as the only possible means of producing the one into the other, the need of creating a generalization. As long as only the first capability was possessed, there were, so far as Intellect was concerned, only detail recognitions. The brute knew its parent simply as that which fed him, its child as that which nestled to him, its brother as that which fought with him. How then should it ever learn to do otherwise?—We have, indeed, determined that the agency lies with the emotive nature; since even the brute was capable of the affective attachment to external beings, which thence gave him the beginning of the general sense of them as beings. But still, not until this general sense had attained to an actually concrete realization on its own account, could it really serve to raise the impressional recognition into that which forms proper knowledge. That is, no true knowledge of even the external being as a Father, Brother, Child, could be possessed, until previously had been constructed by the mind an abstract idea of Fatherhood, Brotherhood, Childhood. Hence,—and hence, I would say, *solely*,—has there been the need to the world, which so notoriously there has proved to have been, of the concrete personification which makes up the mythology of universal theology,—the embodied Relationalism of mankind. But the point yet destitute of explanation in the matter,

and eminently requiring it, is, the motive which should have urged the unintellectual mind to set about effecting such abstract images.

17. The mind only as yet occupied by detail cognizance, and immediately personal affections, must be thought of as in a state of utterly passive quietude towards all that we now estimate as Spiritual matter of cognizance. An impulse, therefore, and of specially energetic sort, needs to have been that which should disturb it out of this quietude,—that which should henceforth impart to its *vis inertiae* the character of motion, to supersede this of rest. But such impulse *was* obviously in force. What the quietude of the mind consisted in was, that it knew of nothing which should have to prevent it from enjoying such condition for ever. The disturbance, therefore, needed to break up this quietude, and, as it were, provided by the universal law of nature in order that it *should* break into it, was the feeling that was brought into operation, as soon as ever man was first aware that it *was* the law of nature that he must undergo Death.

18. It was the Fear of Death, I say, that first aroused, as there needed for man's development to be aroused, a Spiritual nature within him. For it was this that solely put him upon seeking out, and thence of hereafter obtaining, the means of counteracting it.—“The creature was made subject to vanity,” as we know, “not willingly”.—If it could by any means have done without dying, it would have caught at the means; but Nature's compulsion was upon it, and it was forced to the raising of resources. What however *was* the obvious resource, suggested by Nature herself, but this: to seek out the Spiritual Being, who should in just the same way protect men against the spiritual, or, rather, the non-corporeal and anti-corporeal agency of Death, that an able-bodied human father would defend a helpless infant from a murderous human antagonist? This, accordingly, it appears, is what man *did* do. He conceived a Deity who exactly fulfilled such requisition. He conceived the Abstract

Father, in whom alone, it seems evident, *could* be filled up the idea which was the demand of the case: namely, the idea of a Deity able to compete with the idea of Death.

19. But in this "embodied Relationalism", as I have called it, lay the opening human faculty, which is the Religious faculty, of forming conception that should have regard to the Whole of things, *as a Whole*:—the crowning department of Feeling, which, when it is distinctively ripened, forms just the same central fulcrum to the body of Feeling, that the massed Self-consciousness forms to separate acts of conscious Intellect. I am here aiming to show that the abstract sense of human relationships was the thing needed to change the passive reception of the effect derived from them, into an active employment of such effect (paragraph 16): but although, as I maintain, Religious imagery *does* bring about this effect,—that is, does produce a Moral capability within man,—it has an immediate effect in itself, that, on the two-fold account of its indispensable ministry towards human progress, and its inevitable rise out of the natural circumstance of things, is most eminently necessary, for the integrity of human reasoning, to be acknowledged as an assured permanent effect. As to the latter, I urge that the fact of the "equatorial obliquity", which from the first caused our waves of being to over-wrap one another, has in itself made it impossible that our abstract idea of Universal Being should ever be *other* than that just described:—namely, that of a *Father*. And as to the ministry of the idea to moral progress, and the very existence of a moral nature, let the following considerations be taken in witness to it.

20. In the first place, as to the reason why the generalization upon the one sole relation of Fatherhood should suffice to represent relationalism in general:—this, I conceive, is met by the classification, through which I have allotted the whole body of influence attached to the Fraternal relations, to the domain of Intellect and of Individualism.—But there is an obscurity of

another kind much less easily disposed of, and which in fact constitutes the real "knot of difficulty" in the case. It is *easy* to see how the Abstract Reflection of concrete experience, when once the grand step of its origination was accomplished, must have gone on continually refining and ameliorating itself; first, in proportion as the concrete experience itself, respecting human instances of Fatherhood, was more and more justly estimated; and secondly, in proportion as a more and more adequate number of such instances was added into the theoretical account taken of them. This was the mere extending of the idea of Deity in respect of Space;—but as the very fact of God's being accounted a *Father* implies, whatever of adequacy be thus far gained, is still only of a subordinate sort to what is of specialty required. Even though the entire amount of contemporary beings (as *Fathers*,) should be taken into estimation, so as duly to fill up the requisition as to Space, such comprehensiveness would still leave remaining the essential in-adequacy respecting Time, which is specially *the* matter requiring obviation; and which can only be met, by farther including under the one Image, the entire amount of the fatherly beings who fill up the idea of Time. As to the accomplishing of this, however, there is a natural obstruction necessitated in the very fact of Original Circumstance which set the idealization on foot.—I said (paragraph 2,) that the prime matter of natural inequality in the lot of individuals, was, that the Father, as such, was endowed with a thorough circumstantial preference over the Child. But in this, I urge, is farther involved a correspondingly prime matter of inequality,—that is, of inherent falsity,—necessitated to every relation, of the properly relational kind, entertained by our Thought. Pure Science, indeed,—in limiting itself to individualistic considerations,—mainly escapes this effect;—but all thought that rests expressly upon Relations as its object, cannot but be affected, and therefore misled, by it in the first instance. Accordingly, the Relational imagery of Religion, in its original institution,

did essential wrong to the character needing to be gained by it out of the influence of the idea of Time. It inserted into its conception of Abstract Fatherhood, the supposition that the portion of Time which is Time Past, is of more valid importance than Time Future:—so that, to correct this false assumption, was called forth, in the course of human experience, the necessity of an elaborate Form of conception, which should indeed, by means of more particularized attention to the reality of things, bring the original image of Deity into a more faithful representation of the general truth which it aimed to represent. That is, there was given occasion for the existence of Christianity.

21. What the reality of things demands as a *just* estimation of the mode of the Succession of things, I urge, is this:—namely, that the Father, in the abstract conception of Fatherhood, be held entitled to our honour, solely because, and in so far as, the Child who makes him a Father, is of right a higher being *than* its Father. But in order to arrive at this apprehension, it is manifest that Children, as Children, demanded their own special abstract representative, just as much as the class of Fathers had done. And, farther, human history has proved, that in fact they gained the mental capacity to make good this demand, precisely by means of a resisting energy, developed by their experience amongst one another as Brothers. Thus, then, came it, that the Form of Deity now devised to stand typically for the whole amount of human beings yet to come, as the Paternal Form had stood hitherto—or rather was now re-adjusted so as to stand henceforth,—for the whole amount of those gone by, must be, on the one hand, the equally-natured Son of the Father, and, on the other hand, the purely human representative of the entire Brotherhood of men. For the actual effect of this ideal arrangement was, that in fact the idea of Time Future came to be exactly as much more *valid* than that of the Past, as the compound idea of the

Son, in conjunction with the ideally-heightened Father who had produced the Son, was richer than the childless idea of the pre-Christian Deity.

22. By this means was accordingly brought about, or rather prepared, the most important of all the rectifications whatever which it is the effect of the natural inequality to make needful for us: namely, that men should *know* their nature to be subject to that which, by our original postulate (paragraph 1,) it is subject: that is, Growth. But, together with this Religious acquisition of Self-knowledge, came, I find now to be proved, moreover the Moral effect that mankind had been hitherto, as it were, in waiting for (see paragraph 16). For man *had* now obtained the abstractly-intellectual sense as to the meaning of the terms Father, Brother, Child, which was consequently capable of the due transference to his own subjective self-recognition. And this was the mode of the transference:— simply, that by means of the Christian recognition of Responsibility, now brought into association with, but in more than balance to, their Privileges, men were made to feel, in respect to their relations to fellow-men, that to *be* Fathers, Brothers, Children, was a thing of greater weight of importance than to *have* such. Thus, accordingly, I conceive, came the filling up of the outer attributes of Self-consciousness, just in proportion as also the central consciousness was produced into definiteness. That is, particular relations came to be understood, and understood under the influence of moral energy to carry them out, just in proportion as the generalized sense of Relationalism in general was itself grown into the distinctness, that made it the true opponent to, and co-efficient principle with, the ripened sense of Individualism.

23. I am now close to the conclusion which I am seeking as the rightful one to my scheme; but in order to it, let me offer the following tabular compendium:—a general view, namely, of what I would suggest as having formed the natural order of the mind's gradual assimilation of external influences

from the beginning; so sorted as expressly to show the manner, here supposed, of the mind's arriving at the distinction in regard to them, of religious kind, asserted as the final one:—

1st, Assimilation of detail impressions of general well-being, received by the entire system of sentient faculty,—creating the foundation for the emotive recognition of fellow-beings.
(low down in the animal series.)

2ndly,—of detail impressions of external particulars, received by separate special senses,—creating the foundation for Intellect.
(high up in the animal series.)

3rdly,—of a general impression of fellow-beings, received by a concentration of sentient faculty, known hereafter as the sphere of Feeling,—creating Feeling.
(beginning in intelligent animals.)

4thly,—of a generalized impression of external particulars, received by the thinking, or reflective, or abstracting faculties,—creating Intellect.
(limited to man.)

5thly,—of an emotive impression, as a conscious one, gained in regard to fellow-beings that lie under the Parental conflict,—creating the domestic affections.

6thly,—of an intellectual and conscious impression in regard to fellow-beings under the Fraternal conflict,—creating our combative and self-supporting instincts.
(here the Scientific branch of mind must be supposed to have parted off from the Religious.)

7thly,—of a vague impression as to an unknown agency, irresistibly cutting short the sense of existence,—creating the dawn of Spiritual life.

8thly,—of individual impressions, of an imaginatively-heightened character, as to the source of that agency,—creating conscious pre-religion, or Fetish-worship of Death.

9thly,—of a general sense of the protective nature of domestic influences,—creating the preparation for a Religion which is to be directed towards surmounting the fear of Death.
(the beginning of feeling not immediately selfish.)

10thly,—of a generalized impression as to a concretely-spiritual Father of men, antagonistic to the Fetish-embodi-

ment of Death,—creating the true foundation of a definite form of Religion. (the beginning of conscious limitation to the sense of Individualism, in regard to God, or general nature.)

11thly,—of such emotive impressions as give importance to Past Time,—creating a servile adhesion to authoritative guidance. (foundation of submissive reverence truly due from the creature to the Creator:—beginning of Christianity.)

12thly,—of intellectual impressions such as confirm the combative individual instinct to aim at exclusive Divine favour for self,—creating a selfish individual independence. (limitation of Individualism in regard to fellow-creatures.)

13thly,—of emotive impressions as to the general well-being resulting from a clinging to the idea of Deity,—creating assumptive confidence as to the perpetuity of the selfish enjoyment of Deity. (belief in Immortality as the gift of God.)

14thly,—of intellectual impressions as to the uncertainty of supposed exclusive Divine favour, arising from observation of general human experience,—creating a consciousness of internal moral defect, or of Sin. (breaking up of the ground for the Moral sense.)

15thly,—of counter-acting emotive impressions as to the counterbalancing benefit of affective assistance of individuals to one another,—creating a reliance upon Vicarious Agency of a vague general sort. (opening of the heart towards general philanthropy.)

16thly,—of intellectual impressions as to the effective character of personal moral effort,—creating the recognition of Moral Responsibility, and of Duty. (limitation of Individualism in respect of the restriction put upon self-seeking by Conscience.)

17thly,—of general impressions as to the Whole of being external to self, purporting that, however far from self any part of being may be, there is nevertheless a true relation to self contained in it,—creating a Sympathy with the Whole of being. (dilation into a truly spiritual sense of Deity.)

18thly,—of a distinct apprehension of Self as that which holds all the previously-intimated relations to outer being, first

domestically, then morally, (also, when scientifically estimated, politically and socially,) and now at last in regard to an abstract image of general nature apart from self,—creating the corresponding abstraction in regard to the psychical Self, that it is an isolated human Soul. (completion of the limitation of Individualism, as far as it can be carried in regard to Space.)

19thly,—of the general impression that the due relation of the Whole to Self, is such as requires absolute subjection of Selfism, in respect of the perpetuity of Self-enjoyment desired by the latter,—creating the willingness to part with that enjoyment in fulfilment of the good ordering of the Whole. (preparation for the limitation of Individualism that has regard to Time.

24. Yet another stage, it seems immediately obvious, ought to be added. The actual realization of due limitation in point of Time, seems what logic, in justice to itself, cannot do otherwise than anticipate! But, in fact, even the three last of those which I have set down, go already beyond the bounds of Christianity, and have therefore an immaturity in them.—In so far, nevertheless, as we *do* yield ourselves to the logical anticipation, as that which appears as if inevitably it *must* come to approve itself in due season, is there not, I ask, at once perceptible, in the final completion thus arrived at for the long-growing sense of Individualism, that which must be felt to give an intelligible bearing to the whole course of development? Individual Life is, and can be, Life, only in so far as it *is* Individual Life; and, so also, the perfection of the Individual, according to the proper mode of that perfection, must consist in his knowing himself to be an Individual. But, if so, is it not self-evident, that he can comprehend the meaning of Individual Life, only just in so far as he comprehends, and perfectly acknowledges to himself, the meaning of Individual Death?—Surely, it must be, that whenever the human mind *shall* have come to acknowledge unquestioningly to itself, that Death *does* form the destined limitation to actual Individualism, it will thence attain, as it

never had the capability of attaining before, to perceive the true import of human Life!—and if its true *import*, surely, with correspondingly increasing depth, its true *importance*!—Nor do I say this, observe, with now a practical intention.—Practical inferences, I am reserving to consider hereafter.—My object is merely the theoretical one, of pointing out the mode in which the full sum of the desideratum of development, asserted in paragraph 13, is thus actually made out. To feel the true Importance of Life, is surely nothing else than the practical side of the recognition of Present Individualism that is in question; and being so, what is there, I ask, conceivable, as tending more immediately to enhance such feeling of Importance, than the conscious perception of the road taken to arrive at it? All the far-stretching aspirations of human Selfism towards Deity and Eternity,—towards Deity *in Eternity*,—have, as we now see, been thus simply brought *home* to the human soul! All the protracted travelling of our thought in the direction of the Future,—the direction given to it by Christianity,—succeeding the previous dwelling upon the Past,—has nothing more, it appears, than sufficed to bestow the reflex consciousness needful in regard to the Present! —Yes: the whole of the complicated range of experience included in the entire course of development just described, seems in this alone to have yet done its work! It has formed, that is to say, and nothing more than formed, the necessary intermedium that naturally lay, and required to be gone over, between the fact of the Individual Existent's mere *living in the Present*, as the creature at the lowest beginning of development lives, and the fact of its *having a true consciousness as to Present Existence*, possible only to the distinctively Intellectual being which Man is, at the highest reached stage of his development as a Man!

25. But so may it similarly be said of the completion of the sense of Individualism in regard to Space, which constitutes the Relational side of the same event of concentrated Self-recognition, as described in my 18th stage. The constant deepening of that recognition, which only at the last settled into the focal

point that gave it true pertinence and efficiency, was the product of nothing less than the amount of successive seasons of experience, whose lengthened course through the ages of human history contemplated, was actually needful to extend progressively the observation of the individual being to beings more and more distant from Self, to the degree of remoteness which alone at last sufficed to bring about the abstract central effect. The lowest sense of Relation to outer existence, was that which regarded the merely immediate concrete Parent;—but this had to grow, until it became a sense of Relation so unlimitedly comprehensive, as that it regarded *as* its Parent the entire unexceptioned Mass of outer existence! And when it *had* so grown, is it not evident how this abstract reach of conception *must* have thus formed the clenching circumstance to the consciousness of Self? The comprising of the whole of outer being under the distinct application to it of the conception of *a* Being, necessitated, under moral conditions (see p. 378), the finding of a Soul to it,—a moral centre of gravity to the moral universe:—but what, as to such fact, was the ascertaining thereby of the line of direction towards that centre, which man's attachment to his Ideal Parent constituted, other than the ascertaining of his *own* centre of gravity, which afforded that line of direction? What, that is to say, was the discovery of such Divine Soul to him, other than the forcing upon him of the discovery of his own Soul?—But religious thought has conceived that the Divine Soul thus imaged, was *Itself* the object of final concern to the human contemplator of it:—and therefore, in order to rectify this partial view,—in order on *this* side of the matter also to bring *home* the fruit of development, as it seems needed to be brought,—I have laid out in this work to show the development that religious thought seems upon its own account to require. *Here*, however, is what, it seems to me, forms an immediate proof, that we may at once rightfully rest upon, in evidence of the really higher ground taken by our religious thought, when we consciously direct it, as we do here direct it, to the human

Soul, as the matter of sole attention to us that is *immediate* attention, in preference to the Divine Soul. It is indeed fully admitted that the ideas of both kinds of Soul, represent no actual reality of the sort represented;—that both of them are alike Symbols, and mere Symbols:—but there is, nevertheless, this of difference between them, and of difference that decidedly favours the direction of attention towards the *human* Soul, that the latter shows incomparably more than the contrary Symbol, the desirable effect of Organization arriving to it, in consequence of the operation of thought upon it, which universally otherwise is the proper sign of thought's being employed to good purpose; and still more, that it shows a power of practical effect upon human action altogether wanting in the opposite case. For the Divine Soul, notwithstanding that it shows depicted upon itself—at least, as I am about to suggest that it does, with a certain extremely remote reality,—the very distinctions, of the most large and fundamental sort, that have thence to be either transferred to, or confirmed in, the human Soul, yet exhibits them, long as ever our thought may occupy itself with them, still only persistently with the primitive vagueness which, although it permits them to be *generally* influential, yet in no way affords them in a mode available for our practical guidance in life: that is, which yields them as religious impressions, but *not* as moral impressions. Quite otherwise, however, I urge, is the case with regard to the distinctions that we have been considering as arriving into our estimation of the Human Soul. Here, all along, from the beginning of its start out of general development, has there been seen arriving into it, together with the general subjection to Growth, a constantly increasing particularity of interior division into regulated departments. First, as we have seen, was vaguely hinted the broad dual distinction between Intellect and Feeling: the fruit of perception received through special senses, and that received in a general manner through the whole of our domain of perception:—thus giving rise, it appears, to the homely psychological distribution,

habitual in our ordinary use, but not at all on that account less true and profound, which gives to Intellect its seat in the *head* of man, while Feeling is consigned for its due residence to his *heart*. But surely the advantage gained, even thus far, in the regulation of estimation of human faculties, and thence in the means of acting by them, is sufficiently obvious, when we compare the interior phenomena presented by even this merely beginning assortment, with what must have been the primitive spectacle to consciousness,—the jumbled heap of mingled feelings and sensible impressions, all confounded together, which must have made up the mental experience of the barbarian! What does it signify, truly, that the distinction be but an arbitrary one, (as in so great part it evidently is,) when it is so incontrovertibly useful!—And this, however, is but the groundwork for closer minor divisions, which, each of them, when made, conveys, or will convey, more of special pertinence to the usefulness.—But, eminently surpassing in importance these sub-divisions as to the already-formed departments of Feeling and Intellect, is the point, here in especial aimed at, which regards the peculiar fruit derived by man out of Religion, as soon as Religion has really attained the state I claim for it, of opposed co-partnership with Science,—that is, of generalized Feeling, with generalized Intellect. For here, I would venture to scheme out, lies the Trinity within true Psychological arrangement, that was already figured out in the faint theological portraiture of the Divine Soul of general things; though now with the immediate fruit of tangible utility, that authorizes us in esteeming the sort of reality to be here, that was *not* there. And this is the naturalness,—the consistent following out of the law of Growth, which, as it belongs to the universal analogy of all otherwise of Growth in Nature, surely ought in no way even to startle us when it presents itself also in Mental Growth, as soon as mind is recognized to be subject at all to Growth:—this, I say, is the naturalness in the mode of the rise of this *third* department, which, I wish to point out, fills precisely the

character of the hypostasis of the "Holy Ghost", added to the hypostases of the "Father" and the "Son", in the Christian Trinity. The function of the third element was, according to the view of it here adopted, that it should form "the principle that is able to account in a general manner, for that which in the second is asserted as special" (see p. 292). Very well then: this, I say, was the case here; and indeed in very pursuance of the mode of ordinary derivative-initiation,—that is, of birth in opposition to original creation,—in which new forms are universally instituted, be they of body, *or* be they of mind. The several capabilities towards Religion and Science were such, as that immediately they had each of them come to their due maturity, a *third* capability could not otherwise than ensue upon them:—and that was, the properly Spiritual capacity: altogether abstract, in its likeness to its masculine parent; and yet, owing to its *own* sex, still more close in its likeness to its feminine parent, which makes it a matter thoroughly of Feeling, and of Relationalism. The Spiritual capacity is represented by the new recognition of man's possession, as a *definite* possession, of an Immaterial Soul: and here, I would say, is the reason for which it came to be such:—While Intellect and Feeling, *not* generalized to the degree implied in the Spiritual nature, *had* severally found fitting corporeal abode for themselves,—a sphere of *manifestation*, corresponding to that which the First hypostasis of the Christian Triad found for itself in the Second:—namely, while Intellect had found material residence in the "Head", and Feeling in the "Heart":—to the Spiritual nature, resulting from their combination, and which *was* generalized to a high degree above them, there was found *no* special sphere of manifestation adapted: no one part of the human frame, which, more than the other parts, seemed to have claim to appropriate it;—and *therefore*, I would say, did it fall to be esteemed as that which *had* no material residence; and which, accordingly, on the ground of its having none, was to be treated as an *immaterial* substance. But the significance of

this conclusion, taken as such, is no less than the following:—It immediately compels a revision of the whole ground upon which the primary division was made:—the new hypostasis, proceeding out of the “Father” and the “Son”, accounts for their *being* “Father” and “Son” to one another! For if Intellect and Feeling are known to us by means of their several spheres of corporeal manifestation, we know that they *are* so, only through our coming to feel what it is to have in demand an idea that finds none of such capability of manifestation:—and this constitutes the definite conception as to the opposed natures of Body and Spirit, which, once made, becomes henceforth the fundamental generalization, upon which alone our Philosophy of Psychology finds whatever it has of substantial resting-place. An entire newness of character is given at once to Philosophy, and to Psychology.—And the power, the practical power, of bringing about this as its result, I say again, is what I offer as evidence of the validity of the new mode of esteeming Religion and the Soul.

26. *Religion* has become more than before organic to me, I consider, by the no less than *four-fold* mode in which it now distinctively presents itself to me, and through which, also, it proves to me the organism acquired by my *Soul*:—by that mathematically-arbitrary centre to my Self-ism, the consciousness of which, notwithstanding its arbitrariness,—or rather should I say, or the special account of its arbitrariness,—has thence become so clearly to me this organized consciousness which I feel to be demanded. When, in the course of development, the point arrived (marked as my 12th stage,) that man's individualistic sense was ripened to the degree of rendering requisite the abstract sign of individuality found in the pronoun “I”, Religion, as the companion sense of Relationalism, was likewise but just ripened to the due state for abstractly acting upon the former;—and, in this merely beginning state, it was, I conceive, the simple, unorganized principle, that had, comparatively with what it has since become, only the feeblest of rightful power

within it. The mind, under it, was in a condition of the pure Subjectivity, or subjection to mere Feeling, which I take to be identical with a state of mere Passivity in regard to outer influences: painting them, namely, entirely under the form of outer and personal Deity;—and this is the condition affording, as a permanent result in our consciousness, the definition of Religion which I have marked as my first (p. 85). But this led, after a time, to a power in man of taking, as it were, the place of Deity, and thence seeing his own mind upon its outer side: giving him therefore an abstract sort of consciousness as to that outer side;—and this condition also, I consider, leaves permanent result, as expressed in my second definition. These two both regard the mind as *passive* with regard to Deity. But, under development, I conceive that there arises, in addition, a portion of *active* faculty in man's own individualistic capacity: which, in an "absolute" view of things, is indeed rightly represented by considering that the estimated Centre of things in general, or Divine Soul of things, actually becomes shifted as to its abode, to a station *within* the human Soul:—and here, accordingly, the phenomenon of the case is, that, to human vision, Deity necessarily disappears: that is, the phenomenon occurs which we call, varyingly, either Atheism or Pantheism. Deity is banished from the field of mental vision; the human Soul, as such, is that alone which remains present. And this affords my third definition. But then I assert, and have it before me to prove (as the chief object proposed for the Second Part of this work), that the very fact of this new adjustment of conception, is to afford a new, and indeed, under modified meaning, an as much as ever properly *subjective* sense of Religion, and recognition of Deity, that shall afford the rightful counterpart to the last definition by a fourth: that is, which shall show the two sides to the estimation of the Soul as an *active* agent, which the first pair of definitions show in it as a *passive* agent.—For, as I have just noted, the idea of a Spiritual Soul in man, however intellectually obtained, is essentially a Relational conception (—a,

so-to-speak, *feminine* conception—). It only exists, because of the Outer Generalized Centre's having existed previously to it. And, hence, here arises a mass of contradictory images which conflict with, and tend to mutually destroy one another, and which moreover must continue to do so, until *they* also shall have realized for themselves a Central Perception upon the subject. For, on the one hand, the human Soul feels itself in the position of superiority, entitling it to look *down* upon the whole outer world of things, which was once the home of Deity to it;—on the other, it owns to itself that this superiority is essentially a derived attainment to it, which thence compels it to reverse, and to look *up* to, that which had the power of conveying the attainment to it. And, to show how the principle of Development is indeed the mode of reconciliation that forms the true one to be sought, nothing more, I conceive, is, in fact, needed to be rested upon, than just this: namely, (as I have all along insisted,) that the very circumstance of the entire of the course of development hitherto having constituted the producing of us, makes that course, as it were, a "Father" to us:—while the matter of present confusion, that remains as yet to impede this symbolical perception from being the adequate one that I believe it may and must hereafter become, is, in especial, the obscurity as to how far the Ego that makes estimation of the religious symbol, is to consider it, or not, identified with the General *Human* Constitution of things, as distinct from the *otherwise* General Constitution of things. Undoubtedly, the fact of being born of the *Human* race, is the portion of Outer Circumstance in the Ego's individual lot, which seems at first sight as if it required, eminently above every other portion, to be credited with the creating of the Ego:—but take into view the amount of Circumstance which a due attention to the agency of Time unfolds to us, as to what the uncounted ages of conceivable existence had been doing towards our creation, before Humanity had any thing of existence whatever,—and needs must that we hesitate!—I venture however to conjecture, beforehand, that

we shall find ourselves obliged to adjust the difficulty by saying, that as long as we *do* have especial regard to Time,—that is, as long as we balance our thought *Religiously,—Relationally,—Subjectively*,—we shall take the whole line of Circumstance in one, as a line, human development altogether blended up with general and physical development, and hence posit our Creative Cause, our true point of Central Deity, as heretofore, *Outside* of us. But then this will not prevent us from equally adjudging, when we turn our thought, as it were, with its back upon the idea of Time, and its direct attention to that of Space, that in truth, as to existing circumstance, Human Conditions *are* those of sole immediate consequence to us. Fancy Thought planted as with the Spatial Plane lying all around it, and is it not manifest that immediate conditions *must*, by necessity, all but exclude those which only lie upon the far and dim horizon! —This, however, being so, judge if there must not farther occur also the following:—While all the tendency of ripening Religion has been to teach us to know God as specially *Within* us, *instead of* *Without* us, we now come to have our Deity definitely marked out under *two* decidedly opposite characters—just as decided as if we had found out a definite sign of Body, and a definite sign of Spirit in God. That is, the God that we esteem such when we think of Him as if abstracting our own subjectivity, is the Focus which shall represent the entire Whole of things: thence, phenomenally to us, a Physical Cause of things;—but the God that we esteem such subjectively, will still be the one whose phenomenal aspect will be the true one, just because the only one possible in the case: namely, a God that forms the Focus only of that portion of the Whole of things, which leaves the Ego of the worshipper standing as its complimentary counter-part; and which thus of necessity throws Physical conception altogether aside, as undeserving of the slightest shade of consideration.

27 And thus is it that there arrives, into this present seeking-to-be Heliocentric mode of Religion, the “fitting

falsity" of occasional equivocation in the use of the appellation of Deity, which nevertheless, I argue, ought in fact to be taken as the true sign of its superiority over the simple apprehension of preceding Religion. The rightfully characteristic mode of conception for the Religious mode of thought in itself, is the subjective mode:—just as the eye that looks up to the Sun in the heavens *must* hold a Geocentric position, however true it is that as soon as the Sun, according to its own position in the heavens, is thought of, the true necessity of the case is that our vision abstractedly occupy the *Sun's* position. And therefore, in making out these definitions of the purport of Religion, I have been, as I hope has been apparent, under compulsion of employing the idea of "God" as solely in the subjective sense: even at the very time that, from the abstracted position of my own thought, treating it *objectively*, subjectivity, as a characteristic quality in Religion, is the very thing that I find it necessary to condemn;—as I have shown in my mode of expression at p. 85. But let me remind my reader of another beginning statement of my design. At p. 9, I have expressed the improvement believed to be arrived at, by saying that while we now recognize that "God did not, directly, make religion" for us, yet we none the less recognize that, still, He did make "the mind that made the religion". Here, accordingly, you perceive, I have employed the name of "God" in that which I count the most of all deserving to be held the "absolute" sense of the term: that is, as standing for the whole course of circumstantial agency, in the whole extent of that course. How then, it remains for me to show, does this representation—this modifying of the heretofore idea of God's *direct* agency in creation into an *indirect* agency,—really betoken the superiority for the present idea, which the reduction of it thus apparently into after all a mere *physical* agency, seems so utterly to abolish for it? Can I show indeed that this derogatory phenomenon in the aspect of Deity *is*, in *itself*, but the "fitting falsity", whose presence may even be held, as an indication, a welcome

presence to us?—Yes: it seems to me that I can:—it seems to me that my idea of Deity is in this way become just as much a merely more-developed idea, as I have just claimed that my idea of Self has become a merely more-developed idea. For observe that this same course of originally-physically-produced development, has, by my scheme, in producing Mind, and as the necessary means of producing Mind, produced it in the mode of being a thing composed of opposite sets of impressions, needing to act in alternation:—so that any *one* view the Mind can by possibility take of the nature of things, is in the nature of it, for a general view, a false view. And hence, the very saying that the Prime Cause of things is a Physical Cause, *in itself* implies that at the next moment—if our mind is allowed its natural play,—we shall see that the same is a Spiritual Cause. All we have done by working out the clear Physicalness in Causation, is that which must, the next moment, make us only the more plainly aware of the Spirituality of it. All we have done is to sort out the ideas into the opposite modes, that the nature of mind requires them to be sorted into. We may still, in fact, with just as much truth say, “It was our Religion that made our Mind”, as that our Mind made our Religion. All depends upon the point in development which we consider at the moment our starting-point. The inherent paradox consequent upon the law of Forms, is, that inevitably the portion of development comprised within the substance of any particular Form, affords an opposite rationale to us when we look at it as in the act of developing itself, from that which it presents when we see the development as completed:—so that, whenever we think of the Religious Form in question with us, or of any other, as actually dominating over us, we *must* think of it, or of the Divine Author self-implied by it, as creating *us*; while, when we think of it otherwise, we *must* also think of it as created *by* the human mind:—the actual case being, that as the mind began to create the Form while itself was in a comparatively low stage of development, the Form

ended by creating for the mind a higher stage. And yet, notwithstanding this alternation of Cause and Effect in the case, it is still, I urge, demonstrable where, in absolute fact, the real priority must have lain. Mind was not Mind, in absolute right to be esteemed such, until it began to take cognizance of relational influence; and since this is, of necessity, influence felt by the mind as coming from without, Mind, I say, must have begun by knowing itself in the *first* instance as Effect, and *not* as Cause. But then, taking this as allowed, here is the conclusion, of sovereign importance, that I draw from it:—Mind *having* thus recognized itself as by the natural law of things a “result”, and nothing else, of the action of general outward influences (see p. 18), how can it help carrying the recognition along with it, *into* also its generalizing recognition of those influences?—and doing so, this, I say, is the mental perception that follows:—However utterly Physical the Causation of things has been, it has nevertheless all along had within it the *Potentiality* of Spiritualism. And this, assuredly, involves every thing. Try, I ask you, to investigate the feeling that this reflection instantaneously awakes in you, and see if you can help owning to yourself, that the idea of God is, not only just *as much* present to you, as if you had never subjected it to all this operation of analysis (p. 14), but, rather, even incomparably *more* vividly present. It has become an idea of a sort of Deity, that can, not only in the one fixed and special mode of orthodoxy, show itself “manifested in flesh”; but that can, in utterly general manner, take “Body” upon itself at any moment, and still be ready, for ever, to fall back into “Spirit” at the next!—This, then, I say, is one mode of feeling the higher stage realized for the idea. But there is also another that I have to insist upon:—a cumulative proof, let me call it:—that is, a means of feeling the increased development of our idea of God, *through* that of our idea of ourselves. And let me especially entreat, with regard to this, that your attention rest upon the point which, as I urge, forms in fact the sign of *organism*

of conception most important of all to be adduced:—I mean, upon the sense which the idea of accumulation has been held to bear in itself, intrinsically,—that is, in the mere fact of *being* accumulation (see p. 78). For observe:—while I consider that our idea of the Divine Soul of general nature is, in very truth, nothing but an ideal amalgamation, constituted from the massing together of the entirety of human Souls: so far am I, nevertheless, from hereby meaning that our idea of Divine nature needs to be identical with our idea of human nature, that I utterly repudiate the representation that would make Deity equivalent even to the abstract conception of Humanity. And for this reason:—namely, that the very fact of amalgamation,—here, in ideal conceptions, exactly the same as in the aggregated masses of corpuscular atoms which make our living bodies: *living*, just because their corpuscular atoms *do* hold together in aggregation:—the very fact of amalgamation, I say, makes, out of the psychical units which our Souls are, a Being for Deity, that is as different from them as—nay, in a multiplied ratio, incomparably *more* different from them than—our Souls are from the atoms of vital force, that animate severally the individual corpuscular atoms of our bodies. Wherever *Being* exists in the mode of *Beings*,—be they ideal or real,—a *new species* of vital force inevitably presents itself: a somewhat, which, however prepared for in the elements of Being, was hitherto incognizable to us: a *minimum visibile*, only just capable of being taken account of. And this, with regard to our mental image of Deity, only, I urge, rightly occurs, when in fact we make the dual distinction just asserted: that is, when we own that Deity, like ourselves, has as truly a *Body* within His nature, as a Spirit. Why not the one, just as well as the other? Certainly, to make our representation of Him a cosmical one, we *must* entertain both sides of the matter;—but my argument is now, that the admission is equally necessary in order to the true elevation of, solely regarded, the purely Spiritual idea of Him. Limit the idea of Deity to that of abstract Humanity, and we have nothing but

the dead, artificial Symbol (p. 110), which, in cutting out one portion of development as if in isolation from the rest, manifestly and essentially nullifies Deity *as* Deity. Full recognition of Growth—as present every where, and every where making union of Spirit *with* Body a matter of necessity; and moreover making every portion of either Spiritual or Corporeal development associated with every other part, and whether in regard to the influence of Space, or that of Time,—being made: and then, and only then, I urge, does the idea of Deity remain, as it needs to remain, an ever-Living Idea. For, as to our individual units of Souls,—why are they Souls, except because of their command over, and therein connection with, material things? Is not each Soul of Man what it is through possessing, from its own concentrated effect of acquaintance with Space and Time, sovereign governance over the whole of the otherwise un-possessed spheres of both? True as it is, that, as to the matter of absolute occupancy, all that it really owns of Space and Time, is limited to the infinitely narrow ground of Self, and the Present term of human life,—yet, through its abstract capacity, is it not manifest that Self has become, as to the generality of Space, the real Lord of Space; and that the Being of the moment, as to the generality of Time, has become the real Lord of Time?—so that every portion of existence that we alienate in our thought with regard to either sphere, is in so much a depriving ourselves of that which rightly constitutes ourselves. But eminently more is this the case with regard to Deity! And if this vague mode of proving it seems unsatisfactory, a much closer one is at hand to give support to it. Have we not, by our preceding examination,—call it microscopic, if you will,—actually *seen* within our own Souls the concentrated effect of those Infinitely-diffused Essences? These psychical atoms possessed by us,—which theologians would have had us regard as just no more than ignited fragments of Vitality, struck off from the substance (the metallic bosom!) of Deity, in the same way that indeed it *was* also figured in old astronomy

that the earth was struck off from the fiery body of the sun,—these psychical atoms of ours, I say, now that we have analysed them, have shown the whole world of difference in their constitution from what would really have betokened such mode of origin,—have shown, that is, the whole living cosmos of interior organization actually contained within them,—which surely *does* demonstrate to us, as I argue it does, that the Source whence they were derived to us, was indeed the *not* directly-elemental Kindler of our being which they conceived it, but the corporeally-evolved and indirect Producer of it, whose mode of producing us has truly been that which the whole mass of human instinct has indeed, under every variety of religious imagery, been asserting its claim to regard it:—namely, the rightful mode of the *Parent*.—And thus, accordingly, I offer in proof, does the microscopic effect bring its aid to concur with the astronomic effect!—Such as are our own atomic Souls, but only in an immeasurably enhanced degree, do we require to think of the General Soul as being:—a Divine Life and Selfism, namely, which are such—not because they reside in an apartness from materialism, which leaves them under the aspect of an in-organic isolation; but—because they have within themselves the utter Un-limitation which causes them to pervade, inferribly, the minutest and most purely physical portion of universal existence. If *our* glory is, from our allotted central and most elevated position amongst existing departments of creation, to stretch out our cognizance widely as ever may be around us;—the glory proper to *Deity* is, that it be conceived to penetrate, deeply as ever it *may* be conceived, into that which is the lowliest interior of all existence.

Let thus much then serve for the scheme of mental development that I have desired to trace—that is, of mental development in so far as concerns alone Religious development. And now, reader, let me turn back to the object which is the proper one of this chapter. Let me again state to you the result that I would fix upon as that of Christianity upon the general human mind—now reduced, by means of the translated terms that I have gained somewhat of command over, into the accordance with my own actually-moulding Form of Thought, which my purpose renders needful to me.

The one leading matter of gain, you see, I finish, as I began, by asserting to have been the actual creation within us of a Soul. Suffer me to quote my own introductory words:—“Although I admit that Religion has for its final aim the unattainable but still legitimate object of the knowledge of God, yet I assert that what it really does succeed in gaining is the knowledge of Self, and of Self in its most important because most deeply-seated department: that is, the knowledge of Self as possessed of a *Soul*” (p. 81). And may I not consider that the Religious benefit of this concentration of consciousness *has* been so shown as to justify this assertion? For let it be well observed what the fact, here adjudged to the case, has been held really to imply:—namely, how it is *only because* of this finishing work to the hitherto process of mental development, that the previous effects of development, which are, the earlier-gained knowledge of a “Mind” (as proper intelligence), and of a “Heart”, as existing within us, have arrived at their own true capability for the fulfilment of their respective offices. By the introduction into human nature of this new and special consciousness, I conceive, remember, not only does an entirely new set of instincts arise within us, but all former ones, moreover, gain a quite new kind of efficiency. On the one hand, the concentration of the instinct of Individualism into this mathematical point, renders the idea of Self one that can be used with a precision and facility impossible before;—on the

other hand, this very definiteness obtained at the basis of Selfism, is that which enables our Feeling to dilate itself outwards, as it now can, to the uttermost extremities of being, without ever losing itself by so doing, but, on the contrary, in retaining to the last always the same sense as at first, of a community of relationship binding it to the world everywhere. And as to the actuality of such effect, what but the sign of it can we take the glorious recognition, now so irresistibly diffusing itself through our thinking atmosphere, of a general Unity of Composition existing throughout Nature?—that grand production of present philosophic science, the ground for which was so plainly laid open by the Christian idea of Unity, however restricted as such the latter was to human inter-relations, as that, now the earlier embodiment of it is departing from us, this present burst of its brighter revelation seems to remain to us, as it were, a phoenix-birth out of Christianity's formalistic ashes! For, surely, here we *have* an animating principle, fit to be a central one, that may well be that of a Religion, whose peculiarity is to be, that of its being a General Religion.

This so largely-inclusive result, therefore, is the one, in regard to Christianity, which I set down as answering to the demand postulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of my scheme: that is, as fulfilling the general requisition of the principle of Growth. I must however farther, it is obvious, in order to a conformity with the terms in which that postulate is designed, state how the religious matter of growth in question, *has* indeed proved also its there-required "correspondence with the mode of regulated growth pervading the rest of general nature", in regard, severally, to each of the *two modes of being* which, by the infeasible constitution of nature, are attached to, or, rather involved in, our being. And this, accordingly, I do, by adding to the above, or inclusive result, this two-parted one:—

On the one hand, as to the individualistic conflict carried on by men with fellow-men as Brothers,—*here*, I aver, the religious development afforded by Christianity has been the

following:—Whereas human Selfism in its pre-Christian condition was of the nature, which made men deal with the always-existing Enigma of Natural Inequality in such a mode, that they deliberately and boastfully aimed to draw, each one severally, to Self as much as was possible of the enjoyment of the good of life, while they severally thrust as much as possible of the endurance of the ills of life upon others:—they now, on the contrary, consciously and more humbly, aim—or, at least, acknowledge that it is becoming in them to aim,—at imparting to others even that which seems to be the just share of Self in the enjoyment of life, while undertaking even what seems to be more than the just share of Self of the endurance of life. For I consider that I have shown, how this is the change which inevitably follows, from the now-assorting of the idea of Responsibility in conjunction with that of Individualism, while the idea of the passive thing that Enjoyment of necessity is, is left to consort solely with the sense of Relationalism. And this assortment, I consider, moreover, is the cause, of so great farther consequence, why none of the evil of egotistic sort, that at first sight would seem necessary to accrue from the limitation of the Christian doctrine of Everlasting Retribution, as personal Retribution, to the term of Present existence, is really likely to accrue: seeing that, through the moral rectification thus instituted, modern Selfism, as distinctively such, becomes an altogether different thing from the barbarous first stage of it which we now condemn as Selfishness.

And, on the other hand, with respect to the primitive human conflict,—the one which regards not so much fellow-men, as the *relation* with fellow-men,—the Parental and eminently the Religious kind of conflict,—*here*, I say, the development gained has been this:—First, the reconciliation with the inherent source of pain in the Inequality of human lots, afforded by the growth of the human sense of Justice, as the fruit of moral experience under Christian conditions, has formed, as far as it has gone, the reconciliation likewise with the Ordering of

Nature in *one* of its departments: namely, in regard to the existence of the Fraternal conflict, and hence, in regard to Space;—while, Secondly, the ennobling of the domestic relations of life, by means of the abstract influence brought to bear upon them through Christian experience, has formed, or tended to form, the reconciliation with the general Ordering in regard to that *other* inherent source of human pain, which is, the need of individual existence being cut short in respect of Time, by the intervention of a new generation of existence, requiring in its nature to supersede the actually-existing generation. For Christian experience has taught us, that, just as the foregoing course of the entire life of mankind has been, as it were, a Father to us, endowing us with the full measure of its own ripened constitution, corporeal and mental: so the hereafter-to-come life of mankind is, by our cultivated anticipation of it, truly henceforth as a Child born to us,—that, namely, which we have to endow with all that attaches to ourselves of good, both corporeal and mental. To look upon our predecessors and our successors in the candidateship for existence in this light,—surely is it, I say, the sign of a “Holy Spirit” established amongst us:—a Spirit which, helping the infirmity that still cannot refrain from groaning as to the flesh, under its necessary bondage of liability to corruption, redeems us, nevertheless, according to the manifest will of God, from the depression else attached to the bondage, by enabling us to acknowledge that, in spite of it, the Governing control of all things is truly to us, and in respect of every sphere both of Space and of Time, persistently as that of a Father!

Farther than this general estimate of benefit gained, it does not seem necessary to go, with a view to the basis I seek. The great point, in fact, and as I have insisted, with regard to the matter of entering upon a new systematization of our thought,

is always that we forbear from trying at a too great definiteness at the beginning. And although the special difference, and special superiority, that I claim for the on-coming Formation over the by-gone one, is that it be a *conscious* human creation, while the latter was only an *un-conscious* one of like sort,—yet it is equally necessary to bear in mind, that the Formation requires to be one of gradual process:—one, that is, that must *grow up* in the human mind, and not be as if stamped off by the mind at once.

The principle which comes as the consummation of the whole matter to me, you perceive, is, that Spirit, in any case,—even in the case of pure Deity itself, and, if so, *à fortiori* in the case of every subordinate matter of thought,—is a nullity to our conception without a balancing conception of Body answering to it. This, therefore, assures me of the need that every new mode of thought, just as much as former ones, *must* have its Form; at the same time that eminently it certifies the value of the departing Form. It shows me Christianity just in the light of having been a naturally inalienable part of the past History of the human mind:—so inalienable, in our estimation of that past History, that if we could really conceive its actual fruit in our development to be annihilated, we see how the human mind could not do otherwise than just set itself to make out the whole work from its beginning all over again! We can scarcely conceive of even one of the rival attempts of old religions, starved out in favour of Christianity, struggling forward into development so as now to fill its place. Far as Grecian thought went towards it,—realizing a cosmical conception *almost* equivalent to the one embodied in our Trinity,—a moral sense of Justice entitled, at least, to bear a comparison with ours:—yet even Grecian thought, if the actual union with the Judaic had not been afforded to it, by what we term the *accidents* of History, must surely by this time have fallen into the decrepitude that would render it little available to us for any modern combination of generalizing imagery. And without

such imagery what would past religious history *be* to us?—Just as insignificant as it is now important:—*now* that we find, as I conceive that we do find, how even the most superficial circumstances of this kind of Historical occurrence have, through the medium of that imagery, left their trace recorded upon our mental conviction,—have furnished the *body* to our thought, without which it has no means of spiritual existence.

Believing in this mode, do you not feel with me, how the whole manner of our creed itself changes! I might indeed say, that, in dealing with every component part of Christianity in the same way that I have dealt with it as a whole, so should I also, in fact, accept every article of the Christian creed, upon its own statement, just in the same manner as I accept the general principle of it. I could, if so required, give in my adhesion even to the formula of the Athanasian! (—nay, with even a preference to this, over less thorough statements of the matter of dogmatization: for is it not my own already embodied belief, that every system of principle that dares to aim at being fundamental, *must* have its Trinity; while, on the other hand, *not* to be fundamental, is that, surely, which is matter of damnation to any system!—) But still I own, that much rather than say my creed in a manner which, like these expressions of ecclesiastical theology, remind me of quarrelsome and worldly-minded councils, I prefer to associate it with the words and thoughts of Paul and John, of Matthew and Isaiah, of individual Fathers and individual Reformers of the Church. That is, I believe in Christianity, formally, as sole matter of human History: as that which has been handed down from living man to living man, and in so doing has both grown in itself, and has caused the minds of its believers to grow.

And here it is of necessity not to omit just a bare recognition of two points attached to the History of Christianity, which, although their consideration has lain altogether outside of my plan of treatment, are nevertheless of such signal his-

torical importance, that the ignoring of them would be fatal to the validity of any scheme of historical interpretation.

The first is, the influence exercised by Christianity—and, as I conceive, in the manner of a now-created original sort of influence,—upon the principles of social organization in the world:—these having been apparently previously only of the kind of floating principles; but receiving from Christianity, first, as soon as the latter had effected its amalgamation with wordly influences, to the degree of attaining for itself an established secular footing, a firm embodiment under tangible and visible forms of such organization. Ever since the time of Gregory the Seventh, Church government has stood forth in history as being, in relation to ordinary political government, as it were, a *myth*, in relation to an ordinary tale. It then, and thenceafter, set up in the world a genuine *type* of government,—a very drama of realism in assertion of un-reality:—a drama, namely, acted out by concrete priests, and with the instrumentality of concrete forms and ceremonies, that *was* so acted out, as if in defiance of the actual worldly undemonstrability of its pretensions. And, at all events, the myth has therefore done this for the world: it has served to enlighten it as to what precisely it is that forms *are* good for, and what they *are not*. The secularity of this topic shows itself, however, immediately, in the manifest alienation from my proper subject, which therefore makes the slightest allusion to it sufficient.

But quite different is the case with the second point. In one respect, indeed, this also is clearly and at once alien to my subject; but in another, it is so deeply involved in it,—so much *more* deeply so, in fact, than any of all the points that I have yet dwelt upon!—that the extreme difficulty in stating it, is to select the few words which are all that I can here give to it. I allude to the historically-exhibited influence of Christianity, in raising the relative importance of Women amongst mankind. In all that I have hitherto said, I have, and with acknowledgment of so doing (p. 169), all but utterly ignored the really

profoundest of all inter-human distinctions, which consists in the division of Sex. I have spoken of two conflicts in human action, as being the *only* conflicts existing:—just as if in fact they *were* the only conflicts!—Fresh paradox as this is, however, is it not apparent why I have done so, and how my subject has indeed compelled me to do so,—though now, equally, my subject compels me to admit having done so?—For here again, reader, is the case of the third hypostasis coming to the point of making itself evident, whose revelation truly alone suffices to explain the previous dualism, which, *unless* for being a dualism, was, nevertheless, of nothing whatever of import!—From the very beginning of human nature, it is manifest how it lay in the nature of things, that a third conflict *should* need to arise within human experience;—the elements of it being, indeed, the very earliest existing of all elements at all of human experience:—and yet the historical event has been, that it did not manifest itself *as* a conflict—I should rather say, did not make the preparation necessary *in order* so to manifest itself,—till the mid-ages of Christianity's allotted duration.—Not that I mean to assert that Christianity was the *sole* cause of its presentation;—here, again, the double parentage required for the one effect is, clear as needs to be, apparent. The *mother* of the effect, I would say, was indeed the principle of Human Equality laid down by Paul; but surely never could that principle have fructified as it did amongst human events, if it had not received the vigorous infusion of Gentile belief, embodied in Teutonic practice, that had already, as a long previously accomplished fact, admitted Teutonic women as rightful sharers of existence, upon independent ground, in companionship with Teutonic men. Christianity, meeting with this notion, seized upon it for itself, and dilated it immediately, in its own fashion, into the special Myth which is *more* than the *glory* of mediæval times,—which is their *beauty*!—And this beautiful Myth,—of the Woman, namely, who was in one the Mother, Spouse, and Daughter of God,—therein represents truly, I say, according to my scheme, the

part which Sex has really to play in our philosophy of things: as soon, that is, as this actually deepest and widest of all philosophical considerations *shall* come to gain fully the distinct Form in our apprehension, which indeed the general aspect of the female energy of our day seems so plainly to betoken that it is now on the point of gaining. The conflict between Man and Woman, as a *true* conflict, I would say, is but just now, in the world's history, making the sort of beginning that looks like a real beginning; but which never could have been made, unless first that mediæval imagery had beforehand initiated the necessary preparatory conception, that in truth Woman is *not* rightfully esteemed as the mere appendage to Man, that, before that period of time, she *had* been esteemed to be. And hence I consider that the obtaining of true regulation respecting this third conflict is, it may even be said, eminently above every other part of the practical duty of life, that which Future Religion has to take heed to;—while, even in theory, which is all the present matter with us, the directing of attention to it, as mere attention, starts us with already an illuminating suggestion of explanation as to the natural action of the other two conflicts. I have already hinted (at the place just referred to), how it seems to have been the matter of female operation, working within the compound operation heretofore passing as merely masculine, that really was the means of bringing into action the two male conflicts, both in themselves, and with one another;—but now I am come to the need of feeling, and of stating, how the theoretic assignment of such character to the operation, will not serve without distinct acknowledgment of being an intrinsic part of the general scheme. For when it is seen that the sub-division, obviously needing to be made,—on the one hand, as to the Parental conflict, of the Parent concerned in it into the Father and Mother, and of the Child concerned in it into the Son and Daughter;—and, on the other hand, as to the Fraternal conflict, of the Brother concerned in it into the Brother and Sister:—when it is seen, I say, that this

subordinate division is nevertheless one that implies a distinction really prior in its action to the primitive distinction, we have, I would say, exactly the same mingling of properly physical, and therefore according to my scheme *causative* elements of consideration, which,—just like the figuring in the Christian mystery, of Mary's being made the Mother of her own Creator,—fills out the integrity of theory respecting the matter, to the degree that alone gives it efficient character as a theory: and that is, the degree which causes it to present a somewhat intelligible means of insight into the actuality of Nature's workings.

And now, to return, for a few farther words, to the mode of this Historical Interpretation put *upon* Christianity, which, I have said, causes so altogether changed an aspect to what was once our belief in Christianity. That which we have now for our creed respecting it, is, that the whole course of human Life, of religious sort, embracing the period between the first institution of the assertion which Christianity needed to reverse, and the time when it *had* reversed it, wrought itself into the Form of Thought, which in the end abstracting itself, thereby left Thought, by no means indeed destined to remain as *pure* Thought, but only in a fit state to receive embodiment in a rightfully consecutive Form:—this mode of the continuous transmission of stored-up conception, by “successive acts” of formal construction, each of which implies a preceding act of “formal destruction,” (see p. 49,) constituting the Body which Spiritual Truth can never dispense with. And do you feel, reader,—forgive me that I urge the question,—how great is the difference that this mode of interpreting Christianity affords, as to our estimation of the facts of it, from the hitherto usually adopted esoteric explanation of it?—So difficult a thing is it, as all that have tried must have found, to treat of the development of human sentiment in a real accordance with such view of its origin, *except* by the apparent attribution of the consciousness respecting the matter to the *beginning* state of the

development actually belonging only to *ourselves*,—that I cannot help feeling it possible, notwithstanding the protest I have made to the contrary, that I may be imagined by some persons to suppose, that the meaning which I here give on my own account to Christianity, was that intended by the authors of Christianity themselves:—that, for instance, the Catholic worship of Mary was really intended by mediæval priests to signify the dawn of the Womanly conflict; or that the rendering I gave a little while ago of the doctrine of Responsibility in the Epistle to the Romans, was really designed by Paul!

No!—let me with full explicitness repeat my disclaimer:—what I *do* say is simply, that within their meaning, such as it was consciously present to themselves, there lay that which by the nature of thought-development, *must* have ripened, and in the mode of self-contradiction and partial self-frustration that I have described, until it *should* come into the more abstract form that I assert it *has* come into.

It is, in truth, *only* to the believers in development-principle,—and, I must add, to believers in this special mode of development-principle,—that this fact, supposing it to *be* a fact, *can* be apparent:—whence the utter unintelligibleness that, I have felt, as every similarly-circumstanced mind *must* have felt, is necessary to be found in such principle by all minds that hold as yet by purely the individualistic, or subjective aspect of the matter. The relational aspect attached to this present scheme of Comparativism, is this apparently totally paradoxical one,—that the Mind's Belief existed prior to the existence of the Mind!—Can this otherwise than appear as sheer nonsense to those who have hitherto thought of Mind—as all positivist thinkers, including now the very orthodox under the term, appear to do,—as being that which in itself has, and *has had*, as long as it has been Mind at all, a *fixed status* as such! Development-principle essentially maintains that function, or tentative effort, *precedes* development of constitution; so that to understand what is meant by the “human mind” in any case of

using the term, it has become with us a conditional necessity, that we know the date of the period in the history of the mind's development, to which the term, in the case in question, be used as applied. The meaning of the term, so far from fixing itself, as applied in general to man, has been shifting ever since man began to be man! And the special aim which has here been present with me, has been, accordingly, to show how the Religious Form of Christianity has been the general natural *means* of effecting that mental progress, in the department under concern with me. Therefore, thus is it, that what has hitherto appeared to our retrospective glance, as a mere adjunct to the Mind, now, upon examination, shows itself to be the actual first stage of Mind. The Belief in the Form was the outspreading surface of the Mind, seeking towards the mental nutriment that was to develope thereafter into mental substance:—Truth being the heavenly dew that, upon its own part, has to be figured as depositing itself *upon* the waiting Mind.* Or,—to extend the figure, as we may, to the ultimate degree of comprehensive-ness, which makes it, in fact, an *astronomical* one:—the creating of the Mind is, after all, no other than in parallel with the very creation of planetary worlds themselves,—the depositing, namely, of original terrene existence out of asmospheric Space! —And see, thence, what is indeed the problem which the comparative examination of the Mind's growth sets before us. Constantly we need to conceive of Belief as arriving to the Mind, while as yet there was no Mind to receive it!

What then, you will ask me, was it but an utter evasion to say, as I said just now,—in language so precisely *not* different to, but expressly *similar* to, that employed by esoteric expounders of the ordinary kind,—that my predilection was to

* And observe, how precisely this image yields, *per contra*, the exact opposite to itself, though under a limited condition, to the subjective view of it. Just as we here say that Truth deposits itself, generally, upon the Mind that as yet is not, may we say of a certain fixed condition of Mind, that it strives towards the possession of *Truth* that as yet is not.

say my creed in words derived directly from Paul and John; from Matthew and Isaiah? (For let me be suffered, omitting any reference to Fathers and Reformers, to limit myself now exclusively to these Bible representers of their religion.) How, you will ask me, is it possible that their belief, when by hypothesis it is of necessity directly opposed to mine, can yet so clearly show the secret fibre of intrinsic connection with mine, as that I should be justified, even by any license of acknowledged modification exercised upon it to adapt it to my purpose, so to seize upon and appropriate their expressions?—Let me, I entreat you, throw myself upon your patience while I offer you a leading example or two, which I consider rightly to exhibit what alone it is that the true principle of Historical Interpretation requires us to accept, *as* such mode of Interpretation.

How was it that *Paul*, in the first place, urged his new Gospel upon the acceptance of the trembling sinner of his own day?—Did he not bid him,—and in phraseology that no Christian whatever will hesitate to take as *the* sufficing expression for the total general import of the Gospel,—“*Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved!*”——Yes, then:—and to me also, does this expression, taken under my own interpretation, serve, in the following manner. I see that History has proved to me, that though what Paul believed by these words is not to be regarded as true, with regard, individually, to Paul; yet that what he believed by them is still, as under a figure, true, with regard to the progressing mind of human beings in general. For it is plain to me, that as the world *has* believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, so the world *has* also therein been saved:—saved from previously-existing evil of such utterly condemnable sort, that I truly, and in my own express individuality, give heartfelt thanks to the God and Father of Christ, for having sent Christ to deliver it from! It has been delivered, I see, namely, not indeed, as Paul supposed, from Hell-

fire, but from believing in Hell-fire;—not from the “body of Death”, conceived by him as hanging, in the manner of a mortal and expressly inflicted torment, about the wretched life of man, but from the false conception of Death which caused it to be this peculiar torment;—not from subjection to the “law of sin, warring within our members”, and causing that they “which live after the flesh” are thereby “at enmity with God, and incapable of pleasing Him”: but from believing in any such distracting duplicity of government in the moral world, as if it were possible that there should be any law, of flesh or otherwise, that is *not* a law of God; and as if it were not true, that the only possible kind of resistance to the law of God, is the mere matter of *lawlessness*!—not, therefore, delivered, as Paul supposed the human mind to be delivered, from the power of the Devil, but from the need of thinking of God as a Devil!—And, as to this last point, fully do I all the time see—let me add,—how, before the law of development was understood, there *should* have appeared such rivalry in the government of our moral nature. Taken as a myth, it is a myth of the utmost appropriateness and beauty, to say that when the infant Soul of man began its struggle into birth, there *were*, in truth, rival influences hovering over it, and claiming severally that it *should*, and should *not*, succeed in developing itself in such accordance with the rule of Universal Development, as that the new-born spiritual faculty should possess, contained within itself, the destiny either of final success as to the end of its existence, or that of non-success: the destiny of proving, in the one case, a true creation, or admitted “child of God”; in the other, of shrinking back upon the previous animalism of human nature, which would condemn it as a mere spiritual abortion, inevitably set in a course to sink thenceforth ever lower and lower into the morbidness attendant upon all abortion, and consequently to become a real “child of wrath, and of the Devil”. So evidently, I assert, does our present light as to Natural Selection warrant the intrinsic basis of even the uttermost Calvinism,

which logic has derived, and justifiably, out of the impassioned expressions which Paul, upon his own part, poured forth on the sole immediate impulse of his moral instinct!—while, upon *our* part, I maintain that, in looking back upon his belief with the generalism of the artist, *instead* of the detail criticism of logic, we come, in fact, into truer sympathy with that original expression, than any mid-way station of observation has given means for. And therefore, I urge, does the scheme of Paul, thus viewed, show exactly the condition of younger development than ours, and nothing else than this, which truly testifies to its standing in such condition. The plan devised by him, as to the mental fact of Faith in Christ forming the seal of evidence which marks the *elect* amongst men (or those destined by Natural Selection to succeed in their spiritual development),—while the fact of remaining aliens from Christ, is that which marks the *reprobate* (or those over whom proclivity must triumph):—stands now to me as just the fitting symbolical way of expressing the modern mode of judgment, so little likely to be called in question by any body, that this is:—namely, as if we should sum up our estimate of the general probability of moral and spiritual success to human beings, by saying as follows:—"It is indeed very difficult to determine, in comparing our experience of different men, which amongst them are really those that we may count as rising and improving beings, and which the contrary; but, *upon the whole*, it seems a sure distinction to say, that as long as a man has it in him to *desire* to improve, he has no right to be set down as of the latter class."—For it does indeed appear to me, that Paul's idea of Faith in Christ—as a rendering up of individual purpose in favour of general purpose, of self-seeking in favour of general human good,—more nearly actually reduces itself to this, than to any of the modes of dogmatic interpretation accustomed to be given to it. The myth that was designed by him instinctively, I consider, constituted the sort of division as to the sorting of human characters, that is the beginning mode of all

classification:—that is, into two broadly-marked classes; the harshness of separation between which can only be softened down, as it does come to be afterwards softened down, by the making out of minor divisions.—But, here again, is another point of the same mental succession:—*we* find it the prime condition respecting matters of mental classification, that they be recognized to be sorted by us under merely *arbitrary* distinctions;—very well: and so did Paul, I say, show his true inspiration, after all, that he insisted so vehemently as he did, upon the validity of the benefit of Faith in Christ's lying only in its being a merely "*imputed* righteousness".—For, as to *his* making the *putation* a matter of Divine thought, while *we* make ours only matter of human thought, this, by the present scheme, is only the course of beginning with the rational image that needs in the end reversing, which forms the universal phenomenon in all similar cases.

But, moreover, so obvious is the actual *mode* of this reversing, that nothing more than this needs to be regarded as effecting it: namely, the simple and natural effect of culture in bringing refinement to the conception. With regard to the image of Divine operation,—this is, by our hypothesis, but the inevitable first presentation of the idea of general law, which thence could not but, in course of time, subside into the latter. And as to the subsidence of the theologically "carnal-minded" into the beings who have an average tendency towards proclivity in their general aims of life; and of the "spiritually-minded" into those who are steadfastly set towards progress:—this, too, requires nothing more than the corresponding allowance, which shall take away, namely, all that there is of *intention* in the matter, as attributed to the individual, and leave him in this respect as simply *subject* to general law. All that the individual has of "minded-ness" (consciousness) in the matter—also by our hypothesis,—comes to him only, *not* as the occasion of, but as the consequence of, the peculiar kind of looking-for of impending retribution which possesses him in the case:—whence this

of manifest amelioration to that "mindedness": namely, that while the Salvation supposed by original Christians (and indeed by the average of Christians generally) to have been obtained by means of their imputed righteousness, consisted in merely the gross rescue from an imagined Hell of corporeal torment; the sort of rescue which human culture made gradually the one felt necessary by men, became that from torment which was peculiarly mental. And the very instant this change was substantiated, began, of necessity, the feeling to be at work within man, that he had indeed in *himself*, and in regard to the practical carrying on of his daily, ordinary life, the true power of procuring for himself, the matter of the Salvation that was the thing wanted by him:—so that henceforth the idea of the Divine agency could not help but subside, as it needed to subside. It subsided, that is, into the idea of the sort of agency, that, all in being a Divine, or general agency, nevertheless acted for man, as for man in especial, only *through* man; and whether as to actual action, or to theoretic meditation upon that action. And thus is reached the *desiderandum*:—It is therefore no longer God that imputes the righteousness to man, but man henceforth that imputes to the general ordering of nature, a plan, namely, to raise those beings who are bent upon raising themselves, and on the other hand, to sink those who are too careless or indolent to make any effort of their own to rise.

Nor is this all; but yet farther may we see how the same psychological law of reversion shows itself with perfect similarity of effect, though in a contrary sort of operation, in regard to his doctrine of "eternal life". When Paul, for himself and his fellow believers, hastily congratulated himself and them, that with the same kind of "redemption of the body" as that supposed to have been bestowed upon him who was to be only the "first-born of many brethren", they should all of them be in due time glorified together with Jesus,—he made, I would say, precisely the counter-imputation, of false kind, which was naturally complimentary to his other imputation, in respect to

spiritual righteousness. He there attributed to God what now seems due to man; he now attributes to man, as an individual being, what seems due alone to God, or to general being: that is, the possession of unlimited existence. And again in this case, see how the required reversion depends alone upon the fining away, through culture, of the original grossness, or corporeality, of the notion. As soon as ever the idea of the resurrection entirely clears itself of that original corporeality, the change is at once and effectually accomplished. The pure resurrection of nothing more than the mathematically-pointed Soul of man, without any body attached to it at all, is only a resurrection of that which belongs to general humanity, and not in any sense to individual man as an individual. Nay, Paul himself, where he rises to his points of highest theoretic abstraction, as it were confutes himself, and in a manner necessitates this generalized view. For, notwithstanding that his ordinary doctrine consists simply in the broad antithesis, that, as "the wages of sin is death", so "the gift of God is eternal life through Christ" (Romans vi. 28): when he comes to the moral rationale of the doctrine, he recognizes—as how could he choose but recognize!—that the real Providential bestowing of unending vitality is to that part of us which follows the "law of the Spirit", and not to that which follows "the law of the flesh";—and how can *we*—*we*, who have means of taking account of all that developing religious conception has subsequently taught us,—forbear to make *our* recognition, that Paul's own desire of bodily redemption must be allotted in truth to the latter class?

But here we need to take up the mystically-thoughted *John*—*John*, who does expressly rise to the full height of the spiritual view of immortality.—"*This*", he said, "is eternal life, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent" (John xvii. 8). And though the utterance is of the merely ecsthetic kind which it could not help

being, if, at so early a period of moral development, the thought contained in it found its way into expression at all, yet to ourselves that very same thought has grown into one of the utmost soberness. Whatever happiness we have that consists in pure regard to fellow-beings, (—for this is the spirit of Christ,—) and to the general whole of Development, (—for this is the knowledge of God,—) is therein that which in its own nature cannot die, and which therefore will cling to us as long as we are capable of entertaining it. And so also, whatever deeds of human righteousness we may have done, not *in the flesh*, for the gratification of self, but *in the spirit*, for the love of God, and of mankind, *these* are likewise what we may know as being immortal in their nature as God and mankind are immortal.

Still, between the thought of John and our own there lies, I would say, a source of obscurity in regard to its actual connection with ours, that is a far greater obstruction to our recognizing such connection, than any that exists in the original Christianity of Paul,—even while, upon one side of his thought, John comes thus so much nearer to us. For in the Asiatic second-century Christianity, the elements of the religion—naturally contradictory, as we remember them to be,—had already begun distinctively to cast themselves under; and yet not, according to my scheme, with the true kind of distinction that could only be forthcoming in the end. The true distinction as to what, being spiritual, possesses eternal life, and what, being of the flesh, is destined to a merely temporary existence, and thence (phenomenally) to perish,—lies, as here stated, between general nature, figured as God, and individual portions of general nature, consciously known to us as ourselves. But John, when he expressed his assurance to be, that the mere knowledge of God and Christ was to him a real partaking of the Divine nature and prerogatives, had manifestly no idea of thus parting with his own individuality. He believed, that is, that it was possible for all men, just as for Christ, to be, in a degree, God and man at the same time. And so believing,

what was the consequence of his doing so?—Manifestly this, which only could follow from such belief:—namely, that there was henceforth, for a time, dominant in Christianity, the object most really degrading, and worldly, and in every way essentially *un-spiritual*, of all objects possible to man: that of casting off, in order to attain likeness with God, the corporeal conditions supposed to be the hindrance to such likeness. Strange as it may sound to Christians, the one-sided thought of John, even as to the truth of it,—even as to that which is of most evident and permanent sublimity in it,—has what now appears, *from* its one-sidedness, the most positive of all possible intrinsic implication of Atheism.

Was it not John, who, at the same time that he was, on the one hand, the agent in the Church for the plunging of the simplicity of Hebrew Monotheism into the intricacies of the growing necessity to “divide the persons”, without bringing injury to “the unity of the Godhead”; yet, on the other hand, left on record for us this, as the most purely intellectual, while latest, of Gospel-proclamations:—“God is a Spirit!”—And, taking it *as* a merely intellectual statement, surely, reader, this is a truth to me,—a truth to the present age of the world,—even as much *more* than it was a truth to John, as precisely this present age has come to have a truer understanding of the meaning of the terms of the statement, than there was any possibility of his having!—John, or at least the age of John, had, we know, gone thus far towards understanding the meaning of “Spirit”: namely, that it is just that which “hath not flesh and bones”, in the way that we see human beings have*;—but how could it be that any one, in days such as those were of demon and angel-worship, (—unless possibly in the moments of extremest “inspiration”, occurring to the “prophet”, in the

* The words referred to are, it is true, from Luke (xxiv. 39); but their implication is, in fact, contained, and much more perfectly so, in the mythical representation actually given by John of the revelation to Thomas, in his chapter xx. 25—29.

real mode of foreseeing what yet he was incapable all the time of comprehending,—) could really have any conception respecting “Spirit” that can now be allowed an accurate one? Is it not, on the contrary, the evident fact of the case, that it has been only through the exercise of human faculties upon this very image of the theological God, that we have been brought to conceive—or rather to begin duly to conceive,—what “Spirit” in truth ought to mean? The idea of *God* was, at first, that He, too, *had* flesh and bones, as men have! But through human meditation upon it, this has occurred:—fresh limitations have continually arrived to it;—one sensible quality after another has been abstracted from it.—Even to New Testament writers, it was that which was already, in theory at least, *Invisible*, and *Intangible*:—not, however, to them—and can we say, that the case is entirely changed to *us*?—was it as yet *Inaudible*. How lately is it, indeed, that even amongst ourselves, it has assuredly been ceased to be believed, and by thinkers of eminence, that a Divine Voice, audibly uttered, was that which really conveyed the sanction required to the whole of Christian belief?—Surely, however, the time is now come when all of any claim to philosophic perception are agreed, that by negatives, and negatives only, is there any valid capability to man of defining Deity. And if so, the definition rests, without power of contradiction, solely this: namely, that Deity is that which can be nothing else than *thought about*. Here, therefore, is our interpretation of pure Spirit, under which we fall into actual coincidence with John:—*we*, Christians, who—unbelievers as we are, in all except a Religion which to you is no Religion at all,—might just as well as you, take up John’s text, and from that alone preach what *you* esteem a denial of any existence whatever to God!

God is to me, I own,—and how can you who are disciples of John, deny it to me?—matter only of pure Thought: of pure Thought, that is, held in the rarest possible concentration of abstract Feeling:—otherwise, nothing that I have any power of conceiving of.—But have I at all succeeded in showing,

moreover, all that I consider to be over-and-above John's view of Deity, in that which I am upholding;—and just in regard to its adding to the nature of conceived Deity, that means of Universal Manifestation—Matter, namely, in ever-lawful co-existence with, and correspondence to, Spirit,—which he, as we know, would have restricted to a manifestation that was in reality but local? Have I not shown how to this purest of all possible human Thought-Essence, have now been produced into distinctness, for most nobly influential upon us of Divine attributes, our experiences of Deity which are these?—first, that the mode under which our *Intellect* knows Him, is, the embodiment into a Principle of Unity of Composition, pervading the entire Universe, reckoned *from* the Mind capable of entertaining the conception, *down* to the lowest conceivable material object of conception;—while, oppositely, the mode under which our *Feeling* knows Him, is, the equally sublime moral image of the Conviction, that all which takes place in the multitudinous series of changes attendant upon the fact of Life, is that which we human beings may recognize as for Good. These two magnificent generalizations, I say, are what I find now present with me, whenever, as by instinct, I repeat the familiar phrases—the Gospel phrases,—that “God is One”, and that “God is the Being whom, in spirit and in truth, we need to worship”. To grow up into these, has been the purport that, I conceive, forms the sufficing purport, of existence, not only to this ripest of New Testament doctrine, afforded by its latest Evangelist, but also to the crudest whatever of the representations of Deity, that have, from the very beginning of human thinking, lain hidden in man's nature as the germs of all forth-coming theology.

But what shall we say then, in accordance with this, to show the permanence of the mere Hebrewism of the New Testament? Surely, it might be thought, all of *this* must have faded into the virtual nothingness of oblivion for us, when once the Jewish-Christian calyx of Christianity (as I have called it,) had done

its part of lengthening itself into just the requisite sufficiency to over-wrap, for the needed time, the bud of Alexandrianism opening out of its bosom!—Oh no!—in looking back now to see what *has* been done in the actual world for our religious growth, that could so little have been definitely *guessed* at in mere theory, heartily do I believe in *Matthew* also still! (—That is, in *Matthew*, interpreted upon the historical principle of harmony with the otherwise history of the nation.—) Does he not set before me eminently this, that the noble aim which the Hebrew Messiah Jesus, in real historic verity, has to be thought of as having aspired to, was the realistic one, so naturally the issue of his Hebrewism, of establishing an immediate kingdom of heavenly righteousness upon *earth*?—Yes: and *there* also is it that I believe *we* have solely henceforth to look for it!—Visionary and idealistic as the Hebrew realism was in those beginning days, (—*beginning* to us, though then so specially counted the finishing *latter* times,—) when Jesus and his Galilean companions expected angel-instrumentation to bring about the reign of the saints, and build up the New Jerusalem: yet we un-Christians are the witnesses of the truth of the Hebrewism thus far, that *only* indeed upon the earth can saints reign, as we trust a race of quite un-Jewish saints *shall* one day reign; and *only* upon the earth can a Jerusalem stand, as we trust an abode of living men *shall* one day stand, as superior to the Jewish conception of what is adapted for human well-being, as their imagined structures of jasper and carbuncles were superior to the ill-conditioned tenements of the actual Jerusalem! For we, too, resemble them, and still more pointedly, in this, that the very contradiction of our own expectations is alone the cause of our attaining that which we come to believe to be better than those were. Not any more than the Former Religion, does the Coming One bear at all the aspect that previous condition gave cause to anticipate its bearing. If those Jewish ancestors of ours were deluded, as we now see they *were* deluded; so, we find, awaits us also that which *would* be delusion in us,

and inexcusable delusion, if we did not avail ourselves, as we ought to do, of the example of fore-gone experience, wanting to them. They began—as we have so long, like wiser self-esteemed children, looked down upon them for beginning,—by expecting an Outward Kingdom, consisting of their own saint-dominion over the otherwise common world of men; ending, thence-after, by the tardy and unwilling discovery, that Christ's true reign is nowhere except solely *within* us. But consider, reader, if we have not been now dealing here with mistakes, upon our own part, that are at least as great as, though they be more abstract than, this of those Jew-Christians. In our seeking, as we have learned since John's time to seek, for the true kingdom of God as that which consists in the discovery of Truth alone, we have, even yet, still aimed towards a dominion inevitably *outside* of our real power of attainment:—a dominion, namely, over Truth, which has respect to that Absolute Fact of things, which, in the nature of things, it can be the prerogative of God alone, and not of us, to know. In comparison to this aim, to find a merely relative mode of knowledge attached to our innate possibility,—must we not confess it to have appeared to us at first just as pitiful a put-off, as to them must have been theirs?—But much more close in the resemblance to their personal disappointment, is *our* personal disappointment. We might have cared comparatively little, to find ourselves obliged to leave exclusively to God's own possession, the sovereignty over Absolute Truth,—owning that the Spiritual Happiness, which the knowledge of Truth is, while as real as any other sort of Happiness, must belong in its entirety solely to the purely Spiritual nature that, for our parts, we can in no way realize, but only think about:—but we have found ourselves moreover obliged, as it appears, to yield to that Spiritual Being also, the entirety of Enjoyment resting with the enduring possession of the corporeal thing that all Self-ism is. The prerogative of an Eternal Self-ism, it seems, needs to be owned by us, just as much an Outside prerogative to us, as the Spiritual

one. For our Inside means God's Outside, and our Outside means God's Inside. And it is not for us to desire what God has kept within His own power.

We, truly,—comparing our present state of Self-ism, with that of the first disciples of Jesus,—have already submitted to the refining away of our instinctive claim of Immortality to this extent, that instead of any longer aiming, as they aimed, to possess ourselves of heavenly thrones, seated upon which we may “judge” our inferior fellow-men, we are contented to limit ourselves to the humbler, and in every way better object, which this is: namely, of obtaining an everlasting repose upon the permission to love uninterruptedly our chosen friends amongst men, and to learn to love our God with a sort of love altogether nobler than any we give to men. But still, for all this, the same answer that reproved the first covetousness, seems yet to hang in the moral atmosphere about us, as if to compel us, with its echoing tone of Divine sadness and Divine sympathy, to self-condemnation for our still so manifest egoism. “Are ye fit to enjoy,” it seems to rebuke us, “that have not yet learned to resign? The possession of Eternity, not any matter in truth of ‘mine’ or of ‘thine’, is that which belongs alone to Him, whose Ever-Present Life is the producing Source of all the partial possessions of Life attached to creature-existence; and the Future inheritance of such partial possessions, asked for by you who are not contented with your Past endowment, shall be given by the common Father to those—yes, and to those alone,—for whom his universal law has appointed it!”—A bitter baptism may it be to us, just as it doubtless was to the sons of Zebedee, to yield up our personal longings; but neither for us, any more than for them, is it possible to “reign with Christ”, unless we also, and in that which is our very dearest, “suffer with him!”—Had not Jesus,—the Hebrew living man that Matthew paints him to us,—his own peculiar cup of deepest personal disappointment required of him to drink? Was not, in fact, the whole first century of Christian experi-

ence one of fiery trial, and fiercest struggle with the cruellest thwarting of previously-cherished expectations,—contrasting, when we look upon it in its reality, with the blankest of contradiction, to all that we have painted to ourselves respecting it, when seen under the veil of its mythical glorification?—And yet we know that nothing else but this thwarting of the actual human expectations brought the real good out of the experience, which thence formed the occasion for the glorification!—brought, that is, the good which consists in our coming to believe, as by actual experience, that Spiritual triumph over Self is a thing better worth than Corporeal triumph over physical impediments to enjoyment. Our lesson gained from those original frustrated preparers of Christianity, is thus a clear one: it is, that we be not discouraged, though it have fallen to us, in a manner, to occupy the post where it has become needful to take up, and repeat their experience. Spiritual glory is coming, more and more, to be known by us only as the glorious faculty of being able to rely upon, and govern ourselves by, that which has to be merely *thought about*, instead of being *presentable to sense*. To the merely-thinkable God, we find, belongs alone the merely-thinkable fact of Eternity;—but then our growing spiritual faculty, through raising our likeness towards that which we attribute to God, both enables us better to content ourselves with, and avail ourselves of, what we are, and enables us in a measure to be as that we are not! For, as to the first, the triumph of Spirit as a practical triumph, is that of being no longer bowed down by the matter of complaint, which we have learned to know as that which no complaining can ever complain away;—and, as to the second, the triumph of Spirit of more intellectual sort is the following. Is it not manifest to our rational experience, that in so far as we do seek to appropriate to ourselves the merely-thinkable fact of Eternity, we lose ourselves, as to any reality of being ourselves? Has not the whole course of meditation (—of Christian meditation,—) upon the subject of our supposed Future Exist-

ence, experimentally shown us, that the more we do try to conceive ourselves Eternal beings, the more we also require to conceive ourselves the purely Spiritual beings, which to conceive ourselves, implies the ridding ourselves of all the qualities—of all the capabilities, the affections, and every thing else belonging to us,—that alone cause us to be the individual beings that we are:—thus rendering the possession of Immortality, to our inevitable logical apprehension, through the inevitable effect of that logic, the essentially identical thing with Eternal Death!—But, once own that this whole conception altogether *is* but a mere Thought;—once own, that our most Spiritual of images are but altogether as merely phenomenal as our most sensuous of images;—and these contradictory aspects of the matter of our Personal Desires become as little perplexing, and as really instructive, as the similar contradictions have been argued to do in regard to the Realistic existence of God. That is, they confute the idea of it, as to its realism in *our* mode; but show it, as to an hidden, absolute mode of its own,—I mean, of Nature's own,—incomparably more surely certified than ever. In so far, namely, as we do gain the mastery over the personal way of considering ourselves, and substitute instead the way of looking at ourselves as if with God's eye, we see, by an absolute inevitableness, that whatever becomes of our merely human idea of our own Personality, all in us, of whatever sort, spirit or matter, is that which by its own nature cannot die. Every constituent part of us, whatever become of the ideal circumstance of our own consciousness of the massing together of us, is nevertheless the ever-remaining constituent part of the substance of Divine existence, which thence is in itself of necessity immortal. And thus becomes realized to us the general sense of the proposition we seem now to have been all along struggling towards: namely, that the spiritualistic view of ourselves *is* in truth that which shows us to ourselves as in this ultimate mode incapable of

extinction, while the personal view really has no such assurance:—this being gained in conjunction with the practical religious experience, now raised into a principle, that Personal Frustration, organically encountered, is in any and every case a thing identical with Spiritual Realization.

Let us however turn yet to *Isaiah*, and we shall see how perfectly the whole case of Christianity, taken as from its real beginning, forms the true type of the event belonging thus to all Individual Forms—be they Forms of Life, or Forms of Thought. The image which kindled the enthusiasm of this great “comforter” of the dejected Israel, was this: that his own nation was “the elect servant of the Lord”, destined (—for all his worldly insignificance, and stealthy unobtrusiveness: his “not crying out, nor lifting up his voice in the streets,”—) to be he that should “bring forth judgment to the Gentiles, judgment unto truth”; and that should not fail nor be discouraged till he *had* set his judgment in the earth, so that “the isles should wait for his law”.—But surely history has shown us, on the one hand, that this prophecy *has* been fulfilled, in a sense corresponding to, though different from, Isaiah’s own sense; and on the other, that the sort of difference in the sense is just that now believed necessary by the universal law of the case. Israel, as Israel, has died; but Israel, regarded as a portion of general human existence, has vitally preserved himself in the very respect that its prophet anticipated,—by solely dropping, *that* is, the personality of the manner of the fulfilment. For have we not seen, that the gaining of recognition respecting “judgment” in the mode of a principle of Abstract Justice, *has* been that which the whole world of Gentiles, and we of “the isles” in particular, *have* been indebted for to the course of developing conception, which “Israel” in especial wrought into realization for mankind?—so that Isaiah has been fulfilled, as it were, in the teeth of himself!—The instant particular conception rises to become general conception, and only then, does it, in precise

proportion to the *degree* of its general-ness, become permanent. This is the great matter of contrast between our modes of thinking, which it is the principle of the present "Comparativism", to show as necessary in every matter whatever of general thought to be made good, *in order for* the means of comparison regarding such matter. On the one hand, we must perfectly work out our individual view; on the other, we must do as much justice as we are able to the general view, which we esteem as God's view:—and then, by means of the historical observation of the course of events, through which alone we trace what has been, so-to-speak, God's manner of working out His own view, we obtain a balance of at least practically-available truth in the matter. And this manner the world is now beginning to know as the manner of Development. *This* is the "third hypostasis" which, as ever, alone, in fact, seals and fructifies the recognition of the dual aspects. For see:—if, according to God's view, (as I am now stating to be the case,) the dispersion of individual Forms of existence, of every sort, in the manner of a withdrawal of the life contained in that Form, into the bosom of general existence, is a true immortalization of that existence;—while, according to individualistic view, such dispersion can only bear the aspect of absolute extinction:—development-view presents an inherent blending and interweaving of those opposite views. It softens away utterly the *un-truth*, as we feel it, of the opposition, which would, indeed, actually *be* there without it. If individual lives were *not* subject to developmental action,—if they were not, every species of them, linked, as successive beings, on to one another in the mode of parentage and off-springing,—the isolation that would pertain to them would give no means of comparison respecting the opposite views of them, and therefore no means of human reasoning at all respecting them. *From* this developmental action, however,—existing, as it does,—comes, in especial respect to the instance of our *own* individual lives, this great reconciliation with regard to the

contrariety to our personal will in the extinction willed to them by God: namely, the creating, as we have seen, of the power of Love between man and man, to which, it appears, is truly committed the real mission of Mediation for the softening away of the personal necessity of dying. Life that a parent yields to a child,—and the case is intrinsically the same when the transmission of life is only of the spiritual sort, instead of being, as in ordinary, of the partly corporeal sort,—is never, or *ought* never to be, in so far, painfully yielded. And how truly *this* also has been indeed typified in Religion, I have all along been endeavouring to prove. Isaiah's Hebrewism, if it expired with the Jewish followers of Jesus, gave birth to the Christianity of Paul and John; and this, again,—or rather the whole course of religious events, from Isaiah to ourselves, taken comprehensively in one,—is, I maintain, in the act of giving birth to a New Form: an eminently *more* generalized Form, namely, than any that Christian conditions, as such, had the power within them to cover.—*Here* then, I say, is the authorized ground for my sympathy with Isaiah:—my sympathy with his note of exultation, even paramount to my sympathy with the note of disappointment in Matthew. I claim the right to use his own words, and to sing over again his own “new song,” just on the very same occasion of prescience that *he* sang it. Nay, I must even, in the precise correspondence of the case, turn actually his own words to the condemnation, if not of himself, yet of the present realistic believers in himself. “Behold”, we too need to say, “the former things are come to pass”; and just because they *are* come to pass, do we see that the time is come that we also should pass on, and declare “new things.”——“Who is blind”, we cannot help going on to repeat after him,—“Who is blind, but” he that was once *truly* “the Lord's servant? or deaf, but he” that was then indeed “the messenger that the Lord sent?—who is blind as he that” *was* “perfect” in his recognition of now Past Truth, and yet *will* not believe in New Truth?—“blind as the Lord's” would-be

still-continuing "servant", who, having found the former things come to pass, will not yet believe that farther and greater things shall still be brought to pass! (Isaiah xlii.)

In this way, reader, do I seem, by what appears to me a not over-strained appropriation of Christian thought, to complete my demonstration of essential connection with the whole body of Religious conception gone before me! The Historical Interpretation thus applied to Christianity seems to bring, even to its outward formal delineation, the sign of correspondence with its inner intention, wrought out by our now-closed analysis, which thence, according to my impression of the whole events of the case, legitimately turns its very falsity into Providential truth; and, in so doing, renders it to me the vital Common Stock of Religious embodiment, upon which all future embodiment, as I began by laying down, requires to be affiliated.

Yes, reader:—here is the deep, the large consideration, that does constitute my own impression from the examination that I have been making into the circle of those events (—or let me rather say, the *speculation* that I have ventured upon respecting them;—since I feel how utterly the glimpses I have seemed to myself to catch respecting the great Actuality of things, even if wholly undelusive, are only the faintest presentiment of the truths that it is needful for them to brighten into—): whatever of truth has thus appeared revealed to me, *has* been the revelation of *Vitality* in regard to the entire subject matter, which thence does render the truth of the sort that can only be called "Providential truth". Figure of speech as I own to myself that the expression is, it is an expression that has even gained in the necessity of its being used, through the utter change of religious aspect in things, that the present carrying out of Development-principle in regard to Religion has effected. For is not this its evident effect, and its sole effect?—It has simply

shown, as I believe, that the production of a New Religion for mankind, instead of being promised to the world in the manner that Isaiah is poetically imaged to have described the promise of Christianity, as by the immediate fiat of Deity, is, in a manner intelligibly traceable, ensured for occurrence by the Living Presence of a law of Growth existing within the human mind; and so existing, moreover, as the idea of a general Providence *can* only figure out its existence, since it is the entire course of human events that is seen as having gone to the producing of it. Suffer me to recall to you, reader, *how* this has appeared, so that I may in some measure reproduce, at all events to you, if not *in* you, this general impression of vitality in my scheme, that, arising only from its effect as a whole, could not, in the course of details respecting it, *be* expressed, however necessary in order to give their real force to those details;—but that, now those details are to my own mind somewhat brought into combination, does, I need to assure you,—I cannot, in fact, complete my delineation *without* assuring you,—afford to myself the clenching verisimilitude for it, in comparison with other of general natural experience, which therefore compels me to take it for a genuine addition to such experience.

Christian thought would express the prescient confidence in the forth-coming of a new mode of Religion, in this way:—“If human blindness and perversity resist the innovation of novelty in Religion, yet ‘is the arm of the Lord not shortened’, that He should not once more save us from the effects of such self-destructive folly.”—But, in the book of actual events, I seem truly to have found an equivalent thought:—not a thought, indeed, that lies within my own ground alone, but one that much more safely bases itself upon ground that includes every kind of subject-matter of thought whatever. I mean, upon Development-principle as a general principle, of which Religious Development forms only a portion: forms, as it is the requirement of the present “Comparativism” to maintain, only one of the great leading divisions of Natural Development, which

has for companion another division in nature, the recognition of which, upon fellow-terms with itself, alone gives any sufficing meaning to its own existence. For remember, reader: the thought that upon my scheme does seem to account for, and justify, our belief in the constancy of Providential action and progress in human events, is that which precisely has been gained from attention to the internal re-action that these two opposite modes of Development seem adapted necessarily to call forth. The mere phrase, that upon a merely historical survey of events would suffice, that "the past course of Religion has prepared the way for a fresh course", by no means suffices for the idea that I desire to express. From the very moment that the great Judaic-Alexandrian combination of Christianity had once over-passed the turning-point of its full dogmatization,—and thence the deposition of its rational fruits had commenced, which, in ostensible occurrences, was signified by the setting in of the negative current of Protestantism:—the event, while I consider it to have formed the root of beginning to a now-forthcoming successor to Christianity, I consider to have been such only through forming, meanwhile, the sustenance of a directly opposite sort of formation. That which has thus constituted an ebb-tide to the course of Religion, proceeding till we find, in the witness of the aspect of To-day, a subsidence of that principle to its lowest, appears as identical with a flow-tide in regard to Science, which, on the other hand, has its even more abundant actual indication of having now correspondingly swelled to its highest. Can it be needful to point, in proof of this, to the instances of scientific energy springing up under our own eyes:—to the intensity of eagerness with which the human mind has seemed as if compelled by its disappointment received from its late mode of Religion, in regard to the Eternity of selfish enjoyment promised in reserve for it in the Future, thence to plunge itself, as it were in revenge, into the un-selfish enjoyment of research into the all-but-Eternity of the Past! And this indulgence I conceive to be the source of oscillation,

destined to be henceforth a perpetual one, as, in lower fashion, I conceive that it already has been from the beginning of things a perpetual one, that, through this perpetuity, constitutes the true Causative circumstance, not only for the improvement, but of the very existence of the human mind! This two-fold action of the mind,—its Religious impulses ever stretching forwards; its Scientific impulses, alternately, ever exploring backwards,—appears to me that which so solely conveys to the mind whatever the mind has of life, that if it were possible that either sort of impulse should ever come to an end, nothing can be conceived but that the mind itself should come to an end. And the beginning circumstance that I conceive to have set the oscillation on foot, is moreover so profoundly such, that it forms the primitive condition attached to whatever of separated existence has, from the beginning of things, had any existence!—closely-warranted as the inference has appeared to me, that the one prime element of our constitution, which is our Relationalism, *must* truly, through development, have come to ripen into this special function of Religious striving; and that the other prime element of our constitution, which is our Individualism, *must* likewise, in counter-correspondence, have ripened into the contrary present function of Scientific striving.—A “*must*” that is thus enforced then, reader, have I not ground for taking as of the real character of a Providentially-enforced authority? Does it not, I appeal to you, suggest a sense of Divine Causation,—of Intrinsic Divine Causation,—that *has* somewhat of claim to be considered a development upon the Christian recognition of merely Extraneous Divine Causation?—and therein, also, to a much greater degree, to rise above the mere sense of a dead Fatalism reigning in Nature, which can only be the result of a merely Positivistic estimation of Nature?

I say, a *sense* of Causation. I have not the least desire, observe, to question the assertion of Positivism, that Causes, as Divine Causes, are that which is actually inaccessible to our human knowledge. I assert the sense of Causation only in

accordance with the philosophic experience, surely proved as such by the whole course of philosophy, that whenever it occurs to us in any case to see, or suppose we see, a connection between sequent and antecedent so close as to be upon a par for closeness with that which we feel in ourselves, in respect to our governance over our own thoughts or actions, it is inevitable to us, by the law of our minds, that we thence refer an idea of Life to the governing term of the sequence. And that this is the case with Development-principle, in opposition to merely experimental Positivism, surely there is no possibility of questioning! If we think of human nature as developing itself, the *cause* for its doing so is immediately concurrent to our perception of its doing so, with *this* perception, that it does so from being full of Life. And only extend this to Universal Nature, and the idea is equally immediate, that universal natural Development is caused by Nature being full of Universal Life.

But, reader, it is not upon the ground of Philosophy that I am wishing you to rest your judgment of the view I have presented to you. It is incomparably rather upon the ground of personal, habitual feeling, that I care really as to how it may impress you. Take from me, therefore, instead of the philosophical, rather *this* turn to the same consideration of Life, in regard to the present scheme. What is, in truth, the habitual consciousness attached universally to our sense of our own condition, other than this: namely, that we are beings rendered what we are, through solely a mingled subjection to opposite influences, which are those proceeding, if, on the one hand, from the sense of Life, on the other, from the sense of that which is the necessarily-accompanying "Shadow of Life"? Consider *this*, then, as the presentation of the balancing alternation I have spoken of: in fact, identical with, though in appearance so different from that abstractly-painted one. For do you not, the instant you actually so direct your thought, feel that the sense of Life is that which, in especial manner, supports our all of Individualistic consciousness, in regard to

the enjoyable pursuit of secular and scientific ends; while the sense of Death,—if you will accede to what I have here argued for,—do you not also recognize to be the source of all the enjoyable mental pursuit that is *not* Individualistic? Do you not admit, moreover, the necessity that there is, that this latter mode of human pursuit, and human cultivation, should be the one that, in the aspect of general desirableness,—figured, theologically, as the will of God respecting you,—is, notwithstanding that the Individualistic objects of your pursuit must be those most desired by yourself, nevertheless set in definite opposition to the mode which directs itself to these?—Then, if so, no other way, it is evident, is left, by which any Generalistic principle, such as that of Intrinsic Growth is, can prove itself to be instinct with Life to the individual, co-insidentally with its adhesion to the demand for Death, than such as is limited by the following compromise:—namely, that in increasing *both* sides of human feeling, as general growth implies the increasing, it shall show the side that regards Life to have a tendency ever increasingly to predominate over the contrary side. And thus much, I would maintain, the principle of Intrinsic Growth *does* indeed render demonstrable.

I do not deny, reader, that the Life-Shadow is, as matter of absolute comparison, actually deepened by it to us:—deepened, just in reverse of being lifted away bodily from us, as former Religion professed to lift it away!—I do not deny that this one aspect of Development-principle, as long as this one alone is attended to, does enforce upon us a sense of Fatalistic Necessity, that, even passing *beyond* the effect of pure Positivism, presents itself in the light of an utter paralysis to all Religion. For observe:—the absolute victory over Death which Religion has hitherto seemed to promise, is by the present scheme shown in the mode of a natural impossibility. Death being accepted as having had its indispensable moiety in the creating of us as Individual Beings, it follows that the annihilation of the condition of Death as attached to us, cannot otherwise than be

allowed to be equivalent to the annihilation of ourselves:—that is, as to our Individualistic sense of ourselves.—But only let us throw ourselves upon our Relational sense, and here, I say, the consciousness of at least a relative victory over Death is to such extent actually certified to us, that Present Religion may well claim to have indeed taken up, and thus far have maintained, the very same promise that Christianity seems to have dropped. All deepening of Shadows—we know it everywhere,—has of necessity for its effect the bringing out into greater force of the Light that it defines! But this general fact is far from all that I am referring to. Light, which is *Mental* Light, even to a degree that raises its effect above all similar effects into an absolutely new species of effect, casts itself, by reflection, over its defining Shadow, in the manner that relieves the depth of that Shadow. And has not the reflection I have been all this time portraying, reader, been of the nature of such relief? If Death *have* created for us, as I have tried to prove that it has, the part of us which makes up the entire mass of our abstract, or generally-directed faculties, surely by this it *has* also done for us what ought to cause us to pardon, and much more than to pardon, the revelation of the truth of things, which seems now to show us, that, *except* for the new and better Life thus added to us, Death still holds its share of mastery over us. In proportion as we do gain of this better sort of Life,—this generalized and spiritual Life,—is it not the universal and most precious experience of all of us, that the necessity of yielding to the mastery of Fate, coldly obnoxious to us as, in itself, that necessity must for ever remain, yet gains all the difference in its character, as compared with the spirit of former submission, that henceforth belongs to its carrying both our own understanding, and thence our moral acquiescence, along with it? But, more than this, I have sought to prove, it is also the evident experience of the case, that it does, and must, carry with it in the same companionship, a measure of the acquiescence that is purely personal.

For, as to our strictly individualistic Immortality, remember the two considerations that have arisen to us:—considerations, it appears to me, that, as soon as ever we can bring ourselves to realize them, do in fact all but actually neutralize the denial we compel ourselves to make to our instinct respecting it, even at the very moment of our acknowledging to ourselves that we have made it!—or, rather should I say, which, in the very fact of not quite neutralizing it, have it in them to go *beyond* what they destroy, as to its own most intrinsic purport!—On the one hand, consider, our conclusion has been, that our personal Immortality, in so far as it can be counted a matter of Spiritual desire, is, by the present scheme, established for us:—established, that is, in the relative sense in which alone Spiritual existence can, in any case, be rationally established, when taken apart from, as it is the very nature of mental reflection to take it apart from, its naturally-requisite association with Corporeal existence,—or, in other words, upon exactly the same ground upon which it is established to us respecting God, that He “is a Spirit”. And according to this, therefore, we may still say, and with definite assurance surpassing, as such, that of Christians, that just in so far as our lives are rendered up to be lives in “God”, and in “Christ”, so far, though *only* so far, are we indeed begotten to the living hope—nay, the living *certainty*,—of being partakers of God’s Eternity.—But so likewise, as to the other side, which regards the very matter of the even Corporeal Immortality, which is the real thing that our instincts in ordinary cling to:—even here, I say again, is also the mental relief not wanting to the Shadow. For, grant that when this our present corruptible body die, though it *be* quickened again, as we know that it must be quickened, yet the body whichsoever it shall please God to give it, will not therefore, and cannot be, *our* body:—grant that when our actual hold upon existence is dissolved, we shall become, in fact, but as the primitive particles of matter upon which, incalculable ages ago, the brooding Spirit of Life first of all began—according to our sense of

"beginning",—its never-ceasing working of inter-linked creation:—still, I appeal to you, what is there, as to our very closest experience of feeling, in our thus falling back into the General Ocean of Being, ever Life-abounding as it is, that *can*, after all, be figured by us otherwise than as theology *has* figured it: namely, as a sinking to rest upon the bosom of Deity?—No, reader:—nothing at all is there, it seems to me, that has been really ever attached to religious belief, as capable of affording comfort to dying men, that we are now actually losing by the change thus coming about to the form of our religion. The Psalmist's "staff, and over-running cup," are *not* broken for us. Even with fuller truth than *he* sang, may we, I say, repeat after him, that not our "taking of the wings of" vanishing "morning", and thence, in a seeming fleeing from Divine Presence, our "making of our bed in hell" itself, can really remove us from that Presence. Even there, into whatever uttermost parts of the Life-sea we may fall, we have, I say, an even firmer hold than before upon that which was the ground of *his*, and of the entire mass of *Christian* confidence: namely, upon the fact that God will as 'ever be with us, and will therefore cause the very darkness that covers us, to be still as a shining light about us.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

*The present Work is proposed to be completed, in another
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